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NAME CHANGE AS AN INDICATION OF RELIGIOUS CONVERSION IN ANTIQUITY*

G. H. R. HORSLEY

We take as our starting point the situation at Caesarea in Palestine in A.D. 308: the Persecution is perhaps at its most severe, headed up locally by the *praeses*, Firmillian. On trial before him are several Christians of Egyptian origin, but he is nonplussed because they have renounced their birth-name: ‘instead of the names associated with idols which their parents had given them, they called themselves after prophets’.¹ The names the men took to identify with their new faith were Elijah, Jeremiah, Isaiah, Samuel, and Daniel; Eusebius does not even record their original names for us.

This incident typifies the subject of the present paper: how may we draw upon the evidence of names and name-change to deduce useful historical conclusions about changes in religious adherence in antiquity?

Yet our subject needs to be seen in perspective. For there are many other reasons, and blendings of reasons, why people alter their name. In a papyrus letter² found in the Egyptian Fayum, written by a new recruit from the Roman naval base at Misenum in Italy, Apion writes to his father with news of what has been happening, and adds towards the end, ‘My name is Antonius Maximus’. The Roman name he was given upon enlistment indicates that he was in receipt of Latin rights, something short of full citizen status. When a Roman adopted a male into his family, as Julius Caesar did with Octavian, the name change involved had nothing to do with religion either. This is also true of the manumission of a Roman slave, who took his owner’s name as part of his new name.

What is implied by all such name changes in antiquity—for which modern analogies will readily come to mind—is a statement about the individual’s self-perception, or a perception which others may have and which the individual is content to accept. Nicknames are a good example of the latter. For the Egyptians the nearest

equivalent was perhaps the ‘beautiful’ name, often merely an abbreviation of the person’s name, just as we and many in other cultures might use a diminutive. The Greeks and Romans employed diminutives, of course; but from the great Epidaurus inscriptions attesting miraculous cures by Apollo and Asclepius we have a striking example of the divine bestowal of a nickname which is of relevance to our subject, since it implies that the recipient had been converted to a recognition of the god’s power. A man with an ailment visited the temple but disbelieved the divine healings testified to by the votive tablets. In a dream (presumably while incubating there) the god appeared, showed that he could cure him and gave him the name *Apistos*, ‘Unbeliever’.³ Only this name is recorded on the inscription, not the man’s original name. This incident provides a suggestive analogy to the Gospel episode involving so-called ‘Doubting’ Thomas.⁴

The use of double- or by-names, ‘X also called Y’, may occasionally provide a clue to individual religious devotion, although there are certainly instances where the phenomenon reflects a shift in self-perception for cultural or other reasons. Egyptians or Jews who took a second, Greek name may in many instances have wanted to be perceived as assimilated to a hellenized milieu.⁵ M. Hengel suggests that Jewish use of double names in the Hellenistic period was ‘an intermediate stage in the Graecizing of [Jewish] names’,⁶ though this is not sufficient as a complete explanation of the phenomenon. S.-T. Teodorsson may well be right, that the especial prevalence of double names in later Ptolemaic Egypt (i.e., post III B.C.) reflects the process of racial assimilation between Greeks and Egyptians:

In the third century, before the mixing of races began, the proper names are reliable indications of race, but this is not the case later, because children of mixed marriages were frequently given double names, one Greek and one Egyptian, either of which could be used alone.⁷

Sometimes the by-name is merely a translation of the other name, e.g., Thomas/Didymos in the Fourth Gospel.⁸ Another possible instance of this is afforded by *CPJ* I. 126 (III B.C.), in which we encounter a Jew Ionathas (Graecized form of Yehonathan), who carries also a Greek name, Apoll-. If this is restored as Apollodoros or Apollodotos, then ‘on obtient comme une sorte

d'équivalence entre les deux noms théophores: “Le-SEIGNEUR-a-donné” correspondant à “Apollon-a-donné”⁹.

But consider the evidence provided by a census return of A.D. 175, in which a certain Sarapion figures along with his sister, Apollonarion also known as Sarapias.¹⁰ It is very possible—no more than that, admittedly—that the latter adopted her extra name to identify with the god Sarapis more overtly. The ancients were much more sensitized to the etymological significance of names than we are, and it is clear that names must often have been carefully selected in view of the meaning they conveyed. The choice of a theophoric name implies the expectation that the god whose name is used will protect the individual. Now, this point must not be pressed too far, since a society's pattern of naming may be a factor working against names retaining particular etymological weight (thus, Athenians normally named their eldest son after the paternal grandfather). And, further, there were people with theophoric names for whom the etymology must have been of no account.

An instance of this latter point is provided by a recently-published metrical epitaph from the Propontis.¹¹ In this text the deceased, Meniketes, indicates that he was an initiate in the cult of Isis. In the course of the poem he refers to his father, Menistheus. The common element in both these names is suggestive: Menistheus—or his parents, i.e., the grandparents of Meniketes—were devotees of the god Men,¹² and the theophoric element was passed on to Meniketes, the etymological significance of whose name is ‘Suppliant of Men’. Whether or not this person had any association with the god after whom he was named, his initiation into the mysteries of Isis did not involve a change of name, indicating that the theophoric element was not felt strongly to be important.¹³ The reverse of this situation also occurs, vis-à-vis Isis cult. For example, *CJ I. 291* is an epitaph from Rome for a certain Isidora. The name is only partially preserved in Greek, but fully in Aramaic. Her father was *archon* of the Jewish community at Rome, however, and it is therefore unlikely that the etymology—‘Gift of Isis’—was felt as a factor in the selection of her name.¹⁴ This example bears out the truth of the second half of the dictum: ‘The choice of personal names by Jews during their long history has always been influenced by two opposing tendencies: faithfulness to na-

tional tradition, and the wish to conform to the usages of their environment'.¹⁵

Reverting to the subject of by-names two other examples may be mentioned here of a new name being taken/bestowed which relate to the cults of Isis and Sarapis. The first is a much-discussed sarcophagus from Ravenna (A.D. III),¹⁶ commissioned by Sosius Julianus for his wife, Tetratia Isias, and their daughter, Sosia Juliana. The left side of this coffin depicts a man anointing a woman's eye, an action to be interpreted in the light of the last two verses of the accompanying Greek text: the husband taught his wife to speak the proper words before death, and accordingly Isis proclaims that she is saved. Sosius anoints her eyes to enable her to perceive aright the visions reserved for initiates. Above them are the words *Memphi, glegori!*, a Latin transliteration of the Greek words 'Memphius, be watchful'. That this name belongs to the woman is indicated by the right side of the sarcophagus, where it is repeated above a portrayal of the woman seated. We are to infer that after her initiation her name was changed to Memphius (*sic*), though no doubt her other name was not abandoned in view of the significance of Isias for a devotee of the goddess.

Our second example comes from the Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus. He tells us that when Mederichus, king of the Alemanni returned home after his captivity in Gaul, where he had become an initiate of Isis, he altered his son's name from Agenarich to Serapion: *Serapio...sic appellatus, quod pater eius diu obsidatus pignore tentus in Galliis, doctusque Graeca quaedam arcana, hunc filium suum, Agenarichum genitali vocabulo dictitatum, ad Serapionis transtulit nomen.*¹⁷

One final example of a by-name adopted to indicate religious conversion may be noted. In the recent publication of an archive of documents from the Egyptian village of Theadelphia, we meet in five different texts (dated from 296 or 297 to 300) a *dekaprotos* named Aurelius Athanasios also called Philadelphos.¹⁸ He signs receipts for wheat and money, and a land declaration, the point of interest for us being that he varies the style of his name¹⁹: in one, for instance, he designates himself Aurelius Philadelphus also called Athanasios. Given his name, Athanasios may be presumed to have been a Christian. The majority of extant Decian *libelli* come from Theadelphia²⁰ and are a likely indicator—though not a certain

one—of an official perception that there was a Christian presence in that village in mid-III. Theadelphia is therefore likely not to have escaped the renewal of persecution under Diocletian at the beginning of A.D. IV. Is the disappearance of Aurelius Athanasios also called Philadelphos from Theadelphian papyrus records at the very end of A.D. III to be associated with the Great Persecution?

From Egypt the best-known instance of name change for religious motives is undoubtedly Amenhotep IV, pharaoh of Egypt in the middle of the New Kingdom, c. 1350 B.C. He altered his name, a theophoric one with the meaning ‘Amun is at peace’, to Akhenaton, Aton being the god who revealed himself in the light emanating from the sun-disc. This was a blatant promotion of monotheism—monuments of other deities, such as Amun, were defaced—and a religious reform unique in the entire length of Egyptian history. But the reform was short lived—Akhenaton disappeared, we know not how—because of the violent reaction not merely of priests and other cultic officials but also of the populace at large. As far as we can tell, this reform collapsed not because it promoted the Aton, but because it downgraded other gods. It failed, furthermore, because the king had tried to establish himself as the sole intermediary between the god and the people: the pharaoh alone knew the Aton. A legacy of this name change motivated by religious reasons—though the possibility that it was as much politically inspired to achieve national unity cannot be ruled out—is to be detected in the Pharaoh next but one to succeed Akhenaton. The name Tutankhamen (‘the living image of Amun’) is synonymous with Egypt and the pyramids merely because his is the only royal burial to have been discovered so breathtakingly intact. Less well-known about him is that Tutankhamen was not his original name: previously he had been Tutankhaton, and the change from acknowledgment of Aton to Amun was surely programmatic, to indicate the discarding of the religious reforms of a previous pharaoh which had been so obnoxious.

Some people in antiquity possess a name on the basis of which it may occasionally be reasonable to infer that it was not original, but one adopted subsequently, even though we may have no information what the original name was. Consider the case of Simut, a cultic official at the temple of Amun at Thebes—he was overseer of

the god's cattle—in late New Kingdom Egypt.²¹ Yet his name, 'son of Mut', indicates where his religious adherence lay, and his inscription reveals how whole-hearted was his devotion to the goddess. He sees her as his patron, his protector and helper. Explicitly excluding his family from inheritance, he leaves his property to her. Here is an extract:²²

...Then he contemplated about himself, to find for himself a patron deity, and he found Mut at the top of the gods... Thereupon he spoke: 'Herewith I transfer to her all my possessions and all my wealth. I know that she is of help to me, that she is efficacious, she alone. She has provided a breathing space for me in the tumult of war and has protected me at bad times. She has come—a cool breeze preceding her—when I called upon her name. I was a needy one, a poor person of her town. I have disposed of my possessions on account of her might, in exchange for a breath of life. No member of my household shall have part of them: they shall be for her benefit alone, in peace...O Mut, mistress of the gods, hear my prayers! Just as it is well known that a servant is useful to his master, so is it known that the master rewards his servant with a secure existence. I take no patron from men, I do not bind myself to the mighty, not even my son is my protector; rather I have found Mut as a helper.

He who takes Mut as protector
No god can assail,
He is a favoured one of the king,
He dies in grace.

He who takes Mut as protector
Can meet no misfortune;
He is watched over day by day,
Until he reaches the grave.

He who takes Mut as protector,
—happy is he, who longs for her!—
No god can overthrow him,
Because he does not know death.

It is true that Simut is also called Kyky; but that is his 'beautiful' name²³ and cannot be understood as his original name. Naturally, it is *possible* that Simut was the man's actual birth-name. Was he the son of someone who was an official in the service of the goddess? Perhaps the most we can say is that its very singular appropriateness to his personal devotion to Mut in adult life makes this less likely.

At first sight another instance may appear to be afforded in the person of Quodvultdeus, the former pupil and friend of Augustine,

who became bishop of Carthage in 437.²⁴ Yet although it may be hard to believe that this was his name from birth, this is in fact likely given that about 50 other individuals with this name are known from Carthage, Rome and Trier.²⁵

Nothing has been said of the Jews of the Old Testament so far, but three clear-cut instances occur in Genesis where a name-change is to be associated with religious conversion. Abram is given a new name, Abraham, by God;²⁶ similarly it is God who bestows the new name, Sarah, on his wife Sarai.²⁷ The fact that Abram/Abraham and Sarai/Sarah, are not actually different names is immaterial to the present argument; for they were perceived as different by the author of Genesis. Abraham's grandchild Jacob has the curious wrestling encounter²⁸ which results in his being given a new name, Israel, the implication being that it is divinely bestowed.

An analogy to these situations occurs in the New Testament. For as a direct result of the statement by Symeon at Caesarea Philippi that Jesus is 'the Christ, the Son of the living God', Jesus responds by according him the name Peter.²⁹ The writer of the Fourth Gospel places this name change earlier, at the first encounter between Jesus and Simon.³⁰ Now, the alteration of Simon's name is not so clear-cut as those of the patriarchs in Genesis, for there is a linguistic pun involved.³¹ But like them it is perceived by the writer to have been divinely-bestowed and authorized.

While we have the NT in our sights we ought to dispose briefly of the question of Saul/Paul.³² Only once is he called Saul *ho kai* Paul,³³ and since this statement follows his conversion (though not immediately), one may be tempted to see here a name-change as a result of his religious reorientation. Yet Paul possessed Roman citizenship from birth;³⁴ the *cognomen* Paulus is the third element in his full *tria nomina*, although we are ignorant of the other two elements. Given that he was of conservative³⁵ Jewish parentage the concurrent bestowal of a Jewish name is hardly surprising. It is not uncommon for Jews even today to employ two names on a regular basis, one in the general community and the other reserved for use when in the company of conservative Jewish friends. Epitaphs for infants give us precedents for very young children possessing double names.³⁶ Yet this said, it is clear from Acts—if we can accept that the writer is being careful about the use of names³⁷—that Paul

became the designation used from early in the first missionary journey; and it is employed throughout the letters, to the exclusion of Saul. The conscious preference for Paul over Saul is to be understood as reflecting his perception that his work was to be among Gentiles.³⁸

So far we have been considering evidence for *individual* name-change as a clue to religious conversion. But this phenomenon also occurs at a general, *communal* level, the situation where adherents of a religion come to see it as the norm to give to their children names very different from the prevalent indigenous ones. Our test case for this is the Christians of A.D. III/IV Egypt; and to tie it down more specifically we shall make our point of departure *P. Oxy.* 3314, a private letter of A.D. IV, first published in the late 1970's.³⁹ Here is a translation:

To my lord father Joses and my wife Maria, Judas. In the first place I pray to divine providence concerning your all-round health so that I may hear that you are also in good health. Make every effort, my lady sister, send me your brother, since I've fallen ill after a fall from a horse. For when I want to turn over to my other side I cannot do it on my own without two other fellows turning me. And I don't have anyone to give me as much as a cup of water. So send help, my lady sister. Make it your serious concern to send your brother without delay to me, as I said above. For in straits like these a man finds out who his own folk (really) are. You, too, therefore, please send help to me since I am at a strange (town) and in sickness. I searched for a ship to embark on, and found no one to search for me; for I am in Babylon. I greet my daughter and all who love us individually. And if you need some money, get it from Isaac the cripple who lives very near you. (*m. 2*) I pray you may be well for many years. (*verso*) (*m. 1*) Give...

This text documents the personal predicament of a man who has suffered a fall from a horse during a trip far from home. From his sick-bed he writes to his relatives for prompt aid. The accident is unexceptional in itself; but this letter has attracted considerable attention since it was first published because it serves to focus sharply the question, how are Christians and Jews distinguishable in a period like the fourth century? Whereas the first editor thought that the family in question was Christian, others have argued that the letter concerns Jews.⁴⁰ The biblical names exclude the possibility of a pagan context. Apart from the explicit content of the letter there are several criteria to be weighed: nomenclature, distinctive phraseology and less tangible hints about the social context.⁴¹

What this papyrus preserves for us is an entirely typical personal letter of the fourth century. When a search is made for comparable documents, it is noteworthy that *CPJ* contains almost no private letters written by Jews.⁴² With this scarcity we may contrast the relatively plentiful number of Christian personal letters of the third, and especially the fourth, centuries.⁴³

How we are to account for the dearth of documentary texts written by Jews in Egypt is clear: it indicates how thorough-going was the decimation of the Jewish population in North Africa when the revolt of 115-117 was put down by the Romans.⁴⁴ Those Jews who survived kept a low profile, and though there remained communities of some size in several larger towns in Egypt,⁴⁵ Jews are simply not visible in very many others, so far as we may infer from the patchy evidence. These survivors thus appear to have congregated in close proximity for mutual support; and this remained the pattern in the succeeding few centuries. The official Christianization of the Empire in the early fourth century necessitated such Jews as were left continuing to 'lie low'. So, then, if this newly published letter does emanate from a Jewish circle it would be our first such example from the fourth century. That does not exclude the possibility that it is Jewish, of course, for Jews will have written letters no less than anyone else. But the lack of parallel contemporary documents of undoubted Jewish provenance is a significant element to take into account when the possibilities and probabilities of either side of the argument are being weighed.

Let us pick up the names in this letter, all four of which are distinctively Jewish. By the fourth century it was becoming common for Christians of non-Jewish background to be giving Bible names to their children. It is a simplification to attribute the impetus for such a trend to the reign of Constantine. At the turn of the present century, indeed, Harnack suggested that this development was under way already a little before the mid-third century.⁴⁶ Of the four names which occur in our letter Judas is the one we might perhaps least expect to find being used by Christians because its association in the New Testament with the betrayer so heavily overshadowed the link with one of the apostles.⁴⁷ Christian use of the name Judas in anti-Jewish contexts is one reflection of this. For example, Christian epitaphs survive (including at least one of pre-

Constantinian date) which invoke the ‘curse of Judas’ upon any who exhume the corpse.⁴⁸

The presence of Jewish names in papyri is adduced in *CPJ* as a significant factor in determining whether a text is Jewish or Christian.⁴⁹ The less than half-dozen Judases found in *CPJ* range in date from the Ptolemaic period to A.D. IV. A papyrus list of people who pay an unspecified tax provides a contemporaneous analogy for our letter and highlights the danger of getting caught in a circular argument. *CPJ* III. 501 (provenance unknown, IV) is a quite unexceptional document, but since so many of the names are Jewish the editors of *CPJ* claim them as Jews. ‘Besides, we would hardly expect to meet a Judas among Christians’.⁵⁰ The occurrence of the name Judas in a fourth-century text is thus viewed as a sufficiently strong indication of Judaism to warrant its inclusion in the Corpus. But this kind of argument fails to consider the further possibility of a Jew converting to the new faith, such as may have been the case with a third-century Judas mentioned in Eusebius, who is almost certainly to be understood as a Christian.⁵¹ Although not common, the name is undoubtedly attested of Christians in papyri and inscriptions of Byzantine date.⁵²

In a recent article⁵³ which addresses the problem of identifying Christians from onomastic data, R. S. Bagnall seeks to discover the ‘pace of conversion’ to Christianity in Egypt. His procedure is to analyse shifts in the pattern of naming as reflected in papyrological tax lists and similar documents. The giving of Bible names to children is an indication of the religion of the parents at the time of the child’s birth.⁵⁴ But in view of the so thorough-going putting down of the Jewish revolt in 115-17 few of those with Old Testament names in A.D. IV were likely to have been Jews. Thus, from the evidence he marshalls Bagnall holds that in the period 310-20 there was ‘an enormous leap’ in the rate of conversion to Christianity. A variety of reasons may be suggested for this: the Church was now free to proselytize, many now converted who had held back till then in fear of repercussions, and official sanction allowed people to be open about their adherence.⁵⁵ Bagnall estimates that as many as two-thirds of the Christian population possessed Bible or distinctively Christian names by the late fourth century.⁵⁶

Yet we should appreciate that not all converts and their descen-

dants adopted Christian names. One may point to the instances of a monk from Egypt whose name is Horos,⁵⁷ and of a bishop Ammonotheon who in early A.D. IV arranges a work contract with his deacon.⁵⁸ These last two examples may both serve to bear out the truth of Macmullen's interesting observation⁵⁹ concerning use of personal names in Egypt, whether 'people who seem to stand for some kind of separatism [are] also the bearers of native names.' He suggests that certain separatist groups within the Church, such as the Meletians of A.D. IV who had the support of certain monastic elements,

may have expressed a long-standing dissatisfaction with the foreign and intrusive civilization, and its adherents may unconsciously represent what was Egyptian, rural, indigenous.⁶⁰

Thus, unlike the martyrs on trial with whom we began, the repudiation of pagan, and especially pagan theophoric, names was not universal.

From the papyri he uses, Bagnall extrapolates the conclusion that in the half-century from 310-60 a dramatic growth in the number of Christians was occurring: it was c. 50% of the population by the mid-320s, a percentage which then continued to increase, though more slowly. This coheres with evidence elsewhere in the papyri that the 330s/340s witnessed the large growth of church institutions.⁶¹ It is also consistent with the beginning of a period of major ecclesiastical controversies, a phenomenon which occurred only when the Christian population no longer needed to be covert in its activity, since it had ceased to be a minority. Bagnall's main conclusion, then, is that the pace of conversion was rapid, and that the process began earlier than is sometimes believed.⁶²

From this argument there flow significant implications which affect the interpretation of numbers of papyri of the fourth and fifth centuries. First, if Bagnall is right, then in view of the need by Jews to be much more circumspect and to keep a low profile after 117, we should not be surprised to find that several texts in *CPJ* of A.D. IV and later which have been included *on the ground of Jewish nomenclature* could in fact be Christian.⁶³ *CPJ* III. 501 may be a case in point.⁶⁴ Another possibility is the even earlier *CPJ* III. 469, a business letter (A.D. III) regarded as Jewish by the editor of *CPJ* because of the presence of the name Eissak (= Isaac) in line 16.⁶⁵

Second, if we accept Bagnall's thesis, why is it that personal Christian letters of A.D. IV are not more open about the religious outlook of sender and recipient? Again, whether his conclusions concerning the situation in Egypt can be applied to other parts of the Empire is another issue which needs to be investigated. After all, the Jewish revolt in 115 was largely confined to North Africa—Cyrene was a focus of it as well as Egypt—and the consequent decimation of the Jews there is not paralleled elsewhere.⁶⁶ A not unrelated question is why the Christians preferred Old Testament names; for with a couple of exceptions the names of prominent New Testament individuals were not popularized so quickly.

As for the letter of Judas then, which has served as our test case, the general thrust of Bagnall's argument appears to give some force to the claim that this papyrus may be Christian, in view of its date and the names which are used. Given Christian hostility to the name Judas (though there are exceptions to this) our Judas could perhaps be regarded as a Jewish convert to Christianity. Yet Jews will have continued to choose traditional names, even allowing for the inroads of Hellenism and the desire to conform to the surrounding culture. Just because these names were gaining a rapid vogue among Christians from A.D. IV does not mean that Jews completely abrogated their use themselves. If the letter is Jewish the presence of names like these should occasion no surprise.

One general fruit of Bagnall's hypothesis is that we can be more confident that people with names like Abraham and Isaac are relatively more likely to be Christians than Jews in fourth-century Egypt. A case in point is a recently-published ostrakon (mid/later fourth century) which lists the name and rank of six soldiers, among them two Abrahams and an Isaac.⁶⁷ These may be among the earliest Christian soldiers known to us from the Egyptian documentary record.

The phenomenon which has been considered here with the ancient world in view is one which can be paralleled from other periods and in a variety of cultures and religious heritages. It is not permissible to claim that name-change is in every case an indication of a shift in religious allegiance; for other factors—cultural, political, and social—may be at work, either singly or in concert.

Yet where a religious motive is involved it is not to be doubted that the change is of great personal significance to the individual, reflecting that person's perception of the relationship with the god he/she worships, or of the religious heritage with which he/she now wishes to identify. It cannot be claimed that name-change is involved on every occasion that someone converts from one faith to another; but the landslide swing to Christianity in the first two generations of A.D. IV Egypt is testified to in a revealing manner by the communal shift in naming style.

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¹ Eus., *de mart. Pal.* 11.8 (Migne, PG 20.1504).

² BGU 2.423 (A.D. II), a text much discussed, e.g., in G. A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East* (ET: repr. Grand Rapids, 1980⁴) 179-83 (fig. 32). See also BGU 2.632, a letter written some years later by the same man, now married (Deissmann, 184-86, fig. 33).

³ IG IV².1.123.22-33; cf. my *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity. A Review of the Greek Inscriptions and Papyri published in 1978* (North Ryde, N.S.W., 1983)—henceforth *New Docs* 1978—108, item (a). The *New Docs* volumes (see further below, nn. 5, 20) form part of a long-term team project centred upon Macquarie University, which aims to draw attention to the wealth of new documentary material being published year by year. The papyri and inscriptions help to provide a linguistic and socio-cultural context for the New Testament and early Christianity. The ultimate goal of the project is to rewrite Moulton and Milligan's *Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*, a classic dictionary for Biblical studies from earlier this century, still much quoted and regularly reprinted but now out of date.

⁴ Jn 20.24-29, especially verse 27.

⁵ For examples see *New Docs* 1976 (North Ryde, 1981), 55.

⁶ *Judaism and Hellenism* (ET: London, 1974) 1.61; cf. his *Jews, Greeks and Barbarians*, (ET: London, 1980) 86, ‘... a transitory stage ...’.

⁷ *The Phonology of Ptolemaic Koine* (Goteborg, 1977) 12.

⁸ Jn 11.16; 20.24; 21.2. Cf. *New Docs* 1976 (above, n. 5), 52. For discussion of Greek renderings of Demotic and Coptic names in Egypt see W. Brunsch, ‘Untersuchungen zu den griechischen Wiedergaben ägyptischer Personennamen’, *Enchoria* 8.1 (1978) 1-142.

⁹ J. Mélèze-Modrzejewski, ‘Les Juifs d’Egypte dans l’antiquité’, in J. J. Has-soun (ed.), *Juifs du Nil* (Paris, 1981), 15-49, at 24.

¹⁰ BGU 13.2224; cf. *New Documents* 1976 (above, n. 5), 55, p. 91.

¹¹ Ed. pr.—S. Şahin, ‘Griechische Epigramme aus dem südlichen Proponitisgebiet’, in *Hommages à M. J. Vermaseren*, edd. M.B. de Boer/T. A. Edridge (EPRO 68; Leiden, 1978) 3.997-98, no. 1 (pls. 215-16); text repr. at SEG 28 (1978

[1982]) 1585, and at *New Docs* 1978 (above, n. 3), 12, p. 45. No date is provided by Şahin, but it is at least Roman period.

¹² On this god see E. N. Lane, *Corpus Monumentorum Religionis Dei Menis* (4 vols.; *EPRO* 19; Leiden, 1971-78), some of whose material is drawn upon in *New Docs* 1978.

¹³ For some more examples of this see further below, p. 11.

¹⁴ On pagan theophoric names accorded to Jews not being felt as such cf. Modrzejewski, art. cit. (above, n. 9), 25.

¹⁵ *CPJ* I p. 27. Cf. J. N. Sevenster, *Do You Know Greek? How Much Greek could the first Christians have known?* (*NovT Suppl.* 19; Leiden, 1968) 84-87.

¹⁶ L. Vidman, *Sylloge inscriptionum religionis Isiacae et Sarapiacae (Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten* 28; Berlin, 1969) no. 586, pp. 266-68. Cf. S. K. Heyob, *The Cult of Isis among Women in the Graeco-Roman World* (*EPRO* 61; Leiden, 1975) 62-64.

¹⁷ Ammianus 16.12.25. Cf. Heyob, op. cit. (above, n. 16), 64 n. 47; P. Buchholz, 'Religious sculpture in Roman Germania and adjacent regions', *Journal of Indo-European Studies* 13 (1984) 65, 67.

¹⁸ P. Sakaon 11, 12, 76, 82, 86. Cf. *New Docs* 1978 (above, n. 3), 77.

¹⁹ For other examples of interchangeability of name and by-name see *New Docs* 1976 (above, n. 5), 55, p. 92; *New Docs* 1978 (above, n. 3), 77.

²⁰ 34 out of the 45 known emanate from Theadelphia: see *New Docs* 1977 (North Ryde, 1982), 105, pp. 181, 182.

²¹ For the text of this lengthy biographical inscription, see K. A. Kitchen, *Ramesside Inscriptions, Historical and Biographical*, III (Oxford, 1980) 336-39. Among other documents which follow the biographical inscription is Simut's will, but it survives only in a very fragmentary state. The text, from tomb 409 at Thebes, belongs to the reign of Ramesses II. For recent discussion of the inscription see the two articles by P. Vernus in *Revue d'Egyptologie* 30 (1978) 115-46, and *ibid.*, 32 (1980) 145-46. B. G. Ockinga kindly drew this inscription to my attention.

²² A German translation of the full text may be found in J. Assmann, *Ägyptische Texte und Gebete* (Zurich, 1975) no. 173, pp. 374-78. The extract below is translated from the passages rendered in H. Brunner, *Grundzüge der altägyptischen Religion* (Darmstadt, 1983) 112-14.

²³ See above, p. 2.

²⁴ Cf. J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds* (London, 1972³) 175-76.

²⁵ This and other Christian theophoric names, whose origin may lie in North Africa and even at Carthage in particular, are discussed by I. Kajanto, *Onomastic Studies in the Early Christian Inscriptions of Rome and Carthage* (Helsinki, 1963) 100-03. For the variant Couoldus in a VIth century (?) Latin inscription from Trier see N. Gauthier, *Recueil des inscriptions chrétiennes de la Gaule I. Première Belgique* (Paris, 1975) no. 132 with the comment on p. 346; perhaps no. 115 affords another, but the text is fragmentary.

²⁶ Gen. 17.1-5.

²⁷ Gen. 17.15-16.

²⁸ Gen. 32.24-30.

²⁹ Mt. 16.13-19. Note the anachronism at Mt. 16.16 (contrast Mk. 8.29; Lk. 9.20) where the writer says that 'Simon Peter' makes the statement, only to be accorded the name 'Peter' two verses later. Matthew employs 'Peter' earlier elsewhere, e.g., 8.14; 14.28, 29. At Mt. 4.18 'Simon, the one called Peter' is a hindsight gloss by the author, intended to avert confusion among his readers (contrast 'Simon' at Mk. 1.16).

³⁰ Jn 1.42.

³¹ On Sym(e)on/Kephas/Peter see J. K. Elliott, *NovT* 14 (1972) 241-56; cf. *New Docs* 1976, (above, n. 5), 55, p. 94.

³² The grammatical point involved is not dealt with satisfactorily in the standard NT Grammars. For example, N. Turner, *A Grammar of NT Greek, III. Syntax* (Edinburgh, 1963) merely says (166): 'The NT formula *Saulos ho kai Paulos* has many parallels in the Koine'. What Turner has to say at p. 206 on double-name formulae is merely derived (with acknowledgement) from E. Mayser's *Grammatik der griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit*. The treatment of the phenomenon by BDF § 268 (1) is similarly derivative, as is also BDR¹⁵ § 268.1, n. 4. Only BDF troubles to refer to R. Calderini (name misspelled, however), *Aeg.* 21 (1941) 221-60, but fails to note her continuation article in *ibid.*, 22 (1942) 3-45. Given that they deal with the NT, all three of these Grammars might profitably have referred to G. A. Deissmann, *Bible Studies* (ET: Edinburgh, 1903²) 313-17. For some further items of bibliography on bynames see R. Macmullen, 'Provincial Languages in the Roman Empire', *AJP* 87 (1966) 1-17, at 9 n. 20; cf. *New Docs* 1976 (above, n. 5), 55, p. 89.

³³ Acts 13.9.

³⁴ Acts 22.26-29.

³⁵ This may be inferred from what Paul says about himself at Phil. 3.5, 6.

³⁶ *CIJ* I. 108 (Rome): Hermione surnamed Barseoda, who died before her first birthday; *AE* (1976) 419 (Gaul): *Paula sivi Vstathia* (= Eustathia), who died less than two years old. On these two inscriptions see *New Docs* 1976 (above, n. 5), 55, pp. 90, 92.

³⁷ On double-names in Acts see the interesting observations of G. Mussies, 'The use of Hebrew and Aramaic in the Greek New Testament', *NTS* 30 (1984) 416-32, at 418-19.

³⁸ Cf. *New Docs* 1976 (above, n. 5), 55, p. 94.

³⁹ *Ed. pr.* — J. R. Rea, *P. Oxy.* 46 (1978) 3314; text repr. with commentary at *New Docs* 1978 (above, n. 3), 100. The argument which follows adheres closely to the views presented there.

⁴⁰ E. A. Judge, *Rank and Status in the World of the Caesars and St. Paul* (*Broadhead Memorial Lecture 4*; Christchurch, 1982) 28-31; G. Tibiletti, 'Appunti su una lettera di Ioudas (*P. Oxy.* XLVI.3314)', in *Scritti in onore di O. Montevercchi*, ed. E. Bresciani, et al. (Bologna, 1981), 407-11.

⁴¹ For discussion of these non-onomastic questions see *New Docs* 1978 (above, n. 3), 100, pp. 142-45, 147-48.

⁴² Private letters authored by Jews are: *CPJ* I.4 and 5 (both written by the same man in Transjordan on the same day (12/5/257 B.C.); 2.427 (dated A.D. 87); 3.469 (A.D. III), on which see further below.

⁴³ See M. Naldini, *Il Cristianesimo in Egitto. Lettere private nei papiri dei secoli II—IV* (Florence, 1968); and G. Tibiletti, *Le lettere private nei papiri greci del iii e iv secolo d.C. Tra paganesimo e cristianesimo* (Milan, 1979).

⁴⁴ For papyrus documentation of the revolt see *CPJ* vol. II. On reasons which gave rise to the revolt see most recently M. Hengel, 'Messianische Hoffnung und politischer "Radikalismus" in der "jüdisch-hellenistischen Diaspora"', in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East*, ed. D. Hellholm (Tübingen, 1983), 655-86.

⁴⁵ For a list of places where Jews lived in Egypt, as attested in documentary sources, see *CPJ* III, app. 3, pp. 197-209. The most recent estimate of the population is by Modrzejewski, art. cit. (above, n. 9), 20-21. He suggests that at the be-

ginning of the Roman Period there were c. 150-200,000 Jews in Egypt, of whom half resided at Alexandria. This figure may have been as much as 3% of the entire population of Egypt. How many Jews remained after the revolt is well-nigh impossible even to guess, since the survivors kept such a low profile.

⁴⁶ A. Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*, I (1902; ET: 1908; repr. Gloucester [Mass.], 1972) 424.

⁴⁷ Lk. 6.16; Acts 1.13.

⁴⁸ On this and other anti-Jewish Christian anathemas see *New Docs 1976* (above, n. 5), 61; *New Docs 1978* (above, n. 3), 64, 93, 100.

⁴⁹ *CPJ* I, pp. xvii-xix, (where it is suggested that it is better to risk omission of some Jewish texts than include ones which are only possible candidates), 27-30, 83-85.

⁵⁰ *CPJ*, comm. ad loc.

⁵¹ *HE* 6.7; I owe the reference to Rea's commentary on *P. Oxy.* 3314, ad loc.

⁵² *P. Iand.* 6 (1934) 132.11 (provenance unknown, VI/VII) attests a definitely Christian Judas. For inscriptions note the following examples in G. Lefebvre, *Inscriptiones Graecae Aegypti V. Inscriptiones Christianae Aegypti* (Cairo, 1907; repr. Chicago, 1978): 342 (name partly restored), 563 and 742 (J. the Apostle). Apart from *CPJ* 501, the following other Judases—all Jews, in view of the dates—are included in that corpus: *CPJ* I.24.16, 17, 20 (Trikomia, 174 B.C.), a soldier; 43.3 (Philadelphia, II B.C.); II.235.1 (Edfu, A.D. 69); vol. III, inscr. 1465 [= *CIJ* 2.1465] an epitaph for Judas son of Judas (Leontopolis, Augustan era[?]). Another indubitable Jew appears in the more recently published *P. Oxy.* 44 (1976) 3203 (June/July 400), a lease arrangement between two nuns and 'Aurelius Joses son of Judas, Jew' (line 7).

⁵³ 'Religious conversion and onomastic change in early Byzantine Egypt', *BASP* 19 (1982) 105-24.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 109. On the naming of children as a productive sphere for sociolinguistic work see S. Lieberson, 'What's in a name?...Some sociolinguistic possibilities', *Int. Jnl for the Sociology of Language* 45 (1984) 77-87.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 117-20.

⁵⁷ A. Bernand, *Pan du désert* (Leiden, 1977) Ib (Wadi Bir El-Ain, Byzantine [?]) mentions Horos the *monachos* at line 29; cf. ed. n. (p. 22) on Egyptian names not always being repudiated by Christians.

⁵⁸ *CPR* 5.2 (1976) 11 (provenance unknown, early IV [?]); repr. at *New Docs 1976*, 80.

⁵⁹ Art. cit. (above, n. 32), 10-11.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁶¹ Cf. E. A. Judge/S. R. Pickering, 'Papyrus documentation of Church and Community in Egypt to the mid-fourth Century', *JbAC* 20 (1977) 47-71.

⁶² Bagnall, art. cit. (above, n. 52), 121.

⁶³ I hope to treat this question elsewhere in the near future; in my judgement, there is nearly a score of texts in *CPJ* III which may, *on the basis of their names*, deserve to be considered as Christian rather than Jewish.

⁶⁴ Discussed above, p. 10.

⁶⁵ This letter (= *P. Princ.* 2 [1936] 73) has also been claimed as a Christian text: Naldini, op.cit. (above, n. 43), no. 12. E. Wipszycka, 'Remarques sur les lettres privées chrétiennes des II-IV siècles', *JJP* 18 (1974) 203-21, regards the text as Jewish or Christian. G. Tibiletti, op. cit. (above, n. 43), 9, appears to regard its Christian attribution as uncertain.

⁶⁶ The Revolt also spread to Cyprus: see E. Schürer, rev. G. Vermes/F. Millar, *A History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ* (Edinburgh, 1973²) I.532; cf. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London, 1981), 642 n. 5.

⁶⁷ *SB* 14.2 (1983) 11842; cf. G. Wagner, ‘Les ostraca grecs de Doush’, in *Proceedings of the XVIth International Congress of Papyrology, New York, July, 1980*, edd. R. S. Bagnall, et al. (*American Studies in Papyrology*, 23; Chico, 1981), 463–68.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AE</i>	<i>L'Année épigraphique</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>BASP</i>	<i>Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists</i>
<i>BDF</i>	Blass/Debrunner/Funk, <i>A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature</i> (Chicago, 1961).
<i>BDR</i>	Blass/Debrunner/Rehkopf, <i>Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch</i> (Göttingen, 1978 ¹⁵).
<i>BGU</i>	<i>Ägyptische Urkunden aus den staatlichen Museen zu Berlin</i>
<i>CIJ</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum</i>
<i>CPJ</i>	<i>Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum</i>
<i>CPR</i>	<i>Corpus Papyrorum Raineri</i>
<i>HE</i>	<i>Historia Ecclesiastica</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>JbAC</i>	<i>Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum</i>
<i>JJP</i>	<i>Journal of Juristic Papyrology</i>
<i>NTS</i>	<i>New Testament Studies</i>
<i>SB</i>	<i>Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten</i>
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>

THE NATURE OF FAITH IN THE ŚĀNKARAN VEDĀNTA TRADITION

YOSHITSUGU SAWAI

I

Śaṅkara is popularly regarded as the founder of four or five *mathas* (monasteries) and of the *Smārta* tradition in India. In modern India, Śṛṅgeri Maṭha, which is located in Karnātaka State, is the most influential among them. The Śaṅkaran Vedānta tradition, which has Śṛṅgeri Maṭha as its center, is called *Smārtas*, neither Śaiva nor Vaiṣṇava. It was originally an abode of *saṃnyāsins* and a center of philosophical study. Since the fourteenth century C.E., however, it came to possess land-endowments and money from the kings and lay adherents; it became gradually a center of organized temple worship and of pilgrimage. In this religious tradition, every head of the Maṭha is called *jagadguru* (a teacher of the world) or Śaṅkarācārya. According to legend, Śaṅkara is regarded as having installed the image of Śrī Śāradā in Śṛṅgeri Maṭha. Thus it is often called Śrī Śāradā Piṭha ("the throne of Śāradā").

This article will attempt to clarify the nature of faith in the context of the Śaṅkaran Vedānta tradition of Śṛṅgeri. I conceive of Śaṅkaran Advaita Vedānta phenomena as comprehending both doctrinal and practical aspects. In Śṛṅgeri, *saṃnyāsins* accept Śaṅkara's philosophical works as a guide to attainment of emancipation (*mokṣa*), while lay *smārtas* worship the goddess of knowledge, Śrī Śāradā, whose image is traditionally stated to have been installed there by Śaṅkara, and visit the *Jagadguru* in order to get his advice. In other words, Śṛṅgeri is a center both of philosophical study and of pilgrimage. These are the concrete religious facts, the raw materials of the study of religion. They comprise the subject matter of the author's research, which aims at exploring the nature of faith in this tradition.

Much of the purely philosophical, philological or hermeneutical study of Śaṅkara's philosophy by such scholars as Paul Deussen

and Eliot Deutsch, which has been accomplished without regard to religious practices, is clearly insufficient to understand the totality of the *smārta* tradition. These scholars' principal concern is with Śaṅkara's metaphysical or epistemological system. On the other hand, the sparse available sociological and anthropological studies of life in the *smārta* tradition without regard to Śaṅkara's teachings are—and must necessarily be—also inadequate. For example, the anthropologist Milton Singer's attempted research into the *smārta* tradition in Madras was inconclusive, for his research data concerning the *smārtas* did not differ from those concerning Hindus in general.¹ He could not differentiate *smārta* from general Hindu characteristics, as he was unfamiliar with the distinguishing doctrinal aspects of the *smārta* tradition. Otherwise, as far as I know, scholars of Śaṅkara have consistently ignored the practical aspects of the *smārta* tradition.²

In approaching the nature of faith in the *smārta* tradition, I shall pay attention to levels of both *samnyāsins* and lay adherents in the *smārta* tradition. An adherent's faith is best understood as dynamic, not static. The English term "faith" has had a venerable and specific Christian connotation, as the historian of religion W. C. Smith points out.³ The English word *faith* is generally used to translate the Sanskrit word *śraddhā*, whose etymology may perhaps be from *śrat* (heart)-*dhā* (to place), i.e., the placing of the heart (on something): its etymology has at least been so understood by Indians. The implications of *faith* and *śraddhā* are, however, not identical. In the content of the Śaṅkaran Vedānta tradition, the category of 'faith' provisionally adopted as a working hypothesis is borrowed from W. C. Smith:

Faith is . . . engendered and sustained by a religious tradition, in some cases and to some degree by its doctrines; but it is a quality of the person, not of the system. It is an orientation of the personality, to oneself, to one's neighbour, to the universe; a total response; a way of seeing whatever one sees and of handling whatever one handles; a capacity to live at a more than mundane level; to see, to feel, to act in terms of, a transcendent dimension.⁴

Faith is "engendered and sustained by a religious tradition, in some cases and to some degree by its doctrines;" It is "a quality of the person, not of the system." It is an "orientation of the personality." Faith is an attitude. It is "'assent' to the truth as such,

in the dynamic and personal sense of rallying to it with delight and engagement” and “the exclamation mark in saying not merely ‘yes’ but ‘Yes!’ to the truth when one sees it.” Faith is “the ability to see and to respond.” In Smith’s words, “faith is not only a recognition but a saying ‘Yes!’ to truth.”⁵

Smith adopts the Śaṅkaran term *āstikyabuddhi* to characterize Hindu “faith.” *Āstikya*, Smith says, is “the affirmative religious attitude, the positive rather than negative stance on moral and spiritual matters,” and *buddhi* is “awareness, perception, discernment.”⁶

Astikya-buddhi [sic], then, is awakeness to transcendence. To hold that faith is this is to aver that faith is the apperception that there is indeed something in what saints and seers have been saying over the ages: the recognition that yes, the transcendent dimension of the world and of our lives is indeed there.⁷

Smith translates *śraddhā* as “faith,” but for him *śraddhā* is “a component of generic faith (as it is of specific *bhakti*),” but is “not that generic faith itself.”⁸ Both concepts, faith and *śraddhā*, “are similar, but have not been identical.”⁹ Smith regards *śraddhā* as an intellectual concept, which is “a component of generic faith” and “but one among many things that Hindus have had to say about it.”¹⁰ Before proceeding to discuss ‘faith’ in this article, we must clarify the concept of ‘faith’ in the *smārtā* tradition, particularly with reference to the meanings of *śraddhā* and *bhakti*, and thus smooth the path to discussion, in the English language, of Śaṅkaran Vedānta phenomena.

II

In Śaṅkara’s *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* and *Upaniṣadbhāṣyas* (but nowhere else in Śaṅkara’s works), *śraddhā* is usually explained as *āstikya-buddhi*, i.e., a judgment that affirms Vedic teachings.¹¹ In his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, for example, Śaṅkara defines *śraddhā*:

Śraddhā is a judgment that affirms Vedic teachings with regard to ritual action towards invisible ends and with regard to deities and so on. *Aśraddhā* is a judgment contrary to this.¹²

śraddhā adṛṣṭārtheṣु karmasya āstikyabuddhir devatādiṣu ca/
aśraddhā tadviparitā buddhiḥ/

Further,

Śraddhā is a feeling of respect for the object of one's meditation; it is a judgment that affirms Vedic teachings.¹³

mantavyaviṣaye ādarah āstikyabuddhiḥ śraddhā

Śraddhā is a calmness of mind which must precede the effort to accomplish any of the aims of man; it is a judgment that affirms Vedic teachings.¹⁴

śraddhā yatpūrvakah sarvapuruṣārthaśadhanaprayogaḥ cittaprasāda āstikyabuddhiḥ

In his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, Śaṅkara maintains that *samnyāsins* should maintain their śraddhā while living in the forest.¹⁵ Moreover, in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, Śaṅkara discusses the śraddhā of the lay *yajamāna* (sacrificer).

Śraddhā is a judgment that affirms Vedic teachings, which is accompanied by *bhakti*.¹⁶

śraddhā . . . āstikyabuddhir bhaktisahitā

Śaṅkara is here speaking of the sort of śraddhā that operates in ritual activity, and that is thus outside the realm of *samnyāsa*. In this context, the term *bhakti* is perhaps used in the technical ritual sense of a knowledge of something as being an object of propitiation.¹⁷ This ritual sort of śraddhā has nothing to do with *samnyāsa*, and *bhakti* is here more akin to *āstikyabuddhi* than to reverential devotion. Śaṅkara describes śraddhā as *hṛdayasya vṛttih* or an operation of the heart,¹⁸ but his concept of śraddhā is narrower than that of faith, because it is merely *jñānalabdhyupāya* i.e., “a means for the acquisition of knowledge”¹⁹ and it is associated by Śaṅkara with “trust” (*viśvāsa*) in “the words of a spiritual teacher and in the scripture.”²⁰ In Śaṅkara’s philosophical scheme, śraddhā is not a religious commitment to emancipation, but a *samnyāsin*’s attitude, reflecting his confidence in the words of his spiritual teacher and of the scriptures. Moreover, Paul Hacker points out that for Śaṅkara,

An der Tatsache, daß der religiöse Glaube nicht nur auf die Mittel der Belehrung (Lehrer und Veda) geht, sondern daß auch die Inhalte des religiösen Wissens nur *glaubend* erfaßt werden, läßt sich nicht vorbeikommen.²¹

That is, śraddhā not only is trust in the words of teachers and of the scriptures, but also is a veritable prerequisite to the proper understanding of these words.

The *samnyāśins* of the Śṛṅgeri Maṭha have high regard for the *Vivekacūḍāmani*, which is traditionally—though surely incorrectly—ascribed to Śāṅkara.²² This work explicitly states the scriptures and a spiritual teacher’s words to be the objects of śraddhā:

The determination of the scripture and of the words of the teacher in a judgment that they are true is called by the good śraddhā, by which [knowledge of] reality is obtained.²³

śāstrasya guruvākyasya satyabuddhyāvadhāraṇā/
sā śraddhā kathitā sadbhīḥ yayā vastūpalabhyate//

According to the *Vivekacūḍāmani*, śraddhā is one of the six virtues which comprise a preliminary requisite for the attainment of *brahman/ātman*: they are *śama* (tranquility), *dama* (self-control), *uparati* (cessation of worldly actions), *titikṣā* (endurance), śraddhā, and *saṃādhāna* (intellectual alertness).²⁴ Among these six, śraddhā is especially indispensable for a *saṃnyāsin*’s attainment of *mokṣa*. In this regard, Candraśekharabhāratī, the thirty-third *śaṅkarācārya* of Śṛṅgeri Maṭha,²⁵ says:

In the world too, in the absence of faith in the words of any āpta (trustworthy person who has knowledge) no man acts in accordance with them in the matter of inquiry etc. . . . It is only he who is sānta, dānta, uparata, and titikṣu that obtains conviction of a thing in the form ‘this is thus’ upon his having been taught by the guru and the texts of Vedānta: “Brahman alone is the reality; That thou art; all the rest is mithyā.” He who does not possess this kind of sādhana will not get the conviction.²⁶

This view seems to represent the opinion of modern *saṃnyāśins* in Śṛṅgeri Maṭha. As the scripture and a spiritual teacher are virtually indispensable on the path to *mokṣa*, no *saṃnyāsin* treading this path can afford to be deficient in śraddhā towards the words of his *guru* and the *śāstra*.

A noteworthy explanation of śraddhā is offered by the *Sarvavedānatasiddhāntasārasaṃgraha* (The Compendium of the Quintessence of All Vedānta Doctrines), a text found in the library of Śṛṅgeri Maṭha where it is—no doubt incorrectly—ascribed to the historical Śāṅkara.²⁷ In the following passages (verses 210-217) of this text, śraddhā towards the words of a teacher and of the *Vedānta* (*Upaniṣads*) is emphasized as indispensable for the attainment of emancipation.

Śraddhā is the definite judgment that the words of a teacher and of the *Vedānta* (*Upaniṣads*) are true; it is a prerequisite for the attainment of emancipation.

guruvedāntavākyeṣu buddhir yā niścayātmikā/
satyam ity eva sā śraddhā nidānam muktisiddhaye//

Only by good persons who have *śraddhā*—not by any others—is the aforementioned goal of men attained. The *Veda* [*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VI. xii. 2] says: “Trust, my dear, in the very subtle absolute reality, which has been stated.”

śraddhāvatām eva satām pumarthaḥ samīritaḥ sidhyati netareśām/
uktām susūkṣmām paramārthattvām śraddhatsva somyeti ca vakti vedah//

But there cannot be [any] activity [which leads to emancipation] for one who is devoid of *śraddhā*. There cannot be [any] attainment of the goal [= emancipation] for one who is devoid of activity. And all who are afflicted by *āśradhā* sink in the great ocean of transmigration.

śraddhāvihīnasya tu na pravṛttiḥ pravṛttiśūnyasya na sādhyasiddhiḥ/
āśraddhayaivābhīhatāś ca sarve majjanti saṃsāramahāsamudre//

That which people attain varies [lit. arises] accordingly as they within themselves have *śraddhā* in a god, a *veda*, a *guru*, a *mantra*, a holy place, a great soul, and a healing charm.²⁸

deve ca vede ca gurau ca mantre tīrthe mahātmany api bheṣaje ca/
śraddhā bhavaty asya yathā yathāntas tathā tathā siddhir udeti pumsām//

[The judgment that a thing] exists is reached through determination of the existence of its reality. In this regard, the determination of its existence is [made] by *śraddhā* which is reached through the scriptures.

astiḥ evopalabdhavyām vastusadbhāvaniścayāt/
sadbhāvaniścayas tatra śraddhayā sāstrasiddhayā//

Therefore, *śraddhā* in the words of a teacher and of the *Vedānta* is to be well engendered. A seeker of emancipation, who practices *śraddhā*, attains the goal—not otherwise.

tasmāc chraddhā susampādyā guruvedāntavākyayoh/
mumukṣoh śraddadhānasya phalam sidhyati nānyathā//

The telling of the truth is the cause producing people’s *śraddhā*. Because the *Veda* is the word of *īśvara*, there is no doubt in regard to its truth.

yathārthavāditā pumsām śraddhājananakāraṇam/
vedasyeśvaravākyatvād yathārtatve na saṃśayah//

Because a *mukta* [one who has attained emancipation] is identical with the Lord (*īśvara*), the word of a teacher [who is emancipated] is the same [as the word of the Lord]. Therefore, good people’s *śraddhā* in the words of the Lord and the teacher succeeds [i.e., it leads to emancipation].

muktasyeśvararūpatvād guror vāg api tādṛṣī/
tasmāt tadvākyayoh śraddhā satām sidhyati dhīmatām//

Verses 211 and 212 present *śraddhā* as indispensable for one who seeks emancipation. Verse 213 is remarkable as an exceptional case in which the object of *śraddhā* is not only impersonal (the *Veda*, a *mantra*, a holy place and a healing charm) but also personal (a god, a *guru* and a great soul). But the context of these passages leaves no doubt that the recommended objects of *śraddhā* are the words of a teacher and the *Vedānta*.

Mādhava's *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* (hereafter abbreviated *ŚDV*), a legendary biography of Śaṅkara, which is the sole biography regarded as authoritative by Śṛṅgeri tradition, calls *śraddhā* one of the six virtues of Śaṅkara.²⁹ Dhanapati's *Dīṇḍima* commentary³⁰ explains this *śraddhā* as "being in the form of trust in the words of a teacher and the *Upaniṣads*" (*guruvedāntavākyesu viśvāsarūpā*). In the *ŚDV*, three types of *śraddhā* may be distinguished: (1) a *samnyāsin*'s *śraddhā* in the words of his spiritual teacher and the scripture, (2) ordinary people's *śraddhā* in the scripture and (3) an unspecified *śraddhā* of broader scope. The first type of *śraddhā* is mentioned in the following three examples.

. . . to those who realize pure non-duality and whose souls are kindled by
śraddhā in your [Śaṅkara's] words . . .³¹

. . . tvadīyaphanitīśraddhāsamiddhātmanaḥ śuddhādvaitavido . . .

Then, Śaṅkara, having worshipped the two lotus-like feet of the revered Gauḍapāda, stood with folded hands, very modest, his heart full of the agitation of *bhakti* and *śraddhā*.³²

āryasyātho gauḍapādasya pādāv abhyarcyāsau śamkaraḥ pañkajābhau/
 bhaktiśraddhāsaṁbhramākrāntacetāḥ prahvas tasthāv agrataḥ prāñjaliḥ
 san//

In the *Dīṇḍima* commentary, Dhanapati comments that *bhakti* is *anurāga* (affection) and that *śraddhā* is *viśvāsa* (trust).³³

[Gauḍapāda says to Śaṅkara:] Do the excellent pupils, who are endowed with *bhakti*, who are attached to the self, who are detached, who are tranquil, who are disciplined, who constantly have *śraddhā*, who desire knowledge of reality and who are humble, perchance serve you as [their] teacher?³⁴

bhaktyā yuktāḥ svānuraktā viraktāḥ sāntā dāntāḥ saṃtatām śraddadhānāḥ//
 kaccit tattvajñānakāmā vinītāḥ śuśrūṣante śiṣyavaryā gurum tvām//

The second type of *śraddhā*—ordinary people's *śraddhā* in scripture—is apparent in such passages as:

Although he was omniscient, being accompanied with an artificial [i.e., humanly produced] śraddhā in the scripture of the evil ones [Buddhists] . . .³⁵

sarvajño 'py asatām śāstre kṛtrimaśraddhayā 'nvitah/

Having seen him uninjured, the king placed his śraddhā in śruti scriptures.³⁶

dṛṣṭvā tam akṣatām rājā śraddhām śrutiṣu samdadhe/

These examples indicate the popular use of the word śraddhā to describe śraddhā in scripture. The third, broader type of śraddhā, which is apparently not limited to acceptance of scripture or a teacher's words, is suggested in the following passage:

In such a holy place, the ascetic [Padmapāda], having bathed and having worshipped the Lord Rāmanātha [Śiva] with bhakti, spoke fully to his pupils of his [Rāmanātha's] greatness in order to produce śraddhā among men in that [god].³⁷

tattādīkṣe tatra tīrthe sa bhikṣuḥ snātvā bhaktyā rāmanāthām praṇamya/
tatra śraddhotpattaye mānuṣānām śiṣyebhyas tadvaibhavām samyag ūce//

In the ŚDV, this third type of śraddhā is exceptional: in most cases, śraddhā denotes a state of mind directed toward impersonal objects such as scripture and the words of a spiritual teacher.

More recently, although the smārtā scholar K. Aiyar traditionally defines śraddhā as “belief in the truth of the Holy Scriptures and the words of the Spiritual Guru (Master),”³⁸ he offers a translation of a passage of Candraśekharabhāratī, in which śraddhā is glossed as *faith*:

Śraddhā or faith and Dharma or right action are thus invariably present where happiness is found and are invariably absent where happiness is not found. They are therefore the cause of happiness. Get them back and you will get back your happiness.³⁹

It is unclear whether the words “or faith” in this passage represent an interpretative gloss of Aiyar to explain the word śraddhā or whether they are a translation of a gloss in the Kannada text. In any case, śraddhā, as used in this context, does not primarily denote śraddhā in the scripture and the words of a teacher, but rather a much broader human religious commitment—one sought for by many world religious traditions that recognize a synergy between faith and action. When the Jagadguru here speaks of śraddhā, he is apparently thinking of it as a vehicle not to reach *mokṣa* (in the classical sense of this word) but to reach a happy, fulfilled life. Śraddhā is

presented in this context not as a religious commitment of a *samnyāsin*, but as a religious concern of ordinary people, which brings happiness to them. It is noteworthy how modern editors translate the word *śraddhā* used in addresses by the present *Jagadguru*. The following passage is from an address to Vedic scholars:

Vedic learning is toilsome indeed. It gives us great pleasure indeed that Vedic scholars have assembled here to offer their services and chant the Vedas with real *Śraddhā* (earnestness). Their *Śraddhā* is commendable and may it last for ever.⁴⁰

Although the *Jagadguru* may have used the word *śraddhā* in the sense of the *śraddhā* in scripture, this editor renders it as “earnestness.” In another example, K. R. Venkataraman states:

His Holiness has very often said that for success, we should practise *śama* or control over mental restlessness and discipline of the senses, *titiksha* or power of endurance and *śraddhā* or faith in ourselves. These are virtues to be practised both by monks who desire to renounce the world and the active workers who desire success in the world.⁴¹

In this context, *śraddhā*—“faith in ourselves”—is shown as a virtue to be practiced both by a *samnyāsin* and a lay adherent. Another address by the present *Jagadguru* states:

Devotion to God and an abiding faith in Him are essential to self-realisation. We must earn the blessings of the wise and the great. We must all strive to do *bajan* [sic] and strive to deserve the grace of the Lord and thus obtain liberation.⁴²

In this passage the term *faith*—doubtless a translation of the word *śraddhā*—connotes a faith in God such as is familiar from other religious traditions. From the foregoing examples it is apparent that the word *śraddhā* is not now used by *smārtas* solely in the original Śaṅkaran sense, but has been generalized to include other kinds of religious commitment. During the author’s research in Śṛingeri, however, he rarely heard ordinary *smārtas* speak of *śraddhā*, but often of *bhakti*. Unlike the concept of *śraddhā*, which appears to be significant only for those *smārtas* who have considerable training in religious doctrine or practice, the notion of *bhakti* is a familiar and meaningful concept even to uneducated *smārtas*. Our exploration of the nature of ‘faith’ in the *smārta* community must thus proceed to an examination of *bhakti*.

III

In Śaṅkara's scheme, *bhakti*, which leads indirectly to *mokṣa*, is concerned with *saguṇa-brahman*: it is a personal attachment to gods.⁴³ It may suffice here to note that Śaṅkara speaks of *bhakti* under two aspects: (1) *bhakti* as a gradual preparation for emancipation and (2) *bhakti* as characterized by *jñāna*.⁴⁴ As a *dvaṃdva* compound in the *Upadeśasāhasri*—śraddhābhaktī—shows,⁴⁵ Śaṅkara distinguishes *bhakti* from śraddhā. In the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* passages cited below, Śaṅkara demonstrates that a *bhakta* must already be possessed of śraddhā:

... one who, being possessed of śraddhā, i.e., being one who possesses śrad-dhā, worships, i.e., venerates, me, ...⁴⁶

... śraddhāvāñ śraddadhānah san bhajate sevate yo mām sa ...

But to me those *saṃnyāsins* are extremely dear, who worship, i.e. follow, me, who are possessed of śraddhā, for whom I am the highest goal, i.e., for whom I, as previously described, the indestructible self, am the supreme, the ultimate recourse, and who are devoted to me, i.e., who resort to the supreme *bhakti* characterized by knowledge of the highest reality.⁴⁷

ye tu samnyāsino ... paryupāsate 'nutiṣṭhanti śraddadhānāḥ santo mat-paramā yathokto 'ham akṣarātmā paramo niratiśaya gatir yeṣāṁ te mat-paramāḥ, madbhaktāś cottamām paramārtha-jñānalakṣaṇām bhaktim āśritāḥ, te 'tiva me priyāḥ/

Thus, śraddhā may grow into “*bhakti* characterized by knowledge of the highest reality” (*paramārtha-jñānalakṣaṇām bhaktim*).⁴⁸ The priority of śraddhā in this process is indicated by the fact that śraddhā precedes the element *bhakti* in the *dvaṃdva* compound śraddhābhaktī. Śaṅkara clearly conceives of a close interrelationship of śraddhā and *bhakti* in religious commitment.

The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* considers *bhakti*, as this term is employed by Advaitins, as more important than śraddhā:

Among the material aids for achieving *mokṣa*, *bhakti* is the greatest. Investigation of one's essential nature is said to be *bhakti*.⁴⁹

mokṣakāraṇasāmagryām bhaktir eva garīyasī/
svasvarūpānusandhānam bhaktir ity abhidhīyate//

Commenting on this passage, Candraśekharabhāratī remarks that Śaṅkara regards *bhakti* as “the direct (internal) means (*antarāṅgasādhana*) to realization of the ātman.”⁵⁰ He says:

By *svasvarūpānusandhāna*, contemplation on one's essential nature, *nididhyāsana* (profound repeated meditation) is meant. That alone can serve as the immediate means to direct realization. The continuous contemplation of the śruti text and the upadeśa of the guru: *sa ātmā tattvamasi* (That is the ātman; That thou art): “Thy essential nature is Brahman; thou art That only”, is the indispensable means (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) of such realization. This contemplation (*anusandhāna*) is of the form of the exclusion of contrary ideas and is marked by a continuous flow of accordant ideas. Śama etc., are the cause of jñāna mediated by vicāra and *nididhyāsana*. But *nididhyāsana* is the immediate cause for it. Because it produces direct realisation, it is said to be the greatest among the sādhanas that make for jñāna which is revelatory of one's true nature which is synonymous with mokṣa. Among the means for *nididhyāsana*, *bhakti* is the greatest, because it is direct and internal means.⁵¹

The *bhakti* which the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* defines as *svasvarūpānusandhāna* (investigation of one's essential nature) represents a philosophical *advaita* re-interpretation of the concept of *bhakti*, a word which may in other contexts be generally glossed as “reverential devotion.” Candraśekharabhbāratī equates this philosophical *advaita bhakti* with *nididhyāsana*, i.e., “contemplation of one's essential nature,” which is said to be accompanied by “the continuous contemplation of the śruti text and the upadeśa of the guru.” However, in a seeming contradiction, Candraśekharabhbāratī simultaneously states that *bhakti* is the “direct and internal means” for *nididhyāsana*. This contradiction may be resolved by understanding the word *bhakti*, when used to designate a means of *nididhyāsana*, to refer not to the philosophical *bhakti* of the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* but rather to devotional *bhakti*.

In the Vedānta philosophical context, *nididhyāsana* is treated together with *śravana* (hearing) and *manana* (reflection). These three concepts are already mentioned in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*:

The ātman, my dear Maitreyī, is to be realized—is to be heard of, reflected on and contemplated on. When the ātman, my dear, is realized by being heard of, reflected on and contemplated on, all this is known.⁵²

ātma vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo
maitreyy ātmani khalv are dṛṣṭe śrute mate vijñāta
idaṁ sarvam̄ veditam̄/

In his *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, Śaṅkara says:

. . . for the hearing of and reflection and contemplation on the Vedānta texts have as their object that which is to be immediately known (i.e. *brahman*).⁵³

vedāntaśravaṇamananānidhyāsanānāṁ ca sāksājjñeyaviśayatvāt/

Śravana (hearing) is, according to Śaṅkara, listening to the scriptures and the words of a teacher; *manana* (reflection) is deliberate thinking with reasoning (*tarka*) about what has been heard; and *nididhyāsana* (contemplation) is focusing upon the meaning of what has been heard and reflected on.⁵⁴ This triple discipline is advocated by the *jagadgurus* of the Śṛṅgeri Maṭha.⁵⁵ Its three elements, Paul Hacker notes, correspond to the first, second, and third chapters, respectively, of the prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. Hacker says:

Die drei Kapitel des Prosateils der *Upadesasāhasrī* enthalten nun je ein Musterbeispiel für Shravana, Manana und Nididhyāsana, sie stellen damit einen vollständigen, wenn auch kurzen Lehrgang des advaitischen Vedānta dar.⁵⁶

In the first chapter the teacher expounds to a disciple the purport of the scriptures with many citations from both *śruti* and *smṛti*. In the second chapter the disciple reflects on the purport of the scriptures repeatedly with *tarka* (reasoning) and by discussing with the teacher such fundamental themes as *avidyā* (nescience) and *adhyāropaṇā* (superimposition). The third chapter describes the *parisamkhyanā* meditation.⁵⁷ In glossing *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* term *śravanādi* (“hearing and so on,” conceived as a method of purifying the mind), Candraśekharabhāratī explains *ādi* as *manana* and *nididhyāsana*.⁵⁸

A *samnyāsin*’s daily observances give scope to *bhakti* in the form of *guru-bhakti*. At the same time, his primary religious commitment is characteristically to *yoga*,⁵⁹ which prescribes *nididhyāsana* and even the posture in which *nididhyāsana* is to be performed. The *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* says:

The words of the *śruti* declare that *śraddhā*, *bhakti*, *dhyāna* (meditation) and *yoga* (mind-control) are, for one who is desirous of emancipation, the direct means to emancipation. To one who practices them, emancipation is secured from the bondage of the body caused by nescience.⁶⁰

śraddhābhaktidhyānayogān mumukṣoḥ mukter hetūn vakti sākṣat̄ śruter gīḥ/
yo vā eteṣv eva tiṣṭhaty amuṣya mokṣo ’vidyākalpitād dehabandhāt//

Commenting on this verse, Candraśekharabhāratī explains that *śraddhā* is “unquestioning acceptance of the words of the guru and the texts of the Upaniṣads” and that *bhakti*, which arises from *śra-*

dhā, is “continuous contemplation of one’s own real nature or *nididhyāsanam*. ” He cites the *Yoga-sūtra*, “*tatra pratyayaikatānatā dhyānam*,” to explain *dhyāna* as “flowing or uninterrupted meditation.” Following the *Yoga-sūtra*, *yoga* is defined as “control of the activities of the mind.”⁶¹ Candraśekharabhāratī further comments:

Śraddhā is the basic condition for all these. Among bhakti, dhyāna and yoga, the earlier is the cause of the later. When the activities of the mind are controlled, *samādhāna* (concentration) arises. Upon that, and following the upadeśa of scriptures and of the guru, *nididhyāsana* in the form of contemplation of one’s own nature takes place.⁶²

In this passage, it is apparent that *nididhyāsana* is performed with a controlled mind. *Nididhyāsana* includes all the *yoga* process of concentration. In this regard, a *samnyāsin*’s discipline and traditional practice much resemble those of a traditional *yogin*.⁶³ For example, *yama* (restraint) and *niyama* (observance), to which Śaṅkara refers in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* and which are the virtues for a seeker of *mokṣa*, belong to the eight practices of *yoga*: *yama* (restraint), *niyama* (observance), *āsana* (posture), *prāṇayāma* (regulation of breath), *pratyāhāra* (abstraction [of the senses]), *dhāraṇā* (concentration), *dhyāna* (meditation) and *samādhi* (trance).⁶⁴ In his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* also, Śaṅkara, willingly allowing room for the portions of the *Yoga* system that do not contradict *śruti*, states:

Moreover, in giving rules for the condition of a wandering ascetic, the *yoga* scriptures admit that state of renunciation from the concerns of life which is known from such *śruti* passages as the following one, “Then, a wandering ascetic with specially colored [saffron] dress, shaven, without any possessions” (*Jābālopaniṣad* IV).⁶⁵

tathā ca yogair api “atha parivrād vivarṇavāsā
muṇḍo ‘parigrahāḥ’ ity evam ādi śruti-prasiddam eva
nivṛttiniṣṭhatvam pravrajyādy upadeśenānugamyate

Further, Śaṅkara maintains that the *yoga* practices lead to “the acquisition of such extraordinary powers as subtlety of body” (*animādy aiśvaryaprāpti-*).⁶⁶ A *samnyāsin* is expected to pursue yogic discipline and to attempt to yoke mind and body in order, functioning on the profound level of the unconscious, to achieve oneness with *brahman/ātman*. Like *bhakti*, such a *yoga* presupposes *śraddhā*.⁶⁷ A *samnyāsin*’s *yoga* and *nididhyāsana* (profound repeated meditation) may perhaps be distinguished theoretically, but practically they are

hard to separate. For a *samnyāsin*, there is practically no *nididhyāsana* without *yoga*, and no *yoga* without *nididhyāsana*.

Now let us turn briefly to three *bhakti-stotras* traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkara, which provide data of lay adherents' faith. Of these, only one, the *Dakṣināmūrti-stotra*, which is the object of Sureśvara's *Vārttika*, appears to be in fact by Śaṅkara.⁶⁸ This *stotra* represents the *bhakti* towards god and a spiritual teacher as essential for attainment of *jñāna*:

To the great-souled one who has the highest *bhakti* towards god and towards a spiritual teacher as towards god, the truths taught here shine forth.⁶⁹

yasya deve parā bhaktir yathā deve tathā gurau/
tasyaite kathitā hy arthāḥ prakāśante mahātmanah//

Another *stotra*, the *Sivānandalaharī*, which is chanted by *smārtas* in the Śringeri tradition, calls *bhakti* "the flow of the mind" (*cetovṛtti*). This flow, "having reached the lotus-feet of the Lord of souls, always remains there."⁷⁰ When *bhakti* matures, it leads to *jīvanmukti*.⁷¹ Another *bhakti-stotra*, traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkara, is the *Saundaryalaharī*, which was probably composed after 1000 C.E.. One reason for the importance of this hymn to the *smārtas* is that it describes "the glory of Parasakti-Saradamba [sic] as She is worshipped here [in Śringeri]."⁷² It states that the achievement of the vision of *Devi*, i.e., human identification with man's highest goal, the absolute principle, is possible by winning *Devi*'s grace (1) through *bhakti* (devotion) and (2) through use of a *mantra*, an esoteric formula, knowledge of which constitutes the *śrī vidyā* or holy science.⁷³ A *bhakta* obtains *Devi*'s grace and attains identity with her when one utters the words:

Do you, O lady (bhavāni), extend to me, your slave, a compassionate glance!⁷⁴

bhavāni tvam dāse mayi vitara dr̥ṣṭim sakaruṇām . . .

If this hymn is recited correctly with the use of rosaries of wishing-jewels as beads and accompanied by the necessary oblations, a *bhakta* tastes boundless intense bliss.⁷⁵ In the *smārta* tradition of Śringeri, *sakti* worship takes the form of worship of *Śrī Śāradā*. There is no doubt that such worship has long been practiced there, although the *SDV* is probably incorrect in attributing its unauguration to Śaṅkara himself.

The *ŚDV* lays strong emphasis on *bhakti*. In the *ŚDV*, the concept of *bhakti* is threefold: (1) *bhakti* towards a spiritual teacher, (2) *bhakti* towards a god and (3) unspecified *bhakti*. Discussing *bhakti* towards a spiritual teacher, the *ŚDV* mentions a teacher's feet as particular objects of *bhakti*. For example,

The great sage [Śaṅkara], having a mind to show very great compassion to him [Sanandana] who had unalloyed *bhakti* to his two lotus-feet, thrice taught him his own complete treasure [his commentaries] which is the storehouse of the treasures of the secrets of the Upaniṣads.⁷⁶

advam̄dvabhaktim amum ātmapadāravinda-
dvam̄dve nitāntadayamānamā munīndrah
āmnāyaśekhararahaḥasyanidhānakośam
ātmīyakośam akhilam̄ trir apāṭhayat tam//

The motif of *guru-pāda-bhakti* occurs⁷⁷ in other passages also, as

The good creeper in the form of his [Toṭaka's] *bhakti*, which had, as its root, the two lotus-feet of the illustrious teacher, which had him [Śaṅkara] alone as its support, and which was possessed of the sprinkling of water in the form of his [Śaṅkara's] nectar-like compassion. . . .⁷⁸

śrīmaddeśikapādapāṇkajayugīmūlā tadekāśrayā
tatkārunyasudhāvasekaṣahitā tadbhaktisadvallarī/

The term *bhajana*, “devotion (often in musical form),” is, like the word *bhakti*, derived from the verb *bhaj*, which in this context means “to worship devotedly.” The *ŚDV* contains passages describing the *bhajana* of a teacher's feet:

. . . yet people are made pure with their sins destroyed at the very moment of worshipping (*bhajana-*) the lotus-feet of the lord of ascetics [Śaṅkara] and are fortunate with their hearts being full of compassion.⁷⁹

tathā 'py ete pūtā yatipatipadāmbhojabhajana-
kṣaṇakṣīṇakleśāḥ sadayahṛdayābhāḥ sukṛtināḥ//

There are, however, other passages that describe *bhakti* towards a *guru* without mention of his feet.⁸⁰ Where *bhakti* of his feet is described, their description as ‘lotus-like’ is honorific and may imply divinity.

The second type of *bhakti* is that towards a god.⁸¹ Some passages show that a god's lotus-feet, like a teacher's, are objects of *bhakti*.⁸² The third type of *bhakti* is unspecified as to its object.⁸³ This type of *bhakti* may seem curious in that it has no apparent object, but such *bhakti* has clear parallels in other religious traditions. In

English the word *faith* often denotes a religious commitment that has no clearly specified object. The *ŚDV* employs several other terms whose meanings must be considered in the context of *bhakti*: *arcanā*, *pūjā*, *upāsanā*, *āradhānā* and *saparyā*. The most frequently used of these terms, *arcanā* and *pūjā*, denote *bhakti* directed either toward a spiritual teacher or god, and the same seems to be true of the less often used terms.⁸⁴ *Smārtas* interviewed in Śṛṅgeri by the author of this article often used the word *darśana* [popularly called *darśan*, lit. “seeing”] to describe their reverential beholding of the *Jagadguru* or of Śrī Śāradā. For these *smārtas*, *bhakti* is implicit in every act of *darśana*.

According to Candraśekharabhāratī, *bhakti* is “single-pointed devotion uniformly expressed in mind, speech and body.”⁸⁵ A “true bhakta,” he says, is content to know that (1) “the Vedas are His [the Lord’s] divine commands” and that (2) “a strict performance of the duties” enjoined by the Vedas is “the only way of securing the grace of the Lord and, within the competence of man, the only way of serving Him.”⁸⁶ He concludes that one is not a *bhakta* at all when one “chooses to neglect the *karma* enjoined on him in favour of mental prayers and contemplation.” *Bhakti* is “to perform one’s assigned *karma*. ”⁸⁷ What room is there for *bhakti* in the heart of one who, following the *jagadguru*’s assurances of the truth of the *Veda* punctiliously performs *karman*, such as the *agnihotra* and of *samdhya-vandana* according to the injunction of *smṛti*? If such *karman* is performed entirely in the *śraddhā*-based expectation of the *pūrvamīmāṃsā* school that proper performance of *karman* will entail the sure fulfilment of the performer’s desires, then *bhakti* may indeed be absent. Such ritual action is, however, rare. Rituals almost invariably arouse *bhakti*—a personal relationship or devotion towards the object of the ritual—in the heart of the performer. *Śraddhā* thus leads both to *karman* and to *bhakti*.⁸⁸ Just as *karman* without *bhakti* hardly exists, so too *bhakti* unaccompanied by any form of *karman* is an almost unimaginable abstraction. As Paul Hacker points out, *bhajana* is also an action (ein Tun), although it is often purely spiritual (ein rein geistiges).⁸⁹ In Śṛṅgeri, as in other religious centers within and outside India, the amount of *bhakti* that appears to accompany ritual action may vary greatly, depending upon the occasion and the individuals who are participating.

K. Aiyar has collected data showing that “ordinary people lack faith in the efficacy of religious rites” and that they “resort to *bhajana*,” which they regard as “a direct appeal to God,” while *karman* is but “an indirect appeal through the observance of rituals.”⁹⁰ The author’s research in Śṛṅgeri confirms that *smārtas* understand *bhakti* primarily as devotion to god and that they direct their *bhakti* towards the *Jagadguru* as an incarnation of Śaṅkara/Śiva. It is theoretically true that, as a *sannyāsin*’s *śraddhā* occurs in the practices of *nididhyāsana*, *guru-bhakti* and *yoga* respectively, a lay *smārta*’s *śraddhā* appears in the practices of *karman* (ritual performance) and *bhakti* (reverential devotion towards Śrī Śāradā, other deities, and the *jagadguru*) respectively. In practice, however, there is virtually no *karman* without *bhakti* and no *bhakti* without *karman*, just as there is practically, for a *sannyāsin*, no *nididhyāsana* without *yoga* and vice versa. In so far as lay *smārtas* perform *karman* such as *agnihotra* and *saṃdhyā-vandana*, they do so with a feeling of *bhakti* towards the deities who are invoked. When Candraśekharabhāratī states that “the way to worship Him [God] is to perform one’s assigned karma,”⁹¹ it is evident that *karman* and *bhakti* cannot be separated for lay people in the Śṛṅgeri tradition. Thus, both *karman* and *bhakti* are inseparable in lay *smārtas*’ concrete religious commitment, as both *nididhyāsana*, *guru-bhakti* and *yoga* are combined in *sannyāsins*’ religious commitment.

IV

The above discussion has demonstrated that the concepts of *Śraddhā* and *bhakti* are similar in that both are operations of the heart and that *śraddhā* lives in the *smārtas*’ religious commitment. *Śraddhā* is inseparable not only from lay *smārtas*’ *bhakti* and religious *karman* but also from *nididhyāsana* (continuous contemplation of one’s essential nature), *guru-bhakti* (a disciple’s reverence for a teacher, accompanied by trust in the words of his teacher), symbolic *bhakti* and *karman*,⁹² and *yoga* practiced by *sannyāsins*. While a *sannyāsin*’s *nididhyāsana* and a lay *smārta*’s *bhakti* are subjective internal states, both *karman* (*agnihotra* etc.) and *yoga* (*yama*, *niyama*, and *saṃādhī* etc.) are objective behaviours, which, of course, may be accompanied by *bhakti* (reverential devotion) and *nididhyāsana* respectively. In the

smārta tradition of Śṛṅgeri, the principal factor in *śraddhā* is “judgment” (*buddhi*). Hence *śraddhā*, the prerequisite of the *smārtas’* religious commitment, is essentially intellectual. It has an impersonal object—the words of scripture or of a spiritual teacher.⁹³ The term *śraddhā* in the modern literature of *smārta* tradition sometimes implies that ‘faith in God’ which is generally presupposed in western discussions of faith. This is one of the instances in which the Śṛṅgeri tradition has re-interpreted a word to fit a new religious context. In his authentic works, Śaṅkara employs the word *śraddhā* mainly in the context of a *saṃnyāsin*’s commitment.⁹⁴ *Śraddhā* is an important virtue of a *saṃnyāsin* and is prerequisite to the attainment of *mokṣa*. As the ŚDV and modern literature of the Śṛṅgeri tradition show, however, the Śṛṅgeri tradition came to use *śraddhā* to refer to an element in the commitment of both *saṃnyāsins* and lay *smārtas*. The beginning of the re-interpretation of this word seems to have coincided with the change of the orientation of the Śṛṅgeri Maṭha in the time of Vidyāraṇya. It now designated not only a *saṃnyāsin*’s but also an ordinary *smārta*’s acceptance of the words of scripture and of a *guru*, especially the *Jagadguru*. The technical sense of *śraddhā* as trust (*viśvāsa*) in the words of a *guru*, which implies the relationship of a *saṃnyāsin* disciple and his spiritual teacher,⁹⁵ is hardly applicable to the *śraddhā* of ordinary *smārtas*, who have had no permission to study directly from the *Jagadguru*. At present, as mentioned above, the word *śraddhā* has been gradually generalized to include some motifs of the western concept of faith such as ‘faith in God.’

For lay *smārtas*, *bhakti*, unlike *śraddhā*, has a personal object—a spiritual teacher or a god. It is true that Śaṅkara and some doubtlessly later philosophical works traditionally ascribed to him, especially the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, attribute an intellectual content to *bhakti*, which is described as *nididhyāsana*, contemplation of one’s essential nature. Such *nididhyāsana*, being characteristic of a *saṃnyāsin*’s commitment, is hardly found among the lay *smārtas*. For *nididhyāsana* is typically practiced in the *yoga* of a *saṃnyāsin* who, rather than worshipping deities, meditates. The practice of *nididhyāsana* presupposes *śravaṇa* (hearing [of the words of a teacher]) and *manana* (reflection [on the teacher’s words with employment of *tarka*, reasoning]). A *saṃnyāsin*’s *nididhyāsana* is thus

rather intellectual in contrast to the *bhakti* (reverential devotion) of a lay *smārtas* who worships deities. *Karman* forms part of the typical routine of Śringeri *śamnyāsins*, who perform some *āhnikas* rites, such as *samdhya-vandana*, but abstain from other rituals, such as *agnihotra*. These *śamnyāsins* say that *karman* is not intrinsic to their religious commitment and that they participate in rituals, not in the expectation of thereby attaining *mokṣa* or secular merit, but rather for the sake of providing a model for lay people. Their *samdhya-vandana* consists in *mahāvākyā*-recitation and serves to produce the concentration of mind required for the practice of *yoga*. The *karman* of such *śamnyāsins* has virtually been transformed into a yogic discipline.

It is noteworthy that in speaking of the path to *mokṣa*, Śaṅkara usually emphasizes the significance of *jñāna*, mentions *karman* only in a pejorative sense, and remains silent about *bhakti*.⁹⁶ This left room for the later tradition of Śringeri to reinterpret Śaṅkara's argument, assuming that he had recognized *bhakti* as a means of attaining *mokṣa* especially for lay adherents. This view is found in the *bhakti-stotras* traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkara. According to the *bhakti-stotras*, the *SDV* and modern materials, *bhakti* is “devotion” toward a god or a *guru*. It aims at obtaining the grace of the object of *bhakti*. It is through emotional *bhakti* rather than the more intellectual *śraddhā* that ordinary *smārtas* hope to attain the grace of God. The *śraddhā* found in the *SDV* seems to have more intellectual and less emotional content than the *śraddhā* translated by the word ‘faith’ in various English language works by *smārtas* followers of modern times. English-speakers' use of the word *faith* (as in “faith in God”) may perhaps influence these English-knowing writers to reinterpret the meaning of the word *śraddhā*, extending to it the connotation of the English word.

From our terminological analysis, it has become apparent that *śraddhā*, whose sphere in Śaṅkara's philosophical works was mainly the world of *śamnyāsa*, was later extended to apply to the religious commitment even of lay *smārtas*. In Śringeri tradition, *śraddhā* is a prerequisite of the *nididhyāsana* (continuous contemplation of one's essential nature), *guru-bhakti* (a disciple's reverence for a teacher, accompanied by trust in the words of his teacher), symbolic *bhakti* and *karman*, and *yoga* of *śamnyāsins* and of the *bhakti* (reverential devotion) and *karman* (ritual performance) of lay people. The

Śṛṅgeri Maṭha, which was originally an abode and a center of philosophical study of *saṃnyāsins*, later—after the period of Vidyāraṇya—became a center of pilgrimage even for lay people.

Lay *smārtas*, who evince evident *śraddhā* in the words of the *jagadguru* and of the *Veda*, often know little of the importance of *śraddhā* as a basic concept of their tradition and are generally unaware that Śaṅkara considered it necessary for attainment of *mokṣa*. *Śraddhā* has, however, always been a matter of great concern to *saṃnyāsins*, who even now regard it as an essential part of their religious commitment. After the Śṛṅgeri Maṭha became a center of pilgrimage, *śraddhā*—typically a *saṃnyāsin*'s virtue—was largely replaced there by the lay *smārtas*' *karman* (e.g. *samdhya-vandana*, *agnihotra*) and by their *bhakti* toward the *Jagadguru*, Śri Śāradā, and the other deities of the *pañcāyatana* (the five deities recognized by the *smārtas*).

Conclusion

From the viewpoint of the history of religion which is given by such historians of religion as W. C. Smith, faith includes a human response to the transcendent. When we attempt to apply this insight to the *smārta* tradition, we find a phenomenal difference between the transcendent, as comprehended by a *saṃnyāsin*, and the transcendent understood by a lay *smārta*. For the former, it is *para-brahman* (the highest *brahman*), the attainment of which is his ultimate goal. Except for *jīvanmuktas* (those emancipated while living), *saṃnyāsins* have not attained this goal, but strive to do so. For lay people, the transcendent consists in the Mother Goddess Śri Śāradā, the other deities of the *pañcāyatana*, and the *jagadguru* who possesses miraculous power, all of whom are the objects of worship by pilgrims to Śṛṅgeri. From Śaṅkara's philosophical viewpoint, the transcendent to which a *saṃnyāsin* responds is *nirguṇa-brahman* (the formless highest reality), whereas that to which a lay *smārta* responds is *saguṇa-brahman* (a lower reality endowed with form). At the phenomenal level of doctrine, however, both *para-brahman* and Śri Śāradā possess the same religious significance. Both are identified with knowledge, *para-brahman* with *jñāna* and Śri Śāradā with *vidyā* (i.e. *para-brahman*), and the identity with *para-brahman* and with *vidyā*

represents emancipation (*mokṣa*) for ascetics and lay people respectively.

Until he attains *para-brahman*, a *samnyāsin* must have *śraddhā* “trust in the words of a teacher and of scriptures.” At a concrete level, *śraddhā* is essential for a *samnyāsin*’s faith and is manifested in *nididhyāsana*, *guru-bhakti* and *yoga* practices. His ritual action and *bhakti* towards deities are not for their own sake, but are meant to serve as an example for lay people. The *bhakti* with which lay *smārtas* worship Śrī Śāradā and other deities and secure *darśan* (“seeing”) of the *jagadguru* is thought nearly indispensable in securing the expected blessings from these pious activities. But prior to *bhakti*, a lay *smārta* must have *śraddhā* “trust or belief” in the *jagadguru* and the deities. Although *bhakti* is inseparably associated with *karmāṇi* (ritual action) in the *smārta* tradition of Śṛṅgeri, it is indispensable for the laity. In the faith of *samnyāsins* and lay *smārtas* in the Śṛṅgeri tradition there is a common factor—trust in the *jagadguru*: for *samnyāsins*, trust in his words, which may lead to emancipation; for lay *smārtas*, trust in his power, which may bestow various worldly blessings.

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¹ Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization* (London: Paul Mall Press, 1972).

² William Cenckner’s *A Tradition of Teachers: Śāṅkara and the Jagadguru Today* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1983) does indeed supply much important information about the Śāṅkaran Vedānta traditions.

³ W. C. Smith, *Faith and Belief* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 6.

⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 167-168.

⁶ Ibid., p. 59.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., p. 220.

⁹ Ibid., p. 60.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 59-60. Smith conceives of *bhakti* as another form of faith, which “does not so readily lend itself as a potential counterpart for the explicitly generic notion of faith.” Cf. ibid., p. 219.

¹¹ *GBh*, VI. 37, p. 113, IX. 23, p. 145, XVII. 1, p. 246, XVII. 17, p. 560. *MUBh*, II. i. 7, p. 157, *PUBh*, I. 2, p. 107, *KUBh*, I. i. 2, p. 251, *BUBh*, I. v. 3, p. 698, III. ix. 21, p. 841, *CUBh*, VII. xix. 1, 59.

¹² *BUBh*, I. v. 3, p. 698.

¹³ *CUBh*, VII. xix. 1, p. 560.

¹⁴ *MUBh*, II. i. 7, p. 157.

¹⁵ *BSBh*, III. iv. 17, p. 981, III. iv. 18, p. 983, III. iv. 19, p. 985.

¹⁶ *BUBh*, III. ix. 21, p. 841.

¹⁷ Cf. the definition *ārādhyatvapraṅkāram jñānam* in Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhīmācārya Jhalakikar, *Nyāyakośa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy*, revised and re-edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudev Śāstrī Abhyankar (Poona: The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1978), pp. 615-616.

¹⁸ *BUBh*, III. ix. 21, p. 841.

¹⁹ *GBh*, IV. 39, p. 80. Śaṅkara says: “One, who is possessed of śraddhā, i.e., faithful, obtains knowledge” (*śraddhāvān śraddhālur labhate jñānam*). Cf. *GBh*, IV. 39, p. 80.

²⁰ *GBh*, IV. 40, p. 81. . . . aśraddadhānaś ca guruvākyasāstreṣu aviśvāsavāmś ca

²¹ Paul Hacker, “Über den Glauben in der Religionsphilosophie des Hinduismus,” *ZMR* 38 (1954): 61.

²² Daniel H. H. Ingalls, “The Study of Śaṅkarācārya,” *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, 33, I-IV (1952): 7. According to K. Aiyar, “it is an open secret that His predecessor [Saccidānandaśivābhinavānṛṣimhabhbhāratī] began a commentary on Śri Śaṅkaracharya’s famous work “Viveka Chudamani” and that His Holiness [Candraśekharabhāratī] continued it and yet the manuscript was not handed over by Him to anybody. His own feeling was that it was a book for the guidance of qualified, earnest aspirants and not to be broadcast to all and sundry” (*SS*, p. 80).

²³ *VC*, v. 26, p. 40.

²⁴ *VC*, vv. 19-30, pp. 33-44.

²⁵ Jagadguru Paramparā in Śṛṅgeri Maṭha

	Date of Saṃnyāsa	Date of Videha Mukti
1. Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda	788 C.E.	820 C.E.
2. Sureśvara	813	834
3. Nityabodhaghāṇa	818	848
4. Jñānaghāṇa	846	910
5. Jñānottama	905	954
6. Jñānagiri	950	1038
7. Śiṁhagiri	1036	1098
8. Īśvaratīrtha	1097	1146
9. Nr̥siṁhatīrtha	1146	1229
10. Vidyāśaṅkaratīrtha	1228	1333
11. Bhāratīkṛṣṇatīrtha	1328	1380
12. Vidyāraṇya	1331	1386
13. Candraśekharabhāratī I	1368	1389
14. Narasiṁhabhbhāratī I	1388	1408
15. Puruṣottamabhāratī I	1406	1448
16. Śaṅkarabhāratī	1429	1455
17. Candraśekharabhāratī II	1449	1464
18. Narasiṁhabhbhāratī II	1464	1479
19. Puruṣottambhbhāratī II	1473	1517
20. Rāmacandrabbhāratī	1508	1560
21. Narasiṁhabhbhāratī III	1557	1573
22. Narasiṁhabhbhāratī IV	1563	1576

23. Narasimhabhāratī V	1576	1600
24. Abhinavanarasimhabhāratī I	1599	1622
25. Saccidānandabhāratī I	1622	1663
26. Narasimhabhāratī VI	1663	1706
27. Saccidānandabhāratī II	1706	1741
28. Abhinavasaccidānandabhāratī I	1741	1767
29. Narasimhabhāratī VII	1767	1770
30. Saccidānandabhāratī III	1770	1814
31. Abhinavasaccidānandabhāratī II	1814	1817
32. Narasimhabhāratī VIII	1817	1879
33. Saccidānandaśivābhinavanṛsimhabhāratī	1866	1912
34. Candraśekharabhāratī III	1912	1954
35. Abhinavavidyātīrtha	Jagadguru since 1931	1954

Souvenir: Supplement to Śringeri Temples Kumbhabhishekam, (Madras: The Śringeri Souvenir Committee for the Akhila Bharata Śāṅkara Seva Samiti, 1964), pp. 27-28. This volume reports 788 C.E. as the date of Śāṅkara's *samnyāsa* and 820 C.E. as the date of his *videhamukti*. The date of 788 C.E. given here for Śāṅkara's *samnyāsa* is an evident error and must be taken as the date of his birth. The *SDV* states that Śāṅkara lived thirty-two years and that he took *samnyāsa* at the age of eight. If 820 C.E. is accepted as the year of his *videhamukti* (bodiless emancipation), reckoning thirty-two years backwards, we arrive at 788 C.E. as the year of his birth and 796 C.E. as the year of his *samnyāsa*. Different dates for the three first heads of the Maṭha are found in B. Lewis Rice, *Mysore, A Gazetteer* (Westminster: Archibald Constable and Company, 1897), vol 1, pp. 473-474.

	Consecrated	Died
Sankarāchārya (Born 737 A.D.)	745 A.D.	769 A.D.
Sureshvarāchārya	753	773
Nityabhodaganāchārya	758	848

Rice explicitly states that this information had been secured from the Śringeri Maṭha. The same names and dates are reported by C. Hayavadana Rao, *Mysore Gazetteer* (Bangalore: The Government Press, 1927), vol. 1 (new edition), pp. 306-307. It is apparent that Śringeri Maṭha revised these dates in the early twentieth century.

²⁶ *VC*, Candraśekharabhāratī's commentary on v. 26, p. 40.

²⁷ "Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasamgraha," in *Minor Works of Śrī Śāṅkarācārya*, Poona Oriental Series, no. 8, ed. H. R. Bhagavat, 2nd ed. (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1952), vs. 210-217, p. 148. Cf. Paul Hacker, "Über den Glauben," *ZMR*, 38 (1954): 56-57.

²⁸ In the Śrīraṅgam edition, *deva* (god) is replaced by *daiva* (fate). *The Works of Śāṅkarācārya*, vol. 15 (Śrīraṅgam, 1910). Cf. Paul Hacker, "Über den Glauben," *ZMR*, 38 (1954): 57.

²⁹ In Śringeri tradition, Mādhava is identified with Vidyāraṇya, the twelfth *jagadguru* of Śringeri Maṭha, who is said to have taken *samnyāsa* (world-renunciation) in 1331 C.E. and to have attained *videhamukti* (bodiless emancipation) in 1386 C.E. Thus, the Śringeri tradition ascribes composition of the Śāṅkaradigvijaya to Mādhava or Vidyāraṇya in the fourteenth century C.E. In the

light of philological evidence, however, the *ŚDV* can be presumed to have been compiled prior to 1800 C.E. and probably within the eighteenth century C.E. Cf. Yoshitsugu Sawai, “On a Legendary Biography of Śaṅkara—especially in regard to the date of Mādhava’s *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*—,” *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū), vol. XXXIV, No. 1, Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, December, 1985.

The *ŚDV* (V. 85, p. 173) lists the six virtues as: *sānti*, *dānti*, *uparati*, *kṣānti*, *saṁādhi* and *śraddhā*.

³⁰ *ŚDV*, p. 174.

³¹ *ŚDV*, VI. 9, p. 217.

³² *ŚDV*, XVI. 36, p. 585.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ *ŚDV*, XVI. 39, p. 586.

³⁵ *ŚDV*, I. 59ab, p. 21.

³⁶ *ŚDV*, I. 79ab, p. 25.

³⁷ *ŚDV*, XIV. 134, p. 498.

³⁸ *DWG*, p. 180.

³⁹ *DWG*, p. 35.

⁴⁰ The Sringeri Souvenir Committee ed., *Souvenir: Supplement to Sringeri Temples Kumbhabhishekam* (Madras: The Sri Vani Vilas Press, 1964), pp. 5-6.

⁴¹ K. R. Venkataraman, “Our Homage,” *Śringeri Vignettes* ed. by K. R. Venkataraman (Srirangam: Sri Vani Vilas Press, 1968), pp. 5-6.

⁴² “Two Teachings of Our Master—The Jagadguru,” *Flowers of Devotion* ed. by Akhila Bharata Śaṅkara Seva Samiti (Srirangam: Sri Vani Vilas Press, 1964), p. 13.

⁴³ This article adopts the convention of using the Sanskrit stem *karman* to denote ritual action.

⁴⁴ Cf. Minoru Hara, “Note on Two Sanskrit-Religious Terms: *Bhakti* and *Śrad-dhā*,” *Indo-Iranian Journal*, 7, no. 2/3 (1964): 132.

⁴⁵ *Upad*, I. xvi. 67, p. 129.

⁴⁶ *GBh*, VI. 47, p. 116. Cf. *GBh*, VII. 21, p. 122, VII. 22, p. 123.

⁴⁷ *GBh*, XII. 20, p. 188.

⁴⁸ M. Hara, “Note on Two Sanskrit Religious Terms,” *Indo-Iranian Journal*, 7 (1964): 145.

⁴⁹ *VC*, v. 32, p. 46.

⁵⁰ *VC*, p. 46.

⁵¹ *VC*, pp. 46-47.

⁵² *BU*, IV. v. 6, p. 941. Cf. *BU*, II. iv. 5, p. 760.

⁵³ *BUBh*, I. iv. 2, p. 649.

⁵⁴ *BUBh*, IV. v. 6, p. 941.

⁵⁵ *TT*, p. 172.

⁵⁶ Paul Hacker, *Upadesasāhasrī von Meister Shankara* (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid Verlag, 1949), p. 9.

⁵⁷ Sengaku Mayeda, *A Thousand Teachings: the Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara*, translated with introduction and notes (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), p. xiii.

⁵⁸ *VC*, v. 184, pp. 206-207.

⁵⁹ In his *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* (VI. 12, p. 104), Śaṅkara maintains that the *yoga* practice serves for “the purification of the inner sense” (*amtaḥkaraṇasya viśuddhi*).

⁶⁰ *VC*, v. 48, p. 63.

⁶¹ *VC*, p. 63.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ There is, however, a difference of emphasis between the meditation of a Vedāntic *samnyāsin* and an ascetic of the Yoga school. S. Dasgupta explains:

While for Yoga emancipation proceeds from understanding the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, with Vedānta salvation comes by the dawn of right knowledge that Brahman alone is the true reality, his own self.

A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922; Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, first Indian edition, 1975), p. 490.

⁶⁴ *Upad.*, II. ii. 4, pp. 191-192. According to the *Yoga-sūtra* (II. 30), *yama* (restraint) consists of *ahimsā* (non-injury), *satya* (veracity) and so on, and according to the *Yoga-sūtra* (II. 32), *niyama* (observance) consists of *sauca* (cleanliness), *santosa* (contentment), *tapas* (austerity), *svādhyāya* (study) and of making the Lord the motive of all action. Cf. Patañjali, *Yoga-sūtras*, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series XLVII (Poona, 1904).

⁶⁵ *BSBh*, II, i. 4, part I, p. 407.

⁶⁶ *BSBh*, I. iii. 33, part I, pp. 305-306.

⁶⁷ The *ŚDV* often applies the epithet *yogin* to Śaṅkara. In the present day *smārtas* sometimes thus designate *samnyāsins*.

⁶⁸ According to Robert E. Gussner's stylometric study of *bhakti stotras*, authorship for the *Dakṣināmūrtistotra* cannot be determined. But he thinks that it "may be" by Śaṅkara. Cf. Robert E. Gussner, "A Stylometric Study of the Authorship of Seventeen Sanskrit Hymns Attributed to Śaṅkara," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 96, no. 2 (April-June 1976): 266.

⁶⁹ *Dakṣināmurti Stotra of Sri Śaṅkaracharya*, Sanskrit texts and English trans. by Alladi Mahadevan Sastry, (Madras: Samata Books, first printing; 1899, third printing; 1978), X. 23, p. 188.

⁷⁰ T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Hymns of Śaṅkara*, Sanskrit texts and English trans., (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1980), v. 61, p. 139. *paśupateḥ pādāravindadvayam̄ cetovṛttir upetyati tiṣṭhati sadā sā bhaktir.*

⁷¹ *The Hymns of Śaṅkara*, v. 81, p. 156.

⁷² The Sringeri Souvenir Committee ed., *Souvenir*, p. 12.

⁷³ *The Saundaryalaharī or Flood of Beauty*, traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkarācārya, ed., trans. and presented in photographs by W. Norman Brown, *The Harvard Oriental Series*, vol. 43 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 7.

⁷⁴ *Saundaryalaharī*, v. 22a, p. 56. The translation is Brown's. Cf. p. 17.

⁷⁵ *Saundaryalaharī*, v. 33, p. 60. Cf. p. 18.

⁷⁶ *ŚDV*, VI. 68, p. 240.

⁷⁷ The term *guru-pāda-bhakti* is explicitly mentioned at the *ŚDV*, VI. 70, p. 241.

⁷⁸ *ŚDV*, XII. 80ab, p. 455.

⁷⁹ *ŚDV*, XIV. 106cd, p. 494. Cf. *ŚDV*, IV. 43, p. 105; IX. 42, p. 355 (*tvat-padabhajanam*).

⁸⁰ *ŚDV*, VI. 12, p. 219, XIII. 2, p. 458.

⁸¹ *ŚDV*, II. 47, p. 46 (devam bhajāva), II. 63, p. 51 (devam bhajanta), V. 172, p. 213 (viśveśāś caranayugam̄ pranamya bhaktvā "[Śaṅkara], having paid homage with *bhakti* to the feet of Viśveśa [Śiva at Kāśī],"), XVI. 14, p. 582 (śisyāḥ . . . haribhaktibhājah).

⁸² *ŚDV*, VI. 4, p. 215 (haripadāmbujabhakti-), XII. 31, p. 443 (tava aṅghripadmam . . . vidbudhāḥ bhajante).

⁸³ *ŚDV*, V. 37, p. 155 (bhaktisamnataḥ "being humble with *bhakti*"), V. 80,

p. 171 (bhaktivāśād “on account of *bhakti*”), V. 103, p. 182; IX. 79, p. 365; XII. 26, p. 442; XV. 7, p. 529 (bhaktipūrvā-), XVI. 39, p. 586 (bhaktyā yuktāḥ).

⁸⁴ (1) *bhakti* of a spiritual teacher
arcanā ŠDV, V. 134, p. 202, XV. 28, p. 532, XVI. 36, p. 585 (Śaṅkara’s feet).
pūjā V. 101, p. 181 (Govinda’s feet), XII. 47, p. 447 (Śaṅkara’s feet), XIII. 54, p. 467, XV. 7, p. 529, XVI. 8, p. 580.

upāsanā VI. 19, p. 222.

(2) *bhakti* of a god
arcanā I. 37, p. 17, V. 118, p. 194, V. 172, p. 213, XII. 6, p. 435, XIV. 80, p. 489, XV. 14, p. 530, XVI. 104, p. 601, XVI. 107, p. 602.
pūjā V. 2, p. 140, XII. 38, p. 446, XII. 68, p. 452, XV. 4, p. 511.
upāsanā II. 49, p. 47, IV. 25, p. 98, VI. 13, p. 219, XII. 34, p. 444, XV. 13, p. 530.

ārādhanā XII. 8, p. 436, XII. 28, p. 442, XII. 34, p. 444.

saparyā XII. 20, p. 441.

⁸⁵ DWG, p. 151.

⁸⁶ DWG, p. 153.

⁸⁷ DWG, p. 147.

⁸⁸ In philosophical and religious contexts, Paul Hacker distinguishes two sorts of śraddhā: the intellectual and the ritual śraddhās. He says: “Intellectual śraddhā—faith, belief, reliance on the teacher’s teachings—is a prerequisite to jñāna, but it occurs in the practices of *karman*, *bhakti* and *yoga* also.” Cf. Paul Hacker, “Śraddhā,” WZKSO, VII (1963): 155–158, 188.

⁸⁹ Paul Hacker, “Śraddhā,” WZKSO, VII (1963): 155.

⁹⁰ DWG, pp. 145–146.

⁹¹ DWG, p. 145.

⁹² As discussed *infra*, *sannyāsins*, who are theoretically exempt from ritual, typically say that their participation in religious rites and worship has a purely symbolic significance, being motivated by the need to provide models for the laity. In practice, it serves to concentrate the mind.

⁹³ Seshagiri Rao maintains that śraddhā in the Brāhmaṇas may be referred to as ‘ritualistic’ śraddhā, in the Upaniṣads as ‘gnostic’ one, and in the Bhagavadgītā as ‘devotional’ one (Seshagiri Rao, *The Concept of Śraddhā*, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation at Harvard University, 1966, p. 288).

⁹⁴ For an example of Śaṅkara’s discussion of the śraddhā of persons who are not ascetics, see BUBh, III. ix. 21.

⁹⁵ Śaṅkara’s definition of śraddhā is complemented by his explanation (in GBh, IV. 40, p. 81) of aśraddhā, which he says is *avīśvāsa* ‘lack of trust.’ In his *Dīḍimā* commentary Dhanapati glosses śraddhā as *viśvāsa* (ŠDV, V. 85, p. 174, XVI. 36, p. 585) and *bhakti* as *anurāga* (ŠDV, XVI. 36, p. 585). In general smārta writers make little use of the word *viśvāsa*. The ŠDV employs it at least five times, but only in a secular context.

[Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s disciples say to Śaṅkara:] “Therefore, he [Sureśvara] does not appear to us worthy of trust.”

tasmān na viśvāsapadām vibhāti no (ŠDV, XIII. 12c, p. 460)

[Padmapāda’s disciples say to Śaṅkara:] “How does this Viśvarūpa with his mind solely devoted to rites, Sir, became the object of your trust?”

karmaikatānamatir eṣa kathāṁ guro te viśvāsapātram avapadyata viśvarūpah/ (ŠDV, XIII. 21ab, p. 462).

Having written a work called *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, having dedicated it to his object of veneration [Śaṅkara], having obtained his trust and having addressed him, Viśvarūpa once again spoke to his teacher, who was his own god.

naiṣkarmyasiddhyākhyanibandham ekaṇ kṛtvātmapūjyāya nivedya cāptvā/
viśvāsam uktvā 'tha punar babbhāse sa viśvarūpo gurum ātmadevam// (*ŚDV*, XIII. 54, p. 467)

[Śaṅkara says to Padmapāda:] “Hence trust is to be avoided [and] should not be placed in men with whom one is not well acquainted.”

viśvāso 'to 'paricitanṛṣu projjhāṇīyo na kāryah (*ŚDV*, XIV. 25d, p. 478)

[Padmapāda’s uncle says to him:] “Trusting me, you had deposited [with me] the great book, . . .”

viśvasya mām nihitavān asi pustabhāram . . . (*ŚDV*, XIV. 140a, p. 499)

⁹⁶ The principal and important exception to this generalization is Śaṅkara’s *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, in which he cannot ignore the word *bhakti* completely, although he reinterprets its significance from his own philosophical viewpoint.

ABBREVIATIONS

- ŚDV* Mādhava, Śaṅkaradigvijaya, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, no. 22, Poona: Ānandāśrama Press, 1891.
- BSBh* Śaṅkara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, no. 21, Poona: Ānandāśrama Press, part I, 1890.
- DWG* Dialogues with the Guru: Talks with His Holiness Sri Chandrasekhara Bharati Swaminah, compiled by R. Krishnaswami Aiyar, Bombay: Chetana Ltd., 1956.
- GBh* Śaṅkara, Bhagavadgītābhāṣya, Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit, vol. II, Poona: Motilal Banarsiādass, 1929; reprint ed., Dehli: Motilal Banarsiādass, 1978.
- BU* Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
- BUBh* Śaṅkara, Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya
- CUBh* —, Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya
- MUBh* —, Mundakopaniṣadbhāṣya
- KUBh* —, Kaṭhopaniṣadbhāṣya
- PUBh* —, Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya
- Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit, vol. I, *Iśādidaśopaniṣadah Samkarabḥāṣyasametah*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsiādass, 1964; reprint ed., 1978.
- Upad* Śaṅkara, Upadeśasāhasrī, critically edited by Sengaku Mayeda, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1973.
- VC* Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkara, commented by Candrasekhara bhāratī and trans. into English by P. Sankaranarayān, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1973; reprint ed., 1979.
- ZMR* Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft
- WZKSO* Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ost-Asiens.

BHĀVANĀ ET CRÉATIVITÉ DE LA CONSCIENCE

F. CHENET

Parmi les nombreuses méthodes de libération spirituelle mises en œuvre par les sotériologies indiennes, nulle n'est plus digne d'attention que celle de la maîtrise de l'imagination connue sous le nom de *bhāvanā*. En effet, nulle part sans doute mieux que dans ce privilège accordé à l'imagination dans les conduites spirituelles n'éclate l'originalité puissante du génie indien.

Après que la révélation upaniṣadique ait ouvert la voie à la découverte pacifiée de la conscience comme existence et présence absolues, s'étaient amorcées des pratiques d'absorption enstatische et de maîtrise des fonctions psychophysiologiques. Leur systématisation progressive dans certains cercles de yogins, comme en témoignent les *Upaniṣads* moyennes et tardives (*Kaṭha, Maitri U.*), devait conduire, d'une part, à prôner l'effort volontaire pour vider l'esprit de tout contenu et, de l'autre, à élucider sans cesse la nature ultime de la conscience, dont la question devait traverser toute l'histoire des spéculations philosophiques indiennes. Par la suite, le Yoga classique prescrivit l'effort pour vider l'organe mental de toute turbulence, l'arrêt de tout fonctionnement mental devant permettre la restitution à soi de la puissance pensante en sa forme propre, c'est à dire l'Isolement de la pure conscience.

Or, voici qu'à côté du *samyama* où les quatre “méditations d'unisson” (*samapatti*) constitutives du “*saṃādhi* avec germe”, c'est à dire avec connaissance d'objet (*Yoga sūtra* I.46), sont destinées à se résorber dans “*l'autre samādhi*” sans connaissance d'objet (Y.S. I.18), apparaissent des pratiques mystiques originales faisant au contraire appel à la puissance de l'imagination intégrée. Leur essor prend son départ d'une reconnaissance progressive du dynamisme créateur de la conscience, dont l'essence est comprise non point comme représentation mais comme énergie. Une fois découverte la vertu propre à cette conscience-énergie, il restait encore à définir les modalités de sa conversion à des fins sotériologiques. Bien qu'elles diffèrent dans les détails, ces pratiques sont identiques dans leur principe comme dans leur intentionnalité: partageant la même visée

d'une maîtrise de la destinée humaine, elles s'efforcent d'utiliser le dynamisme réalisateur de la conscience profonde en vue d'orienter le flux en devenir de l'individualité psychique transmigrante, elle-même conçue comme un continuum psychologique.

Les pratiques de la *bhāvanā* méritent une élucidation systématique à un double titre. D'une part, la *bhāvanā*, située au confluent des approches métaphysiques de la conscience et des ressources de la psychologie des profondeurs liée aux techniques du Yoga, interroge le rapport de la conscience à son contenu, et donc la nature ultime de la conscience. D'autre part, elle met en jeu l'articulation de la théorie et de la pratique propre à chaque école ou courant doctrinal, tant il est vrai que la psychologie en Inde est toujours psychagogie, c'est à dire entraînement mental et façonnement de la conscience.

Qu'est-ce donc que la *bhāvanā*? Qu'en est-il du dynamisme de la représentation dans les psychagogies indiennes? Y a-t-il une puissance créatrice ou une efficience réalisatrice propre à l'imagination? Et quelle est sa valeur opératoire en vue de la délivrance? Autrement dit, la conscience peut-elle ressaisir son dynamisme créateur et selon quelles modalités? Une conversion psychagogique de l'imagination est-elle possible et comment s'inscrit-elle dans la progression des étapes du Yoga? Enfin, quels rôles l'imagination d'une part, le contrôle et l'utilisation de l'énergie des émotions de l'autre jouent-ils dans le processus de réintégration?

On se propose donc de dégager ici les diverses composantes de la *bhāvanā* en esquissant son développement dans une perspective moins historique que différentielle. Nous retracerons son évolution en examinant ses formes et spécifications. Une fois reconnue l'importance croissante que revêt la *bhāvanā* comme moyen salvifique (*upāya*), on appréciera enfin le rôle dévolu par les sotériologies indiennes à l'exercice de la faculté imaginative dans la voie d'auto-réalisation (*sādhana*).

L'étymologie du terme *bhāvanā*, qui réfère à la seconde racine sanskrite du verbe être: BHŪ- notant tout mode, toute forme, douée d'objectivité et de positivité, de l'être en devenir (par opposition au non-être ou au néant des logiciens, l'*at�āntabhaava*), suffit à indiquer l'importance et la diversité des pratiques qu'il subsume.

Si la racine AS- note la pure actualité ontologique sans référence à la durée ni à l'action, l'existence pure et réelle de l'être "assuré" ou bien l'affirmation absolue de soi dans l'être, la racine BHŪ- note la "production ou l'auto-production dans l'être",¹ autrement dit le devenir actif. "Sur la racine BHŪ- ont bourgeonné d'exubérantes frondaisons, une infinité de nuances spécifiant le devenir."² "Sans dogmatiser sur l'influence en philosophie de la structure linguistique,"³ on remarque que la forme causative du mot est à rapprocher du causatif de BHŪ-, *bhav(ay)*- signifiant "faire devenir, faire naître, mais aussi se consacrer, contrôler, enfin, avoir présent à l'esprit, considérer, connaître,"⁴ de sorte qu'un interprète (Hiriyanna) suggère de traduire le dérivé nominal *bhāva* par "créativité". Le terme *bhāvanā* désigne donc toutefois toute activité mentale ou tout acte réalisateur dans lequel l'application de l'esprit vise à produire un effet sur le mode transitif ou bien à faire venir à l'existence sur le mode intransitif, à actualiser une transformation interne au sujet qui se "fait être". Le vocable se révèle donc porteur de significations multiples dont la gamme s'étend de la simple "culture physique" (*kāya-bhāvanā*) à la culture d'une attitude mentale (par exemple, la culture d'attitudes positives: *bhāvanātah*, *Yoga sūtra* I.3) et à la culture religieuse au sens très général. Dans ce dernier registre d'expérience, *bhāvanā* désigne en son acception classique une concentration mentale intense, une contemplation assidue et répétée dans laquelle le méditant demeure mentalement concentré sur un objet (par exemple, "en faisant constamment l'expérience de l'ātman" — *ātma-bhāva-bhāvanā*, Y.S. IV.25). La traduction du terme simplement par "contemplation mentale" s'avère toutefois impossible dans les doctrines plus tardives où, revêtant une acception technique, il désigne alors une évocation mystique au moyen de la création mentale ou de l'instauration magique d'une sphère d'existence. Ayant pleinement sa valeur étymologique, le terme désigne un acte qui est essentiellement instaurateur de représentations fictives.

I. *Le Yoga classique:*

Dans le *śamādhi pāda* des *Yoga sūtra*, Patañjali prescrit au méditant la pratique conjointe "de la constante répétition et de la méditation

de la signification (du *praṇava*)” (*tajjapas tadarthabhāvanam*, I.28) en vue de surmonter la condition distraite et dispersée de son esprit. Or, le pouvoir d’un mantra, fût-il OM “exprimant” Īśvara, est potentiel et non point en acte. C’est une semence qui a besoin d’être développée graduellement, soit au moyen de la répétition audible puis silencieuse et mentale, soit au moyen d’une concentration intense polarisant toutes les facultés mentales sur sa signification. *Bhāvanā* désigne ici le fait de demeurer constamment dans l’esprit, ainsi que glose Vācaspatimiśra: “*bhāvanā* est une absorption réitérée dans l’esprit” (*Tattvavāśāradī* ad I.28). Autrement dit, le ressort de cette méditation est l’effort inlassablement répété, assidu et persévérant (*abhyāsa*, I.13), “continué pendant un temps prolongé” (*dirghakālanairantarya*, I.14). Point de *bhāvanā* sans une application intense de la pensée unifiée sur un seul objet, sans une pratique de polarisation constante des facultés mentales sur un seul principe, ici Īśvara (*ekatattvābhyāsah*, I.32). La constance de la répétition fait cesser la condition dispersée de l’esprit et assure la mise au repos du psychisme. Ainsi dans la “culture d’attitudes opposées” (*pratipakṣabhāvanam*, II.33-34), la réflexion constante sur les contraires réussit-elle à contrecarrer le jeu des tendances mauvaises, elles-mêmes enracinées dans de mauvaises habitudes de pensée, et à désceller les habitudes mentales indésirables en les supplantant par d’autres d’une nature exactement opposée. L’injection existentielle réitérée de l’attitude contraire, si l’on ose dire, induit une germination rendant possible la transformation graduelle des tendances indésirables en d’autres méritoires. Or, la formulation de la doctrine classique du Yoga fut préparée, comme on sait, par les méthodes des écoles bouddhiques. Rien d’étonnant dès lors à ce que cette première composante de la *bhāvanā* se retrouve dans le Bouddhisme, dont le développement fut nécessairement associé au Yoga ou, tout au moins, procéda selon des lignes parallèles de développement.

II. Le Bouddhisme, des origines au Grand Véhicule:

Dans le Bouddhisme, la “culture mentale” recouvre une grande variété de pratiques relevant des cinq facteurs connus sous le nom de *samādhi* et de *paññā*.⁵ Ces pratiques visent également à produire

un assouplissement et une transformation en profondeur du psychisme, en reconditionnant l'organisation de ses éléments constitutants actifs mais leur intentionnalité est celle d'une désidentification par la connaissance aboutissant à une involution dans le vide, à une implosion, si l'on peut dire. En effet, le Bouddhisme se présente, à ses origines du moins, comme une discipline mentale d'autodélivrance recourant à une technique psychologique très élaborée de neutralisation des activités du psychisme inconscient (tendances invétérées, "constructions" inconscientes) dont la continuité sérielle (*samtāna*) compose le flux existentiel humain:⁶ la doctrine-médecine du Bouddha est une méthode positive pour guérir la souffrance de la condition humaine dont le propre est d'être "astreinte à devenir."⁷ "O architecte de l'édifice (i.e. la "soif", le désir), je t'ai découvert. Tu ne rebâtiras plus l'édifice. Tes poutres sont toutes brisées, le faîte de l'édifice est détruit. Cette conscience (*citta*) a perdu ses énergies fabricatrices (*visamkhāra*) et est parvenue au terme des soifs" (*Dhammapada*, 154). Or, le Bouddhisme, outre l'importance du psychisme inconscient, découvre aussi de manière corrélative le dynamisme de la conscience, voire sa polarité énergétique.⁸ Dès lors, "ce sur quoi un moine porte son attention, ce qu'il analyse longuement, c'est vers cela qu'il ploie son cœur", c'est à dire le dynamisme de sa conscience profonde (*Majjhima Nikāya*, I.115). Par la "culture mentale", le méditant se promeut en conformité avec un idéal de perfection; il tend à se perfectionner dans une "recréation de soi-même selon un idéal" (C. A. E. Rhys-Davids). Dans son effort ultérieur de systématisation, l'*Abhidharmakośa* définit justement la *bhāvanā* comme un acte d'attention active, discursive et intense⁹ ou bien comme une polarisation active de toute la conscience (*sammukhibhava*) visant soit à l'acquisition (*pratilamba*) d'une disposition appelée à devenir partie intégrante du caractère, soit à contrecarrer¹⁰ certaines tendances indésirables en vue de les expulser.¹¹ Parmi les quarante méthodes de méditation du *Theravāda*, celles qui relèvent du chemin de la vision apaisée (*śamatha*) incluent la culture des quatre "stations brahmaïques" (*brahmavihāra*), qui sont autant de créations mentales rejoignant la *pratipakṣa-bhāvanā* du Yoga classique. Plus originales sont les méthodes des *kaśina* qui ressortissent à des procédés de visualisation requérant le développement de la capacité de rétention des images¹².

visuelles.¹² La fixation oculaire et la concentration y portent d'abord sur un objet visible, un disque de couleur pure (bleu sombre, jaune, rouge, ou blanc), par exemple, suscitant la formation d'une image préparatoire (*parikammanimitta*) jusqu'à ce que l'on perçoive clairement l'image acquise (*uggaha-nimitta*). Tandis que l'on continue à porter son attention sur cette image, une image stable dite "double similaire" (*paṭibhāga-nimitta*) apparaît au terme d'une dématérialisation totale des données sensorielles. Grâce à cette concentration d'approche, désormais au second degré, où l'attention porte alors sur la contrepartie (*paṭibhāga*) mentale de l'image physique du disque, c'est à dire sur sa seule image intériorisée, la conscience est conduite à s'abîmer et à s'identifier à l'image immobile et immaculée de l'objet. Pareille concentration d'approche (*upacārasamādhi*) conduit à la première absorption (*jhāna*). Le méditant peut encore pratiquer la "méditation de l'horrible" (*aśubhabhāvanā*)¹³ consistant dans la visualisation réaliste de l'un des dix aspects du cadavre. Cette contemplation vise également à la formation d'images latentes persistantes dans le psychisme inconscient. L'ascète concupiscent devenu "maître de l'acte d'attention constituant la vision (*jītamanaskāra*; cf. *atikrāntamanasikāra*) et qui ne peut considérer son propre corps ou bien l'univers que comme rempli de squelettes"¹⁴ peut triompher de la sorte du quadruple désir, à savoir le désir (*rāga*) des couleurs, des figures, des tangibles et des honneurs. Or, la "méditation de l'horrible" n'a pas pour résultat l'abandon (*prahāna*) des passions (*kleśa*), mais seulement leur arrêt, (*viskambana*), car "elle est un acte d'attention portant non sur la réalité mais sur une représentation volontaire."¹⁵ Aussi importe-t-il avant tout de "fortifier le pouvoir de vision" (*adhimukti*).¹⁶

Enfin, la méditation sur l'image sacrée du Bouddha pourvu de ses 32 marques canoniques (*lakṣaṇa*) enveloppe un processus de visualisation active qui fraye la voie à la valorisation systématique de l'image dans les *Tantras* bouddhiques ultérieurs. Après avoir visualisé l'image du Bouddha telle qu'il l'a projeta sur une toile selon la légende, le méditant intériorise la figure sacrée du corps du Bouddha; la portant sans cesse en lui, il s'efforce d'en pénétrer intuitivement l'harmonie plastique. Une fois sa faculté de vision apaisée, sa méditation peut se poursuivre par l'adoration de la figure contemplée et l'offrande au Bouddha de ses aspirations ardentes. Bien que

tardif, ce texte de Kamalaśīla offre une description précise du “processus graduel de l’exercice”, largement répandu à date ancienne dans le *Theravāda*. Voici donc l’“ordre des exercices spirituels”: “Alors, au début, le yogin, fixant sa pensée (*citta*) sur les formes corporelles du Tathāgata telles qu’il les a vues (*yathādrṣṭa*) ou apprises (*yathaśruta*), pratique la vision apaisée (*śamatha*). Il réfléchit (*manasikaroti*) continuellement à ces formes corporelles, brillantes comme de l’or en fusion, ornées des marques et des sous-marques canoniques (*anuvyañjana*) et qui, établies à l’intérieur du *mandala* circulaire (*cakramandala*), font le bien des êtres (*sattvahita*) par toutes sortes de moyens salvifiques (*upāya*). Eprouvant du désir pour de telles qualités (*guna*), le yogin, calmant toute distraction (*vikṣepa*) et agitation (*auddhatya*), demeurera recueilli (*dhyāna*) aussi longtemps que ces formes corporelles se montreront clairement à lui, comme si elles étaient directement présentes (*puro’ vasthita*).”¹⁷

A ce premier exercice de vision apaisée succède alors celui du discernement incisif (*vipaśyana*): “Ensuite, le yogin pratiquera le discernement incisif en examinant l’arrivée (*āgamana*) et le départ (*nirgamana*) des reflets du Tathāgata. Il raisonnera ainsi: de même que ces reflets du corps du Tathāgata ne viennent de nulle part et ne vont nulle part, sont vides de nature propre (*svabhava-śūnya*) et privés de Moi et de Mien (*ānātmiya-rahita*), ainsi tous les *dharmas* sont vides de nature propre, comme le reflet (*pratibimba*), d’arrivée et de départ et privés de nature inhérente existante (*bhāva-svabhāva-rahita*).”¹⁷

L’alternance répétée de la vision apaisée et du discernement incisif aboutit finalement à leur coalescence sous forme d’une union inseparable (*yuganaddha*). L’intérêt de ce texte est donc de montrer que l’on peut accomplir un *saṃādhi* en prenant pour support de méditation le corps du Bouddha. Cette méditation suppose que l’image mentale de la copie extérieure soit transférée au psychisme inconscient avant de faire l’objet d’une récollection extérieure nette, claire et pleine de vie, et d’une vision intuitive de ce dont l’image est l’expression.

Dans le Grand Véhicule, la *bhāvanā* vint à désigner la phase terminale de la carrière du Bodhisattva. Le “chemin de la pratique mystique” (*bhāvanāmarga*) est, selon Vasubandhu, “considération ou contemplation répétée des vérités libératrices (*punarāmukhīkara-*

*na), c'est à dire répétition saturante (*abhyāsa*) du savoir pur”.¹⁸ Tout se passe comme si la conscience, dans le creuset même de l'aspiration en marche, s'assimilait par intussusception les vérités libératrices au point de leur devenir consubstantielle. A l'image de l'eau qui prend la forme du vase où on la verse, le savoir pur se coule dans le vase-réceptacle (*bhājana*) qu'est devenu l'ascète.¹⁹ Ce chemin ne peut être parcouru, selon le *Mahāyānasūtrālampkara*, que par l'ascète qui a suivi celui de l'Accumulation du Mérite (*sambhāramārga*), de l'Entraînement (*prayogamārga*) et de la Vision (*darsanamārga*), et accédé par suite à la connaissance indifférenciée (*nirvikalpajñāna*). Durant les quinze premiers moments de la compréhension des vérités (*abhisamaya*), l'ascète parcourt en effet le Chemin de la Vision. Au seizième, il aborde le Chemin de la pratique mystique, sur lequel il progressera à travers les dix terres (*bhūmi*) jusqu'au chemin parachevé (*niṣṭhāmārga*) où il s'éteindra dans le *Parinirvāṇa*. Or, le Chemin de la Vision ne tranche que les vues erronées (notion du “je”, etc.), sans trancher l'attachement (*rāga*) éprouvé pour les sensations agréables, lesquelles à différence du “je” sont réelles. De même laisse-t-il intacte l'aversion (*dveṣa*) et les autres afflictions que le Chemin de la Méditation seul peut trancher. C'est par conséquent la *bhāvanā* qui actualise l'abandon des *kleśa* au plan du formel (*rupadhatu*) et au plan au-delà de la forme (*arupyadhatu*). On mesure par là l'importance de la *bhāvanā* dans le Chemin bouddhique. Le rôle cardinal qui lui est dévolu interdit donc de réduire le Bouddhisme à une “religion de l'analyse,”²⁰ comme on le fait parfois, quand bien même procéderait-il d'abord à l'analyse réductrice des *dharmas* et à l'énoncé de la formule de la coproduction conditionnée: tant il est vrai que de toutes les doctrines indiennes, le Bouddhisme demeure la plus vulnérable aux grandes simplifications.*

III. *L'Imagination instauratrice selon le Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha:*

La notion de *bhāvanā* devient conceptuellement centrale dans le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* (du VIIe S. au XIIe S. ap. J. C. ?) dans lequel le re-travail spéculatif de l'idéalisme bouddhique dans une perspective brahmaïque et védântine se conjugue à l'influence puissante du Šivaïsme du Cachemire. Ce vaste traité rhapsodique gravite autour d'un pivot central, à savoir la notion de *manas*, entendu ici non

point comme l’instance bien connue de la psychologie du Sāṃkhya et du Vedānta mais comme la fonction cosmogonique à la racine de la manifestation.

Au sein de la pure Conscience se dessine une “tendance à l’écoulement”²¹ à la faveur de laquelle la Conscience se révèle comme une absence agissante vouée à s’épanouir en un courant d’activité créatrice. Forme modifiée de la pure Conscience, le *manas* apparaît donc comme cette face active par laquelle elle se manifeste comme agent créateur. En devenant le *manas*, le *Brahman* se modifie en l’activité de la pensée, laquelle produit et suscite sans trêve le tissu des apparences changeantes. “Le *manas* est considéré comme ayant une forme composée du pouvoir de la volonté appartenant à l’âme suprême toute puissante et infinie.”²² Une fois cette énergie dynamique éclosé en son sein sous la forme d’une énergie toujours frémissante, la Conscience en vocation abandonne son état indivis et exempt de la dualité du sujet et de l’objet; elle se modalise en la conscience empirique, affectant la forme d’une conscience à double pôle. Dans sa tension vers l’objectivité, elle se projette et extrapose un objet extérieur, et finit par se déployer en la forme même de l’univers différencié. “Le *manas* n’est rien qu’orientation indéfinie de la pensée (*bhāvanāmātram*) et celle-ci a pour propriété de frémir; son activité prend la forme de ce qui est conçu et chacun en perçoit l’effet.”²³ Le terme *bhāvanā* ne désigne pas ici un mode particulier de cette vie de la conscience, comme s’il y avait pour celle-ci, à titre de possibilité offerte à elle, une vie représentative à côté d’autres formes et d’autres modes possibles d’existence, à côté par exemple d’une vie conceptuelle, volitive, affective ou sensible. En effet, comme dynamisme et mouvement créateur dans la direction du concret croissant (concret ne voulant pas dire ici forcément sensible), la *bhāvanā* est coextensive à l’ensemble de la vie mentale. L’essence de la conscience modifiée doit être comprise à la lumière de notion de *bhāvanā*. Or, la conscience modifiée, dans sa tendance vers l’objectivité, “acquiert une forme définie dans et par une intense activité imageante.”²⁴ Ainsi, dans la mesure où la conscience modifiée est énergie en mouvement (*spanda*) et se définit par son activité immanente ou vibration, la nature du *manas* est d’être le centre d’intégration des facultés humaines: il est le foyer d’une activité mentale synthétique connue sous le nom de *samkalpa* (le pré-

fixe *sam-* notant ici “l’activité dans sa totalité,” *Grammaire sanscrite* de L. Renou, par. II2, p. I45), et destinée à revêtir autant d’aspects ou de modes qu’il existe de directions où elle peut s’engager. Dans le sillage de son ancienne acceptation upaniṣadique désignant la fonction psychique non encore différenciée en facultés particulières, le vocable *manas* est donc ici le terme générique subsumant toutes les fonctions en lesquelles s’engage le mouvement de la conscience modifiée. Ainsi appelle-t-on couramment ce mouvement le “jugement” (*buddhi*) lorsqu’il devient capable, après avoir oscillé à la croisée d’une alternative, de se déterminer et de se fixer sur l’un des termes; lorsqu’il a le sentiment d’être un individu concret pro-férant le mot “je”, on l’appelle “l’agent du moi” (*ahamkāra*); lorsqu’il devient capable de la pensée réflexive douée de rétention et de protension, conservant les souvenirs du passé et ouverte aux anticipations du futur, on l’appelle la “pensée intentionnelle” (*citta*); lorsqu’abandonnant son état d’équilibre, il désire quelque chose, on l’appelle enfin “l’imagination” (*kalpanā*), etc.²⁵ L’idée directrice de ce texte remarquable, que nous résumons ici, est celle d’une déduction, à partir d’un seul principe synthétique consistant en une énergie en mouvement, de la totalité des facultés particulières de la vie mentale. Le *manas* se dévoile comme le foyer de l’activité im-geante (*samkalpanam*, III.4.43) qui se tient à la racine de la vie men-tale tout entière, comme le pouvoir de former des images mentales et de les soutenir simultanément en les pénétrant de son pouvoir d’attention.

Dès lors, en tant que pouvoir créateur, “c’est lui qui imagine à son gré son corps et déploie en vertu de son extension le bel aspect du filet d’Indra (= le monde phénoménal).”²⁶ “L’esprit est le créa-teur du monde qui apparaît tel que l’imagine l’esprit.”²⁷ “Quelque condition que l’on puisse imaginer en son for intérieur, on le de-vient à l’instant.”²⁸ “De fait, l’esprit (*cittam*) est le *puruṣa* du corps qui est conçu par lui: quelque forme qu’il affecte, il l’atteint sans nul doute.”²⁹ Omnipotence par conséquent de ce pouvoir créateur de l’esprit présent en tout esprit³⁰ et capable de tout accomplir.³¹ “Quelque réflexion qu’il vienne à surgir dans l’esprit, celle-ci de-vient manifeste sous une forme et porte fruit.”³² “Lorsqu’on croit et pense avec une foi intense d’une certaine manière, il en résulte qu’on se met pendant ce temps à percevoir ainsi les choses.”³³ “Ce

à quoi l'esprit pense avec une conviction bien établie de sa réalité, cela il le devient de multiples manières.”³⁴ “De la manière dont l'esprit conçoit une chose, cela même se produit ainsi à l'instant.”³⁵ “De ce fait, ce que l'esprit vient à créer mentalement en demeurant imbu d'une perception très fermement ancrée, cela se produit alors.”³⁶ Ces distiques nous introduisent dans le mystère de la *bhāvanā*. Le fait de penser à un objet ou à une condition définis et d'en faire un élément puissant de tout le processus mental conduit la conscience à se mettre à l'unisson de cette condition et à participer à ce qui est créé mentalement. Autrement dit, l'homme devient ce qu'il contemple, c'est à dire ce qu'il s'imagine être en son for intérieur: par un subtil mimétisme intérieur, sa conscience profonde, réceptive et plastique et donc ductile, s'assimile par capillarité ou par innutrition aux images qu'elle entretient au plus sourd d'elle-même. Or, l'ardeur de la foi associée à la répétition intensive et saturante joue un rôle déterminant dans ce processus d'objectivation par mise à l'unisson et résonance sympathique: “on appelle *abhyāsa* le fait d'accomplir sans cesse une action méritoire; cela constitue la fin vers laquelle doit tendre l'effort humain.”³⁷ “Ce qui apparaît de manière répétée dans le for intérieur, cela se produit à cause de la “saveur” intime de “l'atmosphère” (à l'image des nuages chargés de pluie donnant vie à la végétation) de la pensée pure.”³⁸ Seulement, que doit-on entendre ici par “foi”? S'agit-il d'une foi aveugle? Non point, si l'on entend par ce terme une croyance irrationnelle. Mais si l'on signifie par ce vocable une attitude où la sincérité de l'adhésion compense l'obscurité du connaître, alors la création mentale entre en jeu ici sous la forme d'une représentation synthétique (*samkalpa*) reposant sur une adhésion qui ne doute ni ne vacille, bref, sur un acquiescement sans distance. Elle est étayée sur la certitude de l'immanence à la conscience d'un énergie actualisatrice censée participer au pouvoir créateur de l'univers lui-même. Postulant que la conscience individuelle est le foyer empirique où s'individualise l'énergie universelle, elle enveloppe par conséquent la prise de conscience active d'une énergie divine immanente à la conscience. “Ce qui est créé mentalement au moyen d'une création mentale fermement ancrée, cela même est expérimenté.”³⁹ On est ici en présence d'une “imagination sans distance” dans laquelle la combinaison de pensée, d'émotion et de

désir crée une forme mentale active et douée d'une polarité énergétique. Rendue prégnante, cette création mentale acquiert une existence magique: elle cristallise désormais le pouvoir de la conscience en polarisant durablement ses fonctions mentales; impossible de distinguer en elle l'acte de formation de l'image mentale, et la focalisation de l'attention qui soutient son existence. Voici comment le *Tripurārāhasya*, dont les spéculations rejoignent sur ce point celles du *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, définit la *bhāvanā*: “La croyance ou création mentale est une représentation synthétique (*samkalpa*). Elle est tantôt capable de s'imposer (*siddha*), tantôt non. La croyance capable de s'imposer est celle qui ne permet pas à des représentations divergentes (*vikalpa*) d'interférer avec elle, celle qui demeure concentrée sur un seul point (...) A cette condition, elles demeureront stables, et en l'absence de toute interférence avec des représentations mentales inopportunes parce que divergentes, elles pourront s'imposer et produire des effets grandioses.”⁴⁰ Toute création mentale, lors même qu'elle acquiert une existence magique, possède ainsi, au principe de son efficience, un geure de réalité propre. Dans la *bhāvanā*, la conscience profonde, plongée dans un état de réceptivité focalisée, reçoit le germe de l'imagination, puissance vivante et informative, à la manière d'une semence subtile qui grandirait et porterait fruit. En s'assimilant activement à l'objet que son attention concentrée crée mentalement et soutient de sa foi intense, la conscience devient “magiquement identique” à ce dernier, car l'imagination est fortifiée par la conviction intime que l'énergie divine immanente à la conscience va actualiser le but visé. “On devient ce que l'on affirme être (*bhāvayati*) sans interruption; on s'emplit rapidement de puissance, quelque grand que l'on aspire à devenir.”⁴¹ Une fois que la force polarisante de la conscience, véritable *primum movens*, a forgé l'équivalence mentale de ce qu'elle aspire à être, l'affirmation créatrice est censée assurer ensuite la promotion efficiente de la représentation désirée, appelée à exister, à condition toutefois que l'esprit soit purifié: “Ce qu'un homme à la pensée pure et droite crée mentalement, cela même survient tout comme l'eau agitée se transforme en écume.”⁴² Processus qui ressortit précisément au Yoga, selon le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, s'il est vrai que le Yoga comprend la pratique intensive, l'arrêt des souffles et le contrôle du manas.⁴³ Ainsi, la *Brahma-bhāvanā* constitue la première méthode de réalisation de l'absolu: c'est en méditant sur le fait que le noyau de

son être est homogène au Tout “infini et indivis”, c'est en imaginant constamment et en déclarant qu'il lui est identique⁴⁴ que le méditant devient rien moins que Brahma. “Quiconque aspire en son for intérieur à devenir tel, celui-là sans nul doute l'atteint; si tu aspires à atteindre Brahma lui-même, deviens rempli de son être.”⁴⁵ “Par la pratique assidue de ce qui consiste en une seule réalité, le *manas* s'apaise et lorsque l'esprit est ainsi fondu, le souffle vital s'apaise aussi.”⁴⁶

S'il est vrai que le monde objectif, selon le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, n'est que la projection de l'activité imageante du *manas* et la réalisation, au plein sens du terme, de ses désirs particuliers, la *bhāvanā* assure par conséquent la conversion salvifique du pouvoir de projection propre au *manas*. En effet, le *manas* ne détermine pas seulement l'aspect particulier sous lequel le monde apparaît; il détermine bien plutôt de manière radicale le monde même dans lequel vit le sujet, c'est à dire le contenu même de son expérience. “Pour tout être vivant, c'est toujours selon la manière dont l'Energie se lève(en lui), que le résultat vient à se manifester,”⁴⁷ tel est l'axiome de la manifestation. Le *manas* enchanteur voit ses créatures prendre figure d'objets étrangers soumis à des lois fixes. Il forge les croyances massives et invétérées qui gouvernent son appréhension de la réalité et dictent en retour, par le truchement du pouvoir causal de l'imagination en lui, ce qu'il est voué à voir apparaître comme venant à sa rencontre dans son expérience de la réalité: c'est ce que l'homme invoque en toute chose qui constitue son destin. Force est donc de reconnaître, avec le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, que l'homme s'attribue à lui-même des limites. Il s'inflige lui-même, à la faveur d'un fatal processus d'auto-conditionnement circulaire et cumulatif, les limitations mêmes qu'il croit affronter extérieurement dans la contingence des rencontres: c'est dans ce processus auto-entretenu, et donc en lui-même, que réside le soi-disant destin (*daiva*), auquel l'homme s'imagine être soumis. Or, s'il est vrai que l'on ne se libère du pouvoir d'une cause qu'en reconnaissant sa nature véritable, la *bhāvanā* postule que l'homme est radicalement libre de forger son futur en devenant ce qu'il aspire à être, sans nulle limitation. Liberté radicale qui ne se réduit pas au simple pouvoir de choisir, à la croisée des éventualités empiriques, dans l'horizon d'une alternative toujours déjà donnée. A condition d'élargir la nature de la

croyance instauratrice qu'il professe et entretient à son égard, et de dénier activement ses limitations imaginaires en renforçant la croyance opposée, l'homme qui revendiquerait ce qu'il s'imagine être aurait ainsi, grâce à la vertu de son imagination, le pouvoir de conditionner l'énergie inconditionnée de la conscience en lui.

IV. *La bhāvanā et les “pouvoirs merveilleux” (siddhi):*

Selon le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, la pratique de la *bhāvanā* constitue la condition de possibilité de l'obtention des “pouvoirs merveilleux” (*siddhi*). A la différence du Yoga classique où leur obtention résulte de la maîtrise des trois derniers “membres” de la progression, à savoir du *samyama*, à la différence encore du Yoga “de vive force” (*hatha yoga*) où elle résulte de l'éveil et de l'ascension de l'énergie cosmique “lovée” de manière résiduelle dans le microcosme humain (la *kundalinī* lovée en trois anneaux et demi, parfois huit, tel un serpent), leur obtention procède ici du pouvoir qu'a une affirmation créatrice d'inscrire une représentation dans la réalité, de la poser dans l'existence par la force de l'imagination. Ainsi en va-t-il de l'efficience propre aux *mantras*: “De même que les fruits de l'*haritaki* ont une vertu purgative de par leur nature propre, ainsi les syllabes ya, ra, la va, etc. produisent-elles un effet sous l'empire d'une création mentale.”⁴⁸ Il n'est rien qu'un cœur pur joint à un pouvoir d'imagination intense ne puisse obtenir, aucune condition d'existence à laquelle l'ascète purifié ne puisse accéder.⁴⁹

L'on peut, certes, demeurer songeur devant une telle affirmation ou bien rester désarmé par l' ὅποις dont elle témoigne. Mais la possibilité de fait d'un tel processus d'instauration, qui soude ensemble imagination et magie, étant laissée de côté, demandons-nous à présent quel est, en droit, son sens, et s'il n'est pas possible de procéder à son évaluation critique en le rapprochant d'autres types de pratiques attestées par ailleurs dans l'histoire des pratiques indiennes. Loin d'apparaître comme une nouveauté, ce type d'instauration magique remonte en effet aux plus anciennes pratiques magico-rituelles.

De toutes les pratiques de la magie performative, nul doute que celle de la **satyakriyā* ne soit la plus mystérieuse et la plus profonde. Dès les hymnes védiques s'est fait jour l'idée qu'une affirmation

créatrice, soutenue par une résolution impérieuse proférant un ordre catégorique, peut infléchir le cours des lois naturelles, à la double condition qu'elle émane d'un sujet pur et sincère assumant à la perfection son rôle dans le concert universel (et donc indemne de toute accumulation de *karma* négatif), et qu'elle s'accorde harmonieusement à la “disposition véritablement bonne et incrée” (*rta*) de l'ordre cosmique. Adhérant à la vérité et en appelant à son pouvoir intrinsèque, le sujet profère la formule et décrète son accomplissement, comme si la prière à forme d'astreinte avait le pouvoir d'influencer les forces cosmiques.⁵⁰

Dans le rite de la construction de l'autel du feu (*agnicayana*) des *Brāhmaṇa*, le sacrifiant se présente avant tout comme celui qui prononce les formules exactes (*satyavādin*): après avoir pris en lui Agni et divinisé ainsi sa personne, il la rend “*satya*”, c'est à dire pétrie d'exactitude rituelle et de réalité. Opération où la confiance dans le sacrifice jointe à sa pratique exacte, l'ardeur de la prière, la puissance de l'intention et l'efficace formelle du rite mêlées sont censées garantir *ipso facto* la réalisation, en vertu de l'homologie, davantage postulée bien sûr qu'immédiatement sensible, entre les lois du sacrifice et celles de l'univers.

Dans les *Upaniṣad* anciennes enfin, l'accès à l'intuition salvatrice confère l'omnipotence et l'affirmation de la vérité (*satyavākya*) est douée d'une force magique permettant de changer l'ordre naturel des choses et de vaincre ses lois, par exemple dans la parabole de l'ordalie.⁵¹ Plus fécond encore se révèle le thème du *satyasamkalpa*, dont la nature ne laisse pas d'être énigmatique. Comportant la double connotation d'idéation et de volonté, le terme réfère à une opération de la pensée antérieure à sa spécification en entendement et volonté: il note l'action mentale d'imaginer un but avec la résolution qu'il se manifeste. La détermination de la volonté transforme la simple conception en une imagination investie d'une impulsion réalisatrice. *Samkalpa* désigne par conséquent la réalisation ou la production au moyen de l'esprit et grâce à une canalisation de la volonté. “La pensée, en vérité, est plus que l'esprit. Quand on pense, on met l'esprit en action.” C'est par le dynamisme réalisateur inhérent au *sankalpa* de l'Être universel et primordial qu'apparaissent notamment ciel et terre, air et espace, eau et énergie radiante (*tejas*), bref, tous les êtres.⁵² Aussi peut-on affirmer du Soi, à titre

d'attribut, qu'il est l'être dont les désirs et les desseins sont porteurs et garants de leur réalisation.⁵³ Dès lors, pour celui qui reconnaît le Soi, les désirs sont réalité: par la force de son *sankalpa* et par la vertu de son adhésion immédiate au lien, généralement inconscient, qui unit l'homme à son origine, le sujet peut accéder au monde qu'il désire. "Quelqu'objet qu'il ait en vue, quoiqu'il désire, il n'a qu'à le penser, et cet objet se présente à lui."⁵⁴ Le terme *samkalpa* désigne donc ici l'acte mental d'imagination réalisatrice par lequel l'initié upaniṣadique suscite et "crée" à son bénéfice, en les faisant surgir du "cœur de l'espace universel" (*antarhṛdaya ākāśa*), les "mondes", c'est à dire les sphères d'existence qu'il désire. La *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* affirmait déjà que pour "celui qui considère que le Soi est son véritable lieu ontologique" (...), "quelque chose qu'il désire, il le tire de ce Soi,"⁵⁵ au moyen d'une émission hors de la source intarissable qui satisfait tous les désirs. C'est dire qu'une fois le psychisme réinvolué et reployé en son centre vide (*khā*), tel un moyeu évidé, conception et obtention se confondraient comme si les désirs engendraient ici très catégoriquement leur réalisation, à la manière du Dieu Pantocrator: *dixit et facta sunt!* En somme, le repliement du psychisme sur sa racine ontologique livrerait accès à la source ontologique universelle: comme l'extériorité n'a point encore survécu dans cette totalité cosmique non encore différenciée en un moi et un non-moi, les désirs de l'initié upaniṣadique accédant à l'intuition du Soi seraient infailliblement réalisés, à la périphérie de la roue pour ainsi dire.

De manière similaire, la *bhāvanā* aurait pour ressort propre la causalité magique d'un désir paroxystique capable d'agir sur les lignes d'univers, de manière à ce que se produise l'accord entre le registre du monde intérieur et celui des événements extérieurs. Si la notion mal famée de magie — notion que l'avènement d'un rationalisme raide et arrogant, et le destin inexorable de la démythification ont rejeté dans l'inconscient collectif de l'Occident à partir des Temps modernes — ne signifie rien d'autre que l'affirmation de l'efficace du seul vouloir convenablement exalté et focalisé, et capable d'une action directe sur les choses ou les hommes sans passer par les instruments physiques de la volonté, alors la *bhāvanā* paraît manifester la possibilité pour une conscience individuelle polarisée par un facteur psychologique d'orienter, suivant ses forces et dans

les limites nécessaires, la Conscience universelle dans un sens préféré par elle, en actualisant et prolongeant telle possibilité permise par elle. A travers le point focal de l'attention concentrée, l'imagination intégrée projette son désir, par l'intermédiaire d'une image, dans la Conscience universelle, échappant ainsi aux condition limitatives de l'espace et du temps. Plongeant ses racines endéçà de l'espace de la représentation, l'imagination vraie se mettrait alors en phase avec l'énergie créatrice de la Conscience universelle, l'âme individuelle n'étant que modulatrice de l'énergie divine. “C'est ainsi que cette âme individuelle est capable d'accomplir à loisir, graduellement et simultanément, tout ce qu'elle a désiré, conformément à (*anusārena*) sa concentration intérieure et à sa contemplation mentale.”⁵⁶ L'âme individuelle n'est pas en effet sans recueillir les pouvoirs de la Conscience universelle: “Comme elle est à l'unisson de l'Unique Puissance, l'âme individuelle possède de manière innée tous ses pouvoirs; l'être infini étant en contact avec l'être fini, ce dernier lui est connaturel en vertu de sa nature inhérente.”⁵⁷

Mais, objectera-t-on, comment ne pas reconnaître dans cette “foi actualisatrice” l'anthropologie indienne du désir et sa nostalgie d'une satisfaction magique du désir? Comment douter que la foi appartienne à l'ordre du désir? La foi n'est-elle pas une volonté qui reste enracinée dans le désir primordial? Oui, l'imagination est le fruit naturel de l'arbre du désir car “l'imagination ne meut pas sans le désir.”⁵⁸ Irrationalité pure du désir à ce point exalté qu'il est conçu comme immédiatement efficace; résidu de l'omnipotence narcissique du désir infantile qu'illustrent déjà, à l'époque védique, l'idéal de prospérité (*svasti*) et de vie heureuse “cent automnes durant,”⁵⁹ la *kāmadhuga* et l'arbre exauçant les vœux (*kalpataru*) du paradis d'Indra?⁶⁰ Le *tapasvin* védique, en s'efforçant d'étendre son emprise sur les “mondes,” n'aspire-t-il pas précisément à la domination magique?

Sans récuser la valeur d'une telle interprétation, on remarquera toutefois que le thème de la réalisation psychique et immédiate des désirs est trop constant et prévalent, des *Upaniṣads*⁶¹ aux cosmogonies purāṇiques,⁶² de la littérature du Yoga au Śivaïsme du Cachemire et aux *Tantras* bouddhiques où nous le rencontrerons bientôt, pour que l'exégète ne s'interdise de recourir prématurément à une

interprétation sinon évasive et inopérante, du moins par trop réductrice et univoque. Or, la prudence s'impose d'autant plus à lui s'il veut se rappeler combien tout est en Inde complexe par nature et secret par vocation. Mais n'éludons pas ici des objections trop prévisibles et examinons donc les diverses interprétations possibles des pratiques précédemment décrites.

Dira-t-on qu'une telle concentration intense de l'attention sur une seule représentation idéo-motrice ressortit à un mono-idéisme hallucinatoire dirigé ou à un phénomène d'auto-suggestion hypnotique? Dans l'auto-conditionnement hypnotique, le sujet cherche à atteindre, comme on sait, sa conscience sous-corticale qui est plastique et réceptive, en utilisant sa conscience corticale comme simple canal de communication: la concentration du sujet sur ses images ouvre la voie vers sa conscience profonde où il fait pénétrer non des informations, mais des thèmes de croyance et d'action, des attitudes (*bhava*), des "montages,"⁶³ en sorte qu'il l'anime à la manière d'un souffleur dissimulé. Or, cette animation-montage continue à exercer ses effets après que le sujet soit revenu à la conscience empirique ordinaire.

Mais que le mécanisme de la *bhāvanā* soit analogue à celui de l'auto-suggestion hypnotique ne saurait suffire à les confondre. N'est-il pas en effet trop facile et inexact de chercher à tout résoudre par l'auto-suggestion? Au surplus, à peine énoncé, l'argument révèle aussi sa faiblesse, car il suppose avérée l'existence de critères permettant de distinguer hallucination et réalité. Si l'auto-suggestion apportait une solution universelle aux problèmes soulevés par certains types d'expériences, il faudrait alors admettre qu'elle se tient à la racine de tous les événements de l'expérience commune. En toute rigueur, comme toute hallucination qui en serait le produit se donne comme une perception, il nous faudrait soupçonner toute perception de n'être qu'une hallucination. La réflexion est ici au rouet, qui se voit derechef reconduite au problème crucial — mais peut-être rationnellement insoluble — de l'idéalité ultime des données de l'expérience et du monde.

Donnera-t-on à croire, en second lieu, que la *bhāvanā* ne laisse pas d'évoquer d'assez près des processus de type magique? Les doctrines magiques apparaîtraient comme un effort de justification rationnelle de l'anthropomorphisme naïf sous-jacent à tous les rites. En

faisant de l'univers entier l'image agrandie de l'univers psychologique humain (comme dans le panthéon védique, par exemple), puis en faisant de l'âme humaine le reflet de l'âme universelle, elles prétendent fonder l'efficace du désir humain. Ce serait l'Être universel et absolu (*Brahman*) qui le voudrait en lui et y tendrait. Comment douter alors que le rite exactement exécuté, l'investissement intense d'une image mentale servant de support et de relais au désir dans la *bhāvanā* n'orchestrent à coup sûr l'univers au rythme de leurs volontés?

L'on peut enfin — troisième interprétation possible — convoquer la problématique de l'efficacité purement symbolique, sinon imaginaire, qu'exerce le rite, c'est à dire le pouvoir qui lui appartient d'agir sur le réel en agissant sur la représentation du réel, et donc d'agir immédiatement en vertu de sa δύναμις propre.

Or, ces diverses interprétations, bien que séduisantes, ne laissent pas de soulever de graves difficultés. Nous avons déjà décelé la régression à l'infini qu'enveloppe l'explication par l'auto-suggestion. Certes, parce qu'elle permet à l'adepte “de substituer aux représentations fortuites celles qu'il désire et de se créer un monde qu'il commande au lieu de celui qu'il subit par l'effet naturel de la loi de rétribution des actes,”⁶⁴ la *bhāvanā* semble de prime abord faire œuvre de puissance ou de conquête magique. Aussi pourrait-elle relever tant de la magie sympathique — ou magie par résonance — que de la magie performative. Mais, outre que la distinction entre religion et magie s'avère particulièrement délicate en Inde, on doit reconnaître que la *bhāvanā* dans le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, par exemple, s'ordonne au désir de la délivrance, désir incommensurable aux fins mondaines. Si elle procède d'abord de désirs mondains, puis du désir épuré d'un paradis posthume (*svarga*), participant ainsi au registre de la satisfaction du désir, la *bhāvanā* peut néanmoins se sublimer et se mouvoir dans la sphère du sacré: fille du désir sans doute, elle a vocation à devenir l'instrument psychagogique de la délivrance.

D'autre part, s'il est vrai qu'un rite peut exercer une efficacité symbolique tout à fait réelle (l'acte d'institution, par exemple, est un acte solennel de catégorisation qui tend à produire ce qu'il désigne), c'est à la condition de réduire l'essence du rite à une fonction ou à une dimension exclusivement sociales. Auquel cas

l'efficacité du rite est subordonnée à des conditions ou règles juridiques — qui sont instituées par le groupe ou la cité et qui, par là, en définissent la notion: ainsi la parole imprécatoire ou bien la parole solennelle du rite de transmission du pouvoir ne sont-elles efficaces qu'en vertu du *signe* dont elles sont porteuses, signe qui s'adresse à un groupe social déterminé. Mais est-il permis d'identifier de la sorte la pratique de la *bhāvanā* à des rites dont la vocation est avant tout sociale? Nous en douturons pour notre part. Ces quelques remarques visent à mettre en lumière les difficultés auxquelles se heurte une évaluation correcte de la *bhāvanā*. Aussi convient-il bien plutôt de réservoir notre jugement et de poursuivre l'examen des formes qu'elle affecte dans les traditions plus élaborées du Šivaïsme du Cachemire et des *Tantras* bouddhiques. Il se pourrait en effet que cet examen nous livre justement un principe général d'interprétation à la lumière duquel progresser dans l'intelligence de la *bhāvanā*.

V. *L'assimilation de la Conscience à l'énergie dans le Šivaïsme du Cachemire:*

C'est dans les écoles du Šivaïsme du Cachemire que la *bhāvanā* a trouvé la plénitude de son expression. Dans ces écoles où s'affirme avec force la perspective d'une énergétique généralisée, elle se trouve promue au rang de principal moyen de réalisation, en particulier dans la voie de l'énergie. Point de système où n'apparaisse plus clairement le lien entre l'analyse de la nature de la conscience comme énergie et le choix des moyens de réalisation. Sans doute, le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, sous l'influence du Trika, soutient-il que la Conscience suprême n'existe jamais sans son énergie de manifestation, puissance coéternelle et cooriginaire, force vibratoire qui émet ou projette l'univers. “La pure Conscience et son énergie de manifestation sont toujours identiques en essence, comme la brise et son frémissement, et le feu et sa chaleur brûlante.”⁶⁵ Toutefois, il est clair que le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* hésite encore entre le modèle de la conscience comme miroir et celui de la conscience comme énergie, en sorte qu'il n'accède point à cette identité de la Conscience et de l'Acte où s'atteste l'originalité du Trika, même si ce dernier a bénéficié des analyses et des découvertes, du *Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda*. L'on

cernerai mieux son originalité en marquant d'abord son opposition aux autres courants de la philosophie indienne.

Dans le Sāṃkhya, l'entité consciente ultime (le *Puruṣa*) est cette éternelle présence à soi qui ne tombe sous aucune catégorie de substance, d'attribut ou d'action: doué de puissance pensante (*cit-sakti*), le *puruṣa* est le principe éternel et permanent de toute conscience, principe impassible et inaffecté, sans nul changement et modification en son sein.

Dans le Vedānta non-dualiste, dont la clef de voûte est formée par l'identité de l'être et de l'acte, le *Brahman* apparaît comme l'*Ens realissimum*, substrat statique, unique et sans second: infinie plénitude d'un "acte pur, mais d'un acte apaisé qui refuse de s'épanouir" (O. Lacombe). Quant au Soi, il est la pure conscience brillant de son propre éclat, c'est à dire douée d'une auto-luminosité (*svataḥ-prakāśatva*) et, d'autre part, inactive (*niṣkriya*).

Aussi le Sāṃkhya comme l'Advaita Vedānta doivent-ils admettre l'existence d'un principe doué d'activité (*karttva*) au plan macrocosmique (*prakṛti, māyā*) rendant compte du processus d'émergence de l'univers (le terme d'évolution se révélant ici inadéquat), et, au plan microcosmique, d'un principe du psychisme, d'un organe de la pensée (*buddhi, citta*), auquel attribuer toutes les fonctions qu'on ne saurait imputer à la pure conscience.

Or, tout l'effort du Šivaïsme du Cachemire porta contre le Šanta-brahma-vāda védantin dont l'Être absolu lui apparaît comme un milieu diaphane et quiescent, inerte et atone. Aussi tient-il par réaction que la conscience, dépouillée et privée de l'activité créatrice formant sa nature propre, n'est plus rien. "Si le suprême Seigneur ne se manifestait que par un corps doué d'une seule forme, ce ne serait point le Principe suprême ni la Conscience mais quelque chose comme un pot en terre, etc..."⁶⁶ Ce n'est plus le *Brahman* ou le *Puruṣa* qui est à la présent l'Acte pur mais la lumière de la pure Conscience (*prakāśa*) se ressaisissant et prenant immédiatement conscience d'elle-même (*vimarśa*). En d'autres termes, la Conscience suprême (*Parāsaṃvit*) n'est point simplement une lumière révélatrice brillant de son propre éclat (*prakāśa*) mais encore une prise de conscience active d'elle-même (*vimarśa*), ressaisissement procédant de la *cindrūpiṇī śakti*: acte vibrant de la Conscience frémissante d'énergie, à jamais engagée dans une quintuple activité.

Dans le Trika, l’assimilation de la Conscience à l’énergie repose donc sur la communauté d’essence qui se fait jour derrière les notions de “conscience” et de “*spanda*. ” Dans son unité dynamique et interne, la conscience est une activité, une tension toujours en acte qui se déploie, une énergie qui tend au mouvement. Au lieu d’apparaître comme le pur espace, homogène et isotrope, de la représentation, la conscience est ici vécue comme une tension, comme une activité incessante vibrant sans cesse: variation dynamique qui monte ou descend l’échelle des intensités. Retentissante de son activité immanente, la conscience est ce “feu dévorant” qui s’assimile le combustible de son objet.⁶⁷

Dès lors s’explique-t-on que la voie de l’énergie (*saktopāya*), voie intermédiaire où dominent les pratiques utilisant l’énergie concentrée de la *cit-sakti*, puisse également s’appeler également *bhāvanopāya*. Non que la *bhāvanā* soit absente de la voie de l’individu (*ānavopāya*): c’est ainsi que le yogin peut visualiser la résorption des énergies fragmentatrices (*kalā*), visualiser l’embrasement universel de son corps et du monde par le feu du Temps Dévorateur (*kālāgnirudra*),⁶⁸ ou bien visualiser la purification des canaux et la séparation de la conscience et des éléments grossiers.⁶⁹ Seulement, le volontarisme présidant à l’exercice d’une vigilance soutenue, le dualisme qu’enveloppent encore les concentrations sur les modalités de la vie mentale et les contenus de l’expérience courante interdisent au méditant de faire retour à l’énergie nue de sa conscience. *Bhāvanā* exprime tout à la fois l’énergie indifférenciée de la conscience en son orientation indéfine, et son utilisation systématique en vue de dissiper le réseau des pensées dualisantes impures (*aśudha vikalpa*), moteur de la transmigration par identification au moi empirique et à l’organisme psycho-physique. Dans la voie de l’énergie, la *bhāvanā* peut porter sur la dissolution (*lāya*) par fusion (*vyāpti*) des éléments ou principes (*tattva*).⁷⁰ La contemplation et l’imagination intense par le méditant de son identité à Śiva, sa conviction intense que le Soi en lui n’est pas confiné aux appartances psycho-physiques, autrement dit la formation de *śudha vikalpa* ont un double effet: négativement, elles dissipent croyances et suggestions erronées et dissolvent les automatismes structurants, en annulant tout sens de la dualité; positivement, leur répétition saturante accomplit une refonte de l’individualité psychique pro-

fonde qu'elle reconditionne de la sorte, rendant effective la vérité de l'identité à Śiva jusque là intuitivement saisie par un véritable discernement intérieur (*sattarka*). A force de tourner sans cesse le pouvoir de l'attention sur les vérités spirituelles, à force de focaliser sur elles la tendance indéfinie de la conscience-énergie, les vérités ultimes qui apparaissaient jusque là comme inexistantes et irréelles, s'imposent graduellement à la conscience dans leur réalité et se manifestent à elle dans une parfaite clarté. Mais l'acte d'imagination réalisatrice, aussi affermi soit-il, n'est que le moyen provisoire d'intensifier l'énergie cognitive afin d'actualiser la *śuddha vidyā* rendant manifeste la lumière du Je pur et déracinant la distinction apparente du sujet et de l'objet. Simple moyen provisoire, la *bhāvanā* s'abole à l'instant où la conscience individuelle s'immerge dans la conscience divine. Dès lors qu'est advenue la Reconnaissance du Soi en cette immersion (*saṃvēśa*), la réalisation du Je absolu éclôt comme présence en acte et réalité permanente.⁷¹ A partir d'une méditation prenant le corps pour objet et donc relevant de la voie inférieure, la *bhāvanā* peut encore, au moyen d'une évocation affermée et stable (*sthiram*) de l'espace vide du corps, actualiser l'espace vide illimité;⁷² elle peut enfin, par la contemplation intense "de toute la substance qui forme le corps comme pénétrée d'éther de la conscience (*viyat*),"⁷³ actualiser l'omniprésence cosmique, abandonnant *ipso facto* le plan initial de la représentation (car enfin comment visualiser l'éther vacuitant?) ou bien, "en évoquant tout l'espace vide sous forme d'essence bhairavienne comme dissous (dans sa propre tête),"⁷⁴ faire s'épanouir la conscience infinie et radiante (*tejas*).

Ainsi qu'il ressort de ces exemples, l'office de la *bhāvanā* est d'exercer une induction mentale qui dégage la tendance indéfinie de la conscience des structurations adventices l'offusquant dans la vie ordinaire; en ranimant sa pulsation, elle restitue le flux de la conscience à son homogénéité limpide et à sa souveraineté native. Une fois que la conscience s'est affranchie, au moyen de son absorption dans la vacuité, des polarisations responsables de sa différenciation empirique, la *bhāvanā* libère la puissance créatrice du "cœur." Elle exhausse alors la conscience jusqu'au plan cosmique propre à Śiva. A l'image du bac faisant passer d'une rive à l'autre, le dynamisme actualisateur dans la *bhāvanā* reconduit la conscience

à sa source, laquelle est l’Energie source de toute efficience. Lors même qu’il est identifié à la source de l’énergie créatrice, c’est à dire lorsqu’il est devenu Śiva, le yogin possède la faculté de créer à son gré ce à quoi il aspire.⁷⁵ Or, “chacun éprouve par sa propre expérience l’énergie créatrice.”⁷⁶ Dans l’expérience du rêve où chacun dispose en lui de la faculté de créer à volonté des choses variées, on découvre la présence de cette énergie créatrice (*karana śakti*). “Puisque tout être vivant a ainsi le pouvoir (lui aussi) de manifester (*avabhāsanāt*) et d’inscrire (*samullekha*) ce qu’il désire, on en déduit avec certitude qu’il possède les énergies de connaissance et d’activité.”⁷⁷ Et Kṣemaraja d’ajouter: “En conséquence, si le yogin le veut avec détermination en prenant conscience de son (pouvoir créateur), il peut créer à son gré des choses communes à tous.” Ainsi, “l’imagination purifiée par la connaissance de soi recouvre son efficience native; l’énergie créatrice chez un yogin illuminé se confond avec la libre énergie qu’il puise à sa source.”⁷⁸ Pareil pouvoir de projection créatrice dans lequel conception et efficience réalisatrice ne sont plus disjointes, déconcerte moins si l’on veut bien garder en mémoire la doctrine des *Yoga sūtra*. En effet, lorsque la connaissance et l’action au moyen des cinq facultés de perception et des cinq facultés conatives sont dépassées dans les niveaux les plus profonds de la conscience, connaissance et action finissent par se fondre en une seule fonction intégrée. Ainsi, connaissance et pouvoir vont-ils de pair pour le yogin devenu maître de ses *indriya*: “De là, cognition instantanée sans l’emploi d’aucun instrument et complète maîtrise sur le *pradhāna*.”⁷⁹ Sans l’aide d’aucun instrument (*vikaraṇabhāvah*), le yogin peut obtenir une cognition disjointe du véhicule physique, et manipuler les forces qui sont à l’œuvre dans le domaine de la nature “préétablie” et primordiale. Aux niveaux les plus profonds de la conscience, lorsque les deux ensembles distincts d’instruments sont dépassés, les deux fonctions différencierées s’intègrent de nouveau en une seule fonction: l’omniscience à laquelle atteint le yogin délivré-vivant a pour corrélatif l’omnipotence.⁸⁰

VI. *L’imagination comme lieu théophanique dans le Vajrayāna:*

L’émergence du Vajrayāna donne à connaître clairement une autre composante essentielle de la *bhāvanā*: la formation d’images

eidétiques grâce à une contention d'esprit capable de produire l'objectivation réelle des images subjectivement cultivées. Les *Tantras* bouddhiques prescrivent les pratiques de visualisation intense, et témoignent ainsi d'une valorisation de la fonction spirituelle de l'image.⁸¹ Ultime floraison de la *bhāvanā*, liée au développement d'une psychologie excessivement affinée. Voici comment Mkhas-Grub-rje (1385-1438), le disciple polygraphe de Tsōn-kha-pa, explicite le stade de production ou d'émanation (*utpatti krama*), première phase du processus duel de la méditation où le processus d'émergence (*utpada*) symbolise avec la manifestation, au plan cosmologique, de l'existence phénoménale ou *samsārique*: “On l'appelle ainsi parce qu'à ce stade on doit pratiquer la méditation au moyen de la production d'images dans l'imagination ou de conceptions mentales dans l'esprit (*buddhi*).”⁸² Cette pratique complexe met en jeu deux facultés: la faculté représentative de visualiser graduellement avec fidélité et vivacité une divinité d'élection ou un *mandala* en se conformant au symbolisme traditionnel transmis par la lignée initiatique, et celle de fixer activement l'esprit sur elle au moyen d'une “application sans nulle distraction ou interruption.”⁸³ Dans ce processus de visualisation active et de concentration intense, la conscience n'est point ce milieu abstrait et diaphane où se déploierait la représentation, ce théâtre où se déroulerait le défilé des images. Au contraire, de même qu'une lentille concentre les rayons solaires en un foyer d'incandescence, ainsi le pouvoir de l'attention focalise l'énergie de la conscience constituante sur l'image, dont elle renforce la vertu dominante. L'énergie de la conscience ne se disperse plus dans le jeu des associations automatiques, mais elle infiltre l'image visualisée. Pratique qui se situe à l'opposé de toute “ontologie naïve de l'image” (Sartre), où l'image mentale est une représentation falote, affectée d'un indice d'intensité contingent par rapport à elle. Or, la visualisation ne réussit ici qu'à proportion même de l'intensité de l'imagination. Elle doit mettre en jeu la capacité de “voir avec l'œil de l'imagination” l'image mentale, un peu à la manière d'un hologramme moderne. Au terme du processus, adviendra chez le méditant la révélation qu'il est essentiellement identique à la déité visualisée. Mais que l'imagination soit le lieu théophanique où s'actualise la présence de la Déité ne signifie pas que la fonction constituante de

la conscience invente cette haute transcendance. Car une correspondance précise existe entre les attributs de la déité (formes, couleurs, *āsana*, *mudrā*, etc.) et les diverses potentialités de la conscience profonde qu'elles est censée manifester au terme du processus: sa forme “conventionnelle” (*samaya*) “consonne” précisément avec une potentialité de la conscience profonde intérieurement celée. Ces déités ne proviennent donc pas de quelque ailleurs illusoire, de quelque “arrière-monde”, puisque leur nature divine comme leurs formes symboliques correspondantes sont accessibles au méditant grâce à l'action liturgique mentale par laquelle il se met à l'unisson des potentialités de la conscience profonde et des vertus qu'elles représentent.

Dans la voie tantrique, la *bhāvanā* est coextensive à l'ensemble de la voie, depuis les premiers stades jusqu'à ceux plus avancés des rités d'union. Etant donné que tout culte d'adoration requiert l'auto-divinisation préable de l'officiant tantrique, le rite liminaire de l'auto-consécration (*abhiṣeka*) doit précéder toute pratique. L'*Hevajra Tantra*, par exemple, prescrit le rite d'auto-consécration suivant:

“(1) Imagine qu'à partir du germe (= HŪM) sis en ton cœur tu fasses jaillir un rayon, d'un noir brillant et en forme de crochet, grâce auquel tu rétractes les Bouddhas partout situés dans le triple monde. Après les avoir adoré avec les huit parèdres, tu dois les implorer en disant: “OM puissent les Bouddhas me consacrer!. (2) Tu seras alors consacré par tous ces Bouddhas ayant tous revêtu la forme d'Heruka, avec les cinq récipients symbolisant les cinq Tathāgatas et contenant les cinq ambroisies. Au moment de la consécration, il y aura une pluie de fleurs et une de safran; le tambour retentira; (3) tu seras adoré par Rūpavajrā et ses compagnes et par Locanā et les autres chanteront des chants adamantins. Lorsque tu auras été ainsi consacré, le Seigneur de ta Famille apparaîtra sur ta tête, et Heruka se révèlera à toi. En accomplissant cette méditation aux trois jonctions (*trisaṃdhyādhyaḍhiṣṭānabhāvanām*) qui confère un tel pouvoir, tu deviendras et resteras en permanence consubstantiellement uni à la déité.”⁸⁵ En d'autres termes, cette pratique de yoga concentré (*samāhitayoga*) sur sa divinité d'élection (*sveṣṭadevatā*, ici: Heruka ou Nairātmyā) est supposée s'épanouir en un yoga d'union continue (*nirantarayoga*), dont l'état perdure au long des activités de la vie quotidienne. Des procédés évocatoires complexes

succèdent ensuite à ce rite d'auto-consécration qui tient de l'auto-suggestion ou de l'auto-hallucination. Dans l'étape de la production, l'officier peut ainsi se concentrer sur le triangle-source situé au milieu de l'espace (H.T., I.8). Résidant en son centre, l'officier visualise alors les représentations symboliques des quatre éléments avec leur syllabes (terre-LAM; eau-VAM; feu-RAM; air-YAM), puis l'apparition des quatre déesses correspondantes (Locanā, Māmakī, Pañdara et Tāra), et la présence des quatre éléments à l'intérieur de son corps (dans les quatre centres). L'officier visualise ensuite un *mandala* surgissant du triangle, et, en son centre, un cadavre sur lequel apparaissent le disque lunaire, puis le disque solaire, dont l'union produit le *bija* d'où surgit la visualisation de la troupe des quinze yoginī-s encerclant Nairātmyā.

Or, le Bouddhisme analyse l'entité psychosomatique selon une structure magico-symbolique ternaire (pensée, c'est à dire intention, parole, corps) qui manifeste les trois Mystères. Aussi bien l'acte mental d'évocation doit-il nécessairement s'accompagner d'incantations magiques (*mantra-s*, notamment le *mantrarājā*: OM ĀH HŪM, qui scandent la respiration), auxquelles sont associés des gestes magico-rituels “apposés”, destinés à “sceller” l'attitude adoptée. De la sorte, le pouvoir évocateur de la pensée vraie, l'acte vocal vrai, c'est à dire le verbe vrai, et le geste vrai, investis d'un pouvoir révélateur, forment autant de vecteurs psychologiques qui “saturent” toutes les avenues de l'entité psychosomatique. L'orientation coordonnée et l'intégration de ces trois vecteurs garantissent cette synergie opératoire qui fonderait la supériorité de la “voie rapide” du Vajrayāna: elles permettent en somme au symbolisme en action du rituel d'exercer son rôle véhiculaire. Prenons l'exemple du moulin à prières, qui déconcerte tant l'esprit occidental. Le moulin à prières tire précisément son efficience de la synergie entre la concentration mentale, la récitation du *mantra* d'Avalokiteśvara et le geste assurant la révolution du moulin. Loin d'être le moyen commode d'un “salut automatique garanti” (par récitation automatique du *mantra*), comme on le croit souvent, la giration du moulin n'y est que le substitut extérieur et mécanique d'une *mudrā*; à condition bien sûr d'être accompagnée d'une concentration sur la répétition du *mantra* — répétition indistincte et marmonnée —, la giration du moulin n'est que l'artifice mécani-

que (portatif ou enchassé sur un *stūpa*) visant à conduire à l'état où la conscience et le *mantra* fusionnent, ce dernier finissant alors par s'énoncer lui-même. En somme, la giration du moulin a pour office de fluidifier le flux de conscience en libérant son énergie, de renvoyer la conscience à son centre en la restituant à son propre dynamisme interne où se dissolvent les constructions mentales adventices de la conscience phénoménale.⁸⁶

C'est ainsi que "par l'union de la sapience et du moyen salvifique la configuration des divinités est engendrée, ayant été scellée par quatre sceaux apposés communiquant l'orgueil de la déité (la *samayamudrā* de la Pensée, la *dharlamudrā* de la Parole, la *mahamudrā* du Corps et la *karmamudrā* de l'Action)." ⁸⁷ Processus qui a valeur d'évocation objective, du fait que les déités ainsi suscitées se révèlent réelles au plus haut degré, mais sur un plan plus subtil que celui de la réalité phénoménale: d'être imaginées n'enlève pas le moindre degré d'existence aux déités visualisées. Elles ne sont ni plus ni moins réelles que celui qui les contemple et on doit leur attribuer une existence aussi réelle que celle des représentations apparemment les mieux fondées dans la réalité. Parfois, la visualisation s'achève par une pratique d'animation vitale de l'image au moyen d'une rétention prolongée de la respiration. Au terme de la phase de production, le méditant aspirant à s'unir à la déité procède à la déclaration intense par laquelle l'inclusion intentionnelle de l'image divine dans sa conscience se transmue en une identité essentielle: "*Oṃ Heruka svabhāvātmako'ham.*" Ayant parcouru le *mandala* jusqu'en son centre et l'image visualisée ayant attiré d'elle-même par similitude la puissance correspondante, tout comme l'embryon est censé attirer l'âme selon la médecine indienne, le méditant la résorbe en son cœur durant la phase "réalisatrice" suivante (*sampanna-krama* ou *nispanna-k°*). Ultime communion d'une théophanie mentale où la déité évoquée s'épiphane au cœur du fidèle réceptif sous la forme même de la croyance qu'il professe à son égard, dans une présence réelle puisqu' agissante; ultime réversibilité de l'"information de la Déité à l'âme", ultime commutation d'essence d'où il retire puissance et efficacité. La phase inférieure du "yoga avec images" (*sanimitta-yoga* au cours duquel, précise un commentaire, "l'image est imaginée avec la pensée: "c'est imaginé") se résout par conséquent dans la phase supérieure

du “yoga dépouillé d’images” (*animitta-yoga*), c’est à dire dépouillé de formes et de constructions mentales. “Lorsqu’on atteint la limite du yoga avec images, la vivacité de l’image (intensément contemplée sur la face *manas* de l’appareil psychique (*manovijñana*) comme si elle était réelle, durant la première phase) n’apparaît plus sur la face *buddhi* (de l’appareil psychique); et le corps de la divinité apparaissant telle une accumulation vide, on réalise qu’il est semblable à un rêve.”⁸⁸ La première espèce de yoga (équivalente au *samatha* du Bouddhisme non tantrique, Mkhlas-Grub-rje citant d’ailleurs le *Bhāvanākrama*) laisse une “signature”, comme dit le tibétain, ou une “formation de mise en position d’arrêt du psychisme” (*saṃādhi-saṃskāra*), trace qui devient le facteur motivant de la seconde espèce de yoga (équivalente au *vipasyana*). Remontant vers l’intention du désir qui s’est consommé en elles, le méditant connaît les formes évoquées dans leur vraie lumière: il connaît l’illusion comme telle. “Au-delà de la contemplation des parties (couleurs et formes), exempt de l’imagination et de l’absence d’imagination, au-delà du signe supérieur et de son *bindu*, voilà le suprême *maṇḍala*. ”⁸⁹ La pentarchie des Bouddhas transcendants avec leurs attributs, et le quintuple épanouissement de leurs sagesses correspondantes finissent par se résoudre dans l’unité synthétique du cœur profond qui tout embrasse et où se révèle leur essence, l’Inné. Ne subsiste plus alors qu’une seule série mentale (*ekasamtāna*), qu’“une seule substance d’une seule et même saveur.”⁹⁰

La phase de production délibérée et de création consciente de formes, c’est à dire la phase intensificatrice où la *Bhāvanā* joue un rôle déterminant, s’accomplit paradoxalement lorsqu’elle se transmue en une phase supérieure où les formes se réinvoient dans le vide de l’espace intérieur. Confirmation expérimentale de l’universelle vacuité, ce processus à double pôle vise à faire pénétrer intuitivement la nature intrinsèque de toute forme et existence:

“L’univers dans sa totalité surgit en moi,
En moi naît le triple monde
Toute chose est pénétrée par moi
Ce monde visible ne consiste en rien d’autre.”⁹¹

Paradoxe de la *bhāvanā* dans le Bouddhisme tantrique: en effet, si le processus de visualisation intense dans lequel la forme “con-

ventionnelle” (*samayatattva*) finit par cristalliser, partage avec les autres formes de *bhāvanā* précédemment mentionnées le caractère d’être un processus *intensificateur*, la valorisation de l’image y est néanmoins au service d’une voie involutive et éliminatrice. Le processus complexe de la *bhāvanā* et les invocations éperdues du rituel intérieurisé ne ressortissent plus à une voie synthétique dont le mouvement progressif viserait à une identification et à une consubstantiation (comme dans le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* et le Śivaïsme du Cachemire), mais à une voie involutive et éliminatrice débouchant sur une extinction. Inversion du sens de la *bhāvanā* par conséquent, dont la fonction est ici de révéler, à la faveur d’un passage à la limite, la créativité illusoire de la conscience et, corrélativement, l’inanité et la vacuité foncières du *samsāra*. Mais cette voie ne recourt plus à l’intellectualisation implacable et à l’évacuation dialectique chères au Madhyamika. Car “le moyen est l’émancipation et la sagesse, la résorption et la fin de l’existence.”⁹² Hiérophante de l’imagination, “le yogin se représente et perçoit l’écoulement des choses comme résultant du processus d’émancipation cosmique, et réalisant que celui-ci est semblable à un rêve, il l’arrête par la prise de conscience de cet écoulement.”⁹³

La *bhāvanā* n’est donc plus l’instrument d’une universalisation et d’une transfiguration advenant au terme d’un processus d’intériorisation, mais plutôt celui d’un arrêt et d’une extinction. “Par l’action du même sur le même, ainsi l’existence est purifiée par l’existence, la construction mentale est détruite par une anti-construction.”⁹⁴ Par l’attraction, le monde est enchaîné; par l’attraction aussi il est libéré, mais cette méthode de renversement des actes est inconnue des bouddhistes des autres écoles.”⁹⁵

Ainsi, parce que Heruka est la manifestation, l’existence peut être utilisée, à la manière d’un remède homéopathique, comme moyen salvifique (*upāya*). “Les hommes sont attachés par les liens de l’existence et détachés par leur connaissance de ces liens. O sage, tu dois contempler l’existence en connaissant sa non-existence, et, pareillement, tu dois contempler Heruka en connaissant sa non-existence.”⁹⁶ De manière similaire, la tradition du *Guhyasamājatantra* définit ainsi le yoga: “le yoga est défini comme la mise en adéquation de la sagesse et du moyen salvifique. Ce qui est vide de nature propre est l’intuition sapientielle; le moyen est la caractéri-

stique des modes existant.”⁹⁷ La séquence de la dissolution psychologique des trois *sattva-s* est alors la suivante: le *samayatattva* se dissout dans le *jñānasattva* et ce dernier dans le *saṃādhisattva*, lorsque le yogin s’absorbe dans la Claire Lumière (*prabhāsvara*). En somme, la *bhāvanā* n’a enjoint à l’adepte de former de sa substance la déité dans son cœur et de l’extérioriser par une méditation renforcée d’incantations magiques que pour se transmuer finalement en une récollection de la non-production originelle: “ici, qu’est-ce que la création mentale consistant en la récollection de la non-production? La Lumière qui est par nature claire est complètement dépouillée de tout signe et de tout phonème, elle est ni dueille ni non-duelle, apaisée et pure comme l’espace vide.”⁹⁸ S’explique alors que, du point de vue ultime, la *bhāvanā* n’existe pas comme telle, sa positivité intrinsèque n’étant jamais donnée, puisqu’abolitive et vouée à disparaître. Mystère que résume cette stance célèbre: “En l’absence d’une chose, il n’est point de création mentale (car il n’y a rien à créer); mais aussi une création mentale n’est point la création (d’une actualité); ainsi, qu’il y ait une présence positive (à créer) ou une absence (interdisant toute création), on ne perçoit pas la création mentale.”⁹⁹ La *bhāvanā* n’a d’autre fonction que d’accomplir la maturation du courant de conscience, maturation nécessaire à sa libération. Aussi est-il permis, selon *Les Fondements des Tantras bouddhiques*, d’identifier le stade de la production et le “chemin de la maturation” d’une part, et le stade de la réalisation et le “chemin de la libération” de l’autre, de sorte qu’il est possible de regrouper les chemins du *Mahāyāna* en *vipāka-mārga* et *vimukti-mārga*. Point de *restitutio in integrum* sans cette maturation du flux de conscience (*saṃtāna, saṃtati*) tout au long de l’*utpatti-krama*. C’est elle qui permet au courant sériel de la conscience de rejoindre et de réintégrer l’élément infiniment précieux et secret de la Claire Lumière, enchâssé en lui, mais voilé par les constructions mentales adventices; sagesse non-duelle et source inépuisable d’où surgissent les entités, à la fois cause et effet, puisqu’elle est simultanément la conscience et le domaine objectal imaginé. Rien d’étonnant dès lors à ce que l’adepte, parvenu au terme du *niśpanna-krama* et à jamais stabilisé dans l’aperception de la Claire Lumière, soit à son tour censé pouvoir obtenir toutes les *siddhi-s*, mondaines (inférieures et supérieures) comme supramondaines: “tout ce qu’il désire, que l’adepte l’ac-

complisse sans qu'il soit entravé; et il est absorbé de manière permanente au moyen du "yoga dénué d'absorption."¹⁰⁰

VII. *Les "pouvoirs merveilleux" (siddhi): cadre et principe d'une solution:*

Demandons-nous à présent si cet examen de la *bhāvanā* dans le Śivaïsme du Cachemire et dans les *Tantras* bouddhiques ne livre pas précisément un principe général d'interprétation rendant compte de la possibilité des "pouvoirs merveilleux", lors même que le monde s'y dévoile comme phénomène de conscience.

Dans le Śivaïsme du Cachemire, d'une part, rien n'existe en effet qui ne se manifeste à la conscience. Rien n'existe qu'en fonction d'une opération actuelle ou possible de la conscience. Le monde n'existe que pour autant que le sujet est capable d'en produire une image mentale: tant que le monde ne devient pas objet de connaissance, revêtant la forme d'une image mentale dans la conscience, il est virtuellement inexistant. L'objet n'est rien en lui-même. Sans la connaissance, il n'existe pas; son existence dépend uniquement et invariablement de l'acte de conscience qui le rend manifeste et l'appréhende. Aussi l'activité autonome de la Conscience du Soi se présente-t-elle comme la forme générique de tout ce qui existe. "Etant donné que ce qui n'est pas manifesté à la conscience est sans existence, l'activité de la Conscience est universelle".¹⁰¹ "La conscience divine forme la nature propre de l'univers".¹⁰² La Conscience divine est donc la seule réalité douée d'existence propre et qui ne dépende absolument de rien: c'est elle qui revêt l'aspect de l'objet de l'expérience et forme sa nature. L'objet soi-disant existant n'est réel qu'en tant qu'il est sa forme. Etant donné que le Soi indifférencié répugne à cette connaissance différenciée et phénoménale (ainsi qu'à toute activité différenciée) dont dépendent les objets externes au niveau empirique et individuel, "les objets externes dépendent de la connaissance et, partant, ce monde est vide",¹⁰³ C'est dire que la Conscience divine, en tant qu'aperception pure, est l'existence absolue: elle est la manifestation ou la révélation de l'être dans son unique forme possible. Une opposition ne saurait par conséquent s'instituer entre les concepts d'être et de conscience, car le mode de manifestation pensé sous le titre de conscience n'est pas différent de celui qui constitue l'existence en tant

qu’essence de l’être. L’être est derechef égal à la pensée pour autant que l’existence de l’objet se constitue dans la *jñāśakti* de la Conscience divine. C’est en fait le même pouvoir ontologique de manifestation qui est pensé sous les titres équivalents d’existence, de forme, de représentation, d’image, de conscience, d’être. En conséquence, demande la *Mahārthamañjari*: “Quelle différence existe-t-il du point de vue de la réalité véritable entre une fleur céleste et une fleur réelle? L’univers puise sa vie dans la vibration (*sphurana*) (de la Conscience divine), et cette vibration est partout la même”.¹⁰⁴

Dans les *Tantras* bouddhiques, d’autre part, la *bhāvanā* donne à expérimenter *in vivo*, pour ainsi dire, l’idéalité ultime du monde: sa transparence ultime exprime son intériorité pure et simple. Elle révèle et atteste que la réalité, loin d’exister de manière indépendante et séparée, telle une donnée que l’on ne peut que subir, est une valeur intensifiable dont le degré de réalité dépend de l’intensité de l’expérience du sujet. Pour le yogin, réel veut dire affirmable: l’être ne peut être posé en lui et par lui qu’à proportion de sa propre puissance d’affirmation, car ce qui est offert à sa conscience, c’est le contenu qu’elle revendique. L’être mesure toujours l’élan ou l’ardeur de son pouvoir d’attention, et, conversement, seul est réel ce qui agit en ce sens que cela l’affecte et qu’il peut en faire l’expérience. Dès lors que le yogin cachemirien, par sa participation à la conscience divine, a réalisé que le monde n’est qu’un phénomène de conscience, puisqu’il n’existe qu’en fonction d’elle, et que l’adepte bouddhique, par la création mentale d’une sphère d’existence particulière, a acquis la certitude que la conscience est un exercice spontané de créativité, l’hypothèse devient formulable selon laquelle le dynamisme de la conscience, parce qu’il obéit à une loi d’identification et de participation, est intrinsèquement magique. Comme la *bhāvanā* accomplit une déification rendant possible une domination magique, son élucidation ouvre l’accès à l’intelligence du registre d’expérience propre aux “pouvoirs merveilleux” et “réalisations” praeternaturelles du Yoga. S’expliqueraient alors l’efficience magique propre à la *bhāvanā* et la possibilité que les choses obéissent aux directives de la conscience. Nous lisons ainsi dans le *Tripurārāhasya*: “C’est ainsi que ce monde réputé “extérieur” est une pure création mentale projetée sur l’écran du Non-développé,

lui-même essentiellement fait de conscience. Le monde n'est qu'un assemblage de couleurs jetées sur la toile du Non-développé. Il n'a pas de réalité en-dehors de cette toile. Et celle-ci, à son tour est tissée par la conscience à l'intérieur d'elle-même. Etonne-toi, après cela, qu'un yogin puisse, en un instant, accéder à des lieux très éloignés, qu'un homme ordinaire mettrait très longtemps à atteindre et y percevoir directement ce qui s'y trouve! Le proche et le lointain, le long et le bref ne sont que de pures créations mentales réfléchies dans le miroir intérieur de la conscience''.¹⁰⁵ Ce texte témoigne assez de la possibilité pour le yogin de pénétrer partout, précisément parce qu'étant intérieur à l'être, il a en quelque sorte accès à toutes les parties de son immensité. Le yogin aurait la possibilité idéale de se donner à lui-même toute présence dont il est actuellement privé. Ce texte suggère donc une présence possible infiniment plus vaste que la portion du réel à laquelle sa conscience est actuellement présente. De manière similaire, Novalis a pu écrire de son côté: "Nous sommes en relation avec toutes les parties de l'univers, comme avec le passé et l'avenir. Il ne dépend que de la direction et de la durée de notre attention d'établir le genre de relation que nous désirons surtout établir, celle que nous désirons voir devenir la plus importante et la plus efficace. La vraie méthode à employer ne devrait être rien moins que cet art d'inventer, qui est depuis si longtemps l'objet de nos désirs; mais elle devrait être plus encore. L'homme procède journellement selon les lois de cet art, et il n'est pas douteux qu'il pourrait les découvrir grâce à l'observation géniale de soi-même".¹⁰⁶ Une telle incursion sur tout le domaine de l'être ne met donc pas en jeu quelque translocation; ce n'est pas non plus en s'immissant dans le jeu de la nature, c'est à dire en s'insinuant dans le tissu des forces naturelles que le yogin a le pouvoir de se rendre présent à toute chose. C'est par l'extension de son segment de conscience individuelle au sein du continuum de la Conscience universelle que le yogin actualise et rend conscient sa propre présence à tout ce qui est. L'extension de son segment de conscience s'opère donc intérieurement, au sein du champ unitaire déployé par l'Energie de manifestation: c'est en son sein que le yogin, prenant pour relais dynamique une image-support, découpe son objet, actualise un fragment du réel. A l'opposé du subjectivisme affirmant que nous ne pouvons sortir de nous-même, cette

doctrine postule l'intégration universelle dans la Conscience (*māhavyāpti* dans le Trika). L'omniprésence du Principe est exclusive de toute séparation locale, de sorte que l'énergie de manifestation est partout infuse. "Puisque le Brahman est partout infus et qu'il se manifeste n'importe où, on l'aperçoit partout de quelque manière que l'on veut, comme par le pouvoir de projection du rêve".¹⁰⁷ "En vertu de sa toute puissance, l'énergie de manifestation se manifeste partout; aussi ce qui a pour cause une impulsion intense apparaît-il n'importe où".¹⁰⁸ Ainsi la conscience du yogin n'est que le lieu privilégié de son ouverture à l'énergie potentielle de manifestation: elle en est le foyer d'actualisation "De ce fait, l'esprit de ceux qui connaissent les principes (*tattva*) est doué (du pouvoir de provoquer) un rencontre fortuite: ce qu'il crée mentalement s'accomplit rapidement".¹⁰⁹ L'on comprend que, par la concentration de son énergie spirituelle sur une image-relais, l'adepte puisse rendre la puissance créatrice de son intention telle qu'elle "projette", sans nulle rupture d'immanence métaphysique, ce qui se réfléchit dans le miroir magique de sa *Phantasie*, et le fasse apparaître, au dedans de lui-même, comme doué d'une réalité extra-mentale. C'est ainsi que le yogin, par l'élan de sa conscience où l'intention n'est pas séparée de l'acte, peut prétendre maîtriser des objets par eux-mêmes inaccessibles. L'on comprend également qu'il puisse opérer "le transfert des phénomènes d'un clavier à un autre, à la faveur d'une espèce de transsubstantion",¹¹⁰ etc. Toutes opérations qui ressortissent franchement, disons le mot, à la magie, mais à une "magie naturelle" dont l'efficience, de nature tout intérieure—ce qui ne veut pas dire irréelle—, s'enracine dans la puissance spirituelle unifiante de la conscience où penser et agir sont une seule et même chose. Pour l'Inde, la pensée, au lieu qu'elle soit un instrument de connaissance, est d'abord un instrument d'action, et l'acte authentique, au lieu de consister en l'action mécanique, est pour elle toujours magique. Comme le disait fortement P. Masson-Oursel, "il y a gradation insensible, équivalence foncière entre opérer par geste ou voix et opérer par esprit: l'idéalisme absolu que nous tenons pour attitude philosophique, connaissance *a priori* ou hallucination psychologique, paraît dans l'Inde la plus sûre des magies".¹¹¹ Métamorphoses et ubiquité, fluidité universelle d'un espace-temps circulable et réversible, transferts entre l'homme-

microcosme et le macrocosme: autant de caractères de la vision magique de l'univers à laquelle introduit la *bhāvanā*.¹¹² D'où le sentiment, diffus mais non incohérent, qui rôde en Inde, d'une réalité magique du monde, d'un réalisme fantastique, auquel les spéculations et pratiques indiennes contribuent à donner corps. S'accréderait ainsi la conviction qu'en Inde la limite entre le possible et l'impossible n'est pas la même que chez nous, même s'il convient bien évidemment de se méfier des *mirabilia* du folklore magique. Il reste que la *bhāvanā*, en tant que pouvoir qui forme et transforme, est une véritable magie libératrice au rebours de cette magie créatrice en laquelle s'asservit la conscience phénoménalisante. Elle déroge à l'opposition instituée entre la voie sapientielle de la gnose libératrice et la voie du rituel dont relèvent les prescriptions de l'art hiératique: si elle demeure signifiante quand il s'agit d'élucidation philosophique ou sémantique, la distinction entre métaphysique et magie ne permet pas de cerner la *bhāvanā* en sa spécificité. Mieux encore: il se pourrait que son intérêt pour la réflexion vienne de ce qu'elle soit située en-deçà de l'opposition entre métaphysique et magie. La *bhāvanā* se tient en effet à la charnière des deux registres sur lesquel peut jouer la magie: le registre opératif, d'abord, qui est celui du pouvoir sinon créateur (puisque l'homme à vrai dire ne possède aucun pouvoir de créer des énergies physiques), du moins métamorphique de la pensée, dès lors qu'elle prétend exercer un rôle de détermination efficace susceptible d'altérer les conditions sous lesquelles la réalité est perçue et d'y inscrire des "effets", comme en témoigne par exemple le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*; ensuite le registre docétiste où la *bhāvanā*, qui abolit la distinction entre la réalité perçue et la réalité imaginée, est à la fois pierre de touche de la nature illusoire de la réalité et instrument de délivrance, grâce à l'élaboration volontaire d'une image théophanique jugée plus réelle et plus vraie, comme dans les *Tantras* bouddhiques. Il ne serait pas écarté que la *bhāvanā* soit héritière de cette technique de l'imagination active, dont l'anthropologie se demande si elle ne fut pas la technique préhistorique par excellence, et dont peut penser avec raison qu'elle a précédé toutes les formes élaborées de méditation pratiquées par l'humanité. Par la suite, le savoir-pouvoir qui constituait à l'origine la *bhāvanā* se serait progressivement épuré; sa traduction philosophique ultérieure aurait alors permis que son registre d'expérience

sui generis puisse corroborer des doctrines diverses, et même être érigé en norme de l'idéalité ultime du monde par les écoles idéalistes.¹¹³ Ambivalence de la *bhāvanā* qui explique l'ambiguïté morale foncière affectant le statut de l'adepte: cherche-t-on à cerner la figure de l'adepte tantrique que le départ se révèle difficile entre celle du théosophe et celle du théurge.

Mais il ne faut pas exagérer néanmoins la puissance de la *bhāvanā*. Bien qu'elle soit théoriquement sans limite, son efficacité est toutefois sujette à rencontrer pratiquement des bornes. Pour peu qu'elle perde de son homogénéité, la *bhāvanā*, dès lors insularisée, demeure exposée à subir l'emprise psychologique grandissante d'une autre création mentale plus compréhensive ou plus homogène, comme celle de quelque ascète courroucé.¹¹⁴ *A fortiori* lui faut-il s'abandonner à la toute-puissance irrésistible de la création mentale du Principe (*Brahmā, Viśvakarman*), dont la puissance est par définition englobante, homogène, convergente et exempte d'interférences.

VIII. *La synthèse achevée: l'exemple du Yognīhṛdaya:*

Un tantra hindou, le *Yognīhṛdaya*, où l'on décèle toute la gamme des significations reconnues au terme, marque l'aboutissement de la genèse historique de la *bhāvanā*.¹¹⁵

Dans sa première partie intitulée “*cakrasaṅketa*”, sa technique religieuse complexe¹¹⁶ enjoint à l'adepte de se représenter le diagramme du *śrīcakra* avec ses diverses parties constitutives (*cakra*), les neuf circuits du *navacakra* étant précisément groupés par trois (1: *bindu*, triangle, 8 angles; 2: 10 angles, 10 angles, 14 angles; 3: 2 lotus, le carré). Par cette pratique du *śrīcakra*, l'adepte vise à retrouver et à revivre personnellement la “rencontre convenue” (*saṅketa*) de Śiva et de Śakti unis, en réactualisant le mystère et la joie de leur coprésence. Après qu'aient été dévoilées, dans le sens de l'émanation, les cinq énergies que comporte le *cakra* (I.8) et les divisions cosmiques (*kalā*) assignées à ses diverses parties (I.19 à 21), Bhairava révèle à l'adepte le “sens conventionnel” (*saṅketa*, ce terme présentant une double connotation), c'est à dire le sens secret que revêt le *cakra*: le *cakra* est “une forme de Kāmakalā” (= Śiva et Śakti) et “sa nature essentielle est l'expansion” simultanée de la divinité et du cosmos.¹¹⁷ Le Tantra prescrit ensuite de “triplement méditer le

cakra “dans les neuf *cakra-s* du corps subtils, d’*akula*(= *mūlādhāra*) jusqu’au centre situé entre les sourcils (*bhrūmadhya*).¹¹⁸ Mais au-delà de l’*ājñā cakra*, à partir du *bindu* jusqu’à *unmanā*, la méditation des parties constitutives du *śrīcakra* s’opère dans les étapes successives de l’énoncé des *kalā* de HRĪM, par conséquent aux divers niveaux d’affinement croissant de l’énergie phonique (*bindu*, *ardhacandra*, *nirodhini*, *nāda*, *nādānta*, *sakti*, *vyāpikā*, *samanā* et *unmanā*). “Il faut triplement méditer le *cakra* dans le Point-source suprême (*mahābindu*). Jusqu’à l’*ājñā* (*cakra*, la méditation) est dite avec *kalā*. (De là) jusqu’à *unmani*, elle est *sakalāniṣkalā*. Au stade suprême, elle est sans *kalā*. Elle se trouve ainsi triple”.¹¹⁹ Destinée à réaliser l’unité du *brahmāṇḍa* et du *piṇḍāṇḍa* dans le corps même de l’adepte,¹²⁰ cette méditation progresse des parties constitutives grossières du *śrīcakra* à ses parties subtiles et très subtiles pour s’achever dans l’énergie indifférenciée qui transcende la pensée. “Il faut méditer (*vibhāvayet*) les parties du *cakra*, de l’Enchanteresse des trois mondes” (le *Trailokyamohana cakra* situé entre le *bhupura* et les trois ceintures (*mekhalā*)) au *Bindu* (donc de l’extérieur vers le centre) qui sont (successivement) grossières, subtiles et très subtiles, qui vont d’*akula* à *unmani*, ainsi que dans le *mahābindu*. Cela, il faut le faire “triplement”.¹²¹

On mesure de la sorte la complexité de cette *bhāvanā* au cours de laquelle se produit, à partir de l’*ājñā*, une sorte de conversion du schématisation spatial à l’ordre phonique des *kalā*. Cependant, si la succession des *kalā* correspond à l’exténuation progressive de l’énergie phonique et refuse donc tout schématisation spatial, chacune d’entre elles, malgré sa grandeur évanouissante, admet encore, de manière rémanente sans doute, une forme symbolique, sorte d’“*Urform*”, dont le graphisme est le suivant: le *Bindu* a la forme d’une lampe, l’*Ardhacandra* celle d’une demi-lune bien sûr, *Rodhini* celle d’un triangle, *Nāda* celle d’un bâton entre deux *bindu-s*, *Nādānta* celle du soc de la charrue (*hala*) avec un *bindu* adjoint à droite, *Sakti* celle d’un trait dressé au-dessus et à gauche de deux *bindu-s*, *Vyāpikā* celle d’un triangle, *Samanā* celle d’une ligne droite placée entre deux *bindu-s* et enfin *Unmanā* celle d’une ligne droite (I.28b à 32). La suprême *kalā*, c’est à dire l’énergie de prise de conscience, ayant vu la fulguration du Soi, survient alors l’émission de la Parole suprême par cette *kalā* prenant l’aspect d’*Ambikā* (I.35). Le *Tantra* décrit ensuite le processus de l’émission cosmique par *Vāmā* (I.37),

puis les niveaux de la Parole, auxquels succèdent le processus de conservation, puis celui de résorption (I.39), conformément à cette oscillation pendulaire des mouvements d'épanouissement au dehors et de contraction au dedans de l'énergie qui marque le déroulement de la méditation. Initié au sens ésotérique du *cakra*, “l'adepte éveillé doit constamment pratiquer la méditation intense du suprême éclat (de la Conscience) ayant l'aspect de la volonté. Voici ensuite la triple et nonuple pratique du *cakra*”.¹²²

L'adepte doit ici méditer le *cakra* d'abord selon sa division en trois parties, puis selon celle en neuf parties. Le verbe *bhāvayati* note donc ici une méditation intense assurant l'assimilation réitérée et l'identification de l'adepte à l'incandescence lumineuse et vibrante (*parispurat*) de l'ipséité du Suprême Śiva, source des divers noms et formes composant la manifestation (*prapañca*). En somme, l'adepte doit toujours garder présent à l'esprit l'ipséité du Soi, afin d'en faire l'expérience et de la réaliser.¹²³ Expérience de réalisation de la non-dualité analogue à celle que vise la *pāra pūjā*: compénétration parfaite (*samāvesa*) où l'adepte déclare “Je suis Śiva” et où il accède à l'ivresse que procure l'ambroisie de la réalisation constamment réitérée, “encore et encore”, de son identité à la nature réelle du Suprême Śiva.¹²⁴

La troisième partie du *Yoginīhṛdaya*, intitulée “*pūjāsanketa*”, entend précisément dévoiler le sens secret du rite d'adoration de la Déesse. Elle stipule qu'après “avoir fait exister comme il convient le roi des *cakra-s*”, c'est à dire après avoir fait tracer selon les règles le *śrīcakra*¹²⁵, l'adepte doit lui-même évoquer par la pensée la Déesse qui répand la liqueur d'immortalité puis “contenter” (*tarpayet*) par des offrandes mentales les déités présidant aux divers plans (rite de *tarpana*): “au milieu de cela, on doit évoquer soi-même mentalement avec le mantra consistant en neuf lettres (= HSK\$MLVY ŪM) la Maîtresse (dispensatrice) de l'ambroisie”.¹²⁶ Elle prescrit encore à l'adepte de pratiquer une *bhavanā* très particulière en forme de récitation mentale (*japa*) de la formule de la *śrī vidyā*, *bhāvanā* dont on peut, non sans simplifier beaucoup, résumer ainsi la procédure. Demeurant intérieurement centré dans les sept points centraux (*vishvam*: le faîte médian, d'où l'équinoxe dans la session rituelle brahmanique (*sattrā*), puis le point central d'équilibre), l'adepte doit traverser les cinq états de la conscience (les trois états

naturels: *jagrat*, *svapna*, *susupti* plus les deux états mystiques: *turiya* et *turyātīta*) et les six paliers du vide.¹²⁷ Perçant alors les *cakra-s* supérieurs et accédant à un vide qui va s'exténuant, “dans l'état supérieur aux trois vides, il doit actualiser le grand vide”,¹²⁸ c'est à dire oser plonger dans le firmament illimité et dénué de forme (*nirākāram*) de la Conscience. Le terme *bhāvanā* s'entend ici comme une plongée qui s'épanouit aux divers paliers d'une vacuité spatiale (*vyoman*: le firmament) toujours plus exténuée, qui n'est autre que la conscience devenant sans cesse plus homogène.

IX. Les pratiques parallèles à la bhāvanā dans la tradition occidentale:

Aussi originale puisse-t-elle paraître, la *bhāvanā* ne saurait néanmoins être regardée comme une curiosité insolite ou exotique portant témoignage du seul génie indien. En effet, il n'est pas impossible de repérer des pratiques parallèles jusque dans la tradition occidentale. Certes, la comparaison entre philosophies demeure toujours dangereuse, puisqu'aucune analogie n'a de sens si les philosophèmes mis en coïncidence ne sont encadrés par des structures ou des ensembles organiques soutenant la comparaison. Partant, les jalons suivants, s'ils signalent des convergences, font par là-même mieux ressortir les divergences qui les encadrent.¹²⁹

Dans le Néoplatonisme, se développe la conception des deux “véhicules de l'âme”. Analogue à la conception indienne de l'*āativāhika-deha*, cette doctrine distingue le “véhicule” supérieur, congénital, lumineux ou “astral” et le “véhicule pneumatique” inférieur. Associé au *πνεῦμα*, le “véhicule éthéré de l'âme” (*όχημα*), forme en propre le corps subtil et constitue chez Synesios le “corps phénoménologique” des rêves.¹³⁰ Héritier de cette tradition, le Platonisme florentin (Marsile Ficin, Giordano Bruno) s'efforça d'analyser le lien entre le *spiritus phantasticus* ou le *pneuma imaginatif* et la destinée de l'âme. Il soutint notamment que l'imagination a le pouvoir de modifier ou d'altérer la substance même de l'âme.¹³¹ La Renaissance voit enfin se développer un *Ars memorativa*, chez Robert Fludd en particulier, prescrivant la visualisation et la présentation à l'*oculus imaginationis* des contenus à mémoriser. Le thème des effets magiques de l'imagination devint un des lieux communs favoris des penseurs de la Renaissance.¹³²

Mais c'est la doctrine paracelsienne de l'imagination comme pouvoir créateur et plasmateur qui offre à cet égard l'analogie la plus éclairante, même si la pensée de Paracelse demeure prisonnière d'une illumination théosophique réfractée en des intuitions parfois obscures et toujours confuses. Ce que Paracelse nomme l'*astrum* ou le firmament invisible constitue le noyau du for intérieur de la personne humaine, autrement dit, "l'homme intérieur selon l'imagination": tout l'homme pensant réside dans son imagination, pensée et imagination ne faisant qu'un. L'*astrum* (parfois l'*evestrum*) se confond pratiquement avec le "corps sidéral", cette enveloppe subtile ou psychique qui forme le dominateur éthéré de la chair grossière et dont toute âme est revêtue. Puissant désir qui opère comme un aimant, l'imagination est un feu subtil qui attire un autre feu. Selon Paracelse, la pensée de l'homme, c'est à dire son imagination active, est un feu qui "cuit" les choses, qui les fait mûrir en les transformant. "L'imagination œuvre en elle-même, elle possède l'art et tous les outils pour accomplir tous ses désirs".¹³⁰ D'où le rôle joué par l'imagination plasmatrice de la mère dans la gestation: "A l'endroit où s'applique l'imagination, le corps invisible, se saisissant de son outil, construit ce qui est apparu en son âme".¹³⁴ Puissance active et intermédiaire entre l'être et la pensée, l'imagination est la grande magicienne: puissance démiurgique, elle est l'architecte intérieur invisible et c'est elle qui explique les *mirabilia*, ces phénomènes praeternaturels réputés prodigieux ou aberrants. "Les pensées de l'homme font un ciel nouveaux". Il y a donc d'abord le ciel visible, puis le ciel invisible symbolisé par l'*astrum*, puis encore le ciel que l'homme crée dans ses pensées. Imagination active et foi sont synonymes. L'"esprit sidéral", qu'il faut distinguer de l'âme, est précisément l'imagination, c'est à dire l'*astrum*: feu du désir en l'homme qui fait l'efficace de sa prière. Mais l'*astrum* est aussi hors de lui: il est cette vertu ignée qui régit le monde. Or, l'imagination ferme et déterminée est le commencement de toute opération magique" selon Paracelse. Aussi l'homme est-il en mesure d'insérer dans l'Ame du monde ce qu'il conçoit et de susciter par elle des événements inattendus; il peut imposer sa volonté à l'*astrum* cosmique, en projetant en lui son désir imaginant. L'*astrum* cosmique est alors censé être l'exécutant de ce que l'imagination lui ordonne, "L'astre est par conséquent

le maître d’œuvre et ce qu’ordonne l’imagination se réalise. Car le rôle de l’homme est de commander à tout ce qui est en lui, selon son bon plaisir et sa volonté. Chaque envie et chaque désir sont un accord et une injonction afin que se réalise le contenu imaginatif. L’homme domine son astre comme Dieu domine le firmament”.¹³⁵ Naturellement, à l’instar des spéculations tantriques, Paracelse accepte comme une évidence fondamentale la doctrine de l’homme-microcosme. “Toute imagination humaine vient du cœur. Le cœur est le soleil du microcosme. Et toute imagination humaine venue du petit soleil du microcosme passe dans le soleil du grand univers, dans le cœur du macrocosme. Ainsi, l’imagination du microcosme est une semence qui devient matérielle, etc.”¹³⁶ Paracelse affirme donc que le petit monde humain est un macrocosme condensé: on y découvrirait, outre des planètes, des lumineux ou des étoiles, des fleuves, des forêts, des montagnes, tous issus des quatre éléments.¹³⁷

Il resterait enfin à évoquer l’idéalisme magique de Novalis, cette philosophie incertaine et fuyante qui s’annonce à travers ses *Fragments Esthétiques*. Novalis se proposait de faire de la philosophie une magie. Il crut découvrir en l’homme un “cœur productif” qui serait en lui la “signature” de la volonté infinie agissant dans la nature, et le relais de l’imagination productrice qui a conçu le monde. “De l’imagination productrice se déduisent nécessairement toutes les facultés et forces internes — et toutes les facultés et forces externes”.¹³⁸ Inutile d’examiner plus en détail cette doctrine, du fait même qu’elle connut une certaine fortune et imprima sa marque sur la philosophie et la littérature occidentales.

Si l’on tente à présent de dresser le bilan de notre enquête, il apparaît que l’originalité de la *bhāvanā* sous ses multiples spécifications est d’articuler dans l’unité d’une pratique trois composantes sur chacune desquelles les spéculations indiennes ont mis tour à tour l’accent. Recueillons les éléments, précédemment dégagés de manière différentielle, d’une définition de la *bhāvanā*:

la *bhāvanā* est une pratique 1. d’identification et de participation visant à déraciner la distinction apparente du sujet et de l’objet (elle a pour effet de faire apparaître comme objectif ce qui est de nature essentiellement subjective, et de faire saisir la nature véritablement

subjective de ce qui paraît objectif), 2. au moyen d'une visualisation, plus ou moins thématisée, et donc plus ou moins intense, 3. qui mobilise le dynamisme créateur de la conscience.

Il n'est pas besoin de souligner que cette interprétation de l'essence de la conscience en termes de dynamisme créateur ne s'est pas fait jour sous la forme d'une doctrine achevée. En effet, si les spéculations indiennes ont célébré l'énigme de la créativité de la conscience et décliné le paradigme de la *bhāvanā*, chacune d'entre elles mit l'accent, comme par une sorte de dialectique immanente, sur l'une de ses composantes: ainsi, du Śivaïsme du Cachemire qui exalte la première composante ou du Bouddhisme tantrique qui mit en avant la seconde. Une fois réinsérée dans son développement global, la *bhāvanā* prend donc toute sa profondeur historique: elle a connu une genèse historique au cours de laquelle toute la gamme de ses composantes a été parcourue.

Il est clair cependant que les progrès de la pensée philosophique indienne dans la détermination de l'essence de la conscience se sont toujours déroulés à l'intérieur de l'horizon dessiné par les expériences enstatiques du Yoga. Dès lors s'explique-t-on que la *bhāvanā* soit apparue dans des contextes doctrinaux divers et qu'elle ait pu, fait remarquable, s'inscrire aussi bien dans une voie synthétique et intensificatrice (*Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, Śivaïsme du Cachemire) que dans une voie involutive et éliminatrice (le Chemin bouddhique). Fortes de leurs plongées répétées dans l'énergie de la conscience, les spéculations indiennes ont pu faire droit à la dimension créatrice de la conscience. Elles purent ainsi reconnaître dans l'imagination non point une faculté séparée, mais bien la puissance majeure de l'âme: l'exposant imaginatif de la conscience apparaissait comme le reflet en elle du centre de l'être. De fait, l'articulation spéculative des expériences yogiques ne s'est jamais assignée pour tâche, à la différence de l'Occident, d'élaborer une doctrine des facultés, en proposant, par exemple, une théorie de la perception, de l'affectivité, de la mémoire, de l'intelligence ou de l'imagination, comme si le dynamisme de la vie psychique était la somme d'une collection de facultés indépendantes quoique hiérarchisées. Or, rien ne s'inscrit davantage en faux contre la psychologie occidentale de l'imagination que la psychologie du *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, où la *bhāvanā* désigne l'activité synthétique de la conscience, et non point une fonction particulière de la pensée dans le concert des facultés.

Dès l'aube de la réflexion, la pensée indienne s'est singularisée par son intuition aiguë du flux existentiel en devenir constitutif de l'homme. Le mystère de sa destinée réside au jugement de l'Inde dans l'orientation imprimée au continuum psychologique humain. L'homme est essentiellement γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, c'est à dire processus et devenir, il est projet (*kratu*). “Or l'homme, certes, est projet. Selon ce que fut en ce monde son projet, ainsi en est-il, une fois sorti de la vie présente. Il faut réaliser jusqu'au bout son projet”, proclame la “gnose de Śāṇḍilya”.¹³⁹ L'homme n'est pas seulement, il a à être son être dans l'espace d'une connaissance et d'une compréhension de soi comme auto-créateur: “Etre, c'est se faire être” L'homme est un être “à dessein de lui-même”, car son pouvoir être ne s'ajoute pas à lui mais le constitue de part en part. Seulement, si l'homme ordinaire ne vise point thématiquement ce vers quoi il se projette, “celui qui sait ainsi” se projette consciemment, par une sorte d'auto-transcendance, en direction de son essence la plus intime.

Selon la double formule expliquant le réalisme en matière spirituelle dont font preuve les religions et les philosophies indiennes, comme l'a bien vu P. Mus,¹⁴⁰ *l'homme devient ce qu'il contemple et ne comprend jamais que ce qu'il devient*. Mais ce n'était plus désormais par la voie de l'action rituelle, perfective et sacrilisante que l'homme allait s'efforcer de ressaisir le dynamisme créateur lui permettant de forger sa destinée. Dans la période des *Brāhmaṇas*, l'architecture de l'autel du feu, véritable *yantra* archaïque, constituait la matérialisation d'une magie susceptible d'exercer une influence sur la personne du sacrifiant comme sur la nature, puisqu'elle assurait au *yajamāna* le bénéfice de conjurer toute menace d'effritement de son individualité au moyen de sa reconstruction perfective. Une fois révolue la fortune des exposants externes (quels qu'aient été les motifs divers de la désaffection, vers le IV. S. av. J.C., à l'égard de rites jugés trop complexes ou trop dispendieux), le rite constructif persiste mais sous une forme intériorisée. C'est en faisant retour à la générosité créatrice de sa conscience grâce à une reprise de son dynamisme intensif, et en recourant au pouvoir plasmateur et transformateur de l'imagination que l'homme entendait dorénavant modeler sa destinée: le pouvoir qu'a l'homme sur lui-même met à présent en jeu le pouvoir de la conscience de travailler sur des

images et de s’assimiler à elles. Des *Brāhmaṇas* aux conceptions tardives des *Tantras* s’est par conséquent développée une tradition continue¹⁴¹ qui prescrit au sacrificiant d’associer sa personne à celle du dieu en le créant ou tout au moins en le spécifiant au moyen d’un rite constructif, non plus extérieur et sous une forme matérielle, mais intérieurisé et sous la forme dématérialisée d’une visualisation: visualisation tout aussi artisanale où la plus grande simplicité s’accompagne paradoxalement de la plus grande complexité, et dont le ressort est ce pouvoir qu’a la conscience de produire, c’est à dire d’amener devant son regard, de susciter des modifications intentionnelles qui sont autant de présentations, auxquelles la conscience permet de virer au réel. Au cours de ce développement qui consacra le pouvoir créateur de l’esprit, tout s’est passé comme si les foyers de l’ellipse (le sacrificiant et Prajapāti mis en relation par la “copule magique”, l’autel du feu) avaient fini par se confondre pour former le centre d’un cercle dans les conceptions tardives des *Tantras*: ce n’était plus le “mésocosme” extérieur de l’autel du feu qui procurait l’instance médiatisante, mais bien l’imagination créatrice dirigée, véritable “mésocosme” intérieur. Dès lors qu’elle n’était plus *diffractée* et *serve* mais *intégrée* et *instauratrice*, l’imagination active se dévoilait comme l’organe de la créativité spirituelle, aux divers niveaux potentiels de l’expérience intérieure. L’imagination créatrice dirigée permet au méditant de se libérer de tout déterminisme psychologique d’origine karmique et de toute structure d’auto-conditionnement asservissante. Bien plus, elle reconditionne son individualité psychique. Loin d’être l’instrument d’une simple *metanoia*, la *bhāvanā* accomplit ici l’intégration dynamique et la réunification des niveaux, superficiels et profonds, de la conscience: elle est donc l’instrument d’une psychosynthèse, au plein sens du terme, c’est à dire d’un processus d’intégration unitaire des niveaux fonctionnels entre lesquels se distribue le flux de conscience en l’homme.

A la question qui n’a cessé de tourmenter la conscience indienne: “Est-il nécessaire que l’homme renaisse, et, dans l’affirmative, peut-il choisir sa prochaine incarnation?”, les pratiques et spéculations indiennes ont apporté, sous des formes diverses, la réponse de la dimension créatrice de la conscience. A travers leur entrelacs, une aventure philosophique s’est jouée qui a restitué à l’imagination

tion son rôle démiurgique et sa pleine vertu métaphysique. Car l'homme, avant d'être fils de ses œuvres, est plus originairement fils de son imagination, comme le montre bien le *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*. Parce qu'elle construit et forge mentalement au plus intime de l'homme ce que sera sa prochaine personnalité, l'imagination constitue par conséquent le véritable principe d'individuation. Tel un viatique accompagnant le processus de la transmigration, l'exposant imaginatif de la conscience forme ainsi, par delà la césure du trépas, l'élément dans lequel réside l'identité et la continuité de l'individualité psychique transmigrante, que celle-ci soit conçue en mode substantiel et personnel (*ātmavāda*) ou en mode sériel et impersonnel (*nairātmya*): de l'individualité psychique transmigrante, l'exposant imaginatif de la conscience constitue la condition informative en laquelle trouver ce qu'on nommerait sa "substance". Or, dans le processus de création continuée de l'homme par lui-même, l'imagination est en mesure de redresser tout soi-disant destin (*daiva*): *Imaginatio semper facit saltum!* L'homme est libre dans la mesure où il dépend de lui de "faire oraison" sur le contenu que sa conscience se procure. Parce qu'elle n'est rien de ce qu'elle connaît, la conscience recèle en somme une marge de futur où s'esquiscent en creux les formes possibles que peut revêtir son devenir, comme si chaque acte de l'imagination avait le pouvoir d'ouvrir une nouvelle dimension de réalité.

Ainsi élucidée, la *bhāvanā* place l'homme dans une atmosphère d'invention primordiale. L'imagination se révèle en définitive comme l'exposant au moyen duquel la conscience inconditionnée peut, à partir de sa nudité originelle, déployer les possibilités de l'être en se donnant toute forme, mais également, en fixant du même coup les limites du possible, dessiner la singularité du destin où chacun est appelé à s'enfermer. L'essentiel est ici l'insistance de la pensée indienne à rappeler l'homme à sa tâche d'auto-réalisation (*sādhana*), s'il est vrai que pour elle c'est l'acte qui introduit dans le monde de l'être et de l'absolu.

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¹ O. Lacombe, "Le sanskrit et la philosophie de l'être" in *Indianité*, 1979, p. 123.

² P. Masson-Oursel, *L'Inde antique et la civilisation indienne*, 1933, p. 250. De manière significative, le rêve prophétique se dénomme, par exemple, *bhāvika svapna*.

³ Cette mise en garde prophétique de P. Masson-Oursel (in "Sémantique et Métaphysique: la notion indienne de transcendance d'après l'emploi de trois préfixes sanskrits", *Recherches philosophiques*, T.2 (1932-1933), p. 184) semblait répondre d'avance aux controverses contemporaines sur la relation existante, dans la philosophie occidentale, entre la structure de la langue grecque et l'ontologie aristotélicienne (E. Benveniste, P. Aubenque, J. Derrida).

⁴ A. Padoux, "Contributions à l'étude du *mantraśāstra*", BEFEO, T. LXVII (1980), p. 80 n. 3.

⁵ Une enquête récente confirme d'ailleurs la définition très extensive du vocable signifiant "entraînement mental" parmi les moines cinghalais. Voir J. Maquet, "Bhāvanā in contemporary Sri Laṅka: the idea and practice" in *Buddhist Studies in honour of Walpola Rahula*, Londres, 1980.

⁶ cf. J. Filliozat, "The Psychological discoveries of Buddhism" reproduit in *Laghu Prabandhāḥ*, Leiden, 1974.

⁷ pali: *bhabba*, *Majjhima Nikāya*, I.104; sanskrit: *bhāvya*. Le devenir (*bhāva*) dans le Bouddhisme originel comporte encore une connotation positive.

⁸ C. A. E. Rhys-Davids n'hésite pas à affirmer à cet égard: "The buddhist conception of consciousness is, I venture to think, better understood as a mental electrification of the organism than in terms of any other natural force." (*Buddhist Psychology*, Londres, 1924, p. 16).

⁹ *manasikārana*, *cetasidṛḍhikārana*, *Abhidharmakośa*, VII., trad. La Vallée-Poussin, p. 23 (6 volumes, 1923-1931).

¹⁰ *pratipakṣa*, VI, 60-61, trad. LVP, 1925, pp. 103-104.

¹¹ *vinirdhāvana*, VIII, p. 64.

¹² *Anguttara Nikāya*, I.31; *Visuddhimagga*, IV de Buddhagosa (milieu du Ve S. ap. J. C.) *kaśina* = "tout, complet, entier", terme peut être apparenté au sanskrit: *kṛtsna*. Ces pratiques ne doivent pas être confondues avec celles de la concentration oculaire (*trātaka*) dans le Yoga hindou (*sambhavi-mudrā*, *khecarī*, etc.).

¹³ *Visuddhimagga*, III. 57-60; cf. E. Conze, "The Meditation on Death" in *Thirty years of Buddhist studies*, Londres, 1967, pp. 87-104.

¹⁴ *Abhidharmakośa*, VI. 11a-b, trad LVP, 1925, p. 149.

¹⁵ *ibid.* 9d, p. 149.

¹⁶ *ibid.* 10a-b.

¹⁷ *Uttara-bhāvanā-krama* de Kamalaśila, trad. par E. Lamotte in P. Demiéville, Le Concile de Lhasa, 1952, pp. 349-350.

¹⁸ *Abhidharmakośa*, V. 60d.

¹⁹ *ibid.* VI. 8c-d.

²⁰ Le Bouddha aimait en effet à se présenter lui-même non point comme un penseur dogmatique, mais comme un champion de l'analyse (*vibhajjavādi*, *Majjhima Nikāya*, II.99).

²¹ *bhāvanāmātrasārā saṃsaronmukhī*, *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, III.8.12a, éd. par L. S. Pansikar, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1918 reprinted Dehli, 1981.

²² *anantasyātmalattvasya sarvaśaktermahātmanah / saṃkalpaśaktiracitam yadrūpam tanmano viduh* // III.96.3.

²³ *mano hi bhāvanāmātram bhāvāno spandadharminī /* (glosé: *vihita niśiddhakriyā*) *kriyā tadbhāvitārūpam phalam* *zarvo'nuḍhāvati* // III.96.1.

²⁴ *yadā samkalpya samkalpya samvit samvindate vapuh* (V.91.89a).

²⁵ III.96.17-31.

²⁶ *tatsvayam svairamevaśu samkalpayati dehakam / teneyamindrajālaśrivitatena vitanyate*, III.4.79, *vitatena* glosé par: *ciraṇ bhāvanāvipulena*.

²⁷ *cittamevajagatkartṛ samkalpayati / yadyathā*, VIIb.139.1a.

²⁸ *yathaitadbhāvayet svāntam tathaiva cittam bhavati kṣanat*, III.91.29a.

²⁹ *ataścittam hi puruṣah śarīram cetyamevahi / yan mayam ca bhavatyettadvāpnityasamśayam //* IV.20.7.

³⁰ *pratyekameva yaccittam*, III.40.29a.

³¹ *svarūpaṁ sarvakṛtvam ca saktatvam ca mahānmanah*, III.91.16b.

³² *pratibhāsamupāyātī yadyadasya hi cetasaḥ / tattatprakaṭatameti sthairyam sa phalatāma-pi //* III.91.17.

³³ *dṛḍdha bhāvanamaya āeto tad ākāram tāvat yad yathā bhāvati alam // tat tat phalam tad ākāram tāvat kālam prapāyati*, IV.21.56b-57a.

³⁴ *dṛḍdhaniścayacceto yadbhāvayati bhūriśah /* IV.20.2a.

³⁵ *samkalpyate yathā yadyattathā bhavati kṣanat /* IV.53.66a.

³⁶ *tenopalambhah kudyādāvasau dṛḍdhatarah sthitah / yadyatra cidbhāvayati tattatraśu bhavatyalam //* IV.18.48.

³⁷ *paunah punyeta karānamabhyāsa iti kathyate / puruṣārthah sa eveha*, VIIb.67.43.

³⁸ *yo'bhyāsaḥ prakacayantah śuddhacinnabhaso rasat / bhavetan*, VIIb.67.20.

³⁹ *evam yathā yadeveha bhava bhāvye dṛḍhabhāvanāt bhuyate hi*, VIIa.82.26; cf. IV.17.4.

⁴⁰ *Tripurārahsya*, trad. M. Hulin: *La Doctrine secrète de la déesse Tripurā*, 1979, pp. 123-124.

⁴¹ *yathaiva bhāvayatyātmā satataṁ bhavati svayam / tathaivāpūryate śaktyā śīghrameva mahānapi //* IV.11.59.

⁴² *manonirmalasatvātmā yādbhāvayati yadṛśam / tattathāśu bhavatyeva yathāvarto bhavet payah //* IV.17.4.

⁴³ *ekatattvaghānābhyāsaḥ, prāṇanām vilaya, manovigraha*, VIIa.69.27.

⁴⁴ *anantam akhilam*, IV.11.60.

⁴⁵ *yanmayo'yo bhāvayantah sa tadāpnityasamśayam / brahmaśatyamavāpnūm tvam brahmasatyamayo bhava //* VIIa.54.23.

⁴⁶ *ekatattvaghānābhyāsacchāntaṁ śamyatyalam manah / tallinatvātsvabhāvaya tena prā-no'pi śāmyati //* VIIa.69.48.

⁴⁷ *jīvasyodeti yā śaktiryasya yasya yathā yathā / bhāti tatphaladā nityam tasya tasya tathā tathā //* III.45.14.

⁴⁸ *yathā virekam kurvanti haritakyah svabhāvataḥ / bhāvanāvaśataḥ karyam tathā yaralavādayaḥ //* (VIIa.81.39).

⁴⁹ IV.17.4.

⁵⁰ *Rg Veda*, IX.112; X.134; dans la littérature bouddhique, *Milindapañhā*, 119-123; voir Norman Brown, “The Metaphysics of the truth act (*satyakriyā*)” in *Mélanges d’indianisme à la mémoire de L. Renou*, Paris, 1968, pp. 171-177, où l’A. suggère en conclusion une continuité lointaine entre la *satyakriyā* et la “force de la vérité” (*satyagraha*, litt. l’“étreinte de la vérité”) prônée par Gandhi. Voir aussi du même auteur, “Le devoir, force de vérité” in *Annales E.S.C.*, juillet-août 1973.

⁵¹ *Chāndogya U.* VI.16.2.

⁵² *saṅkalpo vāva manaso bhūyān. Yadā vai saṅkalpayate, atha manasyati*, Ch.U., VII.4.1 et 2.

⁵³ *satyakāmah, satyasāṅkalpa*, Ch.U., VIII.1.5; cf. *Maitry U.*, VI.38.

⁵⁴ *yam yamantam abhikāmo bhāvati, yam kāmam kāmayate so'sya saṅkalpad eva samut-tiṣṭhati*, Ch.U. VIII.2.10.

⁵⁵ sa ya ātmānam eva lokam upāste(...), asmād hy eva ātmano yad yat kāmayate, tat tat srjate, Brhadāraṇyaka U., I.4.15.

⁵⁶ ayam jīvo dhāraṇādhyānayantanusārena yadyadiṣṭam tattatsarvam kramena yugapacca yathēccham kartum samartha ityaha—ekatvamityādinā // Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha, Comm. ad VIa.64.24.

⁵⁷ sarvaśaktayah svarūpatvājjīvasyāstyeśaktitā / anantascāntapṛktaśca svabhāvo'sya svabhāvataḥ // VIa.64.26.

⁵⁸ δρεξτιχὸν δὲ οὐχ ἄνευ φαντασίας, Aristote, *De l'Ame*, III.IO.433b.28.

⁵⁹ Atharva Veda VIII.2.1-2.

⁶⁰ Atharva Veda VIII.9.2.

⁶¹ par exemple, : “Quel que soit le monde que l’homme à l’esprit purifié souhaite en son cœur, il l’obtient, ainsi que toutes les satisfactions qu’il convoite. Ainsi donc, quand on désire la prospérité, on doit honorer celui qui a réussi à atteindre le Soi”. — *yam yam lokam manasā samvighati /viśuddhasattvah kāmayate yāṁśca kāmān / tam tam lokam jayate tāṁśca kāmāṁśtasmādātmāñām hyarcayedbhūtikāmāh // Munḍaka Upaniṣad*, III.1.10 (on notera la référence à la condition nécessaire de la pureté de l’“être psychique” (*sattva*).

⁶² dans lesquelles les délivrés sont pourvus de la possibilité de réaliser immédiatement leurs désirs par la seule intervention du *manas* (*mānasī siddhiḥ*), ce terme conservant ici son ancienne acception de “for intérieur”.

⁶³ Que l’image ne se limite point à une évocation perceptive est un fait bien établi par la psychologie contemporaine: l’électromyographie réalisée durant la représentation mentale d’un mouvement permet de constater une légère activité des muscles mis en jeu par cette évocation. *A fortiori* dans le cas d’un rêve érotique provoquant une pollution nocturne (cf. le Commentaire de Sthiramati sur la *Vimśatikā kārikā* 3, où l’on trouve l’écho de la thèse, présentée par Mahādeva au concile de Vaiśāli, soutenant qu’un Arhat peut être, en rêve, séduit par les tentatrices de Māra).

⁶⁴ J. Filliozat, “Taoïsme et Yoga”, *Journal Asiatique* (1969) 1-2, p. 61 et n. 79 p. 84.

⁶⁵ spandaśaktim manomayīm, spandaśaktim glosé par: sphuritam, VIb 84.2b yathai-kan pavanaspanda mekam auṣṇyānalau yathā / cīnmātram spandaśaktiśca tathaivaikātmā sar- vādā // VIb.84.3.

⁶⁶ asthāsyadekarūpeṇa vapusā cenmaheśvaraḥ / maheśvaratvam samvittvam tadaṭyakṣad ghaṭādīvat // Tantrāloka, III.100.

⁶⁷ citivahniravaropahade channo'pi mātrayā meyendhanam pluṣyati, Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya, 14; cf. Śiva sūtra, II.8.

⁶⁸ Śiva sūtra, III.4; cf. Vijñānabhairava, 52-53.

⁶⁹ Śiva sūtra, III.5.

⁷⁰ Vijñānabhairava, 54.

⁷¹ ibid. 145.

⁷² ibid. 43

⁷³ sarvam dehagataṁ dravyam viyadvyāptam, ibid. 47a.

⁷⁴ līnam mūrdhni viyat sarvam bhairavatnena bhāvayet, ibid. 85a.

⁷⁵ Śiva sūtra, III.37; cf. Vijñānabhairava, 140.

⁷⁶ karaṇaśaktih svato'nubhavāt, Śiva sūtra, III.37.

⁷⁷ ato eva yathābhīṣṭa samullekhaṁvahāsanāt / jñānakriye sphuṭe eva siddha sarvasya jīva-tah // Īśvara-pratyabhijñākārikā, I.6.11.

⁷⁸ Commentaire de L. Silburn dans son édition-traduction des Śiva sutra, 1980, p. 179.

⁷⁹ *tato manojavitvam vikaraṇabhāvah pradhāna jayaśca*, *Yoga sūtra*, II.49.

⁸⁰ *ibid.* III.50.

⁸¹ Que l'imagination soit le moyen privilégié de réalisation prescrit par les *Tantras* est attesté par les expressions fréquentes: *bhavayet*, *prabhā*, *vibhā*, *cintet*, *vicintet*; on rencontre encore *nidhyapti* comme équivalent de *bhāvanā*.

⁸² *Les Fondements des Tantras bouddhiques*, trad. du tibétain par F. Lessing et A. Wayman, La Haye, 1968, rééd. Delhi, 1978, 98a.4, p. 333.

⁸³ *Hevajra Tantra*, II.4.9, éd. et trad. par D. L. Snellgrove, Londres, 1959.

⁸⁴ *deve eva yajed devam, nādevo devam arcayet*, dit l'adage tantrique; cf. A. Padoux, ‘‘Contributions à l'étude du mantrāśāstra II (nyāsa)’’, BEFEO, T.LXVII (1980), p. 83.

⁸⁵ *vibhāvyo ’tiṣṭhet / devatāmūrtyā sthātavyam //* H.T.I.4.1.

⁸⁶ S'il est coupé de la concentration intérieure, ce moyen d'édification menace de sombrer dans la routine supersticieuse au niveau de la pratique populaire.

⁸⁷ *prajñopāyasamāyogat jāyate devataktṛih / caturmudrābhīr āmudrya devatāgarvam udava-han //* *Pañcakrama* (attribué au Nāgārjuna tantrique), II.50, éd. La Vallée Poussin, Gand, 1896, p. 30.

⁸⁸ *Fondements des Tantras*, 64a-4, op. cit., p. 207.

⁸⁹ *sarvāṅgabhāvanātītam kalpanākalpavarjitam / mātrābindusamātītam etan mandala uttamam //* *Candrakirti, Pradippodyotana*, IV., cité par A. Wayman dans *The Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra*, Delhi, 1977, p. 86.

⁹⁰ *samarasam ekabhāvam*, *Hevajra Tantra*, I.8.40.

⁹¹ *madbhavam hi jagat sarvam madbhavam bhuvanatrayam / madvyāpitam idam sarvam nānyamayam dr̄śtam jagat //* H.T. I.8.41.

⁹² *upāyah sambhavo yasmāl layam prajñā bhavāntaki*, H.T. II.2.27b.

⁹³ *utpattikramayogena prapañcaṃ bhāvayed vrati / prapañcam svapnavat kṛtvā prapañcair nihprapañcayet //* H.T. II.2.29.

⁹⁴ *viparītausadhi kalpanāt / bhavaḥ śuddho bhavenaiva vikalpa pratikalpatah //* H.T. II.2.47.

⁹⁵ *rāgena badhyate loko rāgenaiva vimucyate / vi-parītabhāvanā hy esa na jñāta buddhatirthikaiḥ //* H.T. II.2.51.

⁹⁶ *bhāvam bhāvyaṁ bhavet prajñā abhāvam ca pari-jñayā / tadvac chriherukam bhāvyaṁ abhāvam ca pari-jñayā //* H.T. I.1.11.

⁹⁷ *prajñopāyasamāpattir yoga ity abhidhīyate / yo ni(h)svabhāva(s)tah prajñā upāyo bhāva-lakṣanam* G.S.T. XVIII.32 (*Guhyasamājatantra*, édité par S. Bagchi, 1965, p. 123).

⁹⁸ *tatra katham anutpādānusmṛtibhāvanā / prakṛiti-prabhāsvaram sarvam nirnimittaṁ ni-rakṣaram / na dvayam nādvayam sāntam khasdr̄śam sunirmalam //* G.S.T. VII.35, *ibid.* p. 24.

⁹⁹ *abhae bhāvanābhāvo bhāvanā naiva bhāvanā / iti bhāvo na bhāvah syād bhāvana nopalabhyate //* G.S.T. II.3, *ibid.* p. 8; l'*Hevajra Tantra* (I.8.44) se fait l'écho de ce *logion* célèbre que D. L. Snellgrove cite dans sa traduction (p. 77 n° 3) en adoptant la leçon suivante pour le premier *pada*: *abhāvabhāvana bhāvo* ... d'où son interprétation différente.

¹⁰⁰ *yad yad icchatī tat tat kuryād anāvṛtaḥ / asamāhitayogena nityam eva samāhitāḥ //* *Guhyasamājanidānakārikā*, 29, éditées par A. Wayman in *The Yoga of the Guhyasamāja tantra*, op. cit., p. 293.

¹⁰¹ *acetitasya kasyāpi sattvābhavat, citikriyā sarvasāmānyarūpā, Śiva sūtra vimarsinī*, I.1; *acetitasya = aprakāśitasya*, *Śiva sūtra*, éd. et trad. de L. Silburn, 1980, p. 4.

¹⁰² *caitanyam viśvasya svabhavah*, *ibid.*; cf. III.30.

¹⁰³ *jñānāyatta bahirbhāvā atah śūnyam idam jagat*, *Vijñānabhairava*, 134b, éd. et trad. L. Silburn, 1961, p. 158.

¹⁰⁴ *kah sadbhāvaviśeṣah kusumād bhavati gaganakusumasya / yat sphuranānuprāṇo lokah sphuranam ce ca sarvasāmānyam // 32*, *Mahārthamañjari*, éd. et trad. L. Silburn, 1968, p. 117.

¹⁰⁵ *Tripurārāhsya*, op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁰⁶ Novalis, "Grains de Pollen" n° 92 (*Blütenstaub*), 1798, in *Petits Ecrits (Kleine Schriften)*, trad. par G. Bianquis, Aubier, 1947, pp. 74-75.

¹⁰⁷ *brahma sarvagatam yasmād yathā yatra yadotyadoditam / bhavatyāśu tathā tatra svapnaśaktyaiva paśyati // Y.V. III.52.42*, *svapnaśaktyaiva = vikṣepaśaktya*.

¹⁰⁸ *svatratra sarvaśaktivitvād yatra yā śaktirunnayet / āste tatra tathā bhāti tīvrasaṁvegahetu-tah // III.52.43*, *tīvrasaṁvega = dr̥ddhābhīnivesavaśanā*.

¹⁰⁹ *tena tattvidāṇi tāta kākataīyavanmanah / yadyadbhāvayati kṣipram tattadaśu karotyalam // V.89.65*; le *kākataīya sanyoga* (litt. "la corneille tuée par la chute fortuite d'une noix de coco") désigne la collocation des causes, la rencontre fortuite de deux séries causales indépendantes, cf. V.49.7b.

¹¹⁰ L. Renou, *Hymnes spéculatifs du Veda*, 1956, p. 10.

¹¹¹ P. Masson-Oursel, *Le Fait Métaphysique*, 1941, p. 20.

¹¹² Remarquons la congruence de cette vision avec cet aphorisme de Novalis: "Théorie de l'imagination. Elle est le pouvoir de rendre *plastique*". fragment n° 1198 (IV.414) de *l'Encyclopédie*, trad. M. de Gandillac, 1966, p. 278.

¹¹³ Il convient à cet égard, nous semble-t-il, de renverser le schéma, proposé par W. D. O'Flaherty, selon lequel la fonction déréalisante des pratiques magiques précéderait leur fonction manipulatrice (*Dreams, Illusions and other realities*, 1984, p. 292; cf. p. 287).

¹¹⁴ cf. *Tripurārāhsya*, op. cit., p. 124.

¹¹⁵ *Yoginīḥṛdaya*, éd. par Gopinath Kaviraj avec les comm. *Dīpikā* d'Amṛtananda et *Setubandha* de Bhāskararaya, Sarasvatī bhavana Granthāmalā, vol. 7, Varanasi, 1963. Nous remercions M. A. Padoux de nous avoir communiqué sa traduction du *Yoginīḥṛdaya*.

¹¹⁶ On notera que le *Yoginīḥṛdaya* a été rapproché de la *Bhāvanopaniṣad*, cette *Upaniṣad* *taṛḍīve* (la 84e selon la liste de la *Muktikop.*) qui prend rang parmi les *Upaniṣad*-s sākta (et parfois éditée avec la *Saundarya Lahari*), sans qu'il soit possible de préciser, par delà la ressemblance des contenus, les relations qui existent entre eux.

¹¹⁷ *cakram kāmakalārūpam prasāraparamārthatah*, I.24b.

¹¹⁸ I.25.

¹¹⁹ *mahābindau punaścivaṇi tridhā cakram tu bhāvayet / ājñāntam sakalam proktam tatah sakalaniṣkalam // unmanyantam pare sthane niṣkalaṇca tridhā sthitam*, I.27-28a.

¹²⁰ *brahmāṇḍapīṇḍāndayoraikyabhāvanā*, *Setubandha*, p. 41.

¹²¹ *trailokyamohanādī bindvantān sthūlasūksmasukṣmatarān cakrabhāgana akulādyunmānyanteṣu sthūlasūksmasukṣmatarabhāgeṣu mahābindau ca tān vibhāvayed (itiyarthah) // (Dīpi-ka*, p. 41).

¹²² *icchā rūpam param tejaḥ sarvadā bhāvayed buddhah / tridhā ca navadhā caiva cakra-sanketakah punah // I.72.*

¹²³ cf. *ātmāhambhāvabhanaya bhavitayam*, *Dīpika* ad I.3, p. 5.

¹²⁴ *paramāduaitabhbāvanāṁṭa*, III.6a.

¹²⁵ *samyagbhāvayecakra (rājakam)*, III.99a, *bhavayet = lekhayet*, *Dīp.*, p. 151.

¹²⁶ *amṛtesim ca tanmadhye bhāvayecca navātmanā // III.105a*.

¹²⁷ *viśuvam saptarūpam ca bhavayan manasā jāpet*, III.176b.

¹²⁸ *śūnya trayāt pare sthane mahaśūnyam vibhāvayet*, III.177b.

¹²⁹ Pour le domaine islamique, voir le beau livre d'H. Corbin, *L'imagination créatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn'Arabi*, 1958.

¹³⁰ Proclus, *Eléments de Théologie, in fine*, trad. Trouillard, Paris, 1965, p. 196sq.

¹³¹ R. Klein, "L'imagination comme vêtement de l'âme chez Marsile Ficin et Giordano Bruno", *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1956, n° 1, pp. 18-39.

¹³² France A. Yates, *L'art de la mémoire*, trad. fr. Gallimard, 1975; J. F. Marquet, "Foi et Magie", *Les Etudes Philosophiques*, 1977, n° 2, pp. 169-181.

¹³³ Paracelse, *Œuvres médicales*, trad. par B. Gorceix, PUF, 1968, p. 217.

¹³⁴ ibid. p. 219; conception que continue de partager au XVIIe S. Malebranche: "Lorsque l'imagination des mères se dérègle, elles peuvent engendrer des monstres, sans que Dieu en soit coupable", *De la recherche de la vérité*, II.1. chap. 7 (Vrin, p. 18).

¹³⁵ ibid. p. 222.

¹³⁶ *Opera*, 2 vol., 1603, vol. 1, p. 334, cité par Schopenhauer in *De la Volonté dans la Nature*, trad. par E. Sans, 1969, p. 172.

¹³⁷ sur l'ensemble de cette doctrine injustement méconnue, voir P. Deghaye, "La lumière de la nature chez Paracelse" in *Cahiers de l'Hermétisme* sous la dir. d'A. Faivre, n° 7, 1980 et Lucien Braun, *Paracelse, nature et philosophie*, Strasbourg, 1981.

¹³⁸ *l'Encyclopédie* n° 265, trad. M. de Gandillac, 1966, p. 98; voir aussi les *Petits Ecrits (Kleine Schriften)*, trad. de G. Bianquis, 1947.

¹³⁹ atha khalu kratumayah puruṣah, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, III.14.1.

¹⁴⁰ P. Mus, *Barabudur*, E.F.E.O., 1935, T.I, p. 129.

¹⁴¹ continuité remarquable bien mise en lumière par P. Mus, *ibid.*, p. 73.

HASIDISM: THE PRESENT STATE OF RESEARCH AND SOME DESIRABLE PRIORITIES

ZEEV GRIES

The Hasidic movement founded by R. Israel ben Eliezer, Master of the Holy Name (the Besht), has commanded the interest of scholars in the fields of history, literature, and the study of religious beliefs and doctrines. Even if it were our intention to record all the works about or inspired by Hasidism, neither the time nor the space available would suffice.

This survey is divided into two parts: the first tries to establish essential principles for the study of Hasidism, and the second surveys the lines along which research has developed, with particular emphasis on major trends.¹

A

The fruitful results of the vast body of research in comparative religion and the sociology of religion have taught that in order to study and to faithfully depict religious movements, the scholar must actively accept the yoke of interdisciplinary studies to acquire suitable tools for his task.² The student of religious beliefs and doctrines cannot divorce himself from investigation of the social context where they found expression, nor can he ignore the general and local historical circumstances under which they were created. Similarly, he cannot overlook the examination of the literary sources, forms, or literary and intellectual traditions that molded these beliefs and doctrines. It seems obvious that these requirements are certainly desirable for the scholar undertaking the study of the Hasidic movement, and therefore do not need to be specified. Regrettably, however, within the vast amount of written material on Hasidism, only a few scattered attempts to adopt such basic principles can be found. Thus it is incumbent on us to demonstrate their rightful function in the study of Hasidism.

The examination of a movement belonging to a religion that

establishes a set mode for the daily life of its adherents, obviously necessitates total immersion in the study of the regulatory means by which that religion directs and educates the religious person, his offsprings, and the community. The essential nucleus of Judaism is the halakhah. It is vital to ascertain whether the principles of halakhah, and its collected literature, as well as the educational institutions from the elementary level of the heder to the higher levels of the yeshivah and the bet midrash which impart its principles, continue to play a central role in the active life of the movement under consideration. The scholar must recognize that the major internal Jewish criteria for defining sectarian changes (sect as defined by scholars of the history of religion)³ are based on normative, or halakhic, changes. Such changes find their expression in Jewish literature and customs. Since the halakhah has been of a dynamic evolving nature throughout most of Jewish history, modifications must be carefully analyzed in relation to their reflection in the halakhic literature concomitant with the deeds of the innovators. Similarly, close attention must be given to their customs in comparison to local custom, since the mechanism of the halakhah allows custom to add dimensions to the halakhah, to change and to renew it.

Examination of the history of the halakhah, its bearers, and adherents reveals a demand for uniformity of observance coupled with widespread freedom of thought. As a result, Jewish history has not been characterized by the formation of sectarian movements, but rather by religious movements whose attitude towards halakhah is appraisable. Hasidism certainly belongs to the latter category. If this is the case, for what purpose has the sociological concept of sect been introduced? Its introduction is not due to the fact that their opponents occasionally referred to Hasidim as Shabbatean sectarians—a use of the term which was a response to both the state, and the Jewish leadership's fear of anarchy, that a movement whose initial purpose was religious revival would ultimately lead to religious and political licentiousness⁴—but rather, because the sociological definitions are indispensable for delimiting the scope of activity and the goals of Hasidism, as well as for achieving correct understanding of its status within its contemporary Jewish world, whose axis was none other than the halakhah.

If Hasidism is not a sect, perhaps it can be defined as an offshoot that still maintains its connection to the mainstream community, is influenced by and in turn enriches it, that is, as a Jewish example of the phenomenon of denomination among Christians. Or, perhaps Jewish religious movements and sects require a distinctive definition, since Brian Wilson's definition is based on a specifically Christian socio-cultural context. Regardless, any conceptual definition of Jewish religious movements and sectarian activities must be based on their relationship and attitude to the halakhah, as mentioned above. The degree of deviation or change would be determined by comparison of its nature and character with halakhic precepts and with actual customary practice among Jews. A rigorous sociological definition of the sect in Jewish religion, which is not within the scope of this paper, is urgently required for the study of Jewish history, literature, and beliefs and doctrines. It would facilitate more accurate pinpointing of the place of movements like Hasidism, as well as the other religious movements that have influenced and moved the Jewish public at various times.⁵

Although the above statements seem obvious, the points raised are appropriate in this context since we are dealing with a movement whose early literature is not halakhic literature per se, but rather belongs to the category of ethical (*musar*) literature. At first glance, it appears sufficient for the scholar to study *musar* literature as an independent phenomenon, in order to uncover its attributes and the essential characteristics of the movement under whose aegis it was created. However, anyone undertaking the study of Jewish *musar* literature is aware that its authors, readers, and students did not neglect observance or study of the halakhah, even if they themselves did not add to its literary riches. Moreover, the primary intent of Jewish *musar* literature is to strengthen the halakhic mode of life. Occasionally *musar* literature added dimensions to the halakhah through the introduction of kabbalistic customs, especially in ritual matters where the halakhah permits additions. In other cases, it encouraged its students to turn to outside studies such as philosophy; however, this recommendation was not perceived as a halakhic obligation, nor as a custom incorporated into halakhah.

In general, anyone undertaking the study of Hasidic literature must digress to halakhic literature, and to the Hasidic view of its

obligatory nature, as ascertained either through investigation of the literary devices by which it is implanted in their musar literature, or by other indices weighing the importance of halakhah in their lives. The achievement of this goal obligates the student to venture into the realm of the different types of musar literature possessed by Hasidim, to explore their sources, forms, and transmission to various authors and other users both prior to the period of the emergence of Hasidism, and during its era. In addition, he must carefully determine where each type of musar literature has touched, been absorbed by, or diverged from halakhic literature, as well as the degree to which it served as a means of spreading or emphasizing certain functional halakhot, or of suppressing other halakhot. Moreover, any scholar undertaking the study of the literature of Hasidim must unstintingly devote himself to the ostensibly tedious task of checking and recording the history of the Hasidic book, from manuscript, to copy, to printed version—including of course the troublesome investigation of all those anonymous agents of culture whose contributions are of inestimable value, such as authors, copyists, editors (*MalBihad*), and printers. The scholar cannot bypass performance of additional bibliographical analyses that indicate what and how many books were written, printed, and distributed in Hasidic circles—their books alone, halakhic literature alone, or kabbalistic or musar literature, or all of the above, in which case it is necessary to determine the relative importance of each type.

Performance of the above analyses will lay the foundations for proper assessment of the nature of the position of Hasidism within the larger Jewish community. The literary-historical, bibliographical, and similar studies are not ends in and of themselves, but are the means of arriving at a correct description of the Hasidic movement. Another aspect of Hasidism requiring investigation is the relationship of its written Hebrew literature to the spoken Yiddish language of its members, leaders, and preachers. This requires examination of the Yiddish literature contemporaneous with Hasidism, and its relationship, and the relationship of the Yiddish language in general to Hasidic literature. Comprehension of the historical circumstances underlying the formation of Hasidism indispensably requires, as already noted, the study of Hasidic

literature and its relationship to halakhah. Equal attention must be given to the literature contemporary with the formation of Hasidism, as found in internal Jewish sources such as communal council records (*Pinkasei Kahal*) and the comments of rival groups, as well as in non-Jewish sources obtained from the archival records of local administrations. Conceivably a single scholar may be unable to achieve competence in all the relevant academic fields; however, the deficiencies resulting from restriction to one field outweigh the advantages.

The nature of the vast literature concerning Hasidism illustrates this point. Many of its authors do not try to fulfill properly the obligation of describing Hasidism; although they build well-designed general views of Hasidism, their aims exceed their capacities, since their comprehensive descriptions are based on narrow specialization in one of its many facets. Consequently, scholars should join with their colleagues in order to arrive at an understanding of one of the major movements in Jewish history.

Regrettably, the Hasidim (like the members of other movements in Jewish history) felt no need to record the history of their movement during or immediately after its formative period, or during its early generations. The only available internal historiography is of Habad origin, written in the late 19th and early 20th century, and is suspect on the grounds that events have been rewritten to fit the Hasidic, and particularly Habad outlook of the 19th and 20th centuries.⁶ Although Habad historiography is not within the scope of this survey of the current state of research of Hasidism, I cannot proceed without comment, especially since all the early historical and reputedly historical sources for Hasidism derive from the Habad branch of Hasidism. These include:

a) *Letters*—Almost no letters pertaining to the formative period of Hasidism are extant. Those available come from Habad sources, and include both Hasidic letters from Erez Yisrael (intended to establish the chain of succession from R. Dov Baer of Mezhirech through R. Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk to R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady), as well as letters written by the Admorim of Habad, themselves, principally R. Shneur Zalman. Investigation of the history of both the printed and manuscript forms of the letters une-

quivocally establishes that Habad Hasidim have been the chief copyists and publishers of Hasidic letters, beginning with the Habad Hasid, R. Israel Jaffe, who published Hasidic letters in fragmentary form at the end of the book *Pri ha-’Arez* (Kopys 1814). Almost magically, new versions with additions to the letters appear, based on personal memoirs and on internal documents intended to corroborate the data found in the letters. This is verifiable by examination of the updated, expanded, and corrected versions of the *’Igrot Qodesh* published in recent years with fresh additions to the manuscript copies and printed editions issued since the early 19th century.

These letters present many problematic aspects which can only be briefly mentioned here:

1) Problems of dating; 2) doubtful authenticity due to the use of borrowed literary patterns and imitation of literary styles; and 3) instruction from abroad—from Erez Yisrael—by means of popular musar discourses. The reader has no way of ascertaining the social function of these discourses, as similar ones were available to the diaspora Hasidic community at that time. Contrary to our expectations, the letters speak little of organization and rule from afar, from Erez Yisrael, nor do they contain detailed injunctions to the diaspora officials and to the Hasidic community.

b) *Hagiography* (Shevahim)—In my opinion, it is not coincidental that the first Hasidic anthology of legends about the Baal Shem Tov, *Shivhei ha-Besht*, was published by none other than the Habad Hasid R. Israel Jaffe, the publisher of the fragmentary letters from Erez Yisrael mentioned above. By its very nature, shevahim literature intends to create biography through hagiography. Perhaps this was the means used by the Habad movement for presenting the details and data of Hasidic history desirable in their eyes. Although the publisher states in his introduction to *Shivhei ha-Besht* that “the study of the shevahim of zaddikim is equal to the study of merkabah mysticism”, how can we explain the fact that for the 65 year period preceding the publication of *Shivhei ha-Besht* no manuscripts or printed editions of Hasidic hagiography are available? Does this not perhaps suggest the involvement of Habad Hasidim in the composition and publication of hagiography as part of their avowed program of “organization and propaganda”

(histadrut veta'amulah) whose purpose was the coordination of Hasidic propaganda with their historiographical efforts?

c) *Hasidic Polemical writings*: To our surprise, Habad is also the source for most of the polemical writings and Hasidic responses to attacks of Mitnaggedim. The collected documents in M. Wilensky, *Hasidim u-Mitnaggedim* (Jerusalem 1970) illustrate this point. We must again state our suspicion that perhaps the documents as printed are not purely authentic, but rather, at the very least, have been reworked and rewritten to harmonize with a historical view that stresses the unique central role of Habad within a broader but specifically oriented presentation of the Hasidic movement in general. However, the historiographical activities of Habad may also reflect the exposure of Hasidim to the influence of historiographical models created by the 19th century haskalah movement; limitations of space do not permit further elaboration of this conjecture.⁷

Although the opponents of Hasidism provided a detailed description of the strength of Hasidic social ties (viewed by them as conspiracy),⁸ the internal processes of organization were not accompanied by the composition of hanhagot (regimen vitae—conduct literature) to direct and document the special Hasidic mode of conduct.⁹ On the contrary, investigation of Hasidic literature for purposes of comparison to the criticisms of their opponents reveals that Hasidim did not publish books during the first decades of their movement, and that when publication began during the early 1780's, it chiefly involved homiletic discourses (*sifre derus*) as opposed to works of Hasidic conduct (hanhagot Hasidim). The collections of homiletic discourses themselves raise baffling questions.

Firstly: The German language account of Solomon Maimon regarding the delivery and contents of a Hasidic sabbath discourse¹⁰—the identification of the speaker as R. Dov Baer of Mezhirech or some other Hasidic leader is irrelevant—is not reflected in any of the writings of the founding fathers of Hasidism. Apparently, a vast gap exists between the oral discourse and the published written version, particularly due to the likelihood that the Hasidic discourse was originally delivered in Yiddish. The difficulties in ascertaining the nature and structure of the actual

discourse as delivered before an audience are further compounded because the only extant examples are Hasidic collections in Hebrew translation, which must have been edited and polished.

Secondly: The transmission of the manuscript copies of homiletic discourses and their transformation into print, as mentioned, took place only after decades of Hasidic activity. This leads us to infer that Hasidic literature, in manuscript or printed form, was not canonized or especially valued by the first generations of Hasidim, in contrast to the scholars of their movement, who lack any other internal sources for the description of early Hasidism.¹¹ This supposition is supported by present knowledge that kabbalistic and halakhic works comprised the majority of books published in Hasidic areas.¹² These books were in demand among the Hasidim, as well as among those of their opponents heavily influenced by Lurianic kabbalah. Apparently, Hasidic books had a limited social function during the first generations of the movement's existence. The compositions of the leaders of the various groups were neither introduced as compulsory subject matter in the Hasidic educational system, nor were they part of the continuing studies of the adult. Moreover, due to the wide dispersal of Hasidim among various communities, there is no basis for assuming that Hasidim founded a separate, independent educational system for their children and adults during the initial generations of the movement. No data is available for the existence of separate hadarim, talmudei torah, or batei midrash following a special Hasidic curriculum. Moreover, this contention is supported by examination of the inventory of books published in Hasidic areas and the state of independent Hasidic literature.

A representative personal example for the above is the list of books compiled by the authorities at the home of R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady at the start of the 19th century. Almost all the works cited are halakhic and kabbalistic books.¹³ While we must take into account that R. Shneur Zalman certainly hid his Hasidic manuscripts and books out of fear of the consequences of R. Avigdor of Pinsk's denunciation, nevertheless, the fact remains that a major portion of his library contained halakhic works. This learned zaddik, the author of *Shulhan Arukh ha-Rav*, was certainly not exceptional in this regard; rather, his library demonstrates the

place of halakhic works in the study program of the Hasidic zaddik.

It is appropriate to note in this context that in addition to H. D. Friedberg's partial, deficient attempt to record Hasidic books found at the end of his volume, *Bet Eked Sefarim*, two incompletely completed attempts to create bibliographical lists for Hasidic literature have been made. The first, found in *Ha'Inziqlopediah le-Hasidut* (Jerusalem 1980), Part I, lists books by author's name from aleph to tet. The list is incomplete, and critically insufficient; examination of the notes to the bibliographical list of hanhagot ha-Hasidim appearing in my article, "Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit" makes this apparent.¹⁴ The second list, as yet unpublished, was compiled under the aegis of the Hasidic Project initiated by Professor Rivka Schatz-Uffenheimer of the Institute of Jewish Studies at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. I was personally involved as a recorder in this project begun approximately ten years ago and which was never completed. This project and independent bibliographical studies underscored the manifold complexity of the inter-bibliographical problems of Hasidic literature, which are compounded by the already noted fact that the early generations of Hasidim did not make certain to print their sayings with proper ascriptions. Similarly, 19th century publishers and printers in Poland and White Russia have bequeathed us many anonymous books lacking various bibliographical details such as the place and date of publication, the name of the editor, printer, or even the author. With regard to later generations of Hasidim, that is, from the fourth generation on, we lack basic information regarding the types of books composed, and the manner of their printing and distribution, as well as of the status of the Hasidic book alongside and as opposed to kabbalistic and halakhic works within the Hassidic groups.

Great stress has been laid on the question of the culture of Hasidic books. The role of Jewish literature in general, and Hasidic literature in particular, in shaping the actions and Weltanschauung of Hasidim can be incontrovertibly established only by a comprehensive study. The available data indicates that reliance on Hasidic homiletic literature alone is insufficient for determination of Hasidic history, and that sole dependence on Hasidic literature distorts the portrayal of this movement. Apparently, Hasidism

maintained its instructional and educational ties to hoary Jewish tradition while developing its innovative aspect involving the creation of a living community transmitting its unique customs from father to son, and from elders to youngsters, orally and by example. The motivating factor for the continuation of the transmission of Hasidic principles was the strength of the experience resulting from their fulfillment. Fault must be found with the derivation of Hasidic doctrines and beliefs from intensive research of homiletic discourses, since Hasidic literature is but one of the expressions, and not necessarily the primary one, of their life as Jews, who, within the larger Jewish environment, continued to fulfill the functional mitzvot based on halakhah. Moreover, Hasidic literary culture indicates that their educational and institutional energies were primarily directed to the observance and preservation of halakhah among Hasidim.

(*To be continued*)

* This article is an expanded version of material from a chapter in my book *Dorot Risonim be-Hasidut* to be published by "Ha-Kibutz ha-Meuhad". The chapter deals with sources for the study of Hasidism.

¹ A survey of and a stand vis-a-vis the state of research can be found in R. Schatz-Uffenheimer's introduction to her book *Ha-Hasidut ke-Mistikah* (Jerusalem 1968), and in the introduction to Y. Hisdai's doctoral dissertation, *Reshit Darkam shel Hasidim u-Mitnaggedim le-or Sifrut ha-Derush* (Jerusalem 1984), 1-45, where he describes the state of research and its literary sources.

² The field has developed extensively since the pioneering work of E. Durkheim and M. Weber, and students are familiar with the major studies of P. L. Berger, T. Luckmann, C. Geertz, among others. Since H. Z. Reines' attempt to write a philosophical-social introduction to Judaism in his book *Yahid we-Zibbur be-Yahadut*, significant contributions to the study of Judaism have been made by the historians trained by B. Dinur and J. Katz.

³ See B. R. Wilson, "A Typology of Sects", *Sociology of Religion*, 5th edition, ed. R. Robertson (Penguin Books: Bungay Suffolk, 1978), 361-383. Note esp. 364-370, and the editor's suggested bibliography for additional reading titled "Religious Organizations and Movements," 454-455.

⁴ See my article "Mi-Miytos le-Etos: Qawwim li-Dmuto shel R. Avraham mi-Kalisk", in *Umah ve-Toldotehyah* 2 (Jerusalem 1984), 129-130, where I showed that the use of the term Shabbatean is not exclusively restricted to denunciations to the authorities, but is also found in internal Hasidic dissensions.

⁵ A foregone conclusion from our remarks is that a conceptual definition of sects and movements in Jewish history would facilitate the study of the manifestations of the Shabbatean movement. Examination of the attitude of its members to the halakhah in their writings and in their daily lives would enable determination of the actual boundaries of their "so-called" "sect". My own impression is that

many Shabbateans did not neglect the halakhah despite the movement's vicissitudes, and the changes adopted were marginal in comparison to the influence of the halakhah on their self-image as Jews continuing the tradition of observance and study bequeathed by their ancestors. Further comments follow.

⁶ The Habad newspaper *Ha-Tamim* served as the forum for this rewriting of history. At present, A. H. Glicenstein is primarily responsible for this activity. See G. Scholem's ironic comment in *Zion* 6 (1941), 93 n. 34, and *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, 3rd ed. (New York 1967), 332 and n. 15 ibid. Cf. also my comments in "Mi-Miyotos le-Etos", (n. 4 above) n. 10, esp. n. 41. The observations following are based on the extensive study mentioned at the beginning of the notes.

⁷ I. Bartal is preparing a comprehensive study of this topic which will hopefully be published soon.

⁸ See my article "Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit mi-ha-Mahazit ha-Shniyah le-me'ah ha-18 we-ad Shnot ha-shlosim le-Me'ah ha-19", *Zion* 46 (1981), 229.

⁹ See my article, "Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit", 198-236, 278-305, where I extensively analyzed the nature of Hasidic conduct literature, which bears no relation to the actual practice of Hasidism.

¹⁰ See S. Maimon, *Sefer Hayye Shlomo Maimon* (Tel Aviv 1953), 144. English version, trans. and ed. by Moses Hadas, *Salomon Maimon* (New York 1967), 54.

¹¹ This is obvious from inspection of the Hasidic manuscripts found at the Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem, numbers 8°5979, 8°5198, 8°3282, 8°1467, in which the excerpts of homiletic discourses are not transcribed with proper ascription of authorship. Only 8°5198 has been described in detail; see S. Zucker, "Ktav Yad mi-Reshit ha-Sifrut ha-Hasidit", *Kiryat Sefer* 49 (1973/74), 223-235, where Zucker identified the author of the discourses. See also my correction of his ascription of hanhagot from MS 8°3282, in my article "Arikhat Zava'a at ha-Rivash", *Kiryat Sefer* 52 (1977), 193. MSS 8°5979 and 8°1467 include discourses attributed to R. Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk in *Sefer Likutei 'Amarim* (Lemberg 1911) that are actually discourses of the Maggid of Mezhirech. Moreover, even the author of an original book like R. Jacob Joseph of Polonnoye ascribes the same homiletic discourses to various authors; in his *Toledot Ya'akov Yosef* (Korets 1780). This was pointed out by M. Piekartz, *Bi-Yeme Zmihat ha-Hasidut* (Jerusalem 1978), 20, 27, 29, 31. Since Hasidic homiletic literature has yet to be properly studied, as will be seen below, this phenomenon deserves special examination. Moreover, my detailed study of Hasidic conduct literature (see n. 8 above), conclusively proves that Hasidim were careless in recording, copying, and printing their leaders' words. Thus confusion regarding ascription of works and dicta developed; this contention receives extensive treatment in the bibliographical appendix to my article, *ibid.*, 278-287: "Reshimah Bibliyografit shel Hanhagot ha-Hasidim be-Shanim 1790-1830".

¹² See H. Liberman, "Legende un Emes vegen di Khasidishe Drukeryan (Vegen dem Karakter fun di Yidishe Drukeryan in Ukraina ve-Vaisrusland un Lite biz 1836)", *YIVO Bleter* 34 (1950), 182-208; recently reissued in his book *'Ohel Ra'Hel* 2 (New York 1981), 17-160 (in expanded form with the addition of many zincographies of frontispieces). See my comments in my article, "Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit" (n. 8 above), 228-229.

¹³ See M. Wilensky, *Hasidim u-Mitnaggedim* (Jerusalem 1970), pt. 1, 207-209.

¹⁴ See "Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit" (n. 8 above), 278-287. The bibliographical lists in *Ha' Inziglopediya le-Hasidut* are surprisingly similar to the records in the Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem. Unfortunately,

no systematic records have been kept at the National Library of place of publication, publishers, typsetters, managing editor, or approbations, nor is there a catalogue of the type faces and their ornamentation. The pioneering studies of Yaari, Rivkind, Liberman, Friedberg, Tauber, Ben-Menahem, Cohen, Ta-Shma, Wunder, Yudlov, and others cannot provide a complete of the inventory of books since they had no access to comprehensive records. Properly kept bibliographical records are essential for the study of Hasidism due to the plethora of anonymous books published in Poland-Russia in the second half of the 18th century.

The efforts of the Habad Hasid J. Mondschein, which continue the fruitful bibliographical studies of Haim Liberman, are noteworthy; see for example his edition of the versions of the *Tanya* of R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady, *Sefer ha-Tanya: Bibliyografiyah* (New York 1983).

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK SURVEY

Sinica

Scholarship owes a special debt of gratitude to colleagues who have proved their ability and made their contributions, yet do not shun the yeoman's work of compiling bibliographies. This is surely one of the greatest sacrifices on the altar of scholarly altruism. Prof. Lawrence G. Thompson has placed students of Chinese religion deeply in his debt by producing a 1980 version¹ of his earlier bibliography ("through 1970"). The volume is extremely well organised: bibliography and general studies, Chinese religion excluding Buddhism (subdivided into 45 sections), Chinese Buddhism (subdivided into 22 sections) and indices. Subjects for which full bibliographies already exist have been omitted. What Prof. Thompson has done for his own karma is not for the reviewer to say, but its fruits will certainly be enjoyed by all students of Chinese religion. The one drawback of the volume is the inferiority complex it will give to many a user who must necessarily discover how many important articles and publications had escaped his attention.

Historians of religion, like others interested in mythology, spend much time in the company of the Siamese twins (almost as inseparable as Castor and Pollux, or *mythos* and *logos*) "cosmos" and "chaos". There is no reason why this pair should not be at home also in Taoist material, though in this case, as Girardot rightly remarks, we had better speak of myths rather than of mythology. This is a book² to be read and enjoyed, not least because every reader, each in his own way and in accordance with his scholarly biases, will also be alternately and/or simultaneously irritated and amused. The author's erudition and breadth of knowledge, his gift of seeing connections and implications (the present reviewer happens to be allergic to "deep structures"), his capacity for synthesis and (occasional) sharp eye for detail are admirable; the often cavalier treatment of his material at times ceases to be amusing and raises questions of substance as well as method. Fortunately the comparative hints (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) do not go beyond hints and should not, therefore, seduce us to serious polemics.

Michael Loewe's important *Ways to Paradise* (1979) has been reviewed at great length in NUMEN (XXIX, 1982, 79-122). His more recent

contribution³ to the same viz. related subject-matter is lighter stuff compared to the earlier work, but valuable to the general, non-specialist reader. It has the advantage of limiting itself to one “period” about which our knowledge is currently being revolutionised, not least because our knowledge of pre-Han religion and beliefs is being revolutionised. We may confidently expect contributions from Mr. Loewe’s pen to this revolution. Meanwhile there is logic in the fact that the author of *Imperial China* should devote this account of the “Chinese heritage”, its sources and inner varieties (“four attitudes of mind”) to the Han period. What images of the cosmos and the order of nature, and especially of the gods, did people possess? What were the ritual, shamanistic, oracular, divinatory etc. means of communication with the divine world? How did all these link up with concepts of sovereignty? And above all: what is the nature of life hereafter? Michael Loewe shows how also here “Reason” is less decisive than the meanings conveyed by myth.

Since the appearance of the two books to be mentioned here, Mme. I. Robinet has published further important works and established herself as one of the luminaries on the firmament of Taoist studies. “Taoist Meditation”⁴ is a survey of meditation techniques (mythical and esoteric) of the Shang-ch’ing tradition. The study is a goldmine (no alchemical innuendos, internal or external, intended) of information, penetrating analyses, and *verstehende* presentation of Taoist scriptures, cosmology (incl. its astral parts), incantations, talismans, purificatory rituals, and the mystical functions of Taoist hierarchy. No one interested in Taoist meditation can afford to neglect this book.

*Les Commentaires*⁵ is a significant contribution to our understanding of the commentarial and exegetical history of the *Lao Tzu*, from the Han Period to the T’ang. The individual characteristics as well as the interdependence (and differences!) of the major commentators are carefully analysed. Not least fascinating is the precision with which the Buddhist commentaries, especially those exhibiting Madhyamika influence, are analysed. Hence, though ostensibly a contribution to Taoist studies, the volume has implications of much wider relevance for any study of the relationship between sacred texts and commentarial traditions.

The grand old man of both Tibetan and Chinese studies, Prof. Rolf A. Stein of the Collège de France, has received a tribute—a *Festschrift* in his honour⁶—worthy of his vast erudition, and illustrating not only the esteem in which he is held by colleagues and former students, but also the profound influence his scholarship has exerted. Two volumes comprising over 600 pp. (and two more volumes, so we understand, are still under way) hardly lend themselves to reviewing, and simply reprinting the rich

table of contents is hardly a substitute. Suffice it to say that the contributions (vol. i: Tantric and Tibetan studies, vol. ii: Chinese, largely Taoist studies), diverse as their themes may be, have one thing in common: they are of rare excellence. It is surely not minimising the quality and importance of the other articles if one contribution is singled out here as the *pièce de résistance* of this collective magnum opus. This is Anna Seidel's major study—almost a monograph (vol. ii, pp. 291-371)—which takes up points she has made elsewhere but synthesises here in masterful fashion and with magisterial sweep: the parallelism, indeed causal connection, of a) doctrines of imperial sovereignty and spiritual authority viz. of imperial rituals and symbols, and those of the emerging Taoist Church and its founder, the Celestial Master; b) the role of “political prophecies” as contained in “apocryphal” texts and applied to, or used by, both types of office-bearer (as legitimation for a still extant but increasingly shaky order, or for pretenders representing a new order); c) the birth of the Taoist Church from the death-throes of the declining Han. Even if not expanded into a full-length book (as it should be) the article, as it stands, is a major classic.

Another Festschrift, this time devoted to Chinese religion and philosophy (though Japan is not totally absent) has been offered to Hans Steininger (University of Würzburg).⁷ Its value is enhanced by a bibliography of Steininger's publications (pp. 15-17). Thirty contributions filling about 460 pp. hardly lend themselves to reviewing. The names of the contributors (to pick a random few: Isabelle Robinet, Kristofer Schipper, M. Strickman, Herbert Franke, E. Zürcher, W. Bauer) show the esteem in which the Jubilar is held in the scholarly community. The volume is divided into four parts: Taoism (10 papers), Buddhism (5 papers), Varia (7 papers) and philosophy (10 papers). It would be unfair to single out specific articles, but at the risk of once again appearing to be unfair and biased, mention should be made of Anna Seidel's skillful and original analysis of a certain type of funerary document by means of which she succeeds in throwing new light on conceptions concerning the hereafter in the later Han period. Mention has already been made of the fact that ancient Chinese views of life after death, the underworld and the judgment taking place there, the hereafter in general as well as the repercussions of these beliefs on the living, are undergoing thorough re-consideration in current research. Dr Seidel's article must be counted as a major and significant contribution to this process.

The literature on China-West contacts has been snowballing in recent years (cf. also NUMEN xxvii, 1980, 173-6) and shows no signs of abating. By now we have a pretty good idea what the Jesuits, their antagonists and

the post-Ricci West in general thought about China. The history of western understanding and misunderstanding has been well researched. Let us not forget that still in the 19th cent. missionaries translated Shang-ti as "God" (e.g. Legge) or even as Jehovah (sic!). But what did the Chinese think about Christianity? This lacuna in our knowledge has now been filled by Prof. Jacques Gernet⁸ in an immensely instructive and equally provocative book. For although Gernet illustrates the clash between two cultures by means of ample translations of Chinese texts and sources, his study is far more than an account of Chinese reactions to the penetration of Christianity. It is a profound, and at the same time debatable, analysis of some of the basic principles and structures of the two cultures involved. To this end the author also devotes much attention to the role of language (viz. the mental structures underlying it) in cultural encounters, the parameters of understanding and misunderstanding, and the limits of the possibilities of understanding. Aye, and here's the rub. Were Japanese and Chinese language structures so "similar" as to enable the Japanese to absorb Chinese culture, incl. Buddhism, whilst rejecting the "western" language of Christianity? Or might not, given different political situations and historical contexts, a Christian Shotoku Taishi have succeeded? Or, to stick to China (which is after all the theme of Gernet's book), is it not possible that if Buddhism had failed to penetrate China, the Gernet-type of analysis would triumphantly "explain" this failure by invoking the Indo-Aryan character of the Buddhist sources and mental universe, and its incompatibility with the mental structures embedded in the Chinese language? Is a Christian Kumarajiva a theoretical impossibility?

One of the most recent books on Ricci is Jonathan Spence's *Memory Palace*.⁹ The author asserts very explicitly that he was not writing another biography of Ricci. Yet the book is precisely that, albeit a biography of a very special kind. But it is also much more. It ranges from the religious, economic, military and political history of mediterranean Europe through the history of colonial and naval expansion (especially Portuguese: Mozambique, Goa, Macao) to Ming China. As a framework the author does not use simple chronology but a set of images which Ricci himself had composed and circulated. We are thus given biography *sub specie "memoriae imagines"* i.e., a technique of mnemonics. The idea is very sophisticated, perhaps oversophisticated, and so is the book throughout—and hence eminently worth reading. It is a pity that this work, teeming with stimulating analyses and ideas, somehow never jells and crystallises into a "book".

D. E. Mungello's recent major publication¹⁰ is far more than a worthy

successor to the book reviewed in NUMEN xxvii, 1980, 175-6. It is a thorough and wide-ranging study of the origins and early development of western sinology. For the purposes of this study the origin is the Jesuit mission and their accommodation policy. Each and every chapter is a major contribution to scholarship in its own right: the 17th cent. European background, including Renaissance Humanism and Hermetism; the rise of "Learned Societies"; and especially the quest of a universal language. The latter subject is taken up again in a separate chapter, ranging from the biblical notion of a lost adamitic language, to the pivotal role of Athanasius Kircher and the work of his successors from Leibniz to the various *Clavis Sinica*-type publications. A very full discussion of Ricci and his understanding of China in general and of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism in particular; of Semedo and Magalhaes; of Martini, Müller, Metzel, Couplet (*Confucius Sinarum Philosophus*), Bouvet (and via Bouvet Leibniz again); and finally the Revv.PP. Le Comte and Le Gobien. Mungello shows how even reliable information from Jesuit sources was not, indeed could not be, properly used because of the automatic distortion to which the proto-sinological material became subject as soon as it was fitted into European intellectual frameworks. Of special interest is the discussion of Jesuit attitudes to Ming *versus* Manchu (Kang Hsi!) Confucianism or, in other words, Wang-Yang-Min (held responsible for the fall of the Ming) *versus* Chu Hsi (whose interpretation of Confucianism was seen by Ricci as being in direct competition with the Christian one). Here we have scholarly *akribia*, wide erudition, and historical insight at their best.

Unlike Mungello's *opus* which has a well-defined subject matter, A. Hsia's little volume,¹¹ instructive, useful, at times amusing, and well-produced, is an anthology. One would like to see similar anthologies dealing with France and England. Beginning (how could it be otherwise?) with Leibniz and his disciple Wolff, we are led via Kant, Lichtenberg, Herder, Hegel and Schelling to Marx, Engles and Mehring. The anthology does not intend to be a contribution to sinology but rather to the *Geistesgeschichte* of Europe. Probably the least known and also most amusing extract is the piece by Frederick the Great. The most serious contributions are the essays on Taoism by two of the most eminent 20th century philosophers: Martin Buber and Karl Jaspers. Since both philosophers, knowing only too well the difference between dilettantism and serious philosophy, enlisted the assistance and collaboration of sinologists, their essays should be of value to every serious student of Chinese philosophy.

In 1976 W. Banck published *Das Chinesische Tempelrakel* pt. 1 ("sources"). This monument of erudition, based on research in Taiwan,

Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea and other places with a sizeable Chinese community, was printed in Taipei (1276 pp.) and is no longer obtainable. All students of Chinese culture and religion have recognized the importance of divination in its many and diverse forms and techniques, from oracle bones and tortoises to block-prints of oracles with illustrations. Though Chinese history too has had its "enlightenment" type of rationalist critics of "superstitious" practices, by and large oracles and divination dominated Chinese life, whether these were based on venerable classics like the I Ching, or part of what was often contemptuously but certainly inadequately called "folk religion". Whilst recognising the significant role of domestic divination and of itinerant and other professional diviners, Banck's *magnum opus*, unlike the earlier major contributions to the subject by Eberhard, focussed on Temple Oracles. Now, at long last, vol. 2¹² has appeared, giving the translations and analyses of the oracle texts as well as much new material (gathered, *inter alia*, also in mainland China). Since we are not dealing with isolated oracles but with oracle-series viz. sequences, their analysis requires a careful scrutiny of their internal and external structures, their literary peculiarities, their diffusion, their historical locus, the original Chinese, Taoist and Buddhist elements discernible (the latter easily recognisable by their specific terminology), and the kind of questions they were supposed to answer. It is, after all, the latter which give us an insight into the "concerns" of a society. Only quantitative methods can save the researcher from drowning in his material. Hence the large number of tables and tabular presentations, accounting (together with the facsimile pictures) for most of the book. But how else do you deal with 45000 oracles, or analyse over 24000 question-and-answer specimen and arrange them in sequences in order to arrive at meaningful conclusions? This is one of the great books on the subject, for experts only and without any concessions to the "interested reader".

On the other end of the scale is the beautifully produced edition of one of the oldest Chinese collections of over 180 short and enigmatic poem-like sayings (or conundrums?). "Although relatively unknown in the West, it remains the most comprehensive single catalogue of ancient Chinese mythology and pre-imperial legend" (from the Introduction). Whether the authorship of the collection known as *Tian Wen*¹³ goes back to "a number of roving Taoist scholars", or the meaning of the latter phrase (long before the Han!) are debatable issues. The enduring influence of the collection is attested by Ezra Pound's *Cantos*. Stephen Field has produced an attractive volume, not devoid of solid erudition and poetic grace, which will surely be handled with pleasure by many readers who would not touch Banck's forbidding scholarship with a ten-yard pole.

New Religions

Since NUMEN published a lengthy review on the so-called "new religions" (NUMEN xxvii, 1980, 155-65) the industry has continued to mushroom. Of course one could also deal with the beginnings of Buddhism or Christianity or Islam under the heading "new religions" or quaint sectarian phenomena. Here we shall merely cast a glance at a 19th cent. case. The literature on Mormonism is enormous, but Prof. Mark P. Leone's study¹⁴ deserves special mention because it is unusual as regards both subject-matter and method. Instead of describing for the umpteenth time the history of Joseph Smith and his successors, the finding of the tablets, the great trek etc., the author did rural field-work—much of it in east central Arizona—and discusses problems that historians of religion rarely pay attention to e.g., tithing as a mechanism for regulating ecological diversity and water-control as a form of dynamic adjustment. He has an eye for hidden mechanisms e.g., those which transform, by means of a theocratic government, the nature of the separation of state and economy. In other words, Prof. Leone works as a sociologist and anthropologist, and thereby raises Mormon studies to a level which is relatively new. The dialectic of actual change on the one hand and the assumption of fixity by the believers on the other, combine to form a pattern "in which conceptual looseness works with authoritarianism to create subordination". This is one of the few innovative contributions to Mormon studies in recent years.

The aforementioned review-article in NUMEN also made brief mention (p. 156) of the by now classic German *vademecum* edited by K. Hutton in 1950 and of which a 10th ed. appeared in 1966. The subtitle of that edition was "Sekten und Religiöse Sondergemeinschaften der Gegenwart". Meanwhile the 12th ed. has come out,¹⁵ subtitled "Das Buch der traditionellen Sekten und religiösen Sonderbewegungen". As the new subtitle indicates, the survey deals with Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Pentecostals, Mormons, Mazdaznan, Bahais, UFO-believers, Swedenborgians, the "Grail" Movement etc. The contemporary new movements are outside the scope of the survey which very honestly admits its denominational (Protestant) character. The descriptions are as objective as possible, but the ultimate criteria of evaluation are denominational.

It should be added here that the Protestant organisation behind this publication, the *Evangelische Zentralstelle für Weltanschauungsfragen* (Stuttgart) publishes a great deal of material on the new sects (Moonies, Hare Krishna etc.). Their publications, in spite of their denominational inspiration and background, are a model of objectivity and honesty. Instead of

throwing fits of hysteria about the abomination of desolation i.e., the new sects, they try to analyse the sources of their appeal and the possibly critical challenges to the established churches which they imply.

A recent German book on "youth religions", published by Herder (a Catholic publishing house) does not add much that is substantially new to those familiar with the English and American literature on the subject. But apparently certain things still need saying in continental Europe, and the author¹⁶ says them well and with a more psychological than socio-logical slant as befits a psycho-analyst. The plethora of new cults appeals mainly to the young, and hence the unsatisfied needs and the specific problems and family-situations of contemporary adolescents have to be understood if we want to get a handle on the problem. The author notes (perhaps prematurely) that the members of the youth cults are "transit passengers", a phenomenon well-known to Anglo-American sociologists who have devoted at least as much effort to the process of "dropping out" of the sect as to the "conversions". The author refuses to dismiss the new sects as fraudulent cheats and confidence tricks, and seeks the key to their success in more basic failures of modern culture and especially modern family-life.

The Grail Movement (mentioned above as one of the subjects in the Hutton survey) is still well and alive and living in Vomperberg (Austria). The "Bible" of its founder, Abd-ru-shin (= Oskar Ernst Bernhardt, 1875-1941) has been re-edited in a one-volume edition.¹⁷ Those who want to compare the Hutton account with the movement's bible can now do so more conveniently.

The German Catholic publishing house Kösel has brought out a volume on the rise of a new religion.¹⁸ The book is not a comparative study but rather a case study, attempting to illuminate the wider subject by focussing on one example: the Moonies. The nine contributors, mostly sociologists looking at the phenomenon from "the outside" plus one or two believers who give us the inside view, succeed in making up an instructive volume. The volume reminded the reviewer of an attempt by several scholars of Marburg University to set up an Institute for the Study of the New Religions. Their initiative and the provocative questions set as a theme for a planned first colloquium were, however, aborted by the Holy Inquisition—this time not of the Roman Church but of the Faculties of Theology. What a pity that Faculties of Theology did not exhibit similar staunch commitment to Christian principles in and after 1933! Of special importance in the Kösel-volume is the introductory chapter by Prof. Eileen Barker which tries to grapple with the problem of "explaining the inexplicable when studying a deviant religious group". (Cf. also

Prof. Barker's review of Glock und Bellah (eds.) *The New Religious Consciousness* in NUMEN, XXVI, 1979, 274-7). Among the contributions of Prof. Barker to the subject, mention should also be made of a volume edited by her¹⁹ and dealing not so much with the religious meaning of the new sects as with the question what they signify for an understanding of contemporary society.

The present reviewer devoutly hopes that after her retirement Eileen Barker will write her scholarly autobiography and tell us in detail about the tribulations to which not only historians of religion (who should know what *odium theologicum* is) but also sociologists and a Dean at the London School of Economics are exposed when attempting to deal objectively and without the necessary inquisitorial animus with the new sects. NUMEN, as a journal for the History of Religions, does not want to compete with PUNCH or other humorous journals, and hence must refrain from recounting some of the more amusing details. Needless to say that Prof. Barker is not a serious sociologist but a lackey of the Moonies to whom she has sold herself (for how much?). The president of a British anti-cult organisation, after viciously and intemperately attacking Prof. Barker, finally became convinced of the solid quality of her publications and actually wrote in her defence in *The Guardian*. He was promptly fired from his lofty office. Parliamentary commissions have been established to study the nefarious influence of the new sects on our innocent and merely promiscuous and drug-hooked youngsters. If the commission reports are accusatory, they receive wide publicity; if they are not, they are suppressed by the interested anti-cult groups, and researchers have the greatest difficulties in obtaining copies! Examples could be multiplied. Not so long ago in Italy a simultaneous set of police razzias carried off the files and closed twenty-four Scientology centres (or "churches")—with no charges being filed (at the time of writing this). In West Germany a Bavarian Lutheran is circulating an appeal to limit Section 4 of the Bonn Constitution so as not to cover the "religious liberty" of the "destructive cults and sects". In Israel a ministerial committee has submitted a report on the "new cults and sects" to the Knesset. The proper place for reprinting that report would be the "bad jokes" page of a humourous journal, but unfortunately some bad jokes can be serious.

All this by way of preface to another publication by Eileen Barker of what may without fear of exaggeration be described as a standard work on the Moonies.²⁰ It is a model of meticulous scholarship, of careful and critical presentation of the methods employed (participant observation, interviews) as well as awareness of their limitations, of rigorous analysis of the enormous amount of data, and of the examination of related

substantive and methodological problems (participant observation, "choice or brainwashing", suggestibility, susceptibility, the dynamics of cult conversion etc.).

The aforementioned (p. 162) review-article in NUMEN xxvii had remarked that Japan still was the paradise of students of new religions, and earlier in this survey (p. 109) tribute was paid to the self-sacrificing scholars compiling bibliographies. Prof. Byron Earhart's bibliography of western language publications on the Japanese *shin shukyo* (1973) has already been mentioned in NUMEN as well as the fact that a second, revised and enlarged ed. was in press. This edition has now appeared.²¹ From 810 entries and 96 pp. we have progressed to 1447 entries and 213 pp. Thank you, Prof. Earhart.

Prof. Earhart, pending his publication of a larger work on the Gedatsu-kai, has written what is so far the most valuable paper on this sect ("The Society for Religious Deliverance"). Of course the name does not mean very much, since every religious group promises salvation, deliverance etc. to its believers. The Gedatsu-kai is interesting because in spite of its many Shinto, folk-religion and other elements (and in this respect it is similar to almost all Japanese new religions), it is basically Shingon-derived (like, *mutatis mutandis*, the Shinnyo-en). In fact, at its foundation (1929) it called itself *Shugendo Gedatsu-kai*. Prof. Minoru Kyota is a well-known Shingon specialist (cf. his *Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice*, 1978), and therefore in many ways an ideal author on the Gedatsu-kai. Unfortunately too many pages of this short book²² are taken up by a description of the Shingon background and the Shingon elements of the sect, of its meditational practices, of its soteriological approach and its "experiential philosophy" (all Shingon). Historians of religion with a less doctrinal approach and asking other questions will find many of their questions unanswered, especially when it comes to the matter of the sect's appeal. The latter usually has little to do with doctrine but a great deal with other factors. In this case: the sect's determined appeal to young people and their interests (such as the establishing of sports centres). Here what matters is not *mikkyo* teaching but the image which a sect wishes to project of itself.

Many if not most *shin shukyo* engage in active missionary work and have booked some successes also among Caucasians, and not only among nissei or sansei Japanese communities (e.g. Hawaii, California, Brazil). The "Church of World Messianity" has changed its name several times since its foundation by Mokichi Okada (1882-1955; first divine revelation 1926): Kannon-kyo, Sekai Kyusei Kyo, and as a result of a recent crisis there is also a MOA (Mokichi Okada Association for spreading the

Teaching). The lineage of the sect, as of many others, can be traced back to the earlier Oomoto-kyo, and the common ancestry explains many common features. The group is known for three main emphases: the cult of art, its commitment to nature-farming (a method akin to mulching and meant as the god-willed means for purifying and de-polluting our poisoned earth), and for its faith-healing by means of the raised hand which acts like a lens that concentrates the divine healing light present in the cosmos. This practice is called *johrei* (or, with the honorific prefix, *gojohrei*). The *johharei* is clearly a twin brother of the similar practice of the Mahikari-sect where it is called *Okiyome*. The book under review²³ appeared in a hard-cover ed. in 1984 and now again in softcover. Its purpose is to spread the teaching by expounding the sect's criticism of modern civilisation, showing the way to "Paradise on Earth", explaining the "dynamics of spiritual healing", advocating an "integrated science of medicine", and insisting on the spiritual and not merely technical character of the message. The question whether the teaching requires total and unequivocal conversion or can be combined with other religious traditions is obviously of the greatest interest in a missionary situation, and the book contains much interesting material on e.g., "Catholic" Brazil. Those who have not studied the *Messhia-kyo* will find much of interest also in part 3 (Prayers and Hymns) and part 4 (an account of the life and thought of the Founder). The appendices try to bolster—as do many similar sects—the "scientific" character of the religious message by presenting "clinical studies" of *johrei* and research on Nature Farming. The book is valuable as an "inside document" addressed to outsiders.

Another account written from the "inside", but scrupulously fair and striving after a maximum of objectivity is the short description of Japan's new "lay Buddhism", written by the President of the Reiyu-kai, Dr. Tsugunari Kubo.²⁴ The little booklet, based on a lecture given by President Kubo at the SOAS in London, deals mainly with the Nichiren Shoshu/Soka Gakkai and the Reiyukai. For reasons not difficult to guess the Rissho Kosei Kai is rather neglected.

The standard work on the Reiyu-kai for a long time to come, as well as one of the most outstanding contributions to the study of the *shin shukyo* in general, comes from Prof. Helen Hardacre of Princeton University.²⁵ This reviewer would unhesitatingly rank it, together with Winston Davis's study of the Mahikari (See NUMEN XXVII, 1980, 163-5) as one of the two best western language books on a Japanese new religion. The less said about the book the better, lest a reader feel satisfied with a review instead of carefully reading the book. The Reiyu-kai is a neo-Buddhist Lotus sect exhibiting many of the features of other Japanese new religious

groups: a highly conservative value system, a tremendous appeal to familism as well as to the young, a strong emphasis (almost bordering on anti-clericalism, in contrast to e.g. the Soka Gakkai which, although advertising itself as a "lay movement", subjects itself doctrinally to the ecclesiastical authority of the Daisekiji priesthood) on its lay character, and a characteristically Japense emphasis on the relationship with departed spirits. The study is based on solid field-work, participant observation (with the stress on "participant"), interviews, carefully worked out statistical tables and diagrams, and a virtually complete account of the various aspects of the life of the sect (its history, activities, organisation, ritual, healing and other rituals, the role of the family and of home, leadership structures). Prof. Hardacre's is not only, as has been remarked before, the standard study of the Reiyukai but also a model of what a study of a *shin shukyo* group should be.

The preceding paragraph may seem to call for some correction or at least supplement. For Prof. Hardacre did not rest on her laurels and has enriched *shin shukyo* research by a further study.²⁶ This reviewer has difficulties with the new book since in his report on the Reiyu-kai study, and with his limited vocabulary, he has run out of superlatives. Kurozumikyo is probably the oldest of the "old new religions"—preceding Tenrikyo and Konkokyo—and it provides further confirmation of the by now accepted truth that the new religions have nothing to do with World War II, or 20th century crises and dislocations, or the Meiji Restoration. All these, of course, play a role, but the key is the decline of the Tokugawa regime. The Founder, a pukkah Shrine Shinto priest, had his decisive revelation in 1814, and the sect is perhaps the most Shinto in character of all new sects, even those subsumed under the heading "Sectarian Shinto". No serious book on the sect exists (disregarding for our present purpose Hepner's old classic) although its special relation to Amaterasu as the spirit that pervades the universe gives it a very special interest. Incidentally, the Founder's interchangeable use of Ameterasu Omikami and Tensho Daijin viz. Tenshokotaijin (the names are written with the same characters) is reminiscent of Mrs. Kitamura's very un-Shinto sect (Tensho Kotai Jingu Kyo) founded almost 150 years later.

Prof. Hardacre's slim volume is weighty for two reasons. Whilst the main part of the book is an "in-depth study" (to use a favourite Americanism) of the sect, its history, beliefs, organisational and leadership patterns, practices, moral, social and ritual ethos, styles of preaching, processes of change, types of relationships (priests, ministers, preachers, followers; main and branch temples; urban *versus* rural groups etc.) it is also much more. It is, so far, the best book on the religious, historical,

social and ideological implications and meanings of the therm *shin shukyo*. A great deal of dust accumulated by earlier scholars (and some very good ones among them!) is swept away by an original and brilliant analysis and application of basic concepts (e.g. "world view", "self", action patterns), showing where the new religions are innovative and where they are continuous with traditional Japanese patterns—and all this without falling into the "national character" (*nihon-jin no kokuminsei*) kind of trap. The discussion of the role of the family in the ethos of the new religions could have profited from George A. Vos, *The Incredibility of Western Prophets: The Japanese Religion of the Family* (Amsterdam, 1984). The first and last chapters of Prof. Hardacre's book are henceforth required reading for any student of the Japanese "new religions" even if he has no interest whatever in Kurozumikyo.

Dialogues

Numen xxxiii, 1986, p. 262, emphasised the importance of interreligious dialogues for the study of the history of religions: the desire and the practice of dialogue indicate as well as produce changes in the religions concerned. In this respect Christianity seems to play the role of a pioneer advance guard. It would be difficult to imagine theologians of other religions declare, as does the Swiss Protestant theologian H. Ott: "The encounter with the spiritual world of other religions is increasingly becoming a priority for Christian theology. Perhaps this will be the future great focus of theological reflection... Perhaps the day will come when not a single Christian statement of faith can be formulated without taking into account the other religions existing at our side".

Evidently Catholic theologians, with their traditions of *religio naturalis*, *revelatio generalis* etc., have an easier approach to dialogue, and hence it comes as no surprise that one of the most impressive and interesting contributions should come from the pen of a Catholic philosopher (*nota bene* a philosopher who considers himself an heir of Heidegger and who is in constant conversation with the Buddhist philosophers of the Kyoto school). Prof. Walter Strolz's two volumes²⁷ are unquestionably a Catholic document, and the author—a veteran of interreligious dialogue and director of the *Oratio Dominica* Foundation sponsored by the Herder Publishing House in Freiburg—not only takes his stand on the Vatican II Declaration *Nostra Aetate* but also asserts that his reflections are an application and "explication" of this Declaration. Some critics of *Nostra Aetate* have complained about the primitiveness of its basic model of concentric circles: Christianity obviously at the centre, next Judaism (because

of the Old Testament), next Islam (because it is monotheistic and the Quran has some nice things to say about Jesus and Mary), and then the great Asian religions. Strolz shows that this model can also be applied with extraordinary sophistication. The pages on Judaism, the permanent mystery and vocation of Israel (and for Strolz also the Talmud and the Kabbalah are relevant in this context and not merely the “Old Testament”) are among the most penetrating and at the same time moving ever written by a Christian thinker. Strolz not only expounds the biblical understanding of “creation” but also the significance of the Jewish non-acceptance of Christ for a better Christian understanding of history, the nature of *Unerlöstheit* as well as *Erlösung* and salvation. Similarly the chapters on Islam are a model of sympathetic and appreciative theological *Einfühlung* and interpretation.

Strolz is well aware (in a Heideggerian way) of the need to respect the ineffable as well as of the necessity of communication. And communication requires words. If the great religions have communicated i.e., spoken and written (especially in their sacred texts), then dialogue requires that the art of translation be brought to its highest pitch. Avoiding easy, simplistic and in the last resort illusory unities Strolz finds common themes and fundamental assumptions: all religions testify to the basic awareness that the human condition cries our for change (i.e., salvation). This need is thematised differently by different religious cultures. Strolz dismisses as misleading and wrong the traditional Christian “accusation” that some Asian religions preach self-redemption. Even *jiriki*-schools (to use a term often applied to Zen) bespeak an awareness of something wider than and superior to the “self”. And surely “nothing” and “emptiness” are anything but nihilism, even as non-activity is not passivity (in the western sense) but a spiritual attitude to reality. Here Strolz believes he can transcend the alleged opposition between biblical faith in creation and Buddhist-Taoist conceptions. Altogether Strolz makes felicitous use of (what used to be called “philosophical”) Taoism also in his discussion of (Chinese) Buddhism. One wonders when other religions will produce dialogical reflections of a similarly high standard. (The above may require one qualification, for strictly speaking Strolz’s (like Panikkar’s) work is not an exercise in dialogue. It means to be a Christian interpretation of other religions).

Another dialogue-veteran, one might almost describe him as a dialogical wizard, is Raymundo Panikkar. As the son of a Spanish Catholic mother and an Indian Hindu father he is profoundly and genuinely at home in two traditions, in addition to his more general competence as a Professor of History of Religions. *The Unknown Christ of*

Hinduism appeared in 1964 and provoked the critical *boutade* that we should now wait for a Mahayana author publishing a volume on *The Unknown Buddha of Christianity*. But jokes aside, Panikkar's enterprise is not intended as theological imperialism in disguise. It is an attempt to take Hinduism (as also other religions) seriously and to be open not only to its profundities and truths but also to its challenges. We shall not discuss here the validity of Panikkar's interpretation of Hinduism but merely note that as a Catholic theologian the author also has to exorcise the threat of relativism. He wants to write as a Christologist and not just as a spokesman of *theologia naturalis*. Hence his key-word is not the *agnostos theos* to whom St. Paul appealed (and about whom E. Norden gave us such a fine book so many years ago), but the *agnostos Christos* to whom the book is actually dedicated. The first German edition of this much-translated book appeared in 1965. In 1986 a revised and enlarged German version appeared,²⁸ instructive because it illustrates how Panikkar assimilated twenty years of ecumenical discussion since the first ed. The motto to the volume is taken from the *Kath. Up.* ("The spirit whom all gods venerate dwells in your midst") and John 1:26 "He whom ye know not stands in your midst"). And this is precisely not the Unknown God but the Unknown Christ, unknown to others but not to Christians. All good intentions notwithstanding, theological imperialism after all?

Publication Series

NUMEN xxxiii (1986), 259-60, mentioned the extremely useful series edited by the Religionsgeschichtliche Seminar of Bonn University. Since writing that survey, three more volumes (nos. 11, 12, 13) have reached the reviewer's desk.²⁹ Nos. 11-12 are further chronological tables by the compiler of no. 10, K.-H. Golzio. Whereas no. 10 listed rulers and dynasties of China-Japan-Korea, nos. 11 and 12 give the Kings, Khans and other Rulers of Early Central Asia (1984), and Regents in Central Asia since the Mongol Empire (1985), including Afghanistan, Bhutan, Sikkim and the abbots of major Tibetan monasteries. The volumes constitute extremely helpful companions to all students of East and Central Asia. No. 13, *Die Bildersprache der Gnosis* (1986) by Victoria Arnold-Döben takes us into another world. The recent boom in gnostic studies makes a descriptive and analytic "dictionary" of gnostic imagery (e.g., blindness, oblivion, sleep and awakening, death, the stranger, the call, the source, the sea or ocean, royalty, the "pearl" etc.) a real help. A tribute is due (apart from the General Editor Prof. Klimkeit and the authors) especially to the responsible editor of the series. Dr. H. Eimer.

Proceedings

Proceedings and *acta* of congresses have a bad reputation of usually appearing years after the event. The 15th Congress of the IAHR (Sydney, Australia, August 18-23, 1985) gave birth to an exception. The handsomely produced volume,³⁰ both hardcover and softcover, cannot, admittedly, claim to present the Proceedings of the Congress. But it is a judicious selection of twenty-seven contributions to the central Congress-theme "Religion and Identity". The value of the volume as an IAHR document is enhanced by Part B (pp. 245-93) containing, in addition to an excellent essay "From Paris 1900 to Sydney 1985: An Essay in Retrospect and Prospect" by Prof. Eric Sharpe of The University of Sydney (the responsible organiser of the Congress), a record of the formal events, the congress programme, a list of participants and other IAHR information. Victor Hayes is to be congratulated on a job well done, and for not buying speed of publication at the price of slovenliness.

RJZW

¹ Lawrence G. Thompson, *Chinese Religion in Western Languages: A Comprehensive and Classified Bibliography of Publications in English, French and German through 1980*. (University of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona) The Association of Asian Studies, Monograph xli, 1985, pp. xl ix + 302, \$ 19.95.

² N. J. Girardot, *Myth and Meaning in Early Taoism* (Univ. of California Press) 1984, pp. xiv + 422, \$ 39.10. (£ 26.20.).

³ Michael Loewe, *Chinese Ideas of Life and Death* (London, Allen & Unwin) 1982, pp. 226, ISBN 0-04-180001-X.

⁴ Isabelle Robinet, *Méditation Taoïste* (Paris, Dervy Livres) 1979, pp. 346, ISBN 2-85076-095-1.

⁵ Id., *Les Commentaires du Tao te King jusqu'au VIIe siècle* (Paris, Mémoires de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, Collège de France) 1977, pp. 317. ISBN 2-85757-006-6.

⁶ M. Strickman (ed.), *Tantric and Taoist Studies in Honour of R. A. Stein*, vol. i, 1981, pp. 1-289; vol. ii, 1983, pp. 290-631 (Bruxelles, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, vols. xx and xxi, Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises). ISBN 2-8017-0190-4.

⁷ G. Naundorf, K.-H. Pohl, H.-H. Schmidt (eds.), *Religion und Philosophie in Ostasien*. Festschrift für Hans Steininger zum 65. Geburtstag (Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann), 1985, pp. 482, cloth, DM. 98.—. ISBN 3-88479-223-7.

⁸ Jacques Gernet, *Chine et Christianisme: Action et réaction* (Paris, Gallimard) 1982, pp. 342, ISBN 2-07-0263665. English transl. *China and the Christian Impact: a Conflict of Cultures* (transl. by Janet Lloyd, New York, Cambridge University Press) 1986, pp. 310, cloth \$ 49.50, paper \$ 17.95.

⁹ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci* (New York, Elisabeth Sefton Books, Viking) 1984, 2nd printing 1985, pp. 350, \$ 19.59, ISBN 0-670-46830-4.

- ¹⁰ David E. Mungello, *Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology* (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag), Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa vol. xxv, 1985, pp. 405, DM 96.—, ISBN 3-515-04331-4.
- ¹¹ Adrian Hsia (ed.), *Deutsche Denker über China* (Frankfurt, Insel Verlag) 1985, pp. 392, ISBN 3-458-32552-2.
- ¹² Werner Banck, *Das Chinesische Tempelrakel*, Teil II, Uebersetzungen und Analysen (Wiesbaden, Otto Harassowitz), Asiatische Forschungen, Band 90, 1985, pp. xxix + 393 + 49 plates (facsimiles), paper, DM 64.—. ISBN 3-447-02482-8.
- ¹³ TIAN WEN: *A Chinese Book of Origins*, translated with an introduction by Stephen Field (New Direction Books, 80 Eighth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011), 1986, pp. 128, cloth \$ 22.95, ISBN 0-8112-1010-3; paper \$ 8.95, ISBN 0-8112-1011-1.
- ¹⁴ Mark P. Leone, *Roots of Modern Mormonism* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press) 1979, pp. 250, ISBN 0-674-58733-2.
- ¹⁵ Kurt Hutten, *Seher, Grübler, Enthusiasten* (Stuttgart, Quell Verlag) 12th ed., 1982, pp. 896, ISBN 3-7918-2130-X.
- ¹⁶ Johannes R. Gascard, *Neue Jugendreligionen. Zwischen Sehnsucht und Sucht* (Freiburg i. Br., Herder) 1984, pp. 160, paper, DM 16.80, ISBN 3-451-20263-8.
- ¹⁷ Abd-Ru-Shin, *Im Lichte der Wahrheit—Gralsbotschaft*, 8th ed., Vomperberg, Austria, Verlag A. Bernhardt), 1978, pp. 1091.
- ¹⁸ Günter Kehrer (ed.), *Das Entstehen einer neuen Religion: das Beispiel der Vereinigungskirche* (München, Kösel-Verlag), 1981, pp. 354 kart., DM 38.—, ISBN 3-466-25016-1.
- ¹⁹ E. Barker (ed.), *New Religious Movements: A Perspective for Understanding Society*. Studies in Religion and Society vol. 3 (New York and Toronto, The Edwin Mellen Press), 1982, pp. 398, ISBN 0-88946-863-X.
- ²⁰ Eileen Barker, *The Making of a Moonie* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford), first (hard-cover) ed. 1984; paperback ed. 1985, pp. 305, £ 5.95, ISBN 0-631-13247-3.
- ²¹ H. Byron Earhart, *The New Religions of Japan: A Bibliography of Western-Language Materials* (Ann Arbor, Mich., Michigan Papers in Japanese Studies no. 9, Univ. of Michigan Press), 1983, pp. 213, \$ 7.—, ISBN 0-939512-13-0.
- ²² Minoru Kyota, *Gedatsukai: its theory and practice. A Study of a Shinto-Buddhist Syncretic School in Contemporary Japan* (Los Angeles-Tokyo, Buddhist Books International), 198, pp. 132.
- ²³ Mokichi Okada, *Johrei: divine light of salvation* (The Rakuto Press, 3 Yoshida Kaguraoka-cho, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606), 1986, paperback, pp. 240, \$ 5.95, ISBN 4-947619-00-7.
- ²⁴ T. Kubo, *The Development of Japanese Lay Buddhism* (The Reiyukai, 7-8 Azabudai 1-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo), 1986, pp. 56.
- ²⁵ Helen Hardacre, *Lay Buddhism in Contemporary Japan: Reiyukai Kyodan*, (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press) 1984, pp. 267, \$ 45.—.
- ²⁶ Helen Hardacre, *Kurozumikyo and the New Religions of Japan* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press), 1986, pp. xiii + 212, ISBN 0-691-06675-2.
- ²⁷ Walter Strolz, *Heilswege der Weltreligionen* Bd. 1: Christliche Begegnung mit Judentum und Islam, 1984, pp. 192; Bd. 2: Christliche Begegnung mit Hinduismus, Buddhismus und Taoismus, 1986, pp. 255) Feiburg i. Br., Herder Verlag, ISBN 3-451-20111-9 and 3-451-20112-7.
- ²⁸ Raimundo Panikkar, *Der Unbekannte Christus im Hinduismus* (Mainz, Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag), 1986, pp. 166.
- ²⁹ No. 11, *Kings, Khans and other Rulers of Early Central Asia: Chronological Tables*,

compiled by K.-H. Golzio, 1984, pp. 128, ISBN 3-923956-11-8. No. 12, *Regents in Central Asia since the Mongol Empire: Chronological Tables*, compiled by K.-H. Golzio, 1985, pp. 178, ISBN 3-323956-12-6. No. 13, *Die Bildersprache der Gnosis*, dargestellt von Victoria Arnold-Döben, 1986, pp. 221, ISBN 3-923956-14-2. In Kommission bei E. J. Brill, Köln.

³⁰ Victor C. Hayes (ed.), *Identity Issues and World Religions*. Selected Proceedings of the 15th Congress of the I.A.H.R. (Australian Assoc. for the Study of Religions. Distributed by Wakefield Press, 282 Richmond Rd., Netley, S.A., Australia 5037). 1986, pp. 293, ISBN 0-908083-14-9.

VERMASEREN, Maarten J., Hrg., *Die orientalischen Religionen im Römerreich* (OrRR), EPRO 93 - Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981, 576 pp.

Vingt spécialistes, pour la plupart d'expression allemande, ont contribué à ce volume, qui se veut une collection d'essais introductifs (non annotés, mais suivis chacun d'une bibliographie) résumant l'état de la recherche sur chacun des cultes ou des religions traités.

Les temps ne sont plus, en effet, où un seul auteur osait traiter en un volume des *Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*: la première édition du livre magistral de Franz Cumont date de 1906.

Il était certes temps de faire le point sur le sujet, et la spécialisation des contributeurs promettait la haute tenue des différents chapitres. Il faut signaler aussi dès l'abord le nombre des sujets traités, beaucoup plus vaste que celui qu'avait pu aborder Cumont. L'ouvrage rédigé sous la direction de Vermaseren montre clairement à quel point la conception même de "religions orientales" a évolué depuis le début du siècle. On y compte maintenant, par exemple, Christianisme et Judaïsme (religions trop "nobles", ou pas assez exotiques, pour faire part des religions "orientales" dans la taxonomie de Cumont). Mais un chapitre est aussi réservé aux "Mystères" et à la philosophie (qui n'ont rien d'oriental) et un autre aux *papyri graecae magicae* et aux gemmes magiques (Il ne s'agit pas d'une religion, ni même d'un culte).

A ce sujet, l'ouvrage de Cumont, sans doute moins utile comme "text-book" ou comme "catalogue raisonné", garde tout l'avantage d'une structure claire et maîtrisée: quatre chapitres, sur des régions importantes de l'Est (Asie Mineure, Egypte, Syrie, Iran) eux-mêmes flanqués de deux chapitres introductifs (sur Rome et l'Orient, sur la raison de la diffusion des cultes orientaux, sur l'astrologie et la magie) et d'une conclusion sur la transformation du paganisme romain.

Le livre collectif s'ouvre avec une introduction à la période et aux multiples problèmes d'histoire religieuse qu'elle soulève (par Carsten Colpe), ainsi que par un chapitre sur la religion romaine classique et sa transformation sous Auguste (par H. S. Versnel), mais se passe ensuite de toute

conclusion, de toute synthèse. Le lecteur a l'impression de défiler dans une galerie d'antiquités ou les objets, de n'importe quelle provenance ou valeur, seraient alignés avec à peine une étiquette pour les identifier et les différencier (impression renforcée par les pages d'iconographie assemblées à la suite de nombreux chapitres).

Certains choix sont étranges: pourquoi un chapitre — un seul — sur l'histoire et la géographie d'une région, mais sans lien direct avec le sujet du livre (Asie Mineure)? D'autre part, une importance égale semble être accordée aux différents cultes et religions: même nombre de pages, par exemple, pour Manichéisme, le Judaïsme, et pour Jupiter Heliopolitanus ou les divinités thraces et danubiennes. Le Judaïsme, d'autre part, n'est représenté que par des synagogues, comme s'il s'agissait d'une religion sans pensée, sans monuments littéraires. Les papyri magiques grecs sont certes d'une grande importance pour la compréhension de la *koinè* religieuse dans l'Est de l'Empire romain, mais forment-ils une religion à part entière, comme le laisse entendre le chapitre qui leur est consacré?

En fait, le défaut majeur du volume provient d'une erreur de conception, reflétée dans son titre même. Il est vrai que, dans le foisonnement des phénomènes religieux sous l'Empire, et par delà la multiplication des monographies, la recherche a besoin d'ouvrages de synthèse. Mais est-ce bien sur les “religions orientales”, qu'il faille faire porter l'effort, ou plutôt sur le phénomène religieux *dans son ensemble*? Pour comprendre l'attriance des divers cultes, leur multiplication, leur coexistence (ou leur lutte avec la religion officielle, comme dans le cas du Christianisme), peut-on ignorer le culte de l'empereur, dont Simon Price vient de montrer (*Rituals and Power*, Oxford 1983) toute la signification religieuse? L'introduction de Colpe lui-même argue qu'on ne peut séparer radicalement ce culte des “religions orientales”.

Ce qui manque encore aux chercheurs dans les différents domaines (et qui n'est pas comblé non plus par les nombreuses et parfois excellentes études publiées dans la série *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*), c'est un effort d'intégration qui montrerait les relations entre religion et société, entre cultes et cultures. Une telle étude traiterait des transformations religieuses sous l'empire et mettrait en relief les grandes artères de la vie religieuse: peuples et classes, campagnes et villes, vie privée et vie publique, culte et pensée, tolérance et intolérance, rejet de l'étranger (en particulier des doctrines venant d'Iran), et séduction de l'exotisme (*philosophia barbarum*).

Dans un tel cadre, on comprendrait de façon neuve la place des “religions orientales” sous l'Empire, et le panorama s'éclairciraît. C'est comme un jalon utile vers ce but qu'il faut voir le volume publié par Vermaesen.

FISHBANE, Michael, *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*—Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, vii + 613 pages, £35. ISBN 19 826325 2.

The first two centuries of modern biblical criticism (1750-1950: Astruc, the father of the documentary theory of the Pentateuch, to the end of the World War II) were marked by disintegrating analysis of the books of the Bible and the discovery of the great diversity of ideas and standpoints represented in them. As the third century of criticism comes of age, the synoptic view of the Bible, attending to its continuities, is increasingly in evidence. The newly appreciated self-referential character of biblical literature requires the assumption of a cultural tradition nurtured and transmitted by educational institutions of some sort, with a set curriculum including the basic components of biblical tradition as we know it. Recent studies of education in ancient Israel have been summarized and furthered by A. Lemaire (*Les écoles et la formation de la Bible dans l'ancien Israël*, 1981), who has propounded the theory that the biblical canon is the aggregate of various curricula of ancient Israelite schools. If the authors of Scripture were trained in such schools the extensive self-referentiality of the Bible would be explained. How later biblical authors echoed, adapted, and reused elements of the earlier literature and the similarity of their procedures to post biblical midrash have been studied with growing intensity since the suggestive essay of I. L. Seeligmann “Voraussetzungen der Midrasch-Exegese” (*Supplements to Vetus Testamentum*, 1 [1953], 150-181). M. Fishbane has now collected and analyzed very many illustrations of the phenomenon (observed by him and others) in what is advertised as “the first comprehensive treatment and analysis of the phenomenon of textual interpretation in ancient Israel” (so the blurb, echoing the last sentence in the book). Fishbane has undertaken to show how the *traditum*—the received stuff of the tradition—was transmuted by *traditio*—the process of transmission. His main contribution is systematization and classification, and it must be said at once that this is a major contribution. To have scoured Scripture and the voluminous exegetical literature for hundreds of illustrations of “inner-biblical exegesis” (a coinage of N. Sarna) and arranged them by type is a great service to scholarship: it provides a conceptual and terminological framework for further study and sets forth with candor the issues and unsolved—often insoluble—problems encountered by the student.

Fishbane divides the material into four classes: (1) “Scribal comments and corrections”—in which he includes explanatory glosses and pious revisions (the problem arises of discriminating authorial from postauthorial matter when there was really no ancient notation of the difference); (2) “Legal exegesis”—in which revision of early laws (such as

Deuteronomy's cult centralization) is considered alongside late properly exegetical harmonizing (such as the Chronicler's fusion of the paschal laws of Exodus and Deuteronomy); (3) "Aggadic exegesis" (pertaining to nonlegal stuff) in which Fishbane includes both reinterpretation (Deuteronomy's turning the manna into a lesson in God's omnipotence) and the prophet's symbolic or metaphoric use of legal matter (Jeremiah's allusion to a man's remarrying his divorced wife as an analogue to God's relation to Israel); (4) "Mantological [=divinational] exegesis"—by which Fishbane refers to all sorts of dream and oracle interpretation, such as does not entail inner-biblical exegesis (Joseph's explanation of Pharaoh's dreams) and such as does (Gabriel's explaining to Daniel that what Jeremiah meant when he fixed a term of seventy years till the restoration of Jerusalem was seventy weeks of—or 490—years).

Each section ends with conclusions stressing the participation of the ancient interpreter in the shaping of the biblical text and the "paradox" of exegetical liberty within the constraints of a belief in the divine origin of the text. In the Epilogue, Fishbane speculates on the connection between inner-biblical exegesis and that of the Qumran community and the Rabbis. Finally, he ventures some guesses about the mentality of the ancient interpreter, ranging from piously fraudulent to belief that his work was inspired. Bibliography, and indexes to Hebrew terms, subjects and passages cited are provided.

The vast scope of this work cannot but excite admiration; it considers not only biblical and Jewish exegesis, but analogues from outside Israel as well (e.g., the ancient Near East). The drive to systematize, to classify, to establish criteria and achieve comprehensiveness animates the book. An unfortunate result is repetitiveness and overwriting. The material does not lend itself to clean-cut categorization. Since overlapping in the treatment of pertinent matter was unavoidable, more rigor might have been exercised in excluding irrelevant discussion—such as comment on structure (p. 328). Ground is recrossed and criss-crossed in summaries and conclusions that too often only restate the argument.

In a book of such scope the author cannot possibly be in equal control of all the material. Scholars will inevitably differ with Fishbane in some of his judgments; that is no fault. But it is disquieting to find outright errors: Wellhausen is misrepresented on p. 65, and Milgrom on p. 302; Immanuel of Rome had nothing to do with the typological dictum cited on p. 350 (the Davidson note was misread); I Sam 30:23 ff. is not a case of "an Israelite king imposing his own law" (p. 240) since David is not yet king in the story; there is no Targum Onkelos on Psalms, and the Aramaic term cited on p. 541 note 27 is the standard rendering of "wonder" and has nothing to do with "exegesis".

Fishbane's style is baroque; he has a penchant for foreign, archaic, and jargonistic terms. Many contructions are infelicitous and obscure: "diverse similarity exists" [288]; "analogical relationships of structural similitude and of proportion" [362]; "motivational indifference" [338]. Sometimes he misses the right word: "presumptive" [527] serves twice for "presumptuous"; "putative" [533] for "spurious"; "contentions" (= arguments) [304] for "contention" (= strife). Occasionally he makes up his own words: "adversion" [286] = allusion; "disempowered" [340] = disadvantaged. Proper editing could have eliminated such solecisms.

The reader of Fishbane's book may well wonder whether the text of Hebrew Scriptures has been so "actualized," "re-presented," and "contemporized" as to be unserviceable for recovering the stages in the development of ancient Israelite religion. Many modern critics do indeed flatten out the perspective depth of biblical literature by attributing to the final redactors a decisive role in its formulation. Fishbane's book may unintendedly strengthen that dubious view by diverting attention from the monumental facts of (1) the gap between the laws of the Torah and later reality—which gap testifies to the minimal interference of redactors and copyists with their *tradita*; and (2) the divergences between most foretelling prophecies and the actual course of events, testifying again to the fidelity of transmission of prophetic tradition by most tradents. It was precisely the overall faithfulness of transmission of early biblical material that made possible and necessary its adjustment to later conditions by latter-day inner-biblical exegetes.

Notwithstanding these strictures, this product of infinite industry and a rich associative imagination is a milestone in the formulation and exposition of its subject.

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MERKUR, Daniel, *Becoming Half Hidden: Shamanism and Initiation Among the Inuit*, Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis: Stockholm Studies in Comparative Religion 24—Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1985, vii + 305 pp. Paperbound.

Among the many works on shamanism now being issued as a consequence of the general modern concern with spiritual religion the book here presented deserves particular mention. Eskimo or Inuit shamanism has been described to us in many works, several of them articles difficult to get hold of or written in a language less accessible to most scholars, Danish. There has however been no monograph that takes up the subject

in all its width, trying to give an integrated interpretation of the whole shamanic complex. Merkur's book is the first one to do just that. It accomplishes the task in a vigorous, intelligent manner, introducing a whole array of new ideas and concepts in the field.

The author, Dan Merkur, now Professor at the University of Syracuse, New York, wrote this work as his doctoral dissertation at the University of Stockholm. He has earlier dealt with psychoanalysis, studies of American Indian and Hebrew religions, and psychology of religion, and he will soon publish another volume on Eskimo religion. He is a restless, ambitious scholar dedicated more to the intellectual problems he faces than to the people and the cultural materials he studies. Not surprisingly, the work here under consideration is founded exclusively on literary research, not on field-work. Not that this restriction matters so much any more: the days of old-faith shamanism are over among the Eskimo, as Merkur points out.¹ The author is satisfied that the extant trove of literary sources—which he has studied most extensively—supplies enough information for the approach which is closest to his heart, the psychological study of shamanic states. The phenomenological aspects of Eskimo shamanism are in no way neglected, but they are played down in comparison with the psychological analysis.

This is certainly not a new approach to shamanism, on the contrary, it has often been resorted to, as should be generally known. The new thing is that Merkur sees Eskimo shamanism entirely in this light, abstaining from all historical and diffusional operations. Indeed, his few historical interpretations are doubtful, as when he supplants Circumpacific shamanism for Arctic shamanism—a device certainly no other scholar of shamanism would accept. After all, Arctic shamanism is a peculiar cultural construction of northern Eurasia, not just a tendency to trance and soul-journeys. Also, his interpretation of European (and American!) scholarly interest in Siberian shamanism as chauvinistic is, to say the least, preposterous. Siberian shamanism offers to the world the most fascinating and most developed pattern of shamanism there is.

These strictures should however not draw our attention away from the fact that Merkur has presented to us a psychological interpretation of shamanism—Eskimo, as it happens to be—that is of remarkable depth and deserves in places to be called brilliant. He has earlier written papers on the human mind in the psychoanalytical tradition. There is little of this kind of analysis in the present work, although occasional references to genital symbolism or the oral fixation of the manic personality and similar things occur. What Merkur has accomplished is a thoroughly integrated psychological picture of shamanic experiences, particularly in connection

with initiation. We may criticize him for some of his ideas and some of his formulations, but there is rarely any weakening of his logical skill in applying his program.

The author finds what he sees as a convenient reason for conducting a psychological analysis. He declares that this is the first study to discuss shamanism from the shaman's, not the laity's, perspective—a somewhat unfortunate statement in view of the fact that we have several shamanic biographies from the Eskimo field with detailed data of a shaman's life and religious experiences. To spell out his approach further, Merkur defines in the first chapter his approach as "a study in esoterica." That is, the Eskimo shaman is, as the aboriginal formulation goes, "he who is half hidden," a specialist who knows much about hidden things but whose secrets are scarcely known to the general people. Merkur here turns Eskimo sayings in a direction which echoes Radin. It is difficult to align this opinion with another, expressed later in the book, that the dichotomy between Inuit layman and shamans is not as radical as has been said. Anyhow, Merkur backs up his position by insisting that all information on shamanic initiation—by which word he means all preparations of a shamanic adept for his work—is "esoteric". Indeed, he denies that there are, strictly speaking, ethnographic data on Inuit shamanic initiation (p. 118). However, this is a statement that is practically nullified by the author's correct observation that there are shamans' self-reports and other, more general reports on the subject. Merkur seems to presuppose that ethnographic data in a true sense are necessarily synonymous with documents founded on participant observation by ethnographers. These do not exist, but therefore to term all relevant information esoteric is an exaggeration.

The source situation being as it is Merkur tries to accomplish a fuller, more living picture through the interpolations made possible by psychological analysis. By weaving together interpretations and research strategies from different fields of psychology, including the psychology of religion, he arrives at a total pattern of interpretation which is both refreshing and challenging, an intellectual feat of no small consequence. There is not the place here to mention all his new devices, certainly profitable to use in future religio-psychological analyses. Some of them deserve however to be adduced for their general application. "Reverie", introduced in his earlier massive master's dissertation at York University, Canada (1982), covers religious experiences earlier noted by Johannes Lindblom, characterized by daydreaming, hypnagogic states, creative inspirations of high intensity, and unitive experiences, which are all conceived as imaginary, not real. (I confess that in actual practice I find it

difficult to differentiate this state from forms of religious inspiration.) Another creative concept is "automatic thought", referring to earlier conscious ideas that through a trance return as automatisms of thought. "Incorporation" comprehends a bodily inclusion of a spirit without a possession in psychological sense occurring. The shaman is, in other words, in control of a situation even when foreign spirits have invaded him. This is a good term in the English language where "possession" means many things. Finally I should also like to commend Merkur for his excellent distinction between demonstrative and imitative shamanism, two concepts which may otherwise easily be confused.

At the same time some of his interpretations of traditional concepts invite criticism. His definition of ecstasy as "any state of involuntary belief in the reality of the numinous" is scarcely acceptable. Why involuntary? Does not Merkur here confuse the actual belief with the process of meditation? And why does he stress the belief, when the term ecstasy in all times has been joined with experiential states of great exclusivity? To Merkur, the sheer apperception of a physical event as a miracle is an ecstasy—disregarding how the apperception was made, or the perceiver's state of mind. The trouble here is partly Merkur's ambition to drive in a wedge between trance and ecstasy, two concepts that more or less coincide with each other, one derived from medicine, the other from theology and humanities; one referring to the individual's psychophysical reactions, the other to inner experiences. Merkur asserts that "many presume that they are discussing trances when in fact they are not." Such a judgment is too rigid: it all depends on what definitions we have.

Other surprising *dicta* are, for instance, that inspirations are pseudo-hallucinations (what about intuitive inspiration?), and that there is no suspension of external perception in phenomena of "light trance". This is definitely not correct. The trance represents a continuous shrinking of outer influences; without this reduction of exterior perceptions there is no trance (according to the above definition). I have myself been "medically" treated by a medicine-man who during the séance, as both my own observations and his remarks afterwards testified, was in a light trance with reduced sensations of the world around him.

On the whole, however, Merkur's psychological interpretations of Eskimo shamanism are clever, and they teach us very much both about extraordinary psychological states and Eskimo shamanism. It appears that Eskimo shamans, as Merkur skilfully disentangles, are basically normal individuals, and not pathological. He refutes the doctrine of the "healed healer", the nervously sick person who heals himself by becoming a shaman. (There is a case however adduced by the author of a Cop-

per Eskimo who was fatally ill but recovered to become a shaman.) Perhaps one should add however that most shamans are sensitive, nervously disposed persons and that their behaviour in trance situations sometimes manifests motor reactions which are of a hysterical type. Merkur will probably not entirely accede to this interpretation, although he does not exclude hysteria from certain shamanic trance forms (cf. pp. 40, 109).

Merkur is certainly right in describing the shamanic trance as self-hypnotic, in some cases with deep trance hetero-hypnotic. However, in many respects his concept of trance is difficult to grasp, at least for the present reviewer. The bewildering differentiation between ecstasy and trance has already been mentioned. Some pronouncements about the trance appear enigmatic to me, such as that the shaman knows there is a difference between the states of trance and death (but to most North American aborigines these states could be identical if the trance was deep enough), and that the trance always implies the loss of consciousness (the trance represents a scale of stages with increasing loss of consciousness). The introduction of a concept like reverie further complicates the issue.

The author gives a fine presentation of the forming of the shaman under the apprenticeship of a trained master. Soul flights, clairvoyance, acquisition of helping spirits, and vision quests mark the stages of the "initiation". Whether the vision quest stimulates the daydreams of reverie, as Merkur thinks, or genuine trance visions (with stable contents, as among visionaries of the auditory type) may be left as an open question.

The last chapters of the book deal with some specific themes, the journey of the shaman to the Moon and the Sun, the concept of *inua* (which is usually interpreted as owner, indweller etc.), and the concept of power. The discussion of *inua* is important, but since the concept is more broadly treated in another paper it is unnecessary to take it up here.

Each chapter contains challenging new ideas and important conclusions that should be observed by all shamanologists. We may question many of the results the author has arrived at, but we cannot but admire his erudition and intellectual cleverness. This is in short a most attractive and important treatise.

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¹ One of my pupils who spent his childhood and youth with Eskimos in Greenland, and later married an Eskimo, was unable to trace substantial material on shamanism in Greenland and Eastern Canada during his later field research there. Unfortunately, the last vital recording of Eskimo shamanism made some 30-40 years ago by the Dane Svend Frederiksen has disappeared after his death.

La tradizione dell'enkratēia: motivazioni ontologiche e protologiche, Atti del Colloquio Internazionale, Milano, 20-23 aprile 1982, pubblicati a cura di Ugo Bianchi-Roma, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1985; xxxi + 800 pp.

Ce gros livre fait suite à deux autres volumes, publiés aussi par U. Bianchi, et réunissant les communications présentées à des Colloques précédents qui s'étaient efforcés de cerner divers aspects de l'anthropologie (et donc des traditions ascétiques) du Christianisme des premiers siècles. Comme il en a l'habitude depuis le fameux Congrès de Messine sur la Gnose en 1966, le professeur Bianchi publie ici un "document final" adopté par les participants, et censé résumer le problème tel qu'il se pose *après* les débats du Colloque. Le principe d'un tel document est certainement fort recommandable, bien qu'on puisse parfois douter de son utilité pratique. L'essentiel est dit dans les nombreuses contributions excellentes au volume (il y en a en tout vingt-cinq). On trouvera aussi maint point intéressant ou important dans les discussions ayant suivi chacune des communications au Colloque. On peut se demander si certaines les questions précises posées, en particulier celle de la motivation protologique de l'*enkratēia*, c'est à dire la doctrine de l'Adam vierge ou de l'âme originellement incorrompue, sont bien les questions centrales que pose le développement de l'ascèse dans le Christianisme des premiers siècles et dans divers courants religieux de l'antiquité tardive. A ce sujet, on peut regretter un certain manque d'équilibre parmi les participants. Alors que l'importance — paradoxale certes — des courants ascétiques dans le Judaïsme ou à ses pourtours a été soulignée par plus d'un participant (en particulier les Professeurs Guillaumont et Quispel) aucune communication n'a pour but de présenter ou d'analyser le matériel rabbinique à ce sujet. Par ailleurs, trop peu d'attention est accordée aux différents courants ascétiques ou encratiques de la religiosité païenne. Le faisceau complexe de relations nouées autour de la corporéité, du sexe, et de la spiritualité compte parmi les phénomènes les plus importants de l'antiquité tardive, non seulement du point de vue de l'historien des religions, mais encore de celui de l'historien des mentalités. Michel Foucault, Aline Rousselle, Peter Brown, parmi d'autres, ont consacré ou consacrent leurs efforts et leur grand talent à comprendre dans son mécanisme et son détail cette révolution dans l'histoire des attitudes sexuelles et de la conscience de soi que représente l'ascèse rigoureuse (en particulier sexuelle) chrétienne des premiers siècles, et aboutissant ou mouvement monastique du 4^e siècle. Car si l'abstentionisme alimentaire ne peut être exclu de toute définition de l'encratisme, c'est l'opposition au mariage (lui-même lié à la corruption, et à la valeur négative attachée à la *genesis*) qui forme le centre de toute définition utile de l'*enkratēia* — point sur lequel insiste U. Bianchi.

L'absence d'historiens de l'antiquité tardive devait nécessairement faire dévier les débats sur des questions plus précises d'histoire des textes et des doctrine. Le point le plus important, peut-être, soulevé dans les débats est celui des différences et des similitudes entre l'enratisme gnostique et l'*enkratēia* dans des milieux chrétiens non habituellement définis comme gnostiques. A ce sujet, le Professeur Antoine Guillaumont, l'un des participants les plus actifs au Colloque, note que selon le témoignage de Clément d'Alexandrie, l'"enratite" Tatien enseignait l'abrogation de la Loi, qui provenait *d'un autre dieu*.

Tatien est particulièrement important dans ce contexte, comme témoignant de l'importance des courants encratites dans le premier Christianisme syriaque. A ce sujet, le Professeur Gilles Quispel répète à diverses occasions dans les pages de ce volume ses thèses connues sur les différences essentielles entre encratisme et gnose (c'est selon lui au premier de ces courants qu'appartiennent l'*Evangile de Thomas* et d'autres textes découverts à Nag Hammadi et trop hâtivement qualifiés de gnostiques), sur les origines encratites du Christianisme syriaque, et sur la proximité entre encratisme et judéo-christianisme. Guillaumont se montre quant à lui plus nuancé — et plus convaincant — que Quispel quand il souligne que l'*Evangile* et les *Actes de Thomas* représentent un courant parmi d'autres dans le Christianisme syriaque, dont les origines restent obscures.

Malgré les quelques réserves formulées quant à la *Fragestellung* du Colloque de Milan, il faut insister sur le fait que les contributions sont souvent d'une grande richesse. Plusieurs, par exemple celle de Marcel Simon (sur l'ascétisme dans les sectes juives), celle de Giulia Sfameni Gasparro (vénérable dossier d'une centaine de pages sur les motivations protologiques de l'*enkratēia* dans la pensée chrétienne, des gnostiques à Augustin), celle de P. F. Beatrice (sur l'exégèse des tuniques de peau de Gn 3:21), celle de H. Crouzel (sur les sources bibliques de l'*enkratēia* chrétienne), font le point sur leur sujet. Signalons pour conclure la centralité du thème de l'*unité*: l'idéal monastique du *bios angelikos* est caractérisé non seulement par l'incorruptibilité et l'immortalité, mais aussi par l'*unité*. Le *monachos* est celui qui refuse le mariage pour mieux découvrir l'*unité* de sa personne et s'unir — seul à seul, comme disait Plotin — au Dieu un. Cette "métaphysique de l'*unité*", pour employer une locution forgée par le regretté H.-C. Puech, semble bien être au cœur du thème de l'*enkratēia*.

Bien pourvu d'index, le présent volume offre ainsi une somme honnête des résultats de la recherche actuelle, et pourra servir de bon point de départ, ou au moins de repère, à de nouvelles investigations.

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OBITUARY

Marcel Simon (1907-1986)

Président, dix ans durant, de l'I.A.H.R., le doyen Marcel Simon vient de mourir en son domicile strasbourgeois le 26 octobre 1986.

Né le 10 avril 1907 dans une des vallées vosgiennes de cette Alsace à laquelle il demeura indefectiblement attaché, M. Simon fit ses études successivement au collège de Thann, puis au Lycée Lous-le-Grand à Paris, avant d'intégrer l'Ecole normale supérieure tout en préparant sa licence d'Histoire en Sorbonne. Reçu à l'Agrégation d'Histoire, il devint pensionnaire de l'Ecole française de Rome où il retrouva son ami Marrou auquel il resta profondément lié (1932-1934). Il compléta sa formation comme membre de l'Institut français de Berlin, ce qui lui fournit l'occasion d'entendre les cours d'H. Lietzmann.

Son retour à Strasbourg marqua le début de sa carrière d'enseignant au Lycée fustel de Coulanges à l'ombre de la Cathédrale (1936-1939). Ce fut bientôt la guerre et de sombres années pour l'Alsace. Témoin à Berlin de la montée de l'idéologie nationale-socialiste, M. Simon participa à la guerre et se replia ensuite avec les siens sur l'Auvergne. A Clermont-Ferrand, où l'Université de Strasbourg avait trouvé refuge, il est nommé chargé d'enseignement.

Au lendemain de la Libération à laquelle il avait brillamment contribué, à l'heure où dans son Alsace qui retrouvait la France après quatre dures années, tout était à reprendre sur nouveaux frais, M. Simon est nommé en 1947 professeur d'Histoire des Religions et bientôt, appelé par la confiance de ses pairs, élu doyen de la Faculté des Lettres en 1948, poste qu'il devait occuper jusqu'aux soubresauts de 1968. Notre Université doit tout particulièrement à ce polyglotte érudit son ouverture sur les langues et les cultures nordiques — il enseigna lui-même le norvégien —, sur la culture hébraïque et juive, sur le monde arabe et l'Islam, ainsi que de nombreux centres de recherches pluridisciplinaires. Strasbourg lui doit surtout d'être devenue en France, et ce jusqu'à ce jour, un des centres majeurs pour l'étude des idées et des systèmes religieux, grâce à l'Institut d'Histoire des Religions et au Centre de Recherches d'Histoire des Religions qu'il a fondés et animés jusqu'à sa retraite, multipliant colloques, séminaires et publications; grâce aussi aux deux facultés d'Etat de Théologie catholique et protestante. Administrateur ferme, prudent et exigeant, il sut rester un conseiller écouté que beaucoup aimèrent consulter dans les bons et les mauvais jours.

Ses lourdes responsabilités administratives n'éloignèrent jamais M. Simon de ses tâches d'enseignement et de recherche, encore moins de ceux qui lui confierent la direction de leurs travaux. Il suffit pour s'en convaincre d'écouter ses anciens élèves et de consulter la liste de ses publications scientifiques qui rassemble plus de cent cinquante titres en français, en anglais, en allemand, en italien ou en norvégien, indépendamment des nombreux compte-rendus et des "bulletions" régulièrement publiés dans la *Revue Historique* — 1948. 1952. 1956. 1961. 1968. 1975 —.

Parmi les Maîtres qui l'ont marqué, il aimait évoquer la prestigieuse figure de F. Cumont avec lequel il eut de longs entretiens au cours de son séjour romain, mais surtout celui qu'il appelait "mon bon Maître Guignebert". C'est en effet Guignebert qui orienta sa recherche et dirigea au départ sa thèse d'Etat. Les années passant et vu le sujet abordé, il fallut attendre pour la soutenance, car les conseillers de Vichy envisageaient les rapports judéo-chrétiens... à leur manière. Au jour de la soutenance en 1948, le "bon Maître" n'était plus là et "l'ami Marrou" fit office de rapporteur. Aujourd'hui, plusieurs fois réédité, traduit désormais en anglais, le "*Verus Israël*" est devenu un classique et pareillement nombre de ses travaux sur le Christianisme primitif, sur Bellérophon, Hercule ou Mithra ainsi qu'en témoignent les nombreuses traductions de certains d'entre eux. C'est que Monsieur le doyen Simon avait une conception exigeante de sa tâche d'Historien des Religions qu'il a précisée dans plusieurs articles méthodologiques et qu'il définissait ainsi en 1978:

"Si l'étiquette "Histoire des religions" a un sens, elle suppose une compétence, des recherches et un enseignement ne se limitant pas à une seule religion, mais en embrassant deux ou trois. Le groupement le plus normal, tel que je l'ai toujours conçu et pratiqué, est le suivant: paganisme antique (oriental et classique), judaïsme, christianisme. Il permet des études de contacts, une approche comparatiste, et suppose un solide ancrage dans l'antiquité, seule période où ce type d'études soit vraiment possible, sans exclure des "pointes" en ce qui concerne au moins le christianisme, vers des périodes plus récentes."

Toutes les orientations fondamentales de l'œuvre scientifique de M. Simon sont dans ces quelques lignes, y compris ses intérêts personnels pour l'Anglicanisme, ainsi que l'ont parfaitement compris ses amis qui intitulèrent le volume de Mélanges qu'ils lui offrirent en 1978: *Paganisme, Judaïsme, Christianisme. Influences et affrontements dans le monde antique*.

Très vite, la réputation scientifique de M. Simon allait connaître une éclatante renommée: membre étranger de l'Académie de Norvège et de la British Academy, il entrail en 1978 à l'Institut de France, tandis que les Universités de Lancaster, Liège, St. Andrews et Uppsala lui conféraient le doctorat *honoris causa*. Elu à la présidence de l'I.A.H.R. lors du

congrès de Stockholm en 1970, il dut pour des raisons de santé se résigner à résilier ses fonctions en 1980.

Homme discret, d'une insigne pudeur, d'un abord difficile peut-être surtout pour des étudiants qu'impressionnaient ses titres et son prestige, homme pourtant si chaleureux pour qui a connu le privilège de le fréquenter, homme de la fidélité à son Alsace, à ses Maîtres, à ses amis, à ses idées, humaniste raffiné, Monsieur le doyen Simon nous laisse le souvenir d'un Maître exigeant et attentif, d'un chercheur rigoureux, à l'humour si caustique parfois, à tous ceux nombreux qui ont eu l'insigne privilège de le connaître et de le fréquenter, à ses élèves, à ses collègues, à tous ceux qu'il a honorés de son amitié.

Université des Sciences humaines,
Strasbourg France.

François BLANCHETIERE
Professeur d'Histoire des Religions

La liste des publications scientifiques du Doyen M. SIMON figure dans le volume de Mélanges qui lui ont été offerts: *Paganisme, Judaïsme, Christianisme, Influences et affrontements dans le monde antique*, Paris 1978. Il convient d'y ajouter les titres suivants:

- “Judaïsme et Christianisme en Gaule”, *Les martyrs de Lyon* (177). Colloques internationaux du C.N.R.S., Paris 1978, 257-266.
- “Un document du syncrétisme religieux dans l'Afrique romaine”, *Comptes-rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, Paris 1978, 500-525.
- “De l'observance rituelle à l'ascèse: Recherches sur le “décret apostolique”, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* CXCIII. I (1978) 27-104.
- “Mithra et les Empereurs”, *Mysteria Mithrae E.P.R.O. n° 80*, Leiden 1979, 411-428.
- “From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy”, *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition*, Festschrift R. M. Grant, Paris 1979, 101-116.
- “Antisémitisme et philosémitisme dans le Monde romain”, *Annales du C.E.S.E.R.E.*, Paris 1979, 3-12.
- “Trente ans de recherches sur l'Apôtre Paul”, *Ktêma* 3 (1978) 3-33.
- “A propos de la crise moderniste: Ecriture et Tradition chez A. Loisy”, *Text, Wort, Glaube*, K. Aland Gewidmet, Berlin 1980, 359-376.
- “Prière du Philosophe et prière chrétienne”, *L'expérience de la Prière dans les grandes Religions*, Actes du Colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve et Liège (22-23 novembre 1978), *Homo religiosus* n° 5, Louvain-la-Neuve 1980, 205-224.
- “Die Christologie im Rahmen des Antiken Denkens”, *Glaube an Jésus Christus*, Dusseldorf 1980, 90-101.
- *Le Christianisme antique et son contexte religieux*, *Scripta Varia Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament* n° 23, Tübingen 1981. Ces deux volumes rassemblent la majorité des articles scientifiques du Doyen Simon publiés entre 1933 et 1979 et non encore publiés en volume.
- “M. Nédoncelle et l'Histoire religieuse anglaise”, *La pensée philosophique et religieuse de M. Nédoncelle*, Colloque de Strasbourg 1979, Paris 1981, 27-45.
- “Gottesfürchtiger”, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, Bd XI, Stuttgart 1981, 1060-1070.

- “Reinarch S.”, *Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément*, Paris 1981, X. 199-200.
- “Remarques sur les origines de la Chrétienté romaine”, *Religion et culture dans la cité italienne de l'Antiquité à nos jours*, Actes du colloque du Centre interdisciplinaire de Recherches sur l'Italie (8-10 novembre 1979), Strasbourg 1981, 40-50.
- “Conceptions et symboles sotériologiques chez les Juifs de la Diaspora”, *La Sotériologia dei Culti orientali nell'impero romano*, E.P.R.O. n° 92, Leiden 1982, 781-802.
- “Sur quelques aspects des Oracles Sibyllins juifs”, *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East*, Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Apocalypticism, Uppsala (August 12-17, 1979), Tübingen 1983, 219-233.
- *Verus Israël*, traduction anglaise, Oxford University Press 1985.
- “Anonymat et polyonymie divins dans l'Antiquité tardive”, *Perennitas Studi in onore di A. Brelich*, Rome p. 503-520.
- “Sadducéens”, *Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément*, Paris 1985, X 1545-1556.
- “L'épître de Barnabé et le Temple”, *Les Juifs au regard de l'Histoire*, Mélanges en l'honneur de B. Blumenkranz, Paris 1985, 31-36.
- “L'ascétisme dans les sectes juives”, *La Tradizione dell'enkrateia, Motivazioni ontologiche e protologiche*. Atti del Colloquio Internazionale, Milano 20-23 aprile 1982., Rome 1986, 393-431.
- “La montée du Christianisme”, *Mythes et croyances du Monde*, Paris 1985, vol. II 197-201.

CHRONICLE AND CALENDAR OF EVENTS

Conferences in the recent past

The International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations held its 15th Annual Meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico, May 29-31, 1986. Session 28 dealt with "Religious Symbols and Processes" (Chair: Carroll J. Bourg).

Hamburg received the 32nd International Congress for Asian and North African Studies, 25-30 August 1986. Section 2 on Buddhist Studies was convened by Prof. L. Schmithausen, 7 (Islamic Studies) by Prof. A. Noth.

"Tradition and Renewal" was the theme of a conference organized by the Danish A.H.R. at Aarhus University, May 14-17, 1987.

Forthcoming conferences

"The Body. A Colloquium on Comparative Spirituality". Lancaster Centre for the Study of Religion, July 8-11, 1987.

IAHR regional conference in Helsinki: May 13-19, 1990.

33rd International Congress for Asian and North African Studies: Toronto, 19-25 August 1990.

16th IAHR Congress in Rome: September 3-8, 1990.

For Helsinki, Toronto and Rome one may consult *IAHR Bulletin* 4, January 1987, 2-3.

Bildgenres

Numen 31 (1984), 157, informed about a workshop on iconography in Groningen. A double volume of the Annual for Religious Iconography *Visible Religion*, 4-5 (1985-)1986, presents its proceedings under the title *Approaches to Iconology*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, (1985-)1986, ISBN 90 04 07772 3 (with numerous illustrations); f 180.—

A second meeting took place in the Werner-Reimers-Stiftung in Bad Homburg (Fed. Rep. of Germ.), November 3-6, 1986. "Bildgenres" was its theme, and the sessions dealt with "Bildgenres innerhalb kultureller Systeme", "Wechsel der Kontexte", "Wechsel der Massstäbe", "Beziehung zu Betrachtern", and "Wechsel des Mediums" respectively. Participants were Prof. Assmann (Heidelberg), Dr. Assmann-Bornkamm (Heidelberg), Prof. Barasch (Jerusalem), Prof. Cancik (Tübingen), Prof.

Drijvers (Groningen), Prof. Fehr (Hamburg), Dr. Gebhard-Sayer (Ammerbuch), Prof. Gladigow (Tübingen), Prof. Hauck (Münster), Prof. Heerma van Voss (Amsterdam), Dr. Hoffmann (Radda), Dr. Hoffmann-Curtius (Tübingen), Prof. Keel (Fribourg), Prof. Kippenberg (Groningen), Prof. Klimkeit (Bonn), Prof. Metzler (Münster), Prof. Muensterberger (New York), Dr. Schneider (Hamburg), Prof. Stähler (Münster), Prof. Taubes (Berlin), Prof. te Velde (Groningen), and Dr. Witte (Groningen). Prof. van Baaren (Groningen), prevented from attending, sent in a paper.

The conference was animated and as successful as its predecessor.

M. HEERMA VAN VOSS

F. B. J. KUIPER: FUNDAMENTAL DIRECTIONS OF HIS SCHOLARLY WORK*

TATJANA ELIZARENKOVA

Franciscus Bernardus Jacobus Kuiper is a scholar well-known for his great achievements in contemporary Indology. The sphere of his interests is amazingly wide: study of Indo-European languages and especially the Indo-Iranian branch; philological study of ancient Indian and Iranian texts (above all the *Rgveda* and the *Avesta*); interpretation of various peculiarities of the ancient Indo-Iranian languages with the help of the laryngeal theory; study of the non-Indo-Aryan languages of India. Dravidian and Austro-Asiatic (*Munda*); study of the problems connected with the coming into existence of a linguistic area on the Indian sub-continent (borrowings and processes of convergence); study of the religion, mythology and culture of ancient India and ancient Iran on the basis of Vedic and Avestan materials and the reconstruction of a common Aryan stage; explanation of the origin of the Indian theatre. In each of these fields Kuiper has made his contribution and many of his works mark a new stage, a turning point in the understanding of the theme he studies.

In the scholarly work of Kuiper there is a harmonious combination of the best achievements of the classical comparative-historical Indo-European grammar and of new directions and methods characteristic of linguistics in the middle of the twentieth century; systematic approach to the study of language as a structure; application of the laryngeal theory which creates the possibility to explain isolated and archaic peculiarities of Indo-European languages as manifestations of a still older unified system; interest in the problems arising when different linguistic families come into contact and—what is more—when different branches of knowledge are combined. In Kuiper's works one can find the application of concepts of contemporary structural anthropology and psychology to the materials of Indo-Aryan mythology. Indo-Iranian facts and regularities are seen in the context of typological parallels from

other cultural traditions: Indonesian, Semitic, Dravidian, Austroasiatic, etc.

F. B. J. Kuiper belongs to the Dutch school of Orientalists. Already at the beginning of this century the Indological tradition in Holland possessed strong roots, and the publications of such scholars as Kern, Uhlenbeck, Caland and others were well-known throughout the world. Their work was continued after the first world war by scholars such as Vogel and Faddegon and from the thirties onwards, by Gonda and Kuiper. At present Indological problems are studied on a wide scale by a whole Pleiad of their pupils together with their teachers (de Jong who currently works in Australia, Heesterman, Bodewitz and others). Characteristic of Dutch Indology is the variety of their interests—history of religion (especially Buddhism) and of mythology (also the study of rituals which has become a traditional theme), history of Indian art, Vedic studies, publications of ancient texts, study of the Old-Indian language in comparative-historical perspective, etc. In many of the domains mentioned above Kuiper's contribution is very important.

Franciscus Bernardus Jacobus Kuiper was born on the 7th July 1907 in The Hague. After having finished his study at the gymnasium in The Hague, he studied classical languages and Indogermanistics at the University of Leiden and Sanskrit at Utrecht under the guidance of Prof. Caland—at that time the best specialist in the field of ancient Indian religion and ritual. In 1934 he successfully defended his doctor's thesis. During the period 1934-1939 he taught classical languages in a lyceum in Djakarta and since 1939, after having returned to Holland, he has been professor at the University of Leiden where in the course of recent decades he taught Sanskrit, related subjects and comparative Indo-European linguistics.

For more than a quarter of a century Prof. Kuiper (together with his pupil Prof. de Jong) was one of the two chief editors of the Indo-Iranian Journal, founded in Holland in 1955, which united the best forces of scholars of different countries. It determined in many respects the course of studies in Indian and Iranian studies. The activity of Kuiper in this Journal is uncommonly many-sided. He is not only the author of many articles, which have opened new perspectives for Indology, but also an active reviewer who quickly

published his reactions to important Indological and Iranistical publications, a participant in different scholarly discussions, etc.

Retired since 1972, Prof. Kuiper is in full possession of his creative forces and carries on many fruitful scholarly activities.

The first publications of Kuiper, which have appeared since the beginning of the thirties, relate to linguistics. This fact is obviously not accidental. Kuiper is above all a linguist by training and when later on he enlarged the sphere of his scholarly interests and began to study religion, mythology, theatre and ancient culture in general, the precise methods of research of the linguist and a systematic approach always remained a characteristic of his work. In the thirties he was above all engaged in the study of problems of Indo-European linguistics and gradually he tended more and more to the study of Indo-Iranian problems. Beginning with an analysis of the problems of the structure of different types of the Indo-European verb¹ (his doctoral dissertation was devoted to the study of the nasal presents),² Kuiper turned towards the study of the irregularities of the hierarchical peculiarities of the Vedic language and explains them from the point of view of the laryngeal theory. Already in 1879 de Saussure had advanced the hypothesis that in the common Indo-European language there existed a special type of phonemes which had disappeared before the beginning of the historical period and which had played a role in the formation of long vowels and left indirect traces in different languages in vowel interchange and in consonantism. This hypothesis was confirmed in 1927 by Kurylowicz on the basis of Hittite material. An attempt to interpret systematically the facts of the Old-Indian language was not yet undertaken and Kuiper took this task upon himself. Peculiarities of the Vedic nominal inflexion,³ irregularities of alternations in the verb and in word-formation,⁴ specific characteristics of Vedic sandhi (shortening of vowels in certain positions in the text of the RV)⁵ which had already become incomprehensible for the much later brahmanical editors of this text—all these facts were explained uniformly in the light of the laryngeal theory in Kuiper's publications. The results of Kuiper's studies became an integral part of the contemporary comparative-historical study of the Indo-European languages and the successful application of the laryngeal theory to the materials of the Vedic

language served as a stimulus for the study of traces of laryngeals also in other ancient languages: Greek (Cowgill), Hittite (Puhvel), Italic (Watkins), Germanic (Lehmann).

A special group of studies are represented by Kuiper's studies of the Indo-Iranian languages in which the pure linguistic analysis is always based upon cultural-historical realia and structural linguistics leads to a structural analysis of the religious or mythological system.

The scope of the themes studied by the author is extremely wide. Sometimes he publishes long articles, sometimes brief notes but they always contain new ideas and conclusions. For instance, the author interprets the expression RV *párye divī*⁶ in a cosmogonic sense as *on the following day of a new period* (and not as in *the decisive moment* as in Geldner's translation); the word *svavṛṣti*⁷ as *spontaneous action* which is confirmed by Avestan parallels. The term *vidātha*⁸ which is an important concept in the R̄gveda is explained as meaning *distribution of gifts* connected on the social level with a series of actions which aim at heightening the social prestige of the person who organises the distribution and as strengthening his vital forces. A series of articles is devoted to the study of borrowings in Vedic and in Sanskrit from the languages of the non-Indo-European substratum in India.⁹

Kuiper's Iranistical publications are devoted to the study of the oldest part of the Avesta, the Gāthās, in which Zarathustra proclaimed his religious teachings. He analyses the word *mazdā*,¹⁰ which is a part of the name of the supreme deity of Zarathustra, from the point of view of the laryngeal theory and shows that nothing prevents its being taken as an adjective "wise". Peculiarities of its declension attest the influence of Oriental dialects. This is a valid reason to suppose that the propaganda of the new faith spread from Eastern Iran. The Avestan compound Ahura Mazdā¹¹ which has been explained in many ways by scholars is considered by Kuiper to consist of two separate epithets of the deity which did not yet form a unity: all-knowing, wise, and only much later during the reign of the Achaemenids were they transformed into one word, the name of the deity.

The application of the laryngeal theory to the Old-Iranian material shows convincingly that at the time of Zarathustra, i.e. in

the very beginning of the first millenium before our era, the East-Iranian dialects were sharply differentiated from the West-Iranian dialects both linguistically and spatially.¹² The language of Zarathustra which has absorbed different dialectal characteristics represents an artificial literary language (*Kunstsprache*) which in many respects is much older than the language of the *Rgveda*. On purely linguistic grounds the author thinks that Zarathustra lived not later than 800 before our era.¹³

Since the end of the thirties Kuiper has published studies on the non-Indo-European languages of India, i.e. The Dravidian and Austro-Asiatic languages. First he was mainly interested in the role of the language of the substratum in the history of the development of the Indo-Aryan languages of India. Later in many cases his studies developed into independent researches into these languages. The problems of the non-Indo-European studies are extremely manifold. They concern the periodisation of the correlation of voiced and unvoiced consonants in the beginning of the word in Dravidian languages on the basis of Dravidian borrowings in Sanskrit,¹⁴ studies on Dravidian morphology,¹⁵ study of different characteristics of the phonology and morphology of Old-Tamil (the so-called *āytam* problem; the formation of an epenthetic -i- when two nominal bases are joined together)¹⁶—the first of these problems provoked a discussion in which Indian scholars took part,¹⁷ the description of the variation of consonants which constitutes one of the characteristics of the word in Munda;¹⁸ the relationship between Munda and Indonesian.¹⁹

Kuiper paid special attention to the language [Nahali or Nihali]²⁰ of a small group of people in Central India, living in Madhyapradesh and Maharashtra, of which the basis is formed by a lexical stratum which, apparently, belongs to an Austro-Asiatic language different from the type known there.

The Indo-Aryan and substratum studies are synthesized by Kuiper in such investigations as those concerning the influence of the languages of the substratum on Old-Indian. The author shows that about one hundred Sanskrit and Prakrit words are borrowings from the proto-Munda branch of the Austro-Asiatic languages.²¹ The process of borrowing began in the period of the *Rgveda*. The result of the gradual influence of the Dravidian languages and

Munda on Sanskrit was the “Indianisation” of the language of the Aryan conquerors. Characteristics of a linguistic area in the domain of phonetics (spread of cerebral phonemes) and in that of syntax (spread of gerunds and the use of the particle *iti* after direct speech) can be seen already in the R̄gveda.²² From this the author concludes that between the arrival of the Aryans on the Indian subcontinent and the formation of the oldest hymns of the R̄gveda a much longer period must have elapsed than is normally thought.²³

In general outline such are the linguistic problems studied in Kuiper's publications. A no less important place in his scholarly publications is taken up by his studies of Indo-Aryan mythology, religion and culture, studies which have appeared since the beginnings of the sixties. In this field Kuiper's scholarly outlook was greatly influenced by the general views of the cultural anthropological Leiden school which arose in the twenties of this century (de Josseling de Jong and Rassers) and which, in its methodological premises, was close to the French structural-sociological school (Durkheim, Mauss). This school is characterised by the combination of philological and cultural-anthropological interests, and, in the domain of research methods, by the structural approach to the study of the materials. Objects of study are the systems of kinship, social organisation, ritual and mythology, considered in their interaction. Study materials are above all the ancient religion and culture of the peoples of Indonesia to the study of which several generations of Dutch scholars beginning with missionaries devoted their efforts. The conclusions of the scholars of the Leiden school are characterised by the wide scope of their generalisations and their interest in typology. In this connection it is to be remarked that the Leiden school was not uniform and many of their representatives (namely those who worked in the field of Indology: G. J. Held who studied the Mahābhārata from the point of view of ethnology, F. D. K. Bosch who studied Indian symbolism—Kuiper wrote a review on his book *The Golden Germ*)²⁴ did not share the view that the ancient mythology is a projection of the social structure of the peoples who created it. In this respect Kuiper was in sympathy with them. The brilliant structural study of the religion of the Ngadju Dajak by Schärer, which he quotes

several times, had the greatest influence on his studies of the Vedic mythology.²⁵

In order to understand the role which Kuiper's studies played in the interpretation of Vedic religion and mythology it is necessary to say something about the situation in this field before him. At that time the facts were well known. The period of accumulation of facts is the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century when Hillebrandt and Macdonell wrote their classical works on mythology and Oldenberg and Bergaigne theirs on Vedic religion. The foundations of Vedic exegesis were laid by Oldenberg's works. The Vedic religion was seen as a more or less mediated reflection of different natural phenomena and accordingly the gods as their personifications and some gods as personifications of abstract principles. In many instances these interpretations looked fully believable (although at the same time there were also quite a few very questionable and even mutually exclusive interpretations), but there was not one theory which presented a unified systematic explanation of these uncoordinated facts.

Among his predecessors Kuiper most esteemed the French scholar Bergaigne for his attempt at a "systématisation" of the Vedic religion, i.e. a synchronic description of its oppositions as a system, in contrast with the evolutionist views of Geldner, Pischel and others. Closer to Kuiper than all in his sphere of interest in the field of Vedic mythology was one of the most gifted representatives of the German tradition who in his studies on the god Varuṇa arrived at a full understanding of the connection of this complex mythological character with cosmogony and who shed new light on the nature of the Vedic cosmology in general (Lüders' work remained unfinished and was published posthumously²⁶). It is not fortuitous that at the same time the American scholar W. Norman Brown arrived at a cosmogonic interpretation of the Rgveda, and, in particular, of its central myth of the slaying of Vṛtra by Indra.²⁷ In this way the basis for the creation of the cosmogonic theory was prepared.

The basic theme which runs through all Kuiper's studies in this field is a systematic reconstruction of the Indo-Iranian and thereupon the ancient Indian cosmogonic notions in the light of which the different mythological figures are explained. The

mythological unit is here determined as resulting from the entire system of oppositions and only such a structural approach is capable of explaining correctly how in the R̄gveda such and such a deity functions. The existence of many heterogeneous, sometimes conflicting interpretations of the corresponding deities in the works of scholars shows how complicated it is to determine the basic, invariant function of many deities in the R̄gveda.

At the same time he makes use of all possibilities of the classical exegesis and explains the texts, while taking into account their prosodic peculiarities, the meaning of the individual grammatical forms, stylistic polysemy, etc. It would seem that a careful reading of contexts long since known also often gave Kuiper the possibility of seeing the facts in a new light.

Finally, the wide typological background on which the ancient Indian facts are considered, beginning with the genetically related ancient Iranian and—further—Greek, Slavic and other Indo-European parallels, even including Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic, Indonesian, Semitic and other parallels, gives to Kuiper's conclusions a special cogency and reliability.

This cycle of studies begins with the article "The ancient Aryan verbal contest",²⁸ in which the author immediately asks the cardinal question on which social and cultural basis the poetry of the R̄gveda arose. In this respect there exist contradictory views and, besides, one notices a general tendency to secularise this text, whereby one emphasizes excessively the pure literary character of the contests between the R̄gvedic poets.

In order to solve this problem the author formulates above all the foundations of a cosmogonic theory in the light of which, as already pointed out by several scholars, the oldest kernel of this text can be interpreted. The main myth of the R̄gveda which is repeated innumerable times in the hymns,—the slaying by Indra of the demon-serpent Vṛtra (*vrtrá*—litt. opposition, resistance) who dams the flow of the rivers—has according to Kuiper nothing to do with natural phenomena but must be understood as the act of creation of the universe. With his club Indra destroys the resistance of the inert chaos, confined in the primordial hill which floats on the surface of the cosmic waters. The blow with the club makes a hole in the hill and nails it to one place on the bottom of the waters and

Fire and Water (the latter is also represented in the form of the god Soma—the personification of the sacred plant and its juice from which is prepared the drink of immortality of the gods: *amṛta*) leave the world of chaos and inertia and go over to the celestial gods (*devas*). At the same time Indra separates with this blow heaven and earth, and forms the mutually opposed upper and nether worlds (represented correspondingly by the Devas and the Asuras). Varuṇa, the ancient god of the cosmic waters, obtains a new function as protector of *rta*—the cosmic law, and himself hides in the nether world. This myth is a heritage of the Indo-Iranian religion.

Kuiper advanced the hypothesis that for the Vedic people time was represented as a cyclical process. At the end of each year when the cosmos was replaced by chaos a crisis arose and a repetition of Indra's act of creation became necessary for the renewal of order. This repetition was understood by the Aryans as a reproduction of Indra's exploit in the ritual. Since generous donors, the organizers of the ritual, and the god Indra, who praises the generosity, are in the Rgveda designated with the same word *maghávan-*, Kuiper assumes that in the ritual ordinary people can act as personifications of the gods. This new-year festival which was organised on the day of the winter solstice and which aimed at restoring light and warmth after a period of darkness and cold, was for the Aryans a renewal of life with all its blessings. It consisted of a series of contests: verbal contests, races of chariots harnessed with horses, contests in the distribution of gifts with the object of heightening one's own social prestige, etc.

In the light of this general cosmogonic scheme Kuiper confirmed Hillebrandt's thesis, which in his time had not received recognition, that Uṣas in the Rgveda is not the goddess of dawn in general but personifies a concrete dawn on the first day of the new year. The characteristic peculiarities of this deity in the Rgveda are explained consistently and systematically in a cosmogonic sense. Her place in the cosmic process is confirmed by her participation in the nether world: she is born from it, she is the sister of the night and the kinswoman of Varuṇa. Her appearance signifies the victory of Light over Darkness, of Life over Death. The requests for procreation and wealth addressed to Uṣas are requests for being endowed with vital force. Uṣas as a deity which appears at

the time of verbal contests and chariot races, can be considered to be the deity of contests which take place between ritual groups and associations of poets (it is possible that the association of Indra and the Maruts represents their mythological reflection). Such an interpretation of the ancient Indian ritual is confirmed by such typological parallels, as for instance, the New Year potlatch ritual of the North-American Indians.

A reflection of the ancient Aryan ideas connected with verbal contests in the Avesta is found in the terms *vyāxman-* “ritual meeting” and *vyāxana-* “eloquent”—meanings determined by Kuiper on the basis of a painstaking philological analysis of the Avestan contexts. The ritual character of this eloquence is beyond doubt: the skill to speak in meetings is mentioned among the qualities which the devotees ask the deity to give to their male posterity.

The etymological analysis of these words (**vi-yāk-man-* and **vi-yāk-na-*) derives then from the root *yāk* which is connected with Indo-European **yek-* “to declare solemnly”. On the other hand the Vedic root *yāc-* means “to request” and traces of the corresponding Avestan meaning are attested only in later Buddhist Sanskrit. The same concept is expressed in the Rgveda by the term *vi-vāc-* (from the root *vac-* “to speak”) which designates a ritual verbal duel.

Both the term and the concept which it signifies disappear in the period following the Rgveda; this too is explained by Kuiper’s theory. As the Aryans penetrated further into the depths of “monsoon India”, a ritual feast connected with the winter solstice was bound to lose its meaning.

The obvious advantages of this theory consist in establishing an isomorphism between macro- and microcosmos. The systematic correspondences between the mythological representations and the ritual receive a sound philological foundation. The reliability of the reconstructions of the social and cultural Indo-Iranian institutions are typologically confirmed by parallels from other archaic cultures (North-American Indians and several peoples in Borneo).

In his article “Three strides of Viṣṇu”,²⁹ Kuiper studies a mythological figure about the interpretation of whom there are great differences of opinion among scholars. According to the traditional Indian classification he is a god belonging to the celestial

sphere. Western scholars usually connect him with some natural phenomenon: with the sun, the moon, fire, mountains. Some see in him the god of fertility and vegetation, others consider him to be an incarnation of Soma, etc.

Kuiper proceeds from his general methodological tenet that one cannot understand the character of a mythological figure in isolation from the context of the whole mythological system, and consistently adhering to this method he arrives at new, unexpected conclusions.

The main characteristic of Viṣṇu in the R̥gveda consists in the fact that he performs three steps which cover the universe. Sometimes it is said that he takes steps on seven places on earth. Three and seven are figures expressing totality. In this connection it is said in the hymns that Viṣṇu takes his steps for the sake of life. A second characteristic of Viṣṇu is his friendship with Indra for whom he takes steps in order to help him slay Vṛtra. He also participates in opening the cow enclosure—this, again, is one of the expressions which indicate the nether world. In other words he participates in the process of creation.

In the system of the much later cosmic classification of the gods, Viṣṇu occupies the cosmic centre, nadir. The mythological meaning of the centre is the totality of all parts distributed over the four quarters of space.

From all these characteristic traits Kuiper concludes that Viṣṇu represents a much more central figure than Indra and Varuṇa who are at the head of the mutually opposed Devas and Asuras. Viṣṇu is related to each of these worlds and his position is that between two poles, cf. the role of the cosmic pillar.

In this way the three strides of Viṣṇu incarnate the totality of the universe. The third step is the most important one. Indra, by slaying Vṛtra, created the dual world in which Viṣṇu supported him by his steps. His first step corresponds to the nether world and includes the earth, the second covers the upper world and the third, which is secret and cannot be observed by human eyes corresponds to the totality of the universe and unites its dual structure exactly in the same way as the thirteenth month of the ancient Indian calendar represents all preceding 12 months of the year.

The article “The bliss of *asā*”³⁰ is devoted to a reconstruction of

some archaic cosmological conceptions of the Indo-Aryans with the help of the general cosmogonic scheme developed by Kuiper. *Aśa* is the Avestan name of the cosmic law and corresponds to R̄gvedic *r̄tā-*. The Avesta mentions “the bliss of *aśa* which appears together with light” (Y.30.1). In the past scholars paid attention to the fact that the concept “dominion” *xšaθra* is associated with God and *aśa* and that this ancient Aryan complex of ideas is reflected in the theology of Zarathustra. Kuiper reminds us of the fact that in the R̄gveda, Mitra-Varuṇa are rulers—*kṣatriya*, Lords of *r̄tā-* and that also the luminous dominion belongs to them and he poses the question where one must locate that luminous dominion.

According to Kuiper’s cosmogonic scheme, Varuṇa is a god of the nether world where he dwells and guards the *r̄tā-*. The expression “womb of *r̄tā-*” in the R̄gveda was equivalent to the cosmic waters of the nether world. The sun arose from the earth which constitutes a part of the nether world. The primordial hill in the R̄gveda, the prototype of the earth, is indicated by words meaning “mountain” (*giri-, párvata-*), rock (*ádri-*). From this initial hill arises the cosmic tree, which functions as the world axis and the roots of which Varuṇa holds. The nether world of Varuṇa is named a stone house because he lived in the depths of the cosmic mountain from where early in the morning Uṣas and Agni appeared. The word deep (*gabhirá-*) as applied to the Ādityas (a class of gods—sons of the deity Aditi and headed by Varuṇa) must be understood literally, in so far as they belong to the depths of the nether world which in its turn represented a notion stemming from the Indo-Iranian mythology. This is the kingdom of the dead and Varuṇa is the god of the dead. Also Yama is there.

The presence of the sun in the kingdom of Varuṇa can be explained by the fact that the sun represents one of the forms of Agni and is there where the *r̄tā-* is hidden. Each day Agni is born “from the waters, from the stone” and the dawns, the cows, appear from their enclosure in the rock.

At night the picture is changed absolutely and the nether world of Varuṇa extends itself as the nocturnal heaven over the earth. The subterranean cosmic waters become the celestial ocean and the stars act as the spies of Varuṇa. In this way Varuṇa is at the same time the god of the primordial waters under the earth, of the “stone house” and of the night-sky.

In the archaic Indo-Iranian cosmology it is thought that at night the sun returns through the nether world from West to East. At night the nether world looks as though it hangs over the earth in inverted position. This symbolizes such attributes of Varuṇa as the cask turned upside down with its opening or the cosmic tree with its branches below and the roots above. The notion of the inverted tree was known to the Indians even before they came to India. After their arrival the tree was identified with the local tree Aśvattha (*Ficus religiosa*) and not with the oak or the ash-tree as in the case of other Indo-European peoples.

The Dutch scholar assumes that in Zarathustra's doctrine of the celestial world of Ahura Mazda one sees the ancient Aryan notion of the inverted mountain in the night-sky. The central themes of Aryan mysticism were the secret light in the nether kingdom of the dead, the birth of Agni from the rock and the vision of light in the darkness. Moreover, in the R̥gveda there is a parallel between the macrocosmic opening of the primordial hill and the microcosmic opening of the mind of the poet. The Vedic seer obtains his vision in his heart which is equated to the cosmic mountain or the subterranean waters.

The difference between the Indian and Iranian traditions consists in the fact that the prophet Vasiṣṭha was passive: he was plunged in the contemplation of this secret, but the other initiate, Zarathustra, was active: he tried to find the bliss of *aśa* on earth.

In such a way with the help of the common Indo-Iranian cosmogonic scheme as reconstructed by him the author succeeds in giving a convincing interpretation of a series of archaic cosmological peculiarities which became esoteric in each of the two traditions. The light of *aśa* is in turn in the nether world and in heaven—the inverted mountain.

The following study “Cosmogony and conception”³¹ looks, on account of its unexpected and amazing statements, like a jump in our ideas of the system of the Aryan cosmogony and a breakthrough into a new domain of knowledge. In contradistinction to his other studies in which the author studied carefully the problem and gave in detail his reasons for his way of treating it before arriving at an unambiguous conclusion, this study has a conjectural character and is a kind of experiment. Categorical opinions are not expressed in it—the solution of the problem is put off for the future.

The basic idea of the study is that the central cosmogonic myth of the Rgveda—the slaying by Indra of the serpent-demon Vṛtra, who blocks the flow of rivers is to a certain degree the mythological reflection of the prenatal “memories” of the individual of his own conception.

The domain studied by Kuiper is at the junction of different sciences: structural anthropology, mythology, psychiatry, the study of the prenatal consciousness and of the unconscious in general, and finally, of Indology proper. One must not forget that in our times the development of learning often takes place exactly at the junction of different domains, which before did not come into contact with each other.

The material for this study is not only the Rgveda as usual but also a much later class of Indian texts, the Brāhmaṇas, which are closely associated with the ritual and which, with their roots, penetrate into the same layer of mythological notions as the Rgveda. As is well known, the ritual sometimes conserves very archaic traits. Moreover, in the Brāhmaṇas one finds sometimes an elaboration of mythological notions about which the poets,— the authors of the Rgveda, for reasons of taboo are silent.

Kuiper makes use of the facts of the ancient Indian tradition which are represented by this wide range of texts and distinguishes two stages in the creation of the world. Indra's slaying of Vṛtra constitutes only the second stage of the cosmology. This one was reflected in rituals and in it are found fundamental rituals associated with the New Year. The myth of the first stage of creation is not reflected in the ritual but one finds in the ritual texts and in the Rgveda many references to it.

A careful study of the ancient Indian cosmogonic myth leads to the following conclusions. The first stage of creation is represented by the arising of the earth from the primordial waters. This is imagined in different ways: as the result of consolidation of the waters or in the form of the more widespread notion of the world-egg which in one way or another arises from the waters (the Rgveda mentions a “golden embryo” and “an embryo of the waters”.) In some versions a god-demiurge arises at a certain stage of creation (Prajāpati, the Father of the Universe, etc.). Characteristics of the first stage are: the presence of waters, the arising of the unstable

earth (or egg), which has no firm support and which floats on the waters in search of a basis on which it can be fixed.

The second stage of the creation is attested in two variants. In the first, heaven and earth are joined together and later separated. In the second the separation of heaven and earth is described as the creative act of Indra—this variant is central in the Rgveda. In order to perform his exploit Indra must defeat “the forces of opposition” which are usually incarnated in the figure of the mythic serpent Vṛtra. Essential characteristics of the myth are the fact that the serpent lies on the mountain and that by slaying the serpent with a blow of his thunderbolt (Vajra) or by splitting open the mountain Indra gains the goods necessary for a normal functioning of the world.

Kuiper compares the myths of these two stages of creation and reconstructs their common mythological contents: an unstable earth and a primordial hill (i.e. the mountain on which Vṛtra lies), which has no “foundation” and is in need of strengthening. As a result of the combinations of different elements the following picture emerges. First there was a small hill floating on the surface of the waters. From it the earth spread in all directions. By penetrating into this “mountain” in which all the forces of life are confined and by releasing them Indra at the same time chains its basis to the bottom of the waters and gives it a firm support. The mountain was only the place from where the earth arose but it also came to function as its support.

Reconstructed in such a form the ancient Indian cosmogonic myth shows according to Kuiper a definite similarity with the conception of the human being. In the archaic cultures the myth may have helped the individual to relive his mythological past and as a result to feel himself as its hero, to begin after that, so to speak, a new life. There are very many typological parallels in different archaic cultures.

The main difficulty consists in the fact that the prenatal consciousness is insufficiently studied, although what has been done in this field offers grounds to speak of the possibility of a non-sensory perception by the embryo, i.e. a capacity to register facts. To the domain of the unconscious as studied in our times by psychopathology belongs the sensation of swinging on the waves,

which an adult experiences in a dream and which reflects the stage of the ovum in the period between ovulation and fecundation.

In the light of these psychiatric and medical notions Indra's role in penetrating into the primordial floating hill with his *vajra*, while at the same time fixing it on a firm basis and releasing from it the forces of life, is according to Kuiper analogous to the role of the spermatozoon. It is not accidental that this mythological motive of the creation of new life is regularly reproduced in the ancient Indian New Year ritual. Rituals, which typologically confirm exactly such an interpretation of the ancient Indian cosmogonic myth, are found in several other archaic cultures, for instance among some Indonesian tribes.

In this study one also finds suppositions regarding a more concrete identification of the elements of the cosmogony and the parts of the body of the developing embryo. According to the author, the correlative to the tree of life (the central world-pillar) may be the developing spinal marrow. This has its analogy in the mystical anatomy on which the yoga theory is based (the serpent *Kuṇḍalīnī* which arises from the lowest point of the spinal column to the top and so procures final deliverance to the yogin).

In general such a supposition is fully appropriate within the framework of the Indian culture with its notion about retrospective memory, mystical insight into the prenatal state by different seers like the medieval Tamil poet quoted by Kuiper, and with its yoga doctrine.

Finally, many parallels between cosmogony and conception in other ancient religions—Egyptian, Greek, etc.—show that Kuiper's hypothesis merits serious attention.

In connection with Kuiper's very interesting study I would like to make some general observations. Such an interpretation of the Vedic creation myth was bound to be proposed sooner or later. The idea of the association of embryology and cosmogony which had already been foreshadowed in the past, has in the last ten to fifteen years become dominant among specialists who occupy themselves with the study of ancient culture. The parallelism between embryology and cosmology in the Vedic material can be corroborated by many examples. For instance, Brahman is seen at the same time as a golden embryo in the waters and as the ovum from which emanates all that exists.

This study takes its place among the many well-founded contemporary studies on the unconscious and in particular on the pre-conscious (the substratum of the consciousness on the pre-conscious stage). How extensive these problems are studied in different branches of scholarship is shown, for example, by the International Symposium on the unconscious in Tiflis in 1980.

In his article, “An Indian Prometheus?”,³² Kuiper, on the basis of a systematic study of the Rgvedic mythology and a careful philological analysis refutes the opinion that there is in the Rgveda an analogy to the Greek myth of the titan Prometheus, who stole fire from Zeus for the sake of men. For many years Indologists and comparatists explained the Rgvedic story of Mātariśvan who stole Agni, i.e. fire, in the spirit of this Greek myth.

The whole problem in the Rgveda is where the fire was and from where and for whom it was stolen. In the light of Kuiper’s cosmogonic theory Agni and Soma sojourned first in the primordial world of undifferentiated unity and inertia. They were freed from there already before Indra slayed Vṛtra. Soma helped Indra in this exploit.

The interpretation of Mātariśvan as Prometheus, Kuiper remarks, was based on the premise that Agni and Soma were originally in heaven and that the fire was stolen from the gods. Comparing different versions of the theft of Soma by the eagle, Kuiper emphasizes that Soma was stolen by the bird for Indra from the guardians who guarded it. To all appearances, these guardians were serpents associated with the nether world of the dualistic cosmos.

Because the myths of Soma and Agni are parallel in the Rgveda, Agni, as Kuiper shows, must be stolen for the gods and not from the gods. The terms which designate the name of the place from which Agni was stolen usually correspond in the Rgveda to the nether world. Moreover, Mātariśvan is never said to be an enemy of the gods. He rather cooperates with them to fetch the fire for men. All this leads Kuiper to conclude that the form D.-Abl. *devébhyah* in III.9.5 must be interpreted as D.pl. “for the gods” and not as Abl.pl. “from the gods”. It turns out that the whole theory of an Indian Prometheus was exclusively constructed on a wrong interpretation of this place in the Rgveda.

In the article “The heavenly bucket”³³ Kuiper studies some important problems of Rgvedic cosmology in connection with the correlation of the subterranean and celestial oceans according to the conception of the authors of the hymns. In accordance with the general cosmogonic theory developed by Kuiper the primordial waters which support the earth are seen in the mythology of the Rgveda as confined in the earth which represents the primordial hill. The hymns mention several times a bucket full of goods or a cave filled with goods (the myth of the cave of the Vala, where the cows are concealed). As said before, other words designating the nether world are rock and stone.

At the same time there existed the notion that the life-creating waters fell down from heaven in the form of rain. In this connection the author asks himself how, according to the notions of the Vedic poets, this water came to heaven. There is a twofold answer to this question. At night the nether world hangs above the earth in an inverted position as the nocturnal sky (from there comes the image of the world-tree with its roots turned upwards) which was discussed before. During the day the waters spring forth from a source in the earth, i.e. the nether world, go up to heaven and are poured down. On the mythological plane this latter notion is reflected in the idea that one or more gods draw water from a source, pull up the bucket and then overturn it and pour the water on the earth (Parjanya, the Maruts). In the light of this interpretation Kuiper calls into question the generally accepted view that the notion of an always existing celestial ocean was characteristic of the Rgveda.

Kuiper’s lecture “The basic concept of Vedic religion”³⁴ summarizes the results of his study of the Vedic cosmogony. The key to an insight into this religion is its cosmogony. The cosmogonic myth has a special importance because in decisive moments in life the primeval process was repeated. Therefore the myth was not merely a tale about the past but a sacred prototype of the eternal renewal of life.

The initial stage is well known from the previous studies of the author. First there were the primeval waters. A clod of earth floating on them spread and was transformed into earth in the form of a mountain. The world itself was sacred and therefore a creator

was not necessary and even if he is found in some versions, he occupies a peripheral position. The world was undifferentiated. In it there was neither heaven nor earth, neither night nor day, neither light nor darkness, neither man nor woman. That this is no creation myth is obvious from the description given. The Vedic thinkers did not try to explain this stage which they considered as impossible to know.

The second stage of the cosmogony begins with the birth of the god Indra who emerges, one does not know from where. His function consists in the creation of a dual world, in the transformation of the potential world into the real world where there is an opposition between light and darkness, life and death, good and evil. In this way the Vedic cosmogony is depicted and therefore Indra is not a creator of the universe as God in the Old Testament.

The creative act of Indra consists of two parts. First he splits open the mountain and overcomes its power of opposition confined in the dragon and releases the waters. Secondly, separating heaven and earth which were joined together he is identified with the cosmic pillar and creates a dual cosmos. From a mythological point of view this second act cannot be separated from the first.

In general Indra was not a god of the centre and he has no relation with the world axis. He represents it only at the moment of his exploit. This is reflected in the later New Year ritual when first a pole was erected in honour of Indra and later was pulled down and thrown into the river. Indra was a seasonal god whose function consisted in renewing the world each new year.

The gods of the primordial world were the Asuras. When as a result of Indra's creative act the dual cosmos was created the Asuras became opposed to the Devas, their younger brothers who occupied the highest place. The relations between these two groups occupy a central place in Vedic cosmology. Some Asuras go over to the world of the Devas (the Deva-Asuras), for instance, Varuṇa. Others do not go over to them (the Asuric non-Devas) and are chased beyond the bounds of the cosmos. In this connection Kuiper emphasizes that the Asuras were not fallen angels but potential gods.

The figure of Varuṇa is ambiguous in its nature. After having become a Deva he maintains secret relations with the Asuras.

Moreover he obtains from the Devas the title king and becomes king of the waters which corresponds with his primordial association with the subterranean cosmic waters.

At the end of each year the battle between Asuras and Devas is renewed and this is reflected in the New Year ritual which consists of a series of contests. At that time Varuṇa becomes especially dangerous. He is again transformed into an opponent of Indra and his name becomes taboo.

Very important is Kuiper's remark that logically the picture of the Ṛgvedic cosmogony is not entirely consistent. Although "being" appears after "non-being" from which it arises, in some respects they co-exist and are mutually connected. Transcending "being" and "non-being" there appears in the Ṛgveda the "highest heaven" or the third step of Viṣṇu, the god of the totality who is the synthesis of the duality.

In later Indian mythology the idea of the renewal of life in the beginning of each New Year, such as we find it in the Ṛgveda, is absent in this form but its place is taken by the notion of the destruction of the universe at the end of each world period and of the figure of Viṣṇu sleeping on the serpent who floats on the waters and comprises in himself a potential new world.

This self-consistent cosmogonic theory with its new interpretation of the Vedic cosmogony is in its essence and also, in many very essential details, an important contribution to the study of ancient Indian mythology. On the one hand, with its systematic approach it gives a convincing explanation of a series of mythological figures in their interaction with each other and in consequence sheds light on some obscure places in the Ṛgveda, and, on the other hand, it brings the material of the Ṛgveda into the framework of the typology of ancient cultures.

An entirely special place among his scholarly interests is occupied by Kuiper's studies in the seventies on the origin of the ancient Indian theatre. Many scholars have occupied themselves with this theme but not one of the suggested theories received wide recognition. On the origin of the classical Sanskrit drama the most divergent opinions have been expressed. The historians have sought its origin in pantomime, in the religious "ballads" which accompany its performance, in songs and dances, in the recitation

of the epic, in the puppet theatre and in the shadow theatre. They found its roots in popular games (in this connection the figure characteristic for the Sanskrit drama, the *vidūṣaka* was considered to be a clown), in religious rituals, in dialogue hymns of the R̄gveda, etc. Even from this brief enumeration it is clear that the range of opinions on this question was very wide.

Kuiper was brought to the theme of the origin of the Sanskrit drama by his studies in the domain of the Vedic cosmogony. A claim on this theme was made by him in his communication in 1971 at the twenty-seventh International Congress of Orientalists in Ann Arbor.³⁵ Several years later his article “The worship of *jarjara* on the stage” appeared,³⁶ in which he studied the erection of Indra’s pole, the *jarjara*, on the stage before the performance of the drama.

It is necessary to make some preliminary remarks concerning the special nature of the Sanskrit drama. Sanskrit dramas are attested from about the second century of our era. Even the earliest are characterised by a clearly marked finished form, which points to the presence of a preceding tradition, and are composed according to a fixed canon. The principles of the dramaturgic art are set forth in the treatise “*Nāṭyaśāstra*” (Doctrine of the drama). The Indian tradition believes its author to be the mythical sage Bharata, and the time of its composition is put at about the second to fourth centuries of our era. The Sanskrit drama consists traditionally of two parts. The first was the *pūrvvaraṅga* or introductory performance which began backstage, and later took place on the stage. In it took part the leader of the troupe—the *sūtradhara*, his helpers and an actress. First a blessing was pronounced and then a short prologue was performed. After that began the second part—the performance by the actors of the drama itself.

In his article on the erection of the *jarjara*, Kuiper examines the character of the *pūrvvaraṅga*. While stating that the *pūrvvaraṅga* and the drama are completely different matters, the author emphasizes that both possess a ritual character. In the classical drama the *pūrvvaraṅga* has to a considerable extent lost its initial function.

The *pūrvvaraṅga* represents a determined and prescribed order of actions. First, behind the scene one hears music in order to propitiate the Asuras, the Daityas and Dānavas. Thereafter the action is transferred to the stage and the central event is the erection

of Indra's pole which is done by the *sūtradhara* and his helpers. All this has a mythological foundation. According to the *Nātyasāstra* at the time of the first legendary representation the gods were gathered for the festival of Indra's banner and Indra in his contentment gave his banner to the actors. Since that time his banner, named *jarjara*, is associated with the staging of the drama. It is considered that in the *jarjara* several gods are present and this determines its similarity with the cosmic tree.

The *sūtradhara* has two helpers. One carries in his hands the *jarjara*, the symbol of Indra, the other a golden pitcher, the symbol of Varuṇa. With flowers in his hands the *sūtradhara* walks between them, symbolizing the god of the centre, Brahman. Ritual actions—pouring of water from the pitcher and the erection of the *jarjara*—transform the stage into a sacred space. The *jarjara*, identified with the world-tree, is the unifying link between the nether and the upper world and its summit reaches heaven. Its function is analogous to that of Viṣṇu. In the *pūrvvaraṅga* the *sūtradhara* personifies the sacred world, he is Brahman, the god of the universe, when he holds the raised world-tree in his hands. From this moment, as soon as he snatches it from the hands of his helper he symbolizes the centre of the universe. Thus, in a cosmogonic sense, Kuiper reconstructs the mutual connection and motivation of the acts of the persons who appear in the *pūrvvaraṅga*.

In 1979 Kuiper's principal study appeared: his book "Varuṇa and Vidūṣaka. On the origin of the Sanskrit drama".³⁷ It consists of two parts. The first part is devoted to the problems of ancient Indian cosmogony seen through the prism of the ambivalent figure of the god, Varuṇa (Varuṇa: Asura and Āditya). The second part reveals the religious foundation of the dramatic performance and traces the mythological roots of the traditional figure of the Sanskrit drama, the *vidūṣaka*, the helper of the chief hero (the Vidūṣaka).

As is well known, Varuṇa possesses in the mythological system of the R̥gveda a dual character because, on the one hand, he is chiefly an Asura, but on the other hand, as the first among the Ādityas, he belongs to the Devas. In the R̥gveda Varuṇa is usually named a Deva and seldom an Asura and in some places Mitra-Varuṇa who form a pair of gods are defined as Deva-Asuras or as Asuras among the Devas. However, in the brāhmaṇas the picture

is much more consistent. There the contrast between Devas and Asuras is one of the forms of the opposition of the upper and nether worlds in the dual world. In the brāhmaṇas the Asuras were not demons as is traditionally believed. The authors of the brāhmaṇas and the composers of the Vedic hymns proceeded in principle from the same scheme, but the first were theologians concerned with a system and the second were poets.

In his reconstruction of the picture of the creation of the world which is already known to us from the previous studies of the author, Kuiper again emphasizes the importance of the correspondence between mythology and ritual which is manifested in the organisation of the New Year contests when the seasonal god Indra repeats his cosmogonic exploit in his battle with the Asuras. The authors of the brāhmaṇas, desiring to explain the goal and the efficiency of this or that ritual, always resorted to the cosmogony.

Kuiper explains that Varuṇa, when he went over to the gods from Father Asura, maintains his dual character although it is manifested only in a subtle way. He never acts against the Devas as a military force. All the attacks of Indra are directed only against Vṛtra and the primordial hill, which comprises the force of opposition. However, in the R̄gvedic hymn IV.42 the antagonism between Indra and Varuṇa in the period of the cosmogonic battle is reflected in the verbal contest (*vivāc*), verbal mutual challenges in the form of self-praise. The rare mention of this antagonism in the R̄gveda can be explained by reasons of taboo since periodically at the end of a year-cycle Varuṇa again assumes the character of Asura of the primordial world. Usually in the new world established after the exploit of Indra he is considered as the Lord of the Waters (this reflects his primordial association with the cosmic waters of the undivided world). According to the system of classification reflected in the brāhmaṇas Varuṇa is the guardian of the Western quarter of the world and Indra of the Southern quarter.

After having become Devas Mitra and Varuṇa form a special class of Ādityas headed by Varuṇa. The name Āditya, i.e. son of Aditi, shows their participation in the undifferentiated primordial world, of which one of the personifications was Aditi (*aditi*, litt. endlessness, infinity). The Ādityas were from the very beginning

included in the world of the Devas which distinguishes them from the so-called “previous gods”: the Sādhyas and Āptyas. In the organised cosmos the Ādityas represent the nether world. In the critical period of the transition from the old to the new year the Ādityas again joined the Asuras.

After the R̄gveda Varuṇa loses his title of Asura. In the R̄gveda he keeps it because the ancient kernel of this text is connected with the New year ritual performed exactly in that period of renewal of the chaos when Varuṇa and other Asura-Devas again gained the attributes of the Asuras and the contest between Indra and Varuṇa which ended with the victory of Indra and the festival of the erection of his pillar.

In the mythological system of the R̄gveda the Ādityas are opposed to two groups of gods: the Vasus and Rudras. In the cosmogonic battle Indra as chief of the Vasus defeats, with the help of the Rudras (the Maruts), the Asuras of the primordial world as a result of which some of them go over to the Devas. As a result, according to Kuiper, this three-membered structure can be formalised in the following way: Vasus-Rudras + Ādityas. In accordance with the system of classification the Vasus are associated with the East, the Rudras with the South, the Ādityas with the West. Later attempts were made to transform this system into a fourfold one by adding a fourth and even a fifth member (the four quarters of the world + centre).

With regard to the relation of Varuṇa to the Asuras Kuiper considers it essential to emphasize his demonic aspect in the Vedas and in the epic. The author, who adheres strictly to his structural approach, emphasizes that if Varuṇa is associated with the cosmic law *ṛtā-*, this entails his connection with the opposite of law, -*drūh*, evil, fraud, i.e. he is connected with the opposites which go back to the proto-Indo-Iranian period. In the R̄gveda, as has already been said, the dark aspect of Varuṇa is deliberately hushed up. Between Varuṇa and Vṛtra exists an indisputable connection, although many have objected to this view. In the later Vedas and in the brāhmaṇas the dark aspect of Varuṇa is fully expressed. The practice of black magic shows that Varuṇa is identified with death.

Usually it is assumed that in the epic Varuṇa is simply the god of the waters. According to the author this is not so. Also in the

post-Vedic period Varuṇa kept his ambivalence, but the Vedic conception of the cosmic dualism lost its meaning and correspondingly the annual contest between Varuṇa and Indra ceased to be important. Although in the Mahābhārata Varuṇa functions above all as Lord of the waters and his palace is on the bottom of the sea, he remains the chief god of the nether world. His palace is localised in the Western ocean and in the world of the serpents (*nāga*), at the lower end of the world axis. The association of Varuṇa with the serpents and the Asuras is very clearly expressed. In the epic the world of Varuṇa is represented as the refuge of the Asuras after they have been defeated or chased from the earth.

The role of Varuṇa in the later cosmogonic myth of the churning of the ocean deserves attention. The gods and the Asuras compete and churn the ocean with the help of the mountain Mandara in order to obtain the elixir of life, *amṛta*, directly from the cosmic waters. Some gods do not take part in this contest. They are the gods of the centre Brahman and Viṣṇu and also Varuṇa, since he incorporates the cosmic waters in which are confined not only the elixir of life but also poison.

The chapter on the *vidūṣaka* begins with a survey of the different theories on the origin of the Sanskrit drama. In this very vast diversity of opinions the author draws attention to G. K. Bhatt's supposition which has not received recognition, i.e. that the *vidūṣaka* in the drama goes back to the Asuras in the Vedas. Thereupon the author undertakes a detailed analysis of Bharata's teachings on the drama as put forth in the Nāṭyaśāstra and of the story, clothed in mythical form, about the performance of the first drama in India which it describes. Strangely enough, scholars have not attached special importance to this story, evidently considering it a myth and not looking for real content in it. Exactly on this story Kuiper constructs his own theory. First of all he draws attention to the fact that the dramatic art is called *nātyaveda* in the Indian tradition. This puts it on the same footing as the sacred Vedas and shows the religious nature of the origin of the drama. The author of the Nāṭyaśāstra was obviously well versed in the ritual and considered the *pūrvavarāṅga* as a very important ritual during which the banner of Indra was erected and the stage transformed into a sacred space. The *pūrvavarāṅga* was the equivalent of the Vedic sacrifice (*yajña*). And

just as the sacrifice was carried out by priests at the order of the patron and at his expense, the drama too was performed by a group of actors at the expense of the patron who recompensed the actors. All this leads to the conclusion that the classical Sanskrit drama was composed and performed for an *élite*. In its origin it was most probably a ritual which was performed at the initiative of the king, in his presence, and for his well-being.

Thereupon Kuiper carefully studies the legend found in the *Nātyaśāstra* from which important conclusions follow. According to the legend at the request of other gods Brahman composed the *Nātyaveda* as a fifth Veda and asked Indra to represent with the gods the legend composed by him on the stage. However, Indra refused, considering the gods incapable of it. Thereupon Brahman entrusted it to the sage Bharata who together with his sons staged the drama to the accompaniment of songs and music. On Brahman's instructions this was done on the day of the festival of Indra's banner. The spectacle consisted in a blessing of the audience and the representation of the victory of the gods over the Asuras. From this mythological story Kuiper concludes that in the drama ordinary people played the role of gods, i.e. that it was some kind of "Divine Comedy" and that the first staging was a reproduction of the cosmogonic battle between Indra and the Asuras, that it was a religious act *par excellence*.

The fundamental significance of this ceremony consisted in the erection of Indra's banner, a bamboo pole, which symbolized the world axis. This ceremony was a ritual repetition of the exploit of Indra propping up the sky. This festival had a cosmogonic character and signified the renewal of life in the beginning of the New Year. It was first celebrated in the period of the winter solstice or the vernal equinox but later the beginning of the year was shifted in accordance with changes in the calendar.

In the *Nātyaśāstra* is found a description of the gifts which the gods, contented with the spectacle, gave to the performers. The fact that Indra gave his banner and Varuṇa a golden pitcher deserves special mention. In the Vedic cosmology a vessel was the receptacle of the cosmic subterranean waters in which the world-tree was rooted. The mountain which Indra split open in order to release the waters is also represented as a pitcher.

In the description of the playhouse erected by a god, the architect of the universe Viśvakarman, special attention is paid to its orientation, to the quarters of the world and the corresponding arrangement of the gods. Mitra and Varuṇa were placed behind the stage (*nepathyā*) as the place where the first part of the *pūrvavarāṅga* is performed, viz. the music meant to pacify the demons. The theatre is consecrated by the gods and thereafter it symbolically represents the cosmos. The centre of the cosmos is the *jarjara*, a bamboo pole, in the joints of which the gods of the centre are present. Indra himself is absent which corresponds to his character as a seasonal god.

The final stage of the consecration consists of three acts. The jar is broken and water flows from it. This guaranteed the king's success in his battle with rivals (the mythological implication was the splitting of the mountain). Thereafter the *sūtradhara* illuminates the stage by placing with great noise a lamp in its centre (the winning of light). Thereupon a battle is performed to the accompaniment of conch-shells and drums. In this way the consecration is also a specific representation of the cosmogony. All further acts of the participants in the *pūrvavarāṅga* attest to the fact that the *sūtradhara* incorporated the god of the centre, Brahman, and his helpers Indra and Varuṇa.

Thereupon the *sūtradhara*/Brahman pronounces the benediction (*nandi*). This represents the most solemn part of the *pūrvavarāṅga*. Its aim was to remove all obstructions, to chase the evil spirits and to bring blessings to the gods, the king, the cows and the brahmans.

The *pūrvavarāṅga* is concluded with the appearance of one of the assistants of the *sūtradhara* in the make-up of a *vidūṣaka*. In contrast to him the second assistant is now seen as the main hero of the drama (*nāyaka*). Between these three persons a conversation of a very strange nature begins on the stage: on all remarks of the hero the *vidūṣaka* gives incomprehensible, foolish and indecent retorts, and provokes laughter from the public. The nature of this part of the *pūrvavarāṅga* named *trigata*, remained unclear to contemporary scholars. Proceeding from his cosmogonic conception of the Sanskrit drama Kuiper understands the *trigata* as a direct reflection of the Vedic verbal contest (*vivāc*) in its social aspect. The funny and ridiculous talk of the *vidūṣaka* in contrast with the distinct and

persuasive speech of the Devas represented by the hero symbolizes the defeat of the Asuras in the contest. This verbal skirmish is strongly reminiscent of the verbal contest between Varuṇa and Indra in R̄gveda IV.42 or of the ritual of fertility, the *mahāvrata*, which symbolizes the battle for possession of the sun and in which two *dramatis personae*, an Āryan in white and a Śudra in black, fight for a piece of white skin (the sun) and the Āryan always defeats the Śudra, beating him towards the end with this piece of skin. Here too the *sūtradhara* as the highest instance attests to the victory of the hero and condescendingly smiles when the *vidūṣaka* utters his replies. In this way, in its origin, the *vidūṣaka* is not a scenic jester, but a person who must undergo defeat in the verbal contest.

On the basis of the false supposition that the *vidūṣaka* was a clown or a jester the majority of scholars thought that exactly for this reason he could not originally belong to the drama and therefore they looked for his prototype in popular songs about which nothing is known.

Kuiper tries to explain the genesis of the *vidūṣaka* not only by way of reconstruction of the mythological roots of this figure, studying his role in the ritual of the *pūrvavarāṅga*, but also by means of establishing his status and function in the fundamental part of the early Sanskrit drama. The etymology of the name *vidūṣaka*, “corrupter”, is not called into question by scholars but does not in itself explain anything because it is necessary to know whom exactly this person is corrupting. It is typical that in the very oldest dramas the *vidūṣaka* and the hero-*nāyaka*, i.e. the king, treat each other as equals. The relations between these two leading persons of the drama are isomorphous to the relations between the two assistants of the *sūtradhara* who personify Varuṇa and Indra in the *trigata*. A structural approach, as Kuiper emphasizes, sheds new light on the relations between the *vidūṣaka* and the hero: that which in the drama looks like friendship was in origin a contest. The special character of these relations appears in the fact that in the drama the *vidūṣaka* is not simply the friend of the hero but also his “opponent”. It is essential to recall here that already according to Vedic ideas the “abuser” or “insulter” took upon himself the fault of him whom he insulted and that, in this way, he acted in the role of some kind of scapegoat. This shows another hidden aspect of the brahman-*vidūṣaka*.

According to Kuiper it is impossible to consider the hero of the Sanskrit drama in isolation. He can only be understood in correlation with the *vidūṣaka*. Only so is it possible to explain why this grotesque, comical figure together with the main hero is the chief person in the Sanskrit drama. In this drama the interrelations of the actions and the counteractions reflect the relations between Varuṇa and Indra. From this it follows that the ancient Sanskrit drama was a repetition of the cosmogony and a ritual act aiming at the renewal of life. Only those Sanskrit dramas which are not based on Vedic mythology but on epic legends and myths are without the figure of the *vidūṣaka*.

In the *Nātyaśāstra* one finds very detailed indications regarding the physical appearance and conduct of the *vidūṣaka*. He must be a dwarf with protruding teeth, bald, hunchbacked, lame with distorted facial features, yellow eyes, with a funny gait and incoherent talk. This description is strongly reminiscent of the description of the physical appearance of the brahman-*jumbaka* in the Vedic ritual tradition on whose head at the end of the *aśvamedha* an offering is made. There the *jumbaka* represents Varuṇa. From this it is possible to conclude that in its origin the deformity of the *vidūṣaka* had no connections with dramatic performances but was simply the deformity of the Vedic scapegoat. It is of essential importance that the *jumbaka* was also necessarily a brahman because otherwise he could not represent Varuṇa. The equivalence: *vidūṣaka = brahman = jumbaka = Varuṇa* reveals finally the primordial function of the *vidūṣaka* in the Sanskrit drama.

This elegant system of proofs in this remarkable book demonstrates the complete isomorphism between the basic cosmogonic myth in the Rgveda and its “degraded” variant which is at the basis of the ancient Indian drama. The ritual theory of the origin of the Sanskrit drama brings it into the wide framework of the common Indo-European tradition (compare for instance, the analogical theory with regard to the origin of the Greek tradition).

As one of the leading indological scholars in the world Kuiper has often expressed in print his opinion with regard to new Indological studies and theories. By participating in discussions he has to a considerable extent helped to shape the general opinion of scholars in this or that domain. For instance, in the beginning of the sixties Kuiper took part in the discussion of Dumézil’s theory, which

proved of vital interest to many specialists in the ancient mythologies of the Indo-European origin and which provoked conflicting reactions.³⁸

In this numerous publications the well-known French scholar Dumézil advanced a theory of three functions on which Indo-European mythology is based. According to this theory the gods of the ancient Indo-European religions represent three basic functions: the magical-religious (in ancient India: Mitra-Varuṇa), the military (Indra) and the economical, associated with material prosperity and abundance (the Aśvins). These functions reflect the tripartite structure of ancient Indo-European society: priests, warriors and producers. Dumézil's theory provoked objections from many specialists in the different mythological traditions because it is not possible in the different traditions to describe mythology in its totality by means of the theory of the three functions. Two camps were formed: supporters and opponents of Dumézil.

Kuiper considers Dumézil's theory from a structural point of view. He finds a positive aspect of the theory that it takes as its centre the structure of the Indo-European mythology. Kuiper writes: "I believe that Dumézil is right in supposing such a structure to underly the apparently disparate facts of the various mythologies because the assumption of a structure enables us to arrive at a more adequate understanding of the facts in their totality." However, according to him, the narrowness of Dumézil's approach consists in the fact that the author of the theory of the three functions is only interested in the structure which determines the mutual relations between the gods in their correlation with the social system. Such a deliberate restriction of the topic of research distorts its character. Kuiper points out that the clue to the Vedic religion is the cosmogony and that in a mythological system rigidly connected with the social system as set forth by Dumézil the intrinsic dynamism of this cosmogony remains overlooked. A study which is not based upon texts but upon one's own constructions has an insufficient foundation. Kuiper's objections are convincingly corroborated by an analysis of the mythological facts in the R̥gveda and the Mahābhārata.

Since the beginning of the seventies there has been a continuous discussion among Indologists, Iranists and specialists in cultural

anthropology with regard to R. G. Wasson's hypothesis which was surprising in its novelty and boldness. Wasson, the vice-president of the American mycological society, created by his studies a new field of study, viz. ethnomycology which investigated the role of mushrooms in the culture of different peoples. Wasson turned his attention to the Indo-Iranian material and suggested that the ancient Indian plant *soma*/Avestan *haoma*, which was associated with the Indo-Iranian cult of the drink of immortality of the gods, was in fact the mushroom fly-agaric (*Amanita muscaria*). A whole cyclus of hymns of the Rgveda (maṇḍala IX) is devoted to the ritual of the preparation of the drink of immortality, *amṛta*, from the juice pressed from *soma* with the help of stones. The whole mythology of the Rgveda abounds in references to god Soma, who personifies this plant (in this connection it is not always easy to make a distinction between the mythological figure and his physical substance).

In proposing his hypothesis about *soma*—fly-agaric—Wasson based himself above all on Vedic hymns, from which it is known that *soma* grows on a mountain (i.e. the Himālayas in his interpretation), and in which no mention is made of leaves of this plant nor of roots or seed but in which a very precise description of the hallucinatory effect of its juice on the psyche of men is given. Wasson interprets unilaterally in a mycological sense the texts of the Rgveda which are often vague and relate to different levels. Apart from the ancient Indo-Iranian cultural tradition Wasson outlines a very wide cultural context of European peoples who knew the cult of the fly-agaric and he includes the culture of the ancient Aryans in the huge area of shamanistic culture. However, the opinions of scholars were divided. C. Lévi-Strauss supported Wasson but the majority of European Sanskritists and Vedic specialists remained sceptical about his hypothesis.

In 1970 Kuiper published a review of Wasson's book "Soma, the divine mushroom of immortality".³⁹ Kuiper's position is determined by the following factors: on the one hand a strict adherence to a systematic approach to the mythology of the Rgveda and a careful philological analysis and, on the other, a largeness of view and the ability to appreciate at its true value even the most unexpected scholarly hypothesis. In his review Kuiper stresses above all the fact that the Indo-Iranian *soma/haoma* from which the juice was pressed replaced an Indo-European drink consisting of mead and

that sometimes *soma* is still called mead in the Rgveda. God Soma together with Agni occupied a central place in Rgvedic mythology and in the first place in its cosmogonic myth where he belongs to the primordial undivided world of Father Asura. This property of Soma is reflected in the ritual—to collect *soma* was considered dangerous and the brahman who crushed the *soma*-plant was identified with the serpent, the guardian of the nether world. The mountain on which *soma* is found, is the primordial cosmic hill.

In the light of this mythological foundation the botanical identification of *soma* is not so important but more essential for the culture is the repetition of the ritual act which, by the way, admits many substitutes for the genuine *soma*. The Indian priest who pressed the *soma* juice knew that he killed Soma in order to release his life-stimulating force.

Doing justice to the wide scope of the studies of Wasson who handled data taken from botany, chemistry, pharmaceutics, folklore, fine arts, etc., Kuiper does not exclude the correctness of Wasson's hypothesis that the original *soma* was the fly-agaric but true to his philological method he thinks that it is impossible to prove this on the basis of the Rgvedic material.

The abovementioned problems do not exhaust the richness of ideas in Kuiper's work which embodies the highest achievements of classical Indology today. His ideas received wide recognition and response in the studies of many scholars (for example, as concerns Soviet scholars, in the studies of V. N. Toporov, V. V. Ivanov, Iu. M. Alianova, A. M. Dubjanskij and the author of this article).

The profound erudition of Kuiper, the great and attractive talent of this scholar, his striving for a systematic interpretation of the ancient Indian material in the framework of the most forward-looking concepts of today and finally the generally recognized importance of the results obtained by him in more than half a century, make it superfluous to explain any further the importance for Indologists, Orientalists and in general those interested in the humanities to become acquainted with the selected studies of this scholar.⁴⁰

* Note by the translator (J. W. de Jong). Dr. Tatjana Elizarenkova's article was first published in Russian as an introduction to a translation of selected articles by F. B. J. Kuiper, entitled *Trudy po vediskoj mitologii* [Studies on Vedic mythology] (Moskwa, 1986). In consultation with the author and F. B. J. Kuiper a few small changes have been made in the text.

¹ "Zur Geschichte der indo-iranischen s-Präsentia", *Acta Orientalia* 12 (1934), pp. 190-306.

² *Die indogermanischen Nasalpräsentia. Ein Versuch zu einer morphologischen Analyse*. Amsterdam, 1937.

³ *Notes on Vedic non-inflexion*. Amsterdam, 1942, (Mededeelingen der Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, N.S., Deel 5, No. 4).

⁴ "Traces of laryngeals in Vedic Sanskrit", *India Antiqua* (Leiden, 1947), pp. 198-212.

⁵ *Shortening of final vowels in the Rigveda*. Amsterdam, 1955 (Mededelingen der Kon. Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, N.S., Deel 18, No. 11).

⁶ "Rigvedic *pārye divī*", *IJ* 5 (1962), pp. 169-183.

⁷ *IJ* 4 (1960), pp. 59-63.

⁸ "Vidayate and vidátha", *Indologica Taurinensis* 2 (1974), pp. 121-132.

⁹ See, for instance: "Two Rigvedic loanwords", *Sprachgeschichte und Wortbedeutung. Festschrift Albert Debrunner* (Bern, 1954), pp. 241-250; "Rigvedic loanwords", *Studia Indologica. Festschrift für Willibald Kirlfel* (Bonn, 1955), pp. 137-185; "Śailuṣa- and Kuśilava-", *Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft und Kultukunde. Gedenkschrift für Wilhelm Brandenstein* (Innsbruck, 1968), pp. 77-84.

¹⁰ "Avestan mazdā", *IJ* 1 (1957), pp. 86-95.

¹¹ 'Ahura Mazdā "Lord Wisdom"?' *IJ* 18 (1976), pp. 25-42.

¹² "Old East Iranian dialects", *IJ* 18 (1976), pp. 241-253.

¹³ *On Zarathustra's language*. Amsterdam, 1978 (Mededelingen der Kon. Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, N.S., Deel 41, No. 4).

¹⁴ "Zur Chronologie des Stimmtoneverlusts im dravidischen Anlaut (skt. kunda-m, kuṭacakā-h, gola-h)", *BSOS* 9 (1939), pp. 987-1001.

¹⁵ "Note on Dravidian morphology", *Acta Orientalia* 20 (1948), pp. 238-252.

¹⁶ "Two problems of Old Tamil phonology", *IJ* 2 (1958), pp. 191-224.

¹⁷ See the objections of A. Chandrasekhar, "The āytam problem reexamined", *India Linguistics* 34 (1973), pp. 211-216 and Kuiper's reply: "The āytam problem", *Indian Linguistics* 35 (1974), pp. 205-217.

¹⁸ "Consonant variations in Munda", *Lingua* 14 (1965), pp. 54-87.

¹⁹ "Munda and Indonesian", *Orientalia Neerlandica. A volume of Oriental Studies* (Leiden, 1948), pp. 372-401.

²⁰ *Nahali. A comparative study*. Amsterdam, 1962; "The sources of Nahali vocabulary", *Studies in comparative Austroasiatic Linguistics*. Ed. by N. H. Zide (London-The Hague-Paris, 1966), pp. 57-81.

²¹ *Proto-Munda words in Sanskrit*. Amsterdam, 1948.

²² "The genesis of a linguistic area", *IJ* 10 (1967), pp. 81-102.

²³ Kuiper believes that during that period the substratum exercised its influence also on the mythological level as shown by the presence in the Rgveda of the myth about Indra's killing by means of an arrow from a bow (and not by a blow with his vajra) of a boar who guards cooked rice-milk: *An Austro-Asiatic myth in the Rigveda*. Amsterdam, 1950 (Mededeelingen, etc., N.S., Deel 13, No. 7).

²⁴ F. D. K. Bosch, *The golden germ. An introduction to Indian symbolism*. The

Hague, 1960 (English translation of the Dutch edition of 1948). For an English translation of Kuiper's review, first published in Dutch in 1951, see: F. B. J. Kuiper, *Ancient Indian Cosmogony* (Delhi, 1983), pp. 23-40.

²⁵ H. Schärer, *Die Gottesidee der Ngadju Dajak in Süd-Borneo*. Leiden, 1946; English translation: *Ngaju religion: the conception of god among the North Borneo people*. The Hague, 1963.

²⁶ H. Lüders, *Varuna I-II*. Göttingen, 1951-1959.

²⁷ W. Norman-Brown, "The Creation Myth of the Rig-Veda", *JAOS* 62 (1942), pp. 85-98.

²⁸ "The ancient Aryan verbal contest", *IJ* 4 (1960), pp. 217-281.

²⁹ "The Three Strides of Visnu", *Indological Studies in Honor of W. Norman Brown* (New Haven, 1962), pp. 137-151.

³⁰ "The bliss of *aśa*", *IJ* 8 (1964), pp. 96-129.

³¹ "Cosmogony and conception: a query", *History of Religions* 10 (1970), pp. 91-138.

³² "An Indian Prometheus?", *Asiatische Studien* 25 (1971), pp. 85-98.

³³ "The heavenly bucket", *India Maior. Congratulatory volume presented to J. Gonda* (Leiden, 1972), pp. 144-156.

³⁴ "The Basic Concept of Vedic Religion", *History of Religions* 15 (1975), pp. 107-120.

³⁵ "The Origin of the Sanskrit Drama (Summary)", *Proceedings of the XXVIIth International Congress of Orientalists*, 1967 (Wiesbaden, 1971), pp. 298-299.

³⁶ "The worship of *jarjara* on the stage", *IJ* 16 (1975), pp. 241-268.

³⁷ *Varuna and Vidūṣaka. On the origin of the Sanskrit drama*. Amsterdam, 1979 (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, N.S., Deel 100).

³⁸ "Some observations on Dumézil's theory (with reference to Prof. Frye's article)", *Numen* 8 (1961), pp. 34-45.

³⁹ R. G. Wasson, *Soma, Divine Mushroom of Immortality*. New York, 1968. Cf. Kuiper's review, *IJ* 12 (1970), pp. 279-285.

⁴⁰ A few years ago several of Kuiper's articles were published in English in a separate volume: F. B. J. Kuiper, *Ancient Indian Cosmogony. Essays selected and introduced by John Irwin*. Delhi, 1983.

HASIDISM: THE PRESENT STATE OF RESEARCH AND SOME DESIRABLE PRIORITIES

ZEEV GRIES

(*Sequel*)

The major expressions of Hasidic literary activity during its early generations are represented by various types of musar literature: homiletic discourses (*derush*), conduct literature (*hanhagot*), letters, and hagiography (*shevahim*). A still unresearched phenomenon is the single exceptional example of halakhic literature, the *Shulhan Arukh ha-Rav* of R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady.¹⁵ The student is amazed at the lack of a primary study defining the scope of each type of musar literature, its relationship to the other types of musar literature and to Jewish literature in general.¹⁶ Such a study would enable determination of the use of the various literary types mentioned above, and the specific Hasidic contribution to the Jewish world of beliefs. It is almost superfluous to point out again that musar literature, common throughout the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the modern period, had as its purpose guiding the Jew in the proper mode of conduct, in both worldly and heavenly matters—in other words, the strengthening of halakhic observance. Thus, whoever made use of the musar genus was not necessarily concealing his ignorance by adoption of a popular means of expression, but rather was utilizing an excellent, widely accepted vehicle for reinforcing the Jewish way of life according to the Torah, and for spreading beliefs and doctrines.

The Hasidic homiletic discourse, as institutionalized at the third Sabbath meal, is based on the traditional public homiletic discourse delivered throughout Jewish history, and whose purpose was to instruct the masses in halakhah and aggadah. Unfortunately, no proper study has been undertaken of how the exegesis of the Torah by the Talmudic sages evolved in the Middle Ages (whether in literary form, or through oral presentation later recorded) into an exegetical branch of Jewish literature with two main offshoots. The

first, the *Spanish* school—initially represented by R. Saadiah Gaon's Pentateuchal exegesis, by R. Samuel b Hophni Gaon, and by R. Isaac ibn Ghayyat, and others—wrote in Judeo-Arabic, and was strongly influenced by Islamic literary patterns and by the Rabbanite-Karaite polemic.¹⁷ The second branch, the *Ashkenazic* school, essentially continued the form of the midrash aggadah of the sages, supplemented however, by the addition of innovative exegetes like the Rashbam, and by the introduction of new philosophical and kabbalistic dimensions. These additional aspects resulted primarily from contact with the Spanish school in areas near the Spanish border (Provence) from the 13th century on, and from the living contact between Eastern and Central European scholars with Italian and Palestinian scholars after the introduction of printing in the 15th and 16th centuries.¹⁸

The delineation of homiletic literature prior to Hasidim, and its use by their contemporaries as a widespread mean of expression, is necessary for achieving understanding of the role of the homiletic discourse for the Hasid—was it a means of introducing views and modes of behavior that undermined the halakhic world, or an accepted and well-known means for expressing beliefs and doctrines that caused no upheaval? It is known from Jewish literature throughout the ages that the test of the acceptability of a Jewish author was his adherence to the tenets of Jewish life; as long as the only changes introduced were legitimate ones of custom, ideas could take wing without being perceived as threatening or heretical by the community. We can only note here that 18th century homiletic literature was a means for achieving self-expression for posterity by men of differing and peculiar literary statures. Study of this literature leaves the cumulative impression that many authors published their works, but in small editions with a limited number of copies. The popularity of homiletic discourses motivated the distribution of anthologies for preachers like *R'esit Hokmah*, *Shne Luhot ha-Brit*, and *Shevet Musar*. These served as primary accessible sources for official speakers appointed by the community, and for writers of discourses in general.

The social function of 18th century homiletic books in general, and Hasidic books in particular, has not been properly examined. I feel that the majority of homiletic books were not written to be

used as compulsory material in the formal educational system of talmudei torah, yeshivot, or in the informal system of batei midrash (to be discussed below), or in the Jewish home itself. Rather, most of the authors and disseminators of 18th century homiletic books had limited aims—mainly to preserve the memory of their authors among their families and close acquaintances.

A further, not insignificant question is: Does such a literary fashion represent the social translation of the spirit of a particular generation, its perplexities, and its longings? I personally doubt that the ideas common in popular homiletic literature initiated or reflected communal concerns or activities.

Nonetheless, we can establish with certainty that the structure of Hasidic homiletic discourses, including the incorporation of both Talmudic and medieval material, shows that Hasidim did not create a new educational system for themselves and their children. The heder and the bet midrash continued to be central to their mode of life and literary culture.¹⁹ It is not remarkable that few halakhic works from the early period of Hasidism have been found, since many great Jewish scholars transmitted their teachings orally, leaving only a small amount of written material in comparison to their life's work of imparting their teachings to generations of students.

There are also those like the Vilna Gaon, for example, whose literary legacy consists mainly of kabbalistic and musar literature. However, and rightfully so, scholars of halakhic literature might claim that the works of the Vilna Gaon cannot be measured quantitatively, since even his smallest gloss on halakhic matters is a product of the prodigious study to which he devoted his life.

Despite persistent accusations that the value of study among Hasidim had decreased due to their emphasis on the group, study and observance of the halakhah apparently remained the axes of Hasidic life.

The examination of conduct literature makes this evident;²⁰ possibly, it was neglected because it stimulated no Hasidic inspiration and unlike the Lurianic kabbalists preceding them, the Hasidim did not use this instrument to spread propaganda for their special customs, but rather to stress the obligatory nature of halakhic observance and study.²¹ A contributory factor to the image

of Hasidim as “unlearned” is the mistaken supposition that higher Jewish learning was acquired in the latter half of the 18th century only in the yeshivah; since we know of no yeshivot in Hasidic areas, therefore it is assumed that traditional advanced study was of little importance.²² But Jewish historians are aware that batei midrash were widespread in Jewish towns in Eastern Poland, Volhynia, and White Russia. These batei midrash served two main groups—a small coterie of full-time scholars supported by the community, and groups from the general public who met periodically for study.²³ The memorandum sent by Joseph Perl to the Austrian authorities warning against “subversive” religious activities centered in the batei midrash and their libraries should not be seen as extraordinary, since the batei midrash served as cultural and spiritual centers for the local Jewish intelligentsia, and those wishing to cultivate scholarly company.²⁴

The history of the institution of the bet midrash has not yet been properly investigated. But analysis of the data concerning the development of yeshivot as centers of learning in Central Europe in the second half of the 18th century leads to the conclusion that the yeshivah was not the sole institution for higher Jewish learning.²⁵ The importance of the bet midrash for Hasidim is illustrated by its apparent transfer to Erez Yisrael by the Hasidim who immigrated in 1777 under the leadership of R. Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk. Echoes of its books and scholarship are found in the discourses delivered in their new home. However, no specific documentation exists for the continuation of study by Hasidim in Erez Yisrael or for a concentration of scholars in their new residence, since the Hasidim made no requests for funds from the “Constantinople Committee officials of Erez Yisrael”. The inventory derived from documentary research alone might lead to the mistaken conclusion that only ignorant Hasidim lived in the Galilee, intent on adhering to their living leader, the zaddik, and prostrating themselves on the graves of dead zaddikim.²⁶

We now turn to another branch of musar literature common among Hasidim—hagiography. Hagiography has served as the basis for the history of Hasidism, although neither its evolution within Jewish literature nor its relationship to the ancient and medieval literature from which it developed have been defined.

Hagiography and exempla were common in the ancient world and among Jews; however it is difficult to distinguish between these literary types and define them individually. Clearly, scholars of Jewish literature cannot ignore its ties to general literature, whether popular and folkloristic,²⁷ or classical. Nonetheless, hagiographical literature that develops in the context of a halakhic religion such as Judaism must necessarily reflect the principles of the halakhah, present a model of life according to its tenets, and confirm its observance and maintenance. For example, in Rabbinic literature the actions of the sages themselves serve as a basis for the transmission of the halakhah when other traditions are unavailable, or as a means of strengthening the foundation for an already existing tradition.²⁸ Similarly, the lives of the sages serve as model examples of a balanced proper way of life according to the halakhah, with each mitzvah carrying its own special weight. Disturbance of the proper balance by the Jew leads to destruction of social harmony in the world, and within his familial and social context.²⁹ Jewish hagiography presents the “perfect man” by utilizing both specifically Jewish literary patterns already found in the Bible,³⁰ as well as patterns derived from Greek or Roman secular literature,³¹ and the hagiography of Christian saints.³² Thus the biography of the Jewish “man of halakhah” is drawn in typically Jewish fashion, with the addition of literary motifs derived from external cultural sources.³³

Investigation of the forms and patterns of early hagiographical literature will facilitate comprehension of the reasons for its appearance in medieval Jewish literature, either in the tales of R. Simeon bar Yohai and his companions in the Zohar, or in the subsequent transfer of R. Simeon bar Yohai’s attributes to the “Ari” and to the Besht. In these contexts the role of halakhah in creating the attributes of the hero is reflected; moreover, the extent to which Jewish hagiography contributed to or detracted from the observance and dissemination of the halakhah can thereby be determined.

Since Hasidic hagiography revolves about the figure of the *herozaddik*, this survey opens with the portrayal of this central figure by scholars. Gershom Scholem has bequeathed to students of Judaism in general and kabbalah in particular a definition of the

religious man par excellence as one whose spiritual essence permeates his entire being to overflowing. He belongs to the pneumatists who leaven and enrich religious life, who may attract large followings due to their charismatic qualities. But although the pneumatic and his followers outwardly conform to accepted Jewish norms, inwardly their consciousness may have been revolutionized. Often it is only a short step from revolutionization of thought to an open break with tradition, that is, to eradication of functional commandments and enactment of fundamental halakhic changes.³⁴ Scholem's observations are without questions linked to his understanding of the role of the Messianic idea in Judaism,³⁵ and to his description of the talmid hakham as the ideal type in Jewish literature and history as opposed to the zaddik and Hasid. According to Scholem, with the rise of mysticism, kabbalah, and Hasidism, the pneumatic merged with the talmid hakham and changed his character beyond recognition.³⁶

The proper definition of Jewish hagiographic literaturee leads to a correction of Scholem's typology, based on a statement by Scholem himself as well in another context, to the effect that many of the great mystics in Jewish history preserved the halakhah.³⁷ In my opinion it is not insignificant that both the kabbalists prior to Hasidism (and even Shabbateans—excluding the most extreme whom I believe to have been few), as well as the Hasidim themselves, maintained the framework of functional mitzvot, and observed and studied halakhah. This is not simply a case of new wine in old bottles. The product of the halakhic world finds it difficult not to see himself as its bearer and transmitter. Even for the Shabbatean and halakhic genius such as R. Jonathan Eybeschuetz, the study of halakhah was not simply a mask used for attainment of public approval in order to be freed to follow his true proclivities in private. Rather, his immersion in the world of halakhah, its study and observance by himself and with others, was an indivisible part of his self-image as a “man of halakhah”. It is likely that his self-image as a “man of halakhah” conflicted with his Shabbatean faith and tendencies. These expressed another facet of his personality, reflected in his secret writings and his behavior within the privacy of his home. Perhaps, as a result, his son R. Wolf became a more extreme Shabbatean, subverting his father's exoteric

teachings with his esoteric teachings.³⁸ Certainly the Hasidic zaddikim, like their kabbalistic predecessors and contemporaries, viewed the halakhah and life according to the Torah as the basis of their existence, even while investing the body of halakhah with new meanings and new customs related to performance of mitzvot. (Changes were generally restricted to "patterns of conduct"—i.e., to ritual matters alone.)³⁹ Although Scholem's appraisal of Buber's interpretation of Hasidism led him, in my opinion, to the correct assessment of the place of Torah and observance of mitzvot in the life of the Hasid,⁴⁰ nonetheless, it did not cause him to correct his typology of the Hasidic zaddik, as the example of the "perfect man" in this movement, to be distinguished from the talmid hakham.

In my opinion, the ideal type in Jewish history is the "man of halakhah" as found in the title of Rabbi J. D. Soloveitchik's major article, "Ish ha-Halakhah".⁴¹ If for the sake of this discussion "men of halakhah" are defined as those for whom the halakhah is the central focus of their lives, then the talmid hakham is the man of halakhah par excellence, characterized by complete lifelong devotion to study and observance of the Torah. Yet other types of "men of halakhah" exist, who do not devote themselves exclusively to the study of Torah, but in addition find time to perform public services, and to study subjects beyond the limited confines of halakhah. How is a figure like Maimonides to be classified in the context of this schema, with his prodigious Jewish learning, his devotion to public service, and his extensive knowledge of secular subjects such as medicine and philosophy reflected in his activities and writings? Our definition of "men of halakhah" must include those who withdraw completely from the world,⁴² as well as those having various degrees of involvement in it. The Hasidic leader, who combines in himself the aspect of being the axis of the world (possessed by *R. Simeon bar Yohai* of the *Zohar*, the *Ari ha-Kadosh*, and the *Besht*) while maintaining the centrality of halakhic observance and study in his life, is thus included in the spectrum of "men of halakhah" and is certainly not on its periphery. It is not my intention to detract from the mystic kabbalistic dimension of the zaddik's personality; nonetheless I contend that the zaddik did not cease to perceive himself as a man of halakhah, obligated to study,

observe, and transmit the halakhah to his children and followers. It would be a mistake to imagine that due to the zaddik's role as a mediator and an influential force in the world, as found in the homilies of R. Jacob Joseph of Polonnoye, the Hasid believed himself relieved of his personal obligation to be a man of halakhah. It is not surprising that suspicion against those not accepting the role of halakhah motivated the great disciple of the *Besht*, R. Dov Baer of Mezhirech, to dictate regimen stressing this point.⁴³

I maintain that a new type of hero in Jewish literature was not created by mystics with the composition of the *Zohar* and the hagiography of its main characters;⁴⁴ rather, from the moment of his debut in heikhalot literature, the mystic hero inherited and incorporated the characteristics of the talmid hakham. The mystic "man of halakhah" continues to be a talmid hakham, ornamenting the halakhic precepts with new meanings and explanations in accordance with his conception of the deity. Moreover, the halakhic changes effected are mainly in ritual matters, where the mechanisms of the halakhah allow organic additions through incorporation of new customs. Jewish hagiography in general, and Hasidic hagiography in particular, fulfills the pre-condition that its heroes, topics, and writers be immersed in Jewish learning, the foundation of the life of the man of halakhah—learning that shapes their language, their Weltanschauung, and their ideals. This is the case even if in their actual or literary lives, much of their time is devoted to worldly matters.

Finally, with regard to hagiography it is essential to examine the relationship between the Hebrew versions of Hasidic hagiography and their rendering in Yiddish, as well as to Yiddish literature popular during the spread of Hasidism. Abraham Ya'ari made initial comparisons between the Yiddish and Hebrew versions of *Shivhei ha-Besht*,⁴⁵ however, the critical approach to *Shivhei ha-Besht*, as well as to Hasidic hagiographic literature in general, is still in its early stages.⁴⁶

In conclusion, this section of our survey has established that not only are basic definitions for the various literary types lacking, but also that other preliminary steps, as bio-bibliographical study, necessary for research, have not been taken. One of the basic requirements of modern literary research seems to be the establish-

ment of critical editions based on examination of versions and sources, and on investigation of those involved in all stages of its creation—composition, copying, and preparation for printing. To our surprise, although many have undertaken the interpretation and analysis of Hasidic literature, few have attempted to create critical editions.⁴⁷ Moreover, since most researchers ignore the linguistic and literary ties between Hebrew Hasidic literature and its original presentation in Yiddish, the wealth of material brings us no benefit.

B

It is accepted practice, when undertaking a survey of research carried out in a field like Hasidism, to distinguish between academic and non-academic studies. The former are theoretically solidly based on careful historical-philological scrutiny in their search for objective truth, whereas the latter follow a very personal, undisciplined, and uncritical method, aimed not at arriving at scientific truth, but rather at a spiritual truth relevant to its authors. However, from prior comments regarding the defects of the basic studies of Hasidism, the reader is aware that in my opinion most of the scientific studies lack a historical-philological foundation. This contention precludes the reopening of the well-known argument by Baruch Kurzweil against Gershom Scholem and his disciples, rebutted by Isaiah Tishby and Jacob Katz.⁴⁸ Major questions pertaining to the nature of research being carried out in Jerusalem in the fields of intellectual and social history were raised, including the degree to which it was affected by historicism, and the extent to which it was possible to distinguish (in this context) between historical and historiosophical research.⁴⁹ Therefore, this survey distinguishes between types of studies based only on the nature of their approach.

Eliezer Zweifel is regarded by some scholars as the forerunner of research in the field of Hasidism.⁵⁰ His contribution was praised by Dinur thus: “Zweifel not only pointed out the many basic similarities between Hasidic teachings and the essence of internal Jewish religious life in the Diaspora, but moreover, he penetratingly disclosed the unique aspects of the Hasidic Weltanschauung, and laid the foundation for understanding the growth of the Hasidic

myth on the emotional background of this worldview.”⁵¹ However, despite his admiration, Dinur himself did not cultivate Zweifel’s approach. Moreover, the new edition of Zweifel’s “*Shalom al Yisrael*” edited by A. Rubinstein, makes no special mention of Zweifel’s unique contribution, nor does it include many of the quotations of Rabbinic material from which alone it is possible to determine the validity of Zweifel’s position that Hasidic ideas are rooted in the continuum of tradition.⁵² Zweifel is not the sole candidate for initiator of Hasidic research. Our national author, S. Y. Agnon, has awarded this position to Jacob Samuel Bick.⁵³ This is difficult to establish since Bick, whose literary legacy was burned, has not bequeathed us printed works like Zweifel. As for Zweifel, although he made a praiseworthy attempt to compare Hasidic saying to Rabbinic ones, his approach is uncritical with regard to both types of sources, due to his internal political aim—the settling of internal disputes among the Jews, thereby bringing “peace to Israel”, as revealed by the title of his book.

Other candidates for the forerunners of Hasidic research can be found among prominent haskalah figures, literary men, or historians. Haskalah figures like Abraham Kahana, Samuel Joseph Ish-Horowitz, or Moses Leib Lilienblum⁵⁴ could be considered. Or, perhaps renewed interest in Hasidic research was aroused by men of letters like I. L. Peretz or M. J. Berdyczewski, not to mention Martin Buber’s influence in this field.⁵⁵ Among historians, credit for the establishment of essential historical criteria for the study of Hasidism goes to Simon Dubnow⁵⁶ rather than to Heinrich Graetz, from whose works the delusionary sick aspect of Hasidism harshly emanates,⁵⁷ or to Samuel Abba Horodezky, whose books Scholem describes as “an odd mixture of charming simplicity and dullness”.⁵⁸ It is not surprising that Scholem himself, as a historian, noted that: “In fact most of us, when we speak about Hasidism, probably think primarily in terms of the concepts that have become familiar through Buber’s philosophical interpretation....The more than fifty years of Buber’s neo-Hasidic activity have evoked a strong response also outside the Jewish world.”⁵⁹ Scholem’s comment demonstrates the decisive effect of Buber’s work on our knowledge and approach to investigation of the Hasidic movement.

Buber chose Hasidic legend—hagiographic literature—as the mirror of Hasidic life and its sanctification of the “here and now”. He translated, shaped, and rewrote in German form a presentation of the best of Hasidic legend that reflected the spiritual greatness Buber found in the legends in his personal search for spiritual roots, which, in his opinion, the original defective Hebrew and Yiddish texts had diminished and distorted. He undertook this task without pretensions of studying the Hasidic literary form of hagiography, its versions, variants, and printings, and without distinguishing between the real, imaginary, or set characteristics of its heroes.⁶⁰ In contrast, Scholem bound himself to Hasidic homiletic literature as the reflection of Hasidism—a literature that does not sanctify life (Buber’s goal) but looks beyond life to the kabbalistic world of the sefirot, whose hero, the zaddik, is torn between his never-ending desire to divest himself of his corporeality and his worldly obligations to his flock. Scholem’s conception certainly limits the religious experience of Hasidism to an extent, although he specifies that classical Hasidism is the product of direct spontaneous religious experience, undergone for the most part by simple, unsophisticated men.⁶¹ However, Scholem does not explain the manner of realization of this simple experience, nor its harmonization with the new Hasidic demand for devekut achieved by abnegation of this world, as discussed in his article on devekut.⁶² Was this path simple, and was it open to all? Moreover, what was the role of the religious experiences gained through the study of the Torah by Hasidim as men of halakhah, and through observance of mitzvot in general?

Scholem was so deeply influenced by Buber that he retained Buber’s method while presenting, unlike Buber, Hasidic homiletic discourse as representative of the spirit of Hasidism. Scholem did not sift the homiletic traditions, in contra-distinction to his work on the early kabbalists, but rather, as if bewitched by Buber’s interpretation of Hasidic hagiography, chose selections from Hasidic discourses to fit his competing interpretation of Hasidism. He created a Hasidic world of his own making, ignoring his avowed historical principles that require critical examination of the oral and written homiletic traditions, their authors, transmitters, and printers, and determination of the place of the Hasidic discourse in the daily life of the Hasid. This, despite the fact that Scholem

himself pointed out the need for primary research of the nature of Hasidic discourses,⁶³ and early Hasidic historical figures.⁶⁴

While marvelling at Dinur's mastery of homiletic literature in general and Hasidic literature in particular, Scholem is unable to accept Dinur's interpretation or method.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, he praises Dinur's expertise, evaluating him as "making Dubnow look like a naive popularizer",⁶⁶ whose contentions regarding the *Besht* are "typical of the naive psychology of rationalism".⁶⁷ Nor does Scholem spare the historian A. Z. Aescoly of criticism for turning the *Besht* into a merely legendary figure. Scholem lumps Aescoly and Dinur together in his critique—criticizing "Aescoly" for not having examined in depth the details of the documents and the literature, and Dinur, despite cautious beginnings, for reaching far-reaching but marvelous conclusions that leave us speechless with wonder... In his final chapters on the genesis of Hasidism, Dinur gives free rein to his own uniquely "*creative imagination*". Moreover, Scholem notes that it is difficult to appraise seriously Dinur's theory of the existence of "an esoteric Hasidic program", since it is without documentary support. He states his position rather aggressively:

I find Dinur's method unacceptable since the combining of quotations from Hasidic literature as one does in a crossword puzzle does not serve to indicate the existence of a program known to individual Hasidim. I doubt whether such a method is acceptable in historical research. Analysis of the juxtaposition of certain homiletical ideas is relevant—and *I myself occasionally use this method*; nonetheless, heaping of juxtaposition of juxtaposition does not erect a lasting edifice, but rather builds castles in the air.⁶⁸

Ironically the "*muse of history*" frowned upon with Scholem, and "sent" a messenger in the person of the scholar Mendel Piekarz to transfer the laurel wreath for creative imagination from Dinur to Scholem himself. Piekarz criticizes Scholem's attempt to delineate the historical character of the *Besht*.⁶⁹ "The spiritual historical portrait of the *Besht* was painted by Gershom Scholem's dexterous hands; however, a major role was played by his *creative imagination* in his depiction of the *Besht's appearance and stature*".⁷⁰ Piekarz was preceded by R. Haim Liberman, the expert bibliographer of Habad,⁷¹ in his criticism of the scientific method espoused by Scholem's school. Piekarz joined Liberman in his harsh censure of the uncritical methods used by Scholem.⁷²

Examination of the literature pertaining to the Hasidic movement reveals that it concentrates preponderantly on the period from the emergence of the movement in the mid-18th until the first quarter of the 19th century, and only limited attention has been paid to its development and transformation in the 19th and 20th centuries. The explanation for this phenomenon derives from Buber's revelation of the depth and inspirational qualities of the emergent Hasidic movement, and his subsequent position as the connecting link between the various springboards for research. Like Buber, Scholem and his disciples looked to the early period of Hasidism for derivation of beliefs and doctrines, with the historical-philological method as a thin veneer of academic truth. Perhaps Buber's success is due to the fact that he openly admitted that he was not a researcher of Hasidism but rather personally sought living spiritual nourishment, enriching the spiritual life of modern Jews in the process. Furthermore, due to the personal quality of his search, Buber was more sensitive than Scholem to the pulse of the Hasidic movement, and to the central importance of the living experience within the community. Even if we accept Scholem's observation that Buber's expression of the sanctification of existence belongs more to Buber's existential philosophy than to the conduct of Hasidic life, we cannot ignore the fact that Hasidim did create a strong communal life, characterized by powerful interpersonal ties and context as a living expression of the mystic dimension in their lives. Nor can we ignore the evidence given by the opponents of Hasidism as to the strength of their social ties—seen by the Hasidim themselves in their writing as a manifestation of terrestrial love that reflects and arouses celestial love. The intimate Hasidic group had a *raison d'être* independent of its ritual function of raising holy sparks in which the individual participant is obliterated.⁷³

Having the above critical outlines in mind, we will try now to establish the specific details of Hasidic research. Hasidic research can be superficially divided into three types according to author's profession and avowed principles of research.

1. Historians—historical method
2. Scholars of beliefs and doctrines and their method

3. Editors of critical editions of Hasidic literature and their method

I will address myself to each type.

I. *Historians*

A. *The authors of hasidic history*

Scholars concur that the title of the father of the history of Hasidism belongs to Simon Dubnow, who spent decades collecting the writings of Hasidism and their opponents, and examining the historical circumstances behind the rise of Hasidism. Dubnow also appreciated the necessity for outlining a research plan based on detailed examination of the sources, and his plan as found in Appendix A to his book *Toledot ha-Hasidut* is still thematically relevant. Unfortunately Dubnow himself was unable to carry out his proposed plan. Perhaps the stumbling block was Dubnow's projection of his view of the degeneration of contemporary Hasidism onto the study of its past. Dubnow did not delve deeply into the types, transmission, and subjects of Hasidic sources.

Moreover, though he realized that Hasidic writings were a potential source of historical evidence, Dubnow did not devote the necessary attention to Hasidic literature as transmitted among Hasidim, or to its vital origin in musar literature and its ties to halakhah. Thus the real significance of Hasidic literature for practicing Hasidim was not clarified by Dubnow.

An example of Dubnow's approach to Hasidic literature is his classification of R. Jacob Joseph of Polonnoye's *Toledot Ya'akov Yosef* simply as one example of the general homiletic literature of his generation. These homiletic discourses are defined as "a conglomeration of Biblical verses and Rabbinic dicta from the Talmud, midrash and the Zohar, and the posing of solutions are artificially complicated fanciful halakhic problems. Within this mass of material, occasional epigrams and phrases stand out, shedding light on the basic idea". In these words, Dubnow denigrates homiletic literature in general and Hasidic discourses in particular. Surprisingly, Dubnow continues: "Nonetheless, from the content (emphasis in original) of the exegeses and discourses a new direc-

tion can be ascertained''.⁷⁴ The reader is at a loss to understand how Dubnow discovered content and new directions in the conglomeration of verses and the homiletic chaos into which he immersed himself. Clearly, research is not a matter of sleight of hand.

On the same page and its continuation Dubnow provides an excellent example of his method. His interpretation of the Besht's reliance on Ahiyyah ha-Shiloni, well-described by the Besht's disciple R. Jacob Joseph, as the "*prophet of the religious schism*" (emphasis in original) ignores Hasidic sources that view the Besht as a spark (*nizoz*) of R. Simeon bar Yohai,⁷⁵ who, according to the midrash, could hasten the Messianic era if united with Ahiyyah ha-Shiloni.⁷⁶ Indeed, the Besht needed Ahiyyah as a guide and companion in his ascent to heaven, to the Messiah's palace.⁷⁷

Moreover, Dubnow's description of the economic and political distress of the Jewish population as the background for the emergence of Hasidism in his introduction to *Toledot ha-Hasidut* has become axiomatic, essentially adopted by Dinur as well. However, increased access to Polish documents, due to the opening of the archives of the Polish estates where Jews lived, has led to a revision of Dubnow's premise. The Polish Jews of the second half of the 18th century must now be viewed as one of many groups within a stratified society, a group successful politically and economically despite the fact that it had recently suffered destructive pogroms.⁷⁸

Finally, Dubnow's nationalistic aspirations led him (and Dinur, whose work will be discussed below) to seek in emergent Hasidism a program of religious reform and a plan for redemption.⁷⁹ This critique is not intended to belittle Dubnow's contribution to the study of Hasidism, since his book remains the basic text for the study of Hasidism. Even if we contradict his conclusions, Dubnow deserves our admiration for having provided the foundation for further study.

Dinur's enthusiastic attempt to restore Hasidic literature to its place against the background of contemporary homiletic literature represents the swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction.⁸⁰ However, he failed to analyze sufficiently the literary types and sources, coined phrases, and historical data provided by Hasidic literature. Moreover, Dinur's discussion incorporates source material relating to a period of 100 years from a variety of Jewish com-

munities to support his conception of Jewish society, with common expressions accepted as historical evidence rather than as literary fashions. Dinur even goes so far as to use R. Jacob Emden, famous for his quarrelsome nature, to support his portrait of R. Ezekiel Katzenelbogen.⁸¹ Nonetheless, Dinur's contribution to renewed interest in homiletic literature prior to and during the period of the emergence of Hasidism must be acknowledged. Similarly, his work encouraged examination of Hasidic literature and its relationship to comparable literary types, both prior and contemporary with Hasidism,⁸² as well as early Hasidic historical documents.

Another trend in Hasidic historiography is represented by Raphael Mahler, whose work diverges from that of his predecessors due to his Marxist perspective. His description of the place of Hasidism in Jewish history is based on his Marxist ideology as well as on the accepted tools of research. Mahler's historical method was aptly described by Jacob Katz in the latter's critique of Mahler's book *Divre Yeme Yisra'el Dorot Ahronim*.⁸³ Nevertheless, Mahler's work is important, particularly his book *Ha-Hasidut ve-ha-Haskalah*⁸⁴ in which the relationship between Hasidim and maskilim is elucidated by Mahler's uncovering of new sources and documents in government archives.

The work of a historian like Jacob Katz entails a different approach. Katz included a chapter on Hasidism⁸⁵ within the body of his systematic study of various topics in social, political, and intellectual history.⁸⁶ Unfortunately, Katz's explicit reliance on Scholem's analyses for the study of Hasidic history causes his work to suffer from the shortcomings of Scholem's work as discussed above.⁸⁷

B. *Biographers of Hasidic personalities*

A plethora of biographies of zaddikim exists. Noteworthy contributors among the many who have devoted themselves to this task are Rabbi M. Y. Gutman, responsible for the series *Mi-Giborei ha-Hasidut*, and S. A. Horodezky. However, serious attempts at critical biography are a rarity. An important early effort is M. Teitelbaum's biography, *Ha-Rav MiLyady u-Mifleget Habad* (Warsaw 1914); however, despite copious citations of sources, Teitelbaum's

objectivity is distorted by his love, and his book teaches little about R. Shneur Zalman's actual life. Conspicuously absent are a description of the dissension involved in R. Shneur Zalman's rise to leadership, and various personal and Habad communal incidents.⁸⁸ A recent attempt at a critical biography of R. Nahman of Bratslav has been made by A. Green in his book, *Tormented master* (Alabama 1979).⁸⁹ This biography has been sharply attacked by Pierkarz as a refined version of Hasidism created to make Hasidism more palatable to the American public.⁹⁰

Creation of biographies correctly establishing the contribution of Hasidic personalities to the realm of spiritual values, and demonstrating the role of these values in their lives, must be based on a proper understanding of Jewish hagiography in general, and Hasidic hagiography in particular, and on the study of Hasidic homiletic literature as well. Without intensive basic research in these primary areas, I fear that authors of Hasidic biographies will continue to mix traditions indiscriminately to mold their desired image of the historical zaddik.

2. *Scholars of doctrines and beliefs*

From the previous discussion it is clear that the outstanding figures among scholars of doctrines and beliefs are Buber, and Scholem, who followed in his footsteps, although their work was preceded by many attempts to describe the subtle filaments of Hasidism. Included among the offshoots of Buber and Scholem's work are A. J. Heschel and his students (Dresner, Green, and others), I. Tishby and his students (Dan, Halamish, Piekarz, etc.), R. Schatz-Uffenheimer and her students, J. G. Weiss and his students, among many others. Each has made contributions in his particular field of interest. However, consideration of beliefs and doctrines without a substructure of intensive study may leave the seeker of Hasidic ideas empty-handed. I maintain that the treasury of Hasidic doctrines and beliefs cannot be unlocked or divorced from its social context and literary foundation.

Intensive study may provide conclusive evidence regarding the role of certain concepts in Hasidic life. Perhaps it will confirm beyond the shadow of a doubt to what extent and by what means

devekut was an ideal realized in the daily life of the hasid. Moreover, it may establish the degree to which the study of the Oral Law was diverted to another type of experience that strips daily existence of its corporeality by means of an ecstatic trance raising the hasid and the holy sparks from the physical realm to the source of the sparks.⁹¹ The degree to which alien thoughts filled Hasidic daily routine should be examined, as well as the changes, if any, introduced into the fixed prayers and their versions by Hasidism, and the influence of the acceptance of the yoke of contemplative prayer on the Hasidic attitude to the specific halakhah that a Jew must pronounce each syllable of prayer distinctly. Moreover, perhaps the meaning of kavvanah in common Rabbinic and Hasidic dicta will be re-examined; for example, is the demand for “service of the heart” (*kavvanat ha-lev*) necessarily diametrically opposed to the need for kavvanah to fulfill the obligation of observing mitzvot? In addition, intensive research may reopen the question of Messianism, and expand discussion beyond the interpretation of fragments of letters and homiletic discourses.

3. *Editors of critical editions*

In recent years critical editions of Hasidic books have come from two main sources—academia and Hasidic courts. Perhaps no serious critique of these books has been undertaken due to the thankless nature of the book reviewer’s task, and for fear of insulting friends and colleagues. Unfortunately, space does not permit an extensive critique here; nonetheless, I will briefly discuss the three types of critical editions—academica, Hasidic, and critical English translations.

a. Academic editions

Rivka Schatz-Uffenheimer deserves credit for the publication of the first critical edition of the *Maggid Dvaraw le-Ya’aqov* of R. Dov Baer, the Maggid of Mezhirech (Jerusalem 1976). Her edition compares the various manuscript and printed versions of the doctrines and discourses, and provides alternate versions to the corrected text, a commentary on the text including citations of literary

sources for the homiletic discourses, a short introduction, and indices to Biblical verses and major concepts.

In general, the publication of a critical text with commentary is a positive phenomenon, for even if each generation has the legitimate right to interpret without being concerned with its objective ability in comparison to its predecessors, our ability to understand the subtle references to Rabbinic material in general does not equal our ancestors. In my opinion, the purpose of such a commentary is to facilitate comprehension of the simple meaning of the Hasidic homiletic discourse, its structure and components, and the adaptation of source material—is it quoted directly or used in a surprising or strange way? Attention must be paid to Schatz-Uffenheimer's edition, whose aims are clearly stated in the editor's introduction, and which purposely refrains from any attempt to describe the book's author, R. Dov Baer of Mezhirech. In my opinion, the book, its commentary, and indices do not fulfill their aim of making the text easily comprehensible, and further study is essential to achievee understanding. The book can be criticized on several points:

The textual version—Despite the editor's statement (p. 13 of the introduction) that her version is based on the Korets edition, examination reveals that it is actually based on the Jerusalem edition (1962) whose errors originate from the faulty Lemberg edition of uncertain date. Comparison to the first edition, Korets 1781, reveals that R. Solomon of Lutsk faithfully performed his task based on his interest in the subject and on his expertise as a managing editor in Korets and as a partner in a printing house in Puryck.⁹² (Examples are found in the footnotes).⁹³ Moreover, exact indications of the sources for alternate versions are missing, thus making comparison difficult.

Citation of sources—It is generally accepted that editors of critical editions indicate to the best of their ability all sources used directly or indirectly by the author. However, Schatz-Uffenheimer has provided only partial citations in her notes, despite the fact that while her work was in preparation, a Hasidic edition published by A. Y. Kahn (Jerusalem 1971) provided additional citations of sources. The indices are also inadequate since they do not include references to Talmudic or medieval rabbinic dicta.

The commentary—The homiletic discourses of the Maggid, Dov Baer of Mezhirech, are characterized by outstanding preaching ability and virtuoso use of Jewish sources from different strata and historical periods. Therefore, I feel that the editor's commentary should have employed a different procedure.

Schatz-Uffenheimer states in her introduction (p. 7) that she views the Maggid's use of sources simply as citations, although she claims to have touched upon the Hasidic change in attitude to the sources in her commentary. Nevertheless, the reader of her commentary receives no enlightenment regarding the special or perhaps conservative nature of the Maggid's use of the sources, the only door to comprehension of his language and world. Two examples from Schatz-Uffenheimer's commentary suffice.

I. The opening of the homiletic discourse in section 28 (p. 45) quotes *Kiddushin* 40b: "The Gemara compares the zaddikim to a planted tree." The editor draws no connection between the Talmudic citation and the continuation of the discourse. However, it is essential to examine the Talmudic context and its relationship to the Maggid's discourse. The simile in the Gemara is a continuation of the previous Mishnah:

He that has a knowledge of Scripture and Mishnah and right conduct will not soon fall into sin, for it is written, 'And a threefold cord is not quickly broken.' (Eccles. 4:12) But he that has no knowledge of Scripture and Mishnah and right conduct has not part in the habitable world.⁹⁴

From the Gemara it is clear that a comparison is being drawn between the role of zaddikim in the world and the role of ordinary men—and the balance to be achieved between the study of Torah and concern with social welfare. The continuation of the discussion with the question asked of the sages in the upper story of Nithza's house in Lydda, "Is study greater or practice?", makes this apparent. I question the failure of Schatz-Uffenheimer's commentary to examine the Maggid's understanding of this Gemara—does his exegesis stress the parallelism between the zaddik of the Gemara, who is like a bough overhanging an unclean place but whose trials enable him to achieve "the world to come", and the Hasidic zaddik? Moreover, the Maggid specifically describes the study of Gemara as part of the activity of tikkun and the raising of sparks, thereby demonstrating that in his opinion, study itself is an act. Is

it not essential then to study the discussion in *Kiddushin* in order to ascertain whether the rabbis also debated the independent role of study as a mitzvah—is study simultaneously an act, or does it remain restricted to study alone?

An interpretation comparing the meaning of the dicta quoted in their original context with the Maggid's commentary would certainly enable us to understand whether the Maggid's interpretation of the zaddik's worldly obligations is innovative or (heaven forbid!) conservative. Can we not contend that the purpose of the Maggid's discourse is to encourage the Hasid to follow the zaddik's example, and the example of his forefathers, that is, to include study in his daily regimen? Furthermore, according to the Maggid the simple act of study can precipitate change in the higher regions, on condition that each individual is aware of the possibility of tikkun upon initiating the act of study without being obligated to withdraw from this world in order to achieve union with the higher spheres (which nullifies the simple meaning of study).

II. A second example of one of the Maggid's discourses and Schatz-Uffenheimer's treatment of it is taken from section 41 (pp. 61-63). The Maggid interprets the verse, "Let the mother go and take only the young", (Deut. 22:7) with reference to the dialogue between Hillel and the heathen who wanted to convert to Judaism on condition that Hillel teach him the entire Torah while he stands on one foot (*Shabbat* 31a). If Schatz-Uffenheimer had checked the Gemara and its commentaries, she would have realized that the Maggid was certainly familiar with the Maharsha's interpretation of *Shabbat* 31a equating foot (*regel*) with stage (*madregah*). According to the Maharsha *regel* means the basic source for belief. The Maggid borrowed the Maharsha's interpretation of the heathen's question as a serious one. In actuality, the heathen was asking for the base from which most mitzvot are derived, perhaps as a means of holding fast to Judaism. Rashi explained Hillel's reply, "What is hateful unto you, do not to your neighbour", as referring literally to your friend, like stealing, robbery, adultery and most of the mitzvot. Expressed in modern terms, such an interpretation of the Gemara indicates that the heathen required an insurance policy for his worship of God. It is not coincidence that the Maggid of Mezhirech juxtaposed to the story of Hillel the Elder, R.

Akiba's statement in *Berakhot* 60b, "Whatever the All-Merciful does is for good", which demands faith in God even in a world where there is no apparent reward for fulfillment of mitzvot. We can infer from the Maggid's words that a person is judged according to his "fear of Heaven" as reflected in his deeds—despite the lack of certainty as to the future and the evils that may befall him. This emphasis on the "fear of Heaven" was certainly connected by the Maggid with the continuation of the Gemara in Shabbat where a godfearing man is seen as preferable to a scholar.

Moreover, the Maggid certainly has in mind the continuation of the Gemara in Shabbat where the questions a man will have to answer before the heavenly tribunal are discussed, including whether he engaged in the dialectics of wisdom and understood one thing from another which can be interpreted as—was he satisfied with the simple meaning or did he delve into the mystical aspects of study? (See the Maharsha's comment there.) In the closing section of the discourse the Maggid makes an associative connection between the questions discussed above and God's reply to Moses' inquiry as to why he, and not R. Akiba, had been given the Torah (Menahot 29b): "Be silent for such is my decree (mahsavah)". The Maggid's interpretation of mahsavah is that R. Akiba raised the Torah to the realm of thought (*olam ha-mahsavah*).

These examples merely serve to indicate that, in general, the unique nature and interests of the Hasidic text cannot be ascertained without studying the original contexts of its sources.

Another example of a critical edition is G. Nigal's edition of *No'am Elimelech* (Jerusalem 1978) by R. Elimelech of Lychansk. The editor added other short works by R. Elimelech, a biographical introduction to R. Elimelech's life and thought, citations of sources, and indices to Talmudic and midrashic material, major concepts, and personalities.

The editor attempts to cite all sources utilized by R. Elimelech; however, unlike Schatz-Uffenheimer's *Maggid Dvaraw le-Yaqov*, he does not provide a running commentary to the text, nor does he provide an index to the Biblical verses expounded by R. Elimelech outside the context of the Pentateuchal portion.

Furthermore, in my view, without clarification of the plain meaning of the homiletic text, it is difficult to draw conclusions re-

garding the author's philosophy. Citation of sources for the discourses is but one step in the progression of steps required to understand the thought and worldview of the author. Nigal's introduction illustrates that insertion of citations in the text can be done by rote; however, in and of themselves, the citations as presented do nothing to enhance our understanding of the essential nature and aims of the art of discourse as practiced by R. Elimelech.

b. Hasidic editions

In recent years Hasidim have become involved in the publication of annotated editions of Hasidic works, occasionally with partial commentary. Among the first to appear are A. Kahn's edition of the *Maggid Dvaraw le-Ya'aqov* (Jerusalem 1971) and *Likkutim Yekarim ve-Derekh Emet* (Jerusalem 1974). These editions include an introduction to citations within the body of the text, division of the text into sections, comparison of versions (but without exact notation of sources), and partial indices. Important contributions by Habad to publication of Hasidic books have been made through the editorial board of the *Ozar Hasidim*. Their publications include the *Maggid Dvaraw le-Ya'aqov* and the *Or Torah* of the Maggid of Mezhirech (New York 1974), unfortunately hastily edited, with inadequate indication of sources and insufficient notes to the text. In contrast, J. I. Schocet's edition of *Zavvā'at ha-Rivash* (Kefar Habad and New York 1975) provides alternate versions, citations of sources, and indices and appendices. Schocet, who is deeply involved in this work, has also published pamphlets with special indices to the *Keter Shem Tov* and *Zavvā'at ha-Rivash* (New York 1977), and to the *Maggid Dvaraw le-Ya'aqov* and the *Or Torah* (New York 1979). Unfortunately, the introduction to *Zavvā'at ha-Rivash* does not discuss the problems connected with its editing and versions, essential for fixing the status of this book among Hasidim and the aims of the copyists and publishers of the various versions.⁹⁵ Also noteworthy are the Habad editions of *Keter Shem Tov* (New York 1974), and the beautiful annotated edition of *Shulhan Arukh ha-Rav* of R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady (New York 1976). Although the editors feel no obligation to provide critical evaluations of the history of the book, its authors, or contents, these books are useful.

c. Critical English translations

Since every translation is automatically a commentary, the critical editions in English have one advantage over the Hebrew editions; their editors are obligated to divulge their understanding of the plain meaning of the Hasidic text. A pioneering effort is D. Ben-Amos and J. D. Mintz's translation of *Shivhei ha-Besht*, which includes citations of sources and indices of topics and folkloristic motifs.⁹⁶ Although *Shivhei ha-Besht* has been the focus of scholarly attention, a critical Hebrew edition has yet to be published⁹⁷—therefore the English translation is doubly important.

However, comparison of the English translation to the printed Hebrew edition (Kopys 1815) reveals serious inadequacies. A few examples follow:

1. In the author's preface to the first printed edition (Kopys 1815) a letter has been omitted from the citation—instead of פ"ש Sha'ar ha-Shabbat", it should read פ"ע or "Pri Etz Hayyim", the correct source of the quotation. The editors of the English edition followed Horodesky and noted (Note 16 to the preface—p. 307 in the English) that they were unable to verify the citation in the book *Etz Hayyim*. This is not surprising, since *Sefer Etz Hayyim* does not contain a Sha'ar ha-Shabbat.

2. No note was made of the use of a literary frame in the printer's introduction with an actual historical basis—an outbreak of plague in Erez Yisrael. During the plague, Hasidim secluded themselves in their homes, and told the praises of zaddikim.⁹⁸ The use of pestilence as the cause of removal from society is a recurring theme in world literature; the outstanding example is Boccaccio's *Decameron*. The editors of the English edition also neglected to deal with the historical problem created by the printer's introduction. According to the literary frame, R. Menahem Mendel of Vitebsk sinned and was punished by dying soon afterwards, during the outbreak of plague. However, the letters from Erez Yisrael indicate that he died a year after the plague.⁹⁹ Nor did the translators comprehend that the quotation cited in the printer's introduction from *Likkutei Amarim* is taken from the book *Maggid Dvaraw le-Ya'akov* known also as *Likkutei Amarim*. According to the editor, R. Solomon of Lutsk, in his introduction to *Maggid Dvaraw le-Ya'akov*, the

praises of the Baal Shem Tov are intended to sing the praises of a great man, an expert in the knowledge and language of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, exactly as is related regarding one of the ancients, R. Yohanan ben Zakkai, the youngest of Hillel the Elder's disciples,¹⁰⁰ similar to the praises endowed in antiquity on gentile sages.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the printer did not confuse, as Ben-Amos and Mintz contend,¹⁰² the identity of the *Likkutei 'Amarim* with the edition of the *Tanya* of R. Shneur Zalman of Lyady (also known as *Likkutei 'Amarim*) which appeared in Shklov in the same year as the Maggid's work from which the printer of *Shivhei ha-Besht* quoted.

3. The following is an example of their method of translation. In their translation of the story "The Besht in the Messiah's Heavenly Palace", the Hebrew word *haqdamot* (p. 55) has been rendered "introductions", and not according to its meaning in medieval Hebrew—premises (as in Ibn Tibbon's translation of Maimonides' "guide of the Perplexed", Part II, The Twenty-five Premises). Mintz and Ben-Amos noted that they could not "clarify the meaning of these sentences to [their] full satisfaction".

Other Hasidic works in English translation have appeared in the Classics of Western Spirituality series published in the U.S.A. and Great Britain. The first in the series is "Nahman of Bratslav: The Tales" translated by A. Band, with an introduction by J. Dan.¹⁰³ However, this is not a critical edition, nor does the editor treat the problem of the comparison of the Yiddish and Hebrew versions of the tales. Moreover, no attempt is made to trace or explain the literary sources of the tales. Qualitatively different is the English edition of Menahem Nahum of Chernobyl's *Me'or 'Einayim* edited and translated by A. Y. Green with an introduction by S. Dresner.¹⁰⁴ Green also translated R. Menahem Nahum's *hanhagot*¹⁰⁵ with notes, commentary, and indices. This book, recently issued, awaits a comprehensive review.

In conclusion, we mention the English translation of *Zavva'at ha-Rivash*, prepared as a doctoral dissertation in 1976 with prefaces by H. I. Stern under the title: "The Testament of the Baal Shem Tov: A Study on the Polarities of Spiritual Life" (Northwestern University 1976).¹⁰⁶ From the scholarly point of view this work is extremely deficient; therefore there is no point in providing further criticism.

Afterword

The intention of this survey was not and could not be to explicitly record all the work being done in the field of Hasidism. Its aim was to provide a picture of the general status quo as understood by the author, and the results are solely his responsibility.

Unfortunately, despite several generations of research, fundamental bibliographical studies recording Hebrew and Hasidic books and examining the versions and traditions of Hasidic books have not been undertaken. Furthermore, the realm of musar literature, to which many of the early Hasidic works belong, has also not been sufficiently studied.

Despite the breadth of the field of Hasidism from its inception to the present, surprisingly few basic studies have been done. The direction of research has been predominantly influenced by the models created by Buber and Scholem as adopted by their disciples, with the additional influence of the national historians, Dubnow and Dinur. Nonetheless, in addition to throwing off the shackles of apologetic research, the time is ripe to overturn outdated models of research.

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¹⁵ The study of the relationship of Hasidic literature to halakhic literature and customs has remained practically untouched. The major study is by A. Wertheim, *Halakhot we-Halikhot be-Hasidut* (Jerusalem 1960). See A. Rubinstein's review in *Kiryat Sefer* 36 (1960/61), 280-286, and my comments in "Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit" (n. 8 above), n. 14, and app. 4, 300-305, which presents excerpts from sources for Hasidic conduct literature. See also my notes pertaining to the sources of certain hanhagot in "Arikhat Zavva'at ha-Rivash", *Kiryat Sefer* 52 (1976/77), nn. 80, 84, 92. See also my article "Meqorotaw we-'Arikhato shel Sefer Darkhe Zedek ha-Meyuhas le-Rabbi Zekharyah Mendel Mi-Yaroslav", *Mehqare Yerusalayim be-Mahshevet Yisrael*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1981/82), n. 31. Additional material can be found in my doctoral dissertation, "Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit ke-Bitui le-Hanhaga we-Etos" (Jerusalem 1979), ch. 3, 133-178.

¹⁶ I Tishby and J. Dan, *Mivhar Sifrut ha-Musar* (Jerusalem: Tel Aviv 1971), briefly listed the types of musar literature in their introduction, 12-13, whereas J. Dan, *Sifrut ha-Musar we-ha-Derus* (Jerusalem 1975), provided a general outline for defining its types. I have attempted to define hanhagah; see "Hagdarat ha-Hanhagah ke-Sug Sifriti be-Sifrut ha-Musar ha-Ivrit", *Kiryat Sefer* 56 (1981), 176-202, but the description is still partial. I have in manuscript an additional

study of the composition, molding, printing, and distribution of hanhagot at the turn of the 16th and during the 17th century, including the historical significance of the phenomenon. In addition, I have intensively studied the Hasidic literary form of hanhagot; see my article "Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit" (n. 8 above). Dinur's major study, "Reshitah shel ha-Hasidut we-Yesodoteha ha-Sozi'aliyyim we-ha-Meshihiyim" which first appeared in *Zion* 9 (1944) and 10 (1945), correctly emphasized the need for independent study of each type of Hasidic literature—homiletic, conduct, and hagiographic (aggadah in his terminology). In the context of his discussion Dinur attempted to briefly define the types. As a result, other scholars were certainly encouraged to study books hitherto not included among the sources for the study of Jewish history and beliefs and doctrines. See Dinur, *Bemifneh ha-Dorot*, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem 1972), 87-88, 89-92, 97-100.

¹⁷ An initial general description of the genre is found in L. Zunz, *Ha-Derashot be-Yisrael we-Hishtalshelutan ha-Historit*, 3rd ed. (Jerusalem 1974). Regarding the influence of Islamic literary patterns on R. Saadia Gaon and his followers, see M. Zucker, *'Al Targum RaSaG la-Torah* (New York 1959), and his introduction to *Peruse Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon le-Bereshit* (Jerusalem 1984). See also U. Simon's article in *Ha-Inziqlopediyah ha-Miqra'it*, s.v. "Tanakh, parshanut," cols. 659-683, and the bibliography, ibid. Only one attempt to define the exegetical method of a particular exegete has been made; see S. Shalem, *Rabbi Mosheh Alshekh: le-Heker Shitato ha-Parshanit we-Hashqafato be-'Inyane Mahshavah u-Musar* (Jerusalem 1966), pt. 1, 39-134. H. H. Ben-Sasson, who contested J. Katz's views regarding the value of the homiletic discourse as a historical source, made extensive use of R. Ephraim Solomon of Luntshits' discourses in his book *Hagut we-Hanhagah* (Jerusalem 1959) where he also described the exegetical methods of the preachers, 34-54, but without defining this literary type. See his arguments against Katz in his article, "Musagim u-Mezi'ut be-Historiyah ha-Yehudit beshalhe Yeme ha-Beynayyim", *Tarbiz* 29 (1960), 297-312; and Katz's reply, "'Al Halakhah we-Derush ke-Maqor Histori", *Tarbiz* 30 (1961), 62-68, as well as Ben Sasson's reaction to Katz's reply, ibid, 69-72.

¹⁸ See M. Greenberg, *Ha-Inziqlopediyah ha-Miqra'it*, vol. 8, op. ci., cols. 689-703, and the bibliography, ibid. See also F. Talmage, ibid., cols. 714-722 and the bibliography, for the relationship between Jewish and Christian exegesis. See also R. Bonfil's introduction to the facsimile edition of *Ha-Madrikh ha-'Ivri le-Retorikah: Nofet Zufim le-R. Yehudah Messar Leon* (Jerusalem 1981). For the contacts of Ashkenazic and Polish scholars with Italian and Palestinian scholars, see the doctoral dissertation of Y. Elbaum, "Zramin u-Megamot be-Sifrut ha-Mahshavah we-ha-Musar be-Ashkenz u-be-Polin ba-Me'ah ha-16" (Jerusalem 1977), 27-73.

¹⁹ It is imperative to point out that the polemical writings of the Mitnaggedim include no contentions to the effect that Hasidim founded their own hadarim and yeshivot following specifically Hasidic curricula. Such claims are later brought by Habad (See n. 6 above and the adjoining notes.) See also my comments in my article, "Sifrut ha-Hanagot ha-Hasidit" (no. 8 above), 232. A pioneering study has been done by M. Piekarz (n. 11 above). Recently, Y. Hisdai has completed a study of homiletic discourses (see n. 1 above). These studies will serve as primary tools for understanding Hasidic discourses.

²⁰ See my articles nn. 8, 15-16 above, as well as my article, "Quntres Hanhagot Ne'eleam le-Rabbi Nahman mi-Braslav?" *Kiryat Sefer* 53 (1978), 763-778.

²¹ I have discussed elsewhere the ramifications of my research; hanhagot never served as an alternate vehicle for the creation of halakhah, nor did they attempt

to embrace all the obligatory aspects of the halakhah and its study. Hanagot were restricted to laws and customs governing ritual matters (*orah hayyim*) that have been legitimately subject to changes and additions throughout Jewish history; they did not relate to civil law or torts. See my article, "Mi-Miyotos le-Etos" (n. 4 above), 137 n. 62.

²² See A. Wertheim, *Halakhot we-Halikhot be-Hasidut* (n. 15 above), 46 n. 53.

²³ For an example of this model for study see J. Katz, "Le-Toledot ha-Rabanut be-Moz'ey Yeme ha-Benayyim", *Sefer Zikaron le-Binyamin de Vries*, ed. E. Z. Melamed (Jerusalem 1968), 282. My thanks to M. Silver for drawing my attention to Katz's remarks.

²⁴ See S. Assaf's apt remarks in "Sifriyot Bate ha-Midrash", *Yad la-Qore*, vol. 1, nos. 7-9 (1946/47), 170-171.

²⁵ See J. Katz's survey in "Jewish Civilization Reflected in the Yeshivot—Jewish Centers of Higher Learnings", *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, vol. 10 (1966), 674-704. See also M. Silver's doctoral dissertation, "Shorshe ha-Pilug be-Yahadut Hungariyah: Temurot Tarbutiyot we-Hevratiyot mi-Yeme Yosef ha-Sheni 'ad 'Erev Mahapekhah 1848", (Hebrew University, Jerusalem 1985), 11-15. See esp. nn. 47, 51 and the adjoining notes.

²⁶ See J. Barnai, *Yehude 'Erez Yisra'el be-Me'ah ha-18 be-Hasut Peqide Qushta* (Jerusalem 1982), 230-252. The reader of Barnai's book may receive the impression that the principal centers of study were in Jerusalem and Hebron; however, even Barnai comments (232) that the distribution of funds in support of scholars led to false registration of the same person in several institutions concurrently.

²⁷ D. Heller attempted to formulate essential criteria for Jewish ethnography with a basis in Jewish legends, of which hagiography comprises a major portion; see his article "Hovot ha-'Etnografiyah we-ha-Folqlor ha-Yehudi bikhlal u-be-'Erez ha-Kodesh befrat", *Me-'asef Zion* 4 (1930), 72ff. Space does not permit the listing of all the literature pertaining to the study of literary heroes originating in folklore.

One of the first to explore this vast subject was Freud's pupil, the Jewish psychoanalyst Otto Rosenfeld, who changed his name to Otto Rank. See O. Rank, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (New York 1964).

²⁸ See A. Kaminka, "Ha-Ma-'aseh be-tor Makor le-Halakhah", in his book *Mehqarim be-Migra u-be-Talmud u-be-Sifrut Rabanit*, 2 (Tel Aviv 1951), 1-41.

²⁹ In this context we can but briefly mention two well-known stories. The first concerns R. Meir who was willing to forego his honor as a Rabbinic scholar in order to reconcile a husband and wife. See *JT Sotah* 1-Halakhah 4; *Lev. Rabbah* 9,9; *Numbers Rabbah* 9,20; *Midrash ha-Gadol* on *Numbers* 5:31 (Rabinowitz ed., 73-74). The second anecdote is found in the pointed derasha at the end of *Lev. Rabbah* 37,2 (M. Margolit, ed. 2nd ed. (Jerusalem 1972), 856-860). A charitable man sold his property and his family's profits in order to give charity above and beyond the obligatory level. Failing to comprehend the consequences of his actions, he was punished by witnessing the deaths by drowning of his brother and his family.

³⁰ See G. B. Sarfatti, "Hasidim we-'Ansche Ma'aseh we-ha-Nevi'im ha-Rishonim", *Tarbiz* 26 (1957), 126-153, reprinted in *Likkutei Tarbiz* 4: *Miqra'ah be-Sifrut ha-Aggadah* (Jerusalem 1983), 216-289. For the types of piety among the sages (hakhamim) see A. Bücler, *Types of Jewish Palestinian Piety* (London 1922). See also W. S. Green, "Palestinian Holy Man: Charismatic, Leadership and Rabbinic Tradition", in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*, II, XIX 2 (1979), 619-647.

³¹ Of particular importance are M. Hadas' studies; note esp. his use of the term "aretalogy". See M. Hadas and M. Smith, *Heroes and Gods: Spiritual Biographies*

in Antiquity (New York and London 1965), 3-97. Cf. to what Hadas wrote in his book *Hellenistic Culture*, 2nd ed. (New York 1972), 170-181.

³² An extensive annotated bibliography is available in Stephen Wilson, ed. *Saints and Their Cults* (Cambridge 1983), 309-447. Of particular importance are P. Brown's studies pertaining to the transition between the ancient hero and the saint among the Church Fathers. See P. Brown, "The Rise of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity", *Journal of Roman Studies* 61 (1971), 80-101. Other important works by Brown include *The Cult of the Saint* (Chicago 1981), and his biography of Augustine, *Augustine of Hippo*, 4th ed. (London 1979). The Bollandian order is esp. active in the preservation and definition of Christian hagiography. See esp. H. Delehaye, *The Legends of the Saints* (London 1961); and "Cinq Leçons sur la méthode hagiographique", *Subsidia Hagiographica*, 21 (Bruxelles 1934). See also R. Aigrain, *L'Hagiographie: ses sources, ses méthodes, son histoire* (Paris 1953). Cf. K. Shmeruk, *Sifrut Yiddish: Peraqim le-Toldoteyha* (Tel Aviv 1978), 201-202, and the bibliography, *ibid.*

³³ A. A. Halevi's book *Ha-Aggadah ha-Historit Biyografit* (Tel Aviv 1975) is extremely useful for comparison of the deeds of hakhamim and their hagiography to the literature of the Greek and Roman world.

³⁴ See G. Scholem, "Mizwah ha-Ba'ah Be-'Averah", in his book *Mehqarim u-Meqorot le-Toldot ha-Shabta'ut we-Gilguleha* (Jerusalem 1974), 19-23. The article appeared in English as "Redemption Through Sin", in *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York 1971), 78-141.

³⁵ See G. Scholem, *Devarim Bego* (Tel Aviv 1976), 155-190, and esp. 173-176. In English, "Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism", *ibid.*, 1-36.

³⁶ See Scholem, "Shloshah Tipusim sheh Yir'at Shamayim Yehudit", *ibid.*, 541-556 (which appeared in English in *Ariel; Review of Arts and Letters in Israel*, no. 2 (1973)). Cf. his comments pertaining to the zaddik in his book, *Pirqe Yesod b-Havanat ha-Kabbalah u-Smaleyyah* (Jerusalem 1976), 241ff, and his chapter on Hasidism in *Major Trends* (n. 6 above), 333-335. J. G. Weiss' observations are certainly based on Scholem's comparison of the biography of the zaddik as opposed to the biography of the talmid hakham; see *Journal of Semitic Studies*, vol. 3 (1958), 207-208 where he expands on the observations found in "Reshit Zmihatah shel ha-Derekh ha-Hasidit", *Zion* 16 (1951), 54. See also H. Liberman's critique in *Ohel RaHel*, 1 (New York 1980), 3-6, and esp. 4. See also E. Schweid's critique, which I accept, in E. Schweid, "Mistiqaḥ we-Yahadut lefi Gershon Scholem", *Mehqare Yerushalayim be-Mahshevet Yisra'el*, Supplement 2 (1983), 17.

³⁷ See Scholem, "Mistiqaḥ we-Samkhut Datit", in *Pirqe Yesod*, 9-35.

³⁸ Regarding this personality see I. Liebes' extensive study, "Hibbur be-Leshon ha-Zohar le-R. Wolf ben R. Yonatan Eybeschuetz 'al Havurato we-'al Sug ha-Ge'ulah", *Kiryat Sefer* 57 (1982), 148-178; 368-379. See 153-155 for biographical details and additional bibliography.

³⁹ See my comments above, n. 21 and adjoining notes.

⁴⁰ See *Devarim Bego* (n. 35 above), 379-380. English version, "Martin Buber's Interpretation of Hasidism", in *The Messianic Idea*, 244-245.

⁴¹ See J. D. Soloveitchik, "Ish ha-Halakhah", in his book *Be-Sod ha-Yahid we-ha-Yahad* (Jerusalem 1976), 37-188.

See G. Alon's superb description of the totally dedicated scholars of the emergent Lithuanian yeshivot and their disregard of worldly matters in G. Alon, "Yeshivot Lita", idem., *Mehqarim be-Toldot Yisra'el bi-Yeme Bayit Shenii u-be-Tequfat ha-Mishnah we-ha-Talmud*, 2nd ed. (Tel Aviv 1967), 1-11, and esp. 3-4.

⁴³ In my article “Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit” (n. 8 above), 232, I showed in detail that the opposition to Hasidism was primarily directed against their creation of an alternate leadership and communal organization.

⁴⁴ It is possible that M. Meged followed in Scholem’s footsteps when he asserted in his book, *Ha’Or ha-Nehshakh: ’Arakhim estetiyyim be-Sefer ha-Zohar* (Tel Aviv 1980), that the Zohar focuses on the new mystic hero hitherto unknown in Jewish literature. See my detailed critique in *Kiryat Sefer* 55 (1980), esp. 376-378.

⁴⁵ See A. Yaari, “Shloshah Turgumim shel Shivhei ha-Besht le-Yudit”, *Kiryat Sefer* 12 (1935/36), 129-131; idem., “Shte Mahadurot Yesod shel Shivhei ha-Besht”. *Kiryat Sefer* 39 (1964), 249-272, 394-407, 552-562. See also J. Mondeschein’s preface to the facsimile edition of *Sefer Shivhei ha-Besht: Kitve Yad* (Jerusalem 1982), 16-17, 22-47.

⁴⁶ K. Shmeruk’s discovery of the Yiddish source for the story of R. Adam is an important initial contribution to this field. See his article, “Ha-Sippurim ’al R. Adam Ba’al Shem, we-Gilguleyhem be-Nusha’ot shivhei ha-Besht”, *Zion* 28 (1963), 86-105.

A revised version has recently appeared in his book *Sifrut Yiddish be-Polin* (Jerusalem 1981), 119-146. See also the notes in his book *Sifrut Yiddish: Peraqim le-Toldoteyha* (n. 32 above), 219 n. 35; as well as *Sifrut Yiddish be-Polin*, 119 nn. 1-2. Upon the completion of initial studies it will be possible to reopen the discussion of the art of the Hasidic story; see M. Piekarz’s comments in *Hasidut Braslav* (Jerusalem 1972), 86.

⁴⁷ This point will be further developed below.

⁴⁸ See B. Kurzweil, *Be-Ma’avak ’al ’Erke ha-Yahadut* (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 1970), 240-299, and his arguments against Katz, ibid., 145-165; I. Tishby, *Netive ’Emunah u-Minut*, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem 1982), 241-245, where Tishby included a critique of Werblowsky in his case against Kurzweil; J. Katz, *Le’umiyyut Yehudit: Masot u-Mehqarim* (Jerusalem 1979), 193-224.

⁴⁹ The distinction used by Katz against Kurzweil apparently served as a precedent for J. Dan’s objection to E. Schweid’s comments regarding Scholem’s view of Jewish mysticism. Schweid commented in a conversation that in his opinion a model of historical research as distinct from historiosophical research cannot exist, since every historian possesses his own Weltanschauung which becomes a historiosophical base for the details of history he studies, chosen because it pertains to his personal spiritual truth. See E. Schweid, “Mistiqaḥ we-Yahadut lefi Gershon Scholem”, *Megare Yerushalayim be-Mahshevet Yisra’el*, Supplement 2 (1983); J. Dan, “Gershon Scholem: Beyn Historiyah le-Historiosofiyah”, *Mehqare Yerushalayim be-Mahshevet Yisra’el* 3 (1984), 427-475. Cf. Kurzweil, ibid., 108-173.

⁵⁰ The author of a recent article attempts to restore Zweifel’s lost honor by exaggerating his contribution and ranking his above Gershon Scholem, as if Scholem’s writings were simply a rewording of axioms already established by Zweifel. Any comparison of the methods of interpretation of these scholars highlights their dissimilarities. Nonetheless, Zweifel’s fascinating personality still awaits a worthy biographer. See G. Wieder-Keher, “Eliezer Zvi HaCohen Zweifel: Forgotten Father of Modern Scholarship on Hasidism”, *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, vol. 49, (1982), 87-115.

⁵¹ B. Dinur, *Dorot u-Reshumot* (Jerusalem 1978), 244.

⁵² See *Shalom ’al Yisra’el* (Jerusalem 1973), and my comments in my article “Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit”, (n. 8 above), 236 n. 156.

⁵³ See S. Y. Agnon, *Me’Azmi ’el ’azmi* (Tel Aviv 1976), 260. Jacob Samuel Bick has been the subject of a number of studies; see the extensive bibliographical

listing in M. Piekarz's addenda to I. Zinberg's *Toledot Sifrut Yisra'el*, vol. 6 (Tel Aviv 1960), bk. 11, ch. 3, 343-344.

⁵⁴ These particular figures, rather than the early haskalah figures who wrote about Hasidism have been mentioned, since if the writings of the early 19th century maskilim were biased, the late 18th and early 19th century maskilim waged an unmitigated war against Hasidism. The works of Joseph Perl, the author of *Megalleh Temirah* and *Bohen Zaddik*, exemplify this attitude. Moreover, he composed a special tract in German, *Ueber das Wesen der Sekte Chassidim aus ihren eigenen Schriften gezogen im Jahre 1816*. This tract, recently published and edited by A. Rubinstein under the title *'Al Mahut Kat ha-Hasidim* (Jerusalem 1977), served Peter Baer and I. M. Jost as a trustworthy source for their historical compositions.

See Rubinstein's introduction to Perl's tract, 1-2; and R. Mahler, *Ha-Hasidut we-ha-Haskalah* (Merhavyah 1961), 93, 155-186, 399-405. See also R. Michael, I. M. Jost: *Avi ha-Historiyografiyah ha-Yehudit ha-Modernit* (Jerusalem 1983), 54, 57-68, 162, 193-194. Regarding the attitude of maskilim towards Hasidut, see S. Verses, "Ha-Hasidut be-'ene Sofre ha-Haskalah", *Molad* 18 (1960 /1961), 379-391.

⁵⁵ See G. Scholem's extensive treatment, "Perusho shel Martin Buber le-Hasidut", in *Devarim Bego* (n. 35 above), 361-382 (Appeared in English in *The Messianic Idea in Judaism*, 227-250.) See also R. Schatz, "'Adam nokhah 'Elohim we-'Olam be-Mishnat Buber 'al ha-Hasidut", *Molad* 18, nos. 149-150 (1960), 596-609. For the personal and cultural background of Buber's intensive study of Hasidism, see P. Mendes-Flohr's excellent article, "'Orientaliyut u-Mistiqah: Ha-'Estetiqah shel Mifnei ha-Me'ah ha-19 we-ha-Zehut ha-Yehudit", *Mehqare Yerushalayim be-Mahshevet Yisra'el* 3 (1984), 623-681; originally appeared in English as "Fin de Siècle Orientalism, the Ostjuden and the Aesthetics of Jewish Self-Affirmation", in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* 1 (1984), ed. by Jonathan Frankel (Indiana University Press: Bloomington), 96-139.

⁵⁶ Dubnow's *Toledot ha-Hasidut* (both the German and the revised Hebrew version) was unquestionably influenced by earlier scholars, for example, by Ilya Orshanski whom Dubnow denigrated (in Dinur's opinion, unjustly). See B. Dinur, *Dorot u-Reshumot* (n. 51 above), particularly 244, 248 which are part of his general survey of Dubnow's work, 231-261. Additional comments on Dubnow's work follow.

⁵⁷ See Graetz, *Divre Yeme ha-Yehudim*, ed. S. P. Rabbinowitz (SHeFeR), (Jerusalem 1972), part 9, ch. 3, 76-92. (In English, H. Graetz, *The History of the Jews* (Philadelphia: JSP 1956), vol. 5, ch. 9.).

⁵⁸ See *Devarim Bego* (n. 35 above), 362; English, 229.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 362-363; English 229-230.

⁶⁰ See the extensive treatment by Mendes-Flohr (n. 55 above), ibid., adjoining nn. 95-97, where he elucidated the significant contribution of Paula Winkler, Buber's wife, in the composition of Buber's *'Aggadat ha-Ba'al Shem Tov*, and perhaps *Sippure R. Nahman* as well. See also, ibid., near n. 134 regarding Buber's letter to George Lukacs in which Buber expressed his opinion of the defective nature of the original Hasidic stories. My colleague A. Schapira is preparing an extensive study of this topic; hopefully it will be published soon. A single instructive example of Buber's method will suffice. Buber's Hebrew version of Hasidic legends, *'Or ha-Ganuz*, is a consistant translation of Buber's stylized German version, and does not reflect the original Hebrew of the tales. See for ex., "Ha-Seder shel 'Am ha-'Arez", *'Or ha-Ganuz*, 5th ed. (Tel Aviv 1977), 208-209. This story is a translation of the German; cf. to *Die Chassidischen Bücher* (Hellerau 1928),

462-464. Comparison of Buber's Hebrew to the original Hebrew version that appeared in *Sefer Ma'asidot we-Sihot Zaddikim* (Warsaw 1898), 68, reveals various changes made by Buber to raise the register of the text. For example, the hero R. Hayyim Tregir (porter in Yiddish), becomes Hayyim Sho'ev ha-Mayim (water-carrier). Cf. the use and translation of the word in *Si-ah Sarfe Kodes*, Yisrael (N. p., n. d.), pt. 2, 23 section 55. Moreover, Buber placed R. Hayyim's domicile in the poor quarter of town. My colleague Y. Liebes pointed out that Buber's rendering of R. Hayyim's sarcastic remark to his wife fails to convey the play of words zo'ananim = zo'an = mizriyyim. Buber translated “⁶¹Ani yode'a she-ha-yehudim hayu be-galut ḥezel ha-ziganers” simply as “⁶²Avotenu we-⁶³imoteynu hayu shuvuyim bi-yede ha-⁶⁴zo'ananim”. For additional examples of Buber's activity in the field of Hasidic literature as part of the “resuscitation” of Jewish culture, see A. E. Simon, “Martin Buber we-⁶⁵Emunat Yisra'el”, *Iyun* 9 (1958), 13-50.

⁶¹ See *Major Trends* (n. 6 above), 347.

⁶² See *Devarim Bego* (n. 35 above), 330ff. In English, “Devekut, or Communion with God”, in *The Messianic Idea in Judaism*, 208ff. In my opinion Buber correctly perceived the importance of the intimate Hasidic group, but without discerning its mystic basis or context; this point will be discussed below. Furthermore, perhaps Scholem's article on devekut can be viewed as making the severance of Buber's influence on Scholem. Scholem, following Buber, based his study on the intensive Hasidic relationship to the here and now. But unlike Buber, Scholem wanted to prove that their purpose was the elevation of holiness, not sanctification of the here and now. Ironically, Scholem was so eager to reverse Buber's interpretation that he was not aware that he continued to use Buber's methodology, rushing to unexamined eclectic Hasidic homilies in a manner similar to Buber's treatment of Hasidic legend.

⁶³ See *Major Trends* (n. 6 above), 340. M. Piekarz presents a similar contention in his book *Bi-Yeme Zmihat ha-Hasidut* (n. 11 above), 16 n. 13. Piekarz strongly attacks Scholem for not properly investigating sources and parallels to homiletic literature prior to and contemporary with Hasidic literature, and takes issue with him regarding the concept of the descent of the zaddik in Hasidism, *ibid.*, 299-302; the study of Torah in Hasidism, *ibid.*, 305-311; the concept of devekut, *ibid.*, 346-356. Fortunately, Piekarz has provided a key which enables re-examination and comparison of Hasidic homiletic discourses with prior and contemporary literature; it is now our task to test Piekarz's contention that Hasidic discourse is a link in the continuous chain of homiletic literature.

⁶⁴ In his article, “Demuto ha-Historit shel R. Israel Baal Shem tov”, *Devarim Bego* (n. 35 above), 287-291, and his comments, *ibid.*, 291-324, Scholem tries to exemplify how historical evidence can be derived from documentary study.

⁶⁵ *Devarim Bego* (n. 35 above), 288, 290.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 292, 295.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 289-290. Cf. Piekarz, *Bi-Yeme Zmihat ha-Hasidut* (n. 11 above), 12 n. 4, pp. 61, 96.

⁶⁹ See Piekarz, *Bi-Yeme Zmihat ha-Hasidut* (n. 11 above), 21-22, 39, 253.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁷¹ See H. Liberman, “Kezad Hoqrim Hasidut bi-Yisra'el”, *Bizaron*, 22nd year, vol. 43 (1961), 154-161. Reissued in his collection of articles, *Ohel Rahel* 1 (New York 1980), 1-11, 24-49.

⁷² See Piekarz (n. 11 above), 131-133, 138-139, 320, 344. Liberman was the first to link J. G. Weiss to Scholem; see *Ohel RaHel*, *ibid.*, 1-11. Piekarz followed

him; see his more extensive, aggressive critique of Weiss in *Bi-Yeme Zmihat ha-Hasidut*, 22-25, 96-98 (in n. 3 Piekartz cited Ettinger's critique of Weiss to support his argument), 170-172, 206, 207, 261, 276, 278, 346-348, 359. Piekartz, who edited Weiss' articles after the latter's demise, attacked Weiss for failing to follow the principles of scientific research with regard to verification of sources, study of historical and biographical background, and examination of contemporary and prior research. Piekartz's comments are included in dozens of bracketed additions to Weiss' notes in Weiss, *Mehqarim be-Hasidut braslav* (Jerusalem 1976), ed. by M. Piekartz. See, for ex., 12 n. 13, 19 n. 28, 30 n. 59, 31 n. 60, 50-51 n. 23. I have commented on Weiss' method in my articles; see " 'Arikhat Zavva'at ha-Rivash" (n. 11 above), 189-190, 210 nn. 104, 109; "Quntres Hanhagot Ne'elem le-Rabbi Nahman mi-Braslav?" (n. 20 above) 767 nn. 16-17; "Mi-Miyotos le-Etos" (n. 4 above), 133-146.

⁷³ See the extensive treatment in my article "Mi-Miyotos le-Etos", (n. 4 above).

⁷⁴ See Dubnow, *Toledot ha-Hasidut*, 3rd ed. (Tel Aviv 1967), 97; see also, ibid., 89 regarding the discourses of maggidim. Cf. to Dubnow's statements in his introduction.

⁷⁵ See the concluding section of the writer's introduction to *Shivhei ha-Besht*.

⁷⁶ *Genesis Rabbah* 35,2. Regarding the erudition and greatness of Ahiyyah, who came into being not only as the prophet of religious schism, see *Sanhedrin* 102a. Cf. *Bava Batra* 121b.

⁷⁷ See, *Shivhei ha-Besht*, ed. B. Mintz (Jerusalem 1969), 64. Cf. to the contents of the Besht's letter to his brother-in-law R. Gershon of Kitov, first published at the end of *Sefer Ben Porat Yosef* (Korets 1781); pp. 167-169 in Mintz's edition. This point was made by Professor Isaiah Tishby at a seminar I attended in 1972. Additional criticism of Dubnow's textual analysis is found in H. Liberman, *Ohel RaHeL* (n. 71 above), 12-23.

⁷⁸ See M. J. Rusman's doctoral dissertation, "The Polish Magnates and the Jews: Jews in the Sieniawsky-Czartoryski Territories, 1686-1731 (J.T.S., New York 1982). A précis of his conclusions appears on pp. 10-15 of the introduction, where he mentions other papers pointing to similar conclusions.

⁷⁹ Dubnow adopted Orshanski's conceptions regarding the program of religious reform, even though he viewed his work derogatorily. See Dinur's comment (n. 56 above).

⁸⁰ A description of Dinur's method is found in Jacob Katz's book, *Le'umiyut Yehudit* (n. 48 above), 230-238. See also S. Ettinger's introduction to Dinur's book, *Dorut u-Reshumot* (n. 51 above), esp. 10-13 where he points out the development of Dinur's nationalistic philosophy and its reflection in his study of Hasidism. See also, Scholem, *Devarim Bego* (n. 35 above), 509-515.

⁸¹ See B. Dinur, *Be-Mifneh ha-Dorot*, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem 1972), 108 n. 38.

⁸² See my comment, n. 16 above. The work of M. Piekartz (n. 11 above), and more recently, of Y. Hisdai (n. 1 above), must be mentioned. Moreover, Piekartz, despite his criticism of current research of Hasidism detailed above, praised Dinur's approach, p. 12 of his book. Even Y. Hisdai made extensive use of Dinur's work despite his disagreement with Dinur's opinions; see Hisdai's doctoral dissertation 9-10, 16, 30, 32-33, 47-49, 114, 181-182.

⁸³ First appeared in *Behinot*; now reissued in his book *Le'umiyut Yehudit* (n. 48 above), 243-251.

⁸⁴ See n. 54 above.

⁸⁵ See J. Katz, *Masoret u-Mashber*, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem 1964), 271-283. In English, *Tradition and Crisis: Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages* (Free Press of Glencoe 1961), 231-244.

⁸⁶ For an assessment of Katz's method and contribution to the study of social history, see the comments of E. Etkes and Y. Salmon, eds., *Peraqim be-Toledot ha-Hevrah ha-Yehudit bi-Yeme ha-Beynayim u-be-'Et ha-Hadashah*—presented to Professor Jacob Katz (Jerusalem 1980). See also I. Kolatt, "Historiyah Hevratit we-Toledot ha-issuv", *ibid.*, 402-404, and his description of the development of social history through its contact with the concepts of historicism, *ibid.*, 404-413.

⁸⁷ Katz, *Masoret u-Mashber*, 271. (English 232.)

⁸⁸ I have already mentioned A. H. Glicenstein's contribution to the rewriting of history (n. 6 and adjoining notes). Of better quality is the work of J. I. Schocet, *Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov* (Toronto 1961), and *idem.*, *The Great Maggid* (New York 1974).

⁸⁹ Appeared in Hebrew as *Ba'al ha-Yisurim* (Tel Aviv 1981).

⁹⁰ See M. Piekarz, "Zaddik li-vne ha'Olam he-Hadash?" *Tarbiz* 51 (1982), 149-165, and Green's answer, *ibid.*, 508-509.

⁹¹ In this context I must mention even if only briefly, the words of the author of the *Toledot Ya'akov Yosef*. Influenced by the *Shulhan Arukh ha-Ari*, he expounded that the hasid is obligated to study halakhah, meaning hakalah (the bride), as the path to closeness with the Divine. This was noted by A. Wertheim, *Halakhot we-Halikhot be-Hasidut* (n. 15 above), 42-43, but without examination of the role of the simple act of study in the daily experience of the hasid.

⁹² See A. Yaari, "Ha-Defus ha-Ivri be-Paritsk [Poryck]", *Kiryat Sefer* 20 (1943/44), 102, 104-106. Cf. Liberman, *'Ohel Rahel* 2 (n. 12 above), 53, 58, where he contends no Hasidic books were printed in Poryck.

⁹³ The following are several examples: In R. Solomon of Lutsk's introduction (p. 3 in R. Schatz-Uffenheimer's ed., 1. 6 from the bottom) "u-mah gam 'atah", which follows the mistaken reading in the Lemberg edition and the 1962 Jerusalem edition, should read "u-mah gam she-hem". In R. Solomon of Lutsk's second introduction to the first edition, and in the second edition (Korets 1784), the following sentence appears—"we-khen shoresh hayir'ah u-she'ar midot"—but in Schatz-Uffenheimer (6), and in the Jerusalem ed. (10) "u-she'ar yesodot" was printed. However, the Lemberg ed. (h.d.) reads "u-she'ar midot". The following examples are culled from the discourses themselves. The word betelim has been omitted in section 40 (p. 60) in Schatz-Uffenheimer's edition. The text reads "kakh ha-zaddik medabber le-ha-shem yitbarakh devarim we-hu mequshar le-ha-shem yitbarakh", but the first and second and the Lemberg editions read "kakh ha-zaddik medabber devarim betelim we-hu mequshar le-ha-shem yitbarakh". The source of the omission is the Jerusalem edition (1962), 27a. Further comparison of section 119 in the edition identical with the Jerusalem edition (1962), 72, with the first edition (Korets 1781), 30a, reveals that "holekh" has become "yeled", "otah"—"oto", and "lo"—"ben", thereby clouding the meaning of the parable.

⁹⁴ Cf. S. Lieberman, *Tosefta Ki-Feshutah* (New York 1973), pt. 8, 929. Regarding the meaning of the concept "derekh 'erez" see M. Higger, *Masekhot Ze'erot* (Jerusalem 1970), 1-7. See also A. Holtz's summary of Max Kadushin's views in his book, *Be'Olam ha-Mahshavah shel HaZaL* (Tel Aviv 1979), 104-151; esp. 112-123. Apparently R. Menahem ben Solomon ha-Me'iri did not have this Mishnah; see A. Sofer's note in *Bet ha-behirah*, Tractate Kiddushin 4th ed. (Jerusalem 1971) where he noted that the Maharsa had expressed surprise in his commentary (*loc. cit.*) regarding this point.

⁹⁵ See the extensive treatment in my article, "'Arikhat Zavva'at ha-Rivash'" (n. 15 above). Approximately four years ago, J. I. Schocet requested a copy of my

unpublished doctoral dissertation (see the end of n. 15 above). To my surprise, he recently published a “revised” version of *Zava’at ha-Rivash* in 1982, in which he made generous use of the above-mentioned article and chapter 3 of my dissertation, which dealt with the literary and ideological sources for *Zava’at ha-Rivash*. Apparently Schochet acted in conformity with the ultra-Orthodox approach of not mixing the holy (their works) with the profane (the works of academics); therefore he presented everything as holy, that is, as his words.

⁹⁶ See D. Ben-Amos and J. D. Mintz, *In Praise of the Baal Shem Tov* (Ontario 1972).

⁹⁷ The deceased A. Rubinstein bequeathed us a critical edition ready for publication, but with an uncompleted introduction; hopefully it will be published soon. S. A. Horodezky’s edition does not deserve serious consideration since he divided the book topically, and did not print the text as given; moreover, his citations are largely inaccurate.

⁹⁸ See J. Barnai, *Igrot Hasidim Ma-’Erez Yisra’el* (Jerusalem 1980), Letter 34, p. 152.

⁹⁹ See Barnai, ibid., Letter 43, p. 177.

¹⁰⁰ See *Sukkah* 28a. Cf. *Shivhei ha-Besht*, ed. by Mintz (n. 77 above), 64, 154-155; cf. also *Lev. Rabbah* 10, 4 regarding the disciples of Judah the Prince, as well as the *Sha’ar ha-Hakdamot* in the opening pages to *Sefer Etz Hayyim* (Warsaw 1891), 4c, 5b, where R. Hayyim Vital relates tales concerning the Ari.

¹⁰¹ See A. A. Halevi, *Ha-Aggadah ha-Historit Biyografit* (Tel Aviv 1975), 254. We should add Porphyrius’ account of Pythagoras’ life. See Smith’s translation in M. Smith and M. Hadas, *Heroes and Gods* (n. 31 above), 110-112.

¹⁰² See their edition (n. 96 above), 306 n. 6.

¹⁰³ See A. Band, *Nahman of Bratslav: The Tales* (New York 1978).

¹⁰⁴ See *Menahem Nahum of Chernobyl: Upright Practices, the Light of the Eyes* (New York 1982).

¹⁰⁵ Apparently he had not seen my articles “Sifrut ha-Hanhagot ha-Hasidit” (n. 8 above) when his work was in preparation; there I discussed the topics of the hanhagot of R. Menahem Nahum of Chernobyl. See, ibid., 209, 218-219, 282.

¹⁰⁶ My thanks to my colleague M. Idel for calling this paper to my attention.

WISDOM AND DIALOGUE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST

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Introduction

The search for Wisdom occupied the ancient mind as much as our own, if not more. The attempt to unravel the mysteries of the world and to comprehend the will of the gods, inseparable from those mysteries, many times proved fruitless. Ancient sages offered “answers” to questions about mortality or the afflictions of the righteous man that often do not appear to us to be answers at all. Witness the theophany in Job 38-40: where we would expect God’s speech to answer the arguments presented in the preceding chapters, we get instead a magnificent oration on the creator; the basic problems do not seem explicitly addressed. How can man understand what God wants, how can man be wise before the Divine? In the Babylonian “Theodicy,” the friend asserts: “The divine mind, like the center of the heavens, is remote; knowledge of it is difficult; people at large do not know it” (256-257). And again, in Job 27 we find: “But wisdom, where can it be found? Where is the place of understanding? Man knows not its abode. ‘Tis not found in the land of the living” (27:12-13).¹

But the seeming inaccessibility of wisdom did not deter the ancient sages from seeking after it. “Happy the man who fixes his thoughts on wisdom, and uses his brains to think, the man who contemplates her ways and ponders her secrets,” exclaims Sirach (14:20-21).² And three times in the Akkadian “Counsels of Wisdom” we are exhorted: *ina ihzika-ma amur ina tuppi*, “in your wisdom (or, by virtue of your education) read in the tablet...”

What, precisely, is this wisdom?

This paper will not try to define what “ultimate knowledge” is for all mankind and at all times. I am not embarking on a metaphysical or epistemological quest. There is, however, a subject attested in the text the ancients left us: they could converse with each other about wisdom across national boundaries and there is no

evidence that they were ever upset about problems of translation between them. What is most important to us is that what came to their mind with “wisdom” inspired them in very ordinary conversation.

The Problem of Definition

When it comes to defining “wisdom” in the ancient sense, modern scholars find themselves a bit perplexed. Scholars are generally agreed about a specific corpus of literature in the biblical texts designated “wisdom literature”; we can pick out the vivid personification of Dame Wisdom in Proverbs or Sirach and exclaim, “*that* is her, *that* is Wisdom.” We can search the ancient texts and list “characteristics” of the wise man: the one who is silent, who keeps his anger and impatience still, the one who practices justice equally to friend and foe; the one who leads a righteous life. We can point to a god of “wisdom” in Mesopotamia, Ea, and look at what he does exactly to merit this distinction. We can find examples in ancient Near Eastern literature of “wise men” such as Gilgamesh, Utnapishtim, Job, or the Eloquent Peasant.

Our problem, however, remains. All we have done is to circle the phenomenon of wisdom but we still have not managed to define precisely what that phenomenon is. The great seeker after wisdom, Socrates, might have chided us. Isn’t our interest in the function of wisdom a bit like Meno’s problem with virtue? When Meno confronts Socrates with the question “Can virtue be taught?”, Socrates answers: “...we shall not understand the truth of the matter until, before asking how man get virtue, we try to discover what virtue is in and by itself.”³ It is no good, says Socrates, to describe simply the symptoms of a phenomenon; one cannot grasp the truth of the matter until one defines the phenomenon. Once we have answered the question “What is X?”, claims Socrates, then we shall know what the essence of X really is.

Our texts do not speak with one voice. We cannot record them as if they did and draw a straightforward conclusion about the essence of wisdom. And Mesopotamian clay tablets have multiplied the number of voices. We find no precise corpus of “wisdom literature,” no group of philosophers gathering together to discuss

“wisdom.” Modern scholars often squirm uncomfortably with the very *concreteness* of ancient wisdom, because this seems to be precisely what prevents us from establishing one general definition. In the Akkadian “Counsels of Wisdom” we find exhortations to extend kindness to one’s enemies in the same text with warnings against marrying prostitutes “whose husbands are legion.” Abstract principles we feel comfortable with; day-to-day advice about when to plant one’s fields or whom not to marry, somehow “taints” the notion of wisdom. But the discomfort is our own. The ancient scribes do not worry about the “discrepancy.” When a sage offers advice it is equally important to advise on matters of concrete daily experience and ideal ethical behavior. For how can one lead a righteous, orderly life if one’s own house is not in order?

Assyriologists who have tackled the notion of wisdom in ancient Mesopotamia have taken several approaches. W. G. Lambert’s monumental work *Babylonian Wisdom Literature*⁴ offers, in one volume, transliterations and translations of all Akkadian texts commonly recognized by scholars as being primarily wisdom material. He does not examine in great detail the idea of ancient wisdom. In his introductory essay he claims that “wisdom” as a literary genre is a term borrowed from biblical studies and is not appropriate to Mesopotamian literature. “Wisdom” in Mesopotamia, he says, “refers to skill in cult and magic lore, and the wise man is the initiate.”⁵ J. J. A. van Dijk⁶ and E. I. Gordon⁷ concentrated on classifying wisdom genres such as proverbs, instructional texts, and fables. The most comprehensive recent view of wisdom material is given in Giorgio Buccellati’s article “Wisdom and Not: The Case of Mesopotamia.”⁸ Buccellati examines the idea of wisdom itself and suggests that we talk of a *tradition* of wisdom. Just because there does not exist a specific literary genre of wisdom literature in Mesopotamia, says Buccellati, does not mean that the concept was absent. He isolates various “wisdom themes” (e.g., “the stress on the growth of inner experience as a major goal in life”) and discovers that these basic themes can be found in a large variety of texts; many texts, such as certain types of omen texts or the Epic of Gilgamesh, have not previously been isolated as wisdom material by scholars. By not limiting himself to literary classifications, Buccellati is much freer

to look at the essence of wisdom in ancient Mesopotamia. It is easy to see that his approach brings in much needed common sense and enables us to look with more confidence at the variety of our sources that puzzled us before.

Distinctions in Our Sources

Our mental habits are not always illuminating for our study of ancient Mesopotamian texts. It seems natural for us to differentiate two types of wisdom: first, a practical, down-to-earth wisdom where advice is offered on how to conduct one's life; and, second, a more abstract type of wisdom where one finds an enquiring into the enigmas of life and an attempt to answer some of those mysteries. This differentiation was not so apparent to the ancient Mesopotamian. We cannot approach the texts expecting there to be this clear-cut distinction, i.e., this text provides practical advice, that text discusses more theoretical, speculative problems. Instead, our texts demonstrate a great deal of overlapping with respect to the two categories *we* have constructed. To the ancient Mesopotamian, theory and practice were not so sharply separated. "Practical wisdom" may include advice about how to prevent oneself from becoming embroiled in unnecessary disputes. But "practical wisdom" may also include many proverbial statements on subjects we would not necessarily consider to be down-to-earth, everyday matters. "Fate" is a good example. Is "fate" a theoretical problem or a practical one? "Fate is a slippery bank that makes a man slide," warns a Mesopotamian proverb.⁹ Our query about whether such a subject as "fate" is theoretical or practical was not one the Mesopotamian would much bother about. For ancient man, the two sides of wisdom were inextricably bound and that is how he expressed it. It is important to realize that theory and praxis are principally our own categories and that "practical" and "theoretical" texts overlap in many instances.

A second distinction many scholars have made is that between literary and non-literary sources. In fact, our knowledge of Mesopotamian wisdom stems from both. Buccellati has shown this most clearly in his article by approaching wisdom as a "cultural tradition" rather than as a phenomenon limited to a specific body

of literature. A text used for cultic instruction (e.g. *Šurpu*) may contribute as greatly to our insight into Mesopotamian wisdom as do those texts which deal with more speculative affairs (e.g. "Theodicy").

One distinction that can be made with some certainty is sociological in character and it is evident from our sources. Mesopotamian "wisdom" springs from the scribal and school tradition, most assuredly; but it also arises from folk tradition and gives us an idea of "common sense" wisdom that must have circulated among "the people."¹⁰

Scribal and Folk Traditions

It is clear that in Mesopotamia, the written tradition is emphasized. I stress the importance of this fact because the written word does not play a central rôle in the acquisition of knowledge in all cultures. In India, for example, and in its search for wisdom, the emphasis was on oral recitation and memorization of the most authoritative tradition, to wit, the Vedas. Instruction was heard rather than read. The tradition of oral recitation continued, to quite an extent, even with texts that did not share the high degree of sacredness of the Vedas.¹¹ In India, then, real knowledge lay in the oral, not the written, tradition.

In Mesopotamia, on the other hand, writing is emphasized. The scribes themselves often claimed ancestry from scholars of old, beginning with the Kassite period (ca. 1500's B.C.).¹² The emphasis here is on the written tradition. Berossus, too, stressed the written tradition. According to him, Oannes wrote a book and presented it to man; it was from Oannes that man learned the arts of civilization.¹³ Also according to Berossus, before the onset of the Deluge, Cronos ordered Xisouthros to bury the "beginnings, middles and ends" of all writing in the city of Sippar before embarking on the boat. After the Flood, a voice from the sky ordered the survivors on the boat to dig up those writings and distribute them to mankind.¹⁴

Of course, oral communication was never dispensed with, just as in India the central importance of recitation and memorization never put an end to writing. While the emphasis in ancient

Mesopotamia is on the written tradition, our documents themselves point to the importance of the spoken word. It is not possible for us to reconstruct with accuracy ancient oral tradition in Mesopotamia. But we can get a glimpse of the significance of common sense wisdom by studying the content of personal names¹⁵ and by examining proverbs. Proverbs are a special case. It is clear that proverbs circulate among the “common folk” in many cultures as a means of instructing young people in cultural mores and values. Proverbs spring from everyday experiences, observations and reflections. In Mesopotamia we find them gathered together in specific proverb collections; but proverbial statements are also written into the body of literary texts and it is evident that proverbs played a sizeable rôle in the cultural tradition. Some proverbs can easily be envisioned as circulating among the general populace:

Whoever has walked with truth generates life.¹⁶
Possessions are sparrows in flight which can find no place to alight.¹⁷

Others indicate their scholarly provenience:

The scribal art is the mother of orators and the father of scholars.¹⁸

I emphasize the rôle played by proverbs within the wisdom tradition for two reasons. First, proverbs grow out of the ferment of everyday living experiences. They can rise above cultural boundaries and become international commodities, the means by which one culture can communicate with another. In the international atmosphere of the ancient Near East where trade flourished for millennia between many disparate cultures, the proverb assumes a supra-cultural garb. Second, wisdom itself is a supra-cultural and trans-cultural phenomenon. The international function of wisdom is not merely external. Throughout the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean world, we find similar approaches to wisdom. The words for wisdom, for example, are all either etymologically or semantically alike, or both. We discover a similar concept of technical skill needed for a particular craft. *Hākām* in Hebrew may indicate “cleverness and skill for the purpose of practical action.”¹⁹ In Greece, particularly prior to the fifth century B.C., *sophia* and *sophos* also denoted a special technical skill²⁰ which might include a

knowledge of carpentry, music and singing, divination, and shipwright skills.²¹ *Sophia* was also “skill in matters of common life, sound judgment, intelligence, practical wisdom.”²² Many of the words in Akkadian which we understand to be connected with wisdom exhibit a similar relationship to technical sagacity: *mūdū*, “one who knows,” “expert in a craft”; *emqu*, “skilled, experienced, educated”; *apkallu*, one of the seven ante-diluvian sages, or a type of priest; *nēmequ*, “wise,” often used in conjunction with cultic skill. Cultic skill in ancient Mesopotamia is an essential element of wisdom. Many of the words for “wise” are used in connection with the gods Ea and Marduk, the gods of wisdom and magic; these words, which often form epithets of the two deities frequently appear in specific cultic and magical nuances, again indicating the connection between wisdom and technical expertise.

Wisdom and Instruction

The international nature of ancient wisdom is also apparent in its *concrete* manner of instruction. Many of the issues of ancient wisdom revolve about how best to orient oneself in the circumstances one is in; how to deal most effectively with day-to-day experiences.²³ We find the barmaid Siduri suggesting to Gilgamesh, who is desperate to attain immortality:

Gilgamesh, whither do you run?
The life which you seek you will not find;
(For) when the gods created mankind
They allotted death to mankind,
But life they retained in their keeping.
As for you, Gilgamesh, let your belly be full;
Day and night be merry;
Make everyday (a day of) rejoicing.
Day and night dance and play.
Let your raiment be clean,
Your head washed (and) yourself bathed in water.
Cherish the little one holding your hand,
(and) let the wife rejoice in your bosom.
This is the lot of [mankind....]. (Tablet X, iii, 1-14)²⁴

In *Ecclesiastes* 9:7-9, we are exhorted:

Go to it, then, eat your food and enjoy it, and drink your wine with a cheerful heart; for already God has accepted what you have done. Always be dressed in white and never fail to anoint your head.

Enjoy life with a woman you love all the days of your allotted span here under the sun, empty as they are; for that is your lot while you live and labor here under the sun.²⁵

And, finally, in the Egyptian “Song of the Harper” we are told:

Hence, rejoice in your heart!
 Forgetfulness profits you!
 Follow your heart as long as you live!
 Put myrrh on your head,
 Dress in fine linen,
 Anoint yourself with oils fit for a god.
 Heap up your joys,
 Let your heart not sink!
 Follow your heart and your happiness,
 Do your things on earth as your heart commands...²⁶

We also find entire texts which consists solely of instructions and admonitions. In Egypt there are a number of such “instruction texts”: “Instruction of Ptah-hotep,” “Instruction Addressed to Kagemni,” “Instruction of Any,” “Instruction of Amene-mope.”²⁷ Mesopotamian texts such as “The Instructions of Shuruppak,”²⁸ “Advice to a Prince,” “Counsels of a Pessimist,” and “Counsels of Wisdom,”²⁹ offer advice on orienting oneself to life’s exigencies. Many times the speaker addresses his listener as “my son,” a form of address also found in many of the biblical Proverbs. The addressee is beckoned; he is invited to hear the words and learn from them. The exhortation to listen and learn is also found in the Mesopotamian text *Ludlul bel nemeqi*, “I will praise the lord of wisdom,” a text most scholars would not readily place within the genre of instruction texts *per se*. There we hear the speaker exclaim: “[He] who has done wrong in respect of Esagila (the temple of Marduk in Babylon), let him learn from my example.”³⁰ So, too, in the first tablet of the Epic of Gilgamesh we are told that Gilgamesh engraved all of his toils on a stone stele (i, 8). This would serve not only to “immortalize” him in writing but would also act as an instructional example to others.

The emphasis here is on instructing: the one who knows instructs the less knowledgeable. In the Mesopotamian incantation series *Šurpu*,³¹ tablets V-VII, there are cultic dialogues between Ea and Marduk, Ea’s son. Marduk was born “wise,” inheriting the tradition of “cultic wisdom” from his father; he possessed multiple ears at birth, signifying his wisdom.³² It is still mandatory, however,

that he be properly instructed by his father in the correct functioning of the ritual. Ea asserts that Marduk already knows everything that he, Ea, knows; nonetheless, tablets V-VII are devoted to detailed ritual instructions to Marduk, cast in the form of dialogues.

Wisdom and Dialogue

Wisdom is a matter of communication, of dialogue. A dialogic relationship is initiated between the one who is knowledgeable and the one to be taught. Knowledge is communicated through the dialogic process.

In Mesopotamian literature, there is a large variety of dialogues. We find dialogues occurring within developing narratives such as the Epic of Gilgamesh, Inanna's Descent to the Netherworld, the Etana legend and the story of Adapa. Other dialogues are set within cultic and ritual contexts such as the Ea-Marduk dialogues in *Šurpu*. Several Mesopotamian pieces of literature center on dialogic debates between interlocutors that may surprise us, such as animals, tree types or seasons of the year. Each one tries to prove its superiority over the other (the contest literature or the "disputations"). Several texts are devoted solely to the dialogue between two people in which one specific issue is addressed.

In all these dialogues, a relationship is engendered; characters disclose themselves through choice of word and mood, situations are created, problems tackled, solutions offered. Man reveals himself through his discourse with his fellow man.

In our Western tradition, the name of Plato looms foremost when one discusses dialogue. Indeed, many scholars are tempted to think of the dialogic tradition as beginning with the great Greek philosopher. Let us look for a moment at the use of dialogue in Plato's works and thought. Why did the Greek master choose the form of the *dialogue* in which to enframe his mentor's and his own philosophical insights? We can get an idea of some of Plato's opinions on the spoken word apart from instruction in *Epistle VII*:

But this much I can certainly declare concerning all these writers, or prospective writers, who claim to know the subjects which I seriously study, whether as hearers of mine or of other teachers, or from their own discoveries; it is

impossible, in my judgement at least, that these men should understand anything about this subject. There does not exist, nor will there ever exist, any treatise of mine dealing therewith. For it does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies, but, as a result of continued application to the subject itself and communion therewith, it is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter it nourishes itself. Notwithstanding, of thus much I am certain, that the best statement of these doctrines in writing or in speech would be my own statement; and further, that if they should be badly stated in writing it is I who would be the person most deeply pained. And if I had thought that these subjects ought to be fully stated in writing or in speech to the public, what nobler action could I have performed in my life than that of writing what is of great benefit to mankind and bringing forth to the light for all men the nature of reality? But were I to undertake this task it would not, as I think, prove a good thing for men, save for some few who are able to discover the truth themselves with but little instruction; for as to the rest, some it would most unseasonably fill with a mistaken contempt, and others with an overweening and empty aspiration, as though they had learnt some sublime mysteries.³³

For Plato, the written word offered less than lively debate and conversation. Writing, he says, is simply an aid to memory, reminding the wise man of what he knows already.³⁴ Writing is the wise man's *paidia* (from *pais*, a child), that is, "play, pastime or recreation."³⁵ Writing is educative but it does not take the place of listening, hearing, conversing. "And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak," says Socrates. "When ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself" (*Phaedrus* 275d).³⁶ The best sort of communication is described as the "legitimate brother" of written speech and it is the "word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent" (*Phaedrus* 267a).

W. K. C. Guthrie traces this emphasis on the spoken word and the verbal debate to the general climate of the Greek tradition. Writing was not meant to supplant speaking but to aid it:

Homer, lyric, tragedy and oratory were only written down in order to be memorized and sung or spoken. By Plato's time the position was already changing, and at this transition stage the relationship between spoken and written logos became a subject of lively argument.³⁷

Historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides and philosophers like Anaxagoras may have written their works down but they were meant to be heard. Furthermore, there was no technical jargon used in philosophical discussions. Matters were presented and written in a straightforward manner, easily understandable to any person wishing to engage in serious discussion.

In Plato, the dialogue offered the best form in which to encapsulate the lively sort of exchange of which Socrates was a master. The written form of the dialogue was to act simply as an aid to memory but was never meant to take the place of verbal debate. Through dialogue, Socrates arrived at the definition of something; it was only through definition that one could pinpoint the essence of whatever was under discussion. The dialogues employ a question-and-answer procedure in order to arrive at the proper definition. Plato enriches his dialogues with a generous splattering of images and metaphors (e.g., the Cave³⁸ and the Line³⁹); at the same time he is adamant that these images be used simply for the purpose of illustration and instruction. An image belongs to an inferior grade of reality (*Republic* 595-602); it is never meant to be taken for essence itself.

When we turn to Mesopotamia we must shift our perspective a bit. We do not find in Mesopotamia a development of a concept of *theory*, that is, a conscious systematization of principles, that is prevalent in later Greek tradition. Wisdom in ancient Mesopotamia remains strongly bound to cultic expertise and this often makes it difficult for us to define “wisdom.” When speaking of Mesopotamian wisdom, I stressed that theoretical, speculative problems cannot be divorced from practical affairs. A man may be “wise” precisely because he is a cultic and ritual expert or because he is skilled in practical matters. Wisdom and expertise, theory and practice are not only closely linked; indeed, in many ancient societies it is difficult to separate them. Even in the case of Plato, matters are not always clear-cut. When Plato discussed his theories in the *Laws*, he was not engaging in idle speculation: for him, theory and practice were cut from the same cloth.⁴⁰ Neither did he attempt to exorcise mythological and religious elements from his philosophical reflection.⁴¹ “Philosophy” as a *discipline* involving certain types of reasoning and a logical order in thought processes

was introduced by the Greeks; but the inquisitiveness and reflective sobriety that belongs to man as man reach endlessly into his past and extend to all customs. It is true that we do not have a hoary Socrates-like figure in Mesopotamia, an analytic Plato or Aristotle. But we *do* have a comparable type of literature. It lends itself to a comparison with the greatest works of human reflection. It is customary to look for the origin of “our” philosophy in Greece, but we may do well to remember that the Greeks, like the nations of the ancient Near East, did not indulge in abstract technical concepts. We do not need to quarrel with our Greek origins in thought, but let me point to one special advantage with Akkadian and other ancient Near Eastern languages: they do not tempt us to introduce abstractions in our translations. Linguistic difficulties notwithstanding, we can understand their documentation beyond a gap of millennia even through translations because of their immediacy, concreteness, and earthiness.

The concept of “dialogue” surely existed in Mesopotamia. In Sumerian literature, the ancients termed one particular genre, *adaman-dug₄-ga*, which refers specifically to the contest literature. In this literature, two or more parties engage in a dispute, vying with each other over which is the superior object or creature. It is true that the term *adaman-dug₄-ga* refers only to this particular genre, was more popular among the Sumerian scribes than among the Akkadians, and that *adaman-dug₄-ga* with its equivalents in the lexical lists is rare; the term did not gain as widespread a usage as the term “dialogue” did in Greek and later traditions. But just because the term is not used extensively in Mesopotamia, does not mean that the concept was lacking. The important point is that the Mesopotamians did conceive of the verbal debate. The “Theodicy” and the “Dialogue of Pessimism” are masterpieces of discourse in Akkadian literature. Discussion and argumentation are present in Mesopotamian literature. The Mesopotamian enjoyed the art of verbal sparring as much as the Greeks reveled in the debater’s techniques of the *agora*.

Characteristics of Dialogue in Mesopotamian Literature

There are several stylistic devices used in Mesopotamian narrative literature that are also present in dialogic contexts. These

include repetition, parallelism, metaphor, simile, and stories-within-stories. In dialogues, however, these devices are used in unique ways.

Similar to their use in Plato, metaphors and similes are continually used in Mesopotamian dialogues to illuminate an idea. One rarely finds advice rendered without several practical examples drawn from daily life. In the “Dialogue of Pessimism,” for example, the slave wishes to point to the folly of love and he unceremoniously compares the figure of “woman” to a series of unflattering objects:

Woman is a pitfall—a pitfall, a hole, a ditch; woman is a sharp iron dagger
that cuts a man’s throat.

The hole, the ditch, and the dagger are not necessarily dangerous in themselves. The speaker wishes to stress their negative aspects in the comparisons. He chooses examples from the everyday life of his audience that will be especially tangible to them; the metaphors will engrave themselves indelibly upon the listener.

Repetition is also frequently used in dialogues. Sometimes sections of preceding narrative will be repeated verbatim within the dialogue of a person; at times, dialogues of other people are repeated in another person’s dialogue. This last device brings us to the use of dialogues occurring within dialogues. In the Epic of Gilgamesh, when Gilgamesh rejects Ishtar’s offer of love, he repeats an earlier dialogue of hers with another prospective lover. This manner of weaving dialogues within dialogues is akin to the ancient Near Eastern literary phenomenon of incorporating stories within stories. In the Akkadian Etana legend, for example, the plot of Etana acquiring the plant of birth is interwoven with the story of the snake and the eagle. In the Epic of Gilgamesh, the flood story is incorporated into the larger structure of the Gilgamesh story. Here, the flood narrative is actually a *dialogue* spoken by Utnapishtim to Gilgamesh.

In spite of the similarity, the device of entwining dialogues within dialogues is not *simply* an extension of the story-within-a-story motif, but is a literary form with its own unique characteristics. The incorporation of a dream within a dialogue shows such a characteristic, one of dramatic intensification. In the Epic of

Gilgamesh, Enkidu recounts his dream of the gods' dialogic counsel in his dialogue with Gilgamesh. Hence, dialogues between the gods in the dream are embedded within the larger Enkidu-Gilgamesh dialogue. Dramatically, the level of gods and of human life touch each other. More generally, we can say that the use of dialogues within dialogues jolts the reader or listener for a moment. They draw him closer to the discussion and, at the same time, pull him back to a place where he can pause to reflect.

Reflection. This is the key word. When Gilgamesh reiterates Ishtar's previous dialogue with another lover, what has he done but stopped and *reflected* on that earlier dialogue? And in the other example I gave, when Enkidu recounts the dream and the divine dialogues to Gilgamesh, he has paused to turn to these earlier scenes and he needs to put what happened then into words now. Such reflection and speech with oneself is attested in other texts and sometimes we read whole passages of true inner dialogues. In Akkadian, this reflection is indicated by the reciprocal form of *malāku*, "to counsel, to advise." When Siduri sees the disheveled Gilgamesh from afar, she addresses her heart in an inner dialogue:

She says to her heart (and) [speaks] (these) words;
 [as she takes counsel] with herself:
 "Surely this (man) is a murderer!
 Whither is he bound....[...]?""⁴²

In another text, a dialogue between a sufferer and God,⁴³ the sufferer says at a certain moment:

Amtalkam-ma ina kabbattiya
 "I took counsel with myself"

or

"I reflected"

Plato had much to say on inner and outer dialogue. In *Theaetetus* 189-190, we find the following exchange:

Socrates: "...And do you define thought as I do?"
 Theaetetus: "How do you define it?"

Socrates: "...as the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers... But the soul...when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound,

and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming an opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself.”⁴⁴

Plato has indicated the real nature of inner and outer dialogue. Outer dialogue, external words, should not be haphazard. They arise out of one’s reflection, one’s inner dialogue, one’s counsel with oneself. Such reflection is attested in our Mesopotamian materials. Every time an author shocks the reader with a literary device—an unexpected metaphor, a sudden interjection of direct speech, an unusual sentence structure or rhythmic construction—he is not merely using a stylistic ornament. He is pulling us back and demanding our reflection at that juncture in the text. And this conscious attempt to make *us* reflect demonstrates *his* own reflection on the matter and his judgment that a particular issue demands deliberation.

Another device that serves an instructional and reflective function is the rhetorical question. It is also a *dramatic* device precisely because of the difficulty or impossibility of answering it or because the answer is self-evident. When Utnapishtim begins his dialogue with Gilgamesh he poses a number of philosophically rhetorical questions:

- Do we build a house (to stand) forever?
- Do we seal (a document to be in force) forever?
- Do brothers divide (their inheritance to last) forever?
- Does hatred remain in [the land] forever?
- Does the river rise (and) carry the flood forever? (X, vi, 26-29)

These questions are not meant to be answered. Their purpose is a dramatic one: they serve to illustrate the impermanence of things in this life for which no immediate solution can be found. They are utterances of Utnapishtim’s own reflection that then demand reflection on the part of Gilgamesh.

Mesopotamian texts that revolve solely about the dialogue between two people offer a unique opportunity to study dialogue’s rôle within the wisdom tradition. In such texts as the “Theodicy,” the “Dialogue of Pessimism,” and the contest literature, there is no accompanying narrative in which dialogues are set such as the Epic of Gilgamesh. These texts are purely dialogic and assume an overtly instructional tone. Let us look for a moment at some of these texts.

Vivid images are used by the slave in the “Dialogue of Pessimism.” He uses images to stress the opposites in every case. He does not try to illustrate sets of “universals.” On the contrary, he wishes to demonstrate that all things are double-edged; no one can be sure of his choices because there will always be two opposing possibilities. For example, a woman can be loved because she will enable a man to dispel fear and sorrow. But beware! he cautions. Woman is also the cause of man’s demise. The slave uses images, not to indicate the stability of any one tenet; rather, the only thing one can be certain of is that nothing *is* certain. And here is the mark of the wise man: all he can do is to acknowledge the ambiguity and make his choices accordingly. The wise man does not make hasty judgments. He reserves his judgment and coolly observes the possibilities. The wise man, like the slave here, must be skeptical in order to judge and choose wisely. And, also like the slave, who forever seems to be laughing up his sleeve, the wise man must retain his sense of humor. Without humor, the wise man loses his sense of perspective and his freedom to transcend the things that enchain us.⁴⁵

When we turn to the dialogue text, the “Theodicy,” a dialogue between a sufferer and a friend, we clearly see the very real importance of the written tradition in ancient Mesopotamia. The text is an acrostic composition; it is arranged in 27 stanzas of eleven lines each. The acrostic reads: “I, Saggil-kinam-ubbib, the incantation priest, am a worshipper of God and king.”⁴⁶ The acrostic is a formal device, a vertical frame within which the entire composition is set. The work is not *only* a verbal discussion; it is a work of art, consciously composed. The acrostic is a *graphic* device that must also be *seen* to be understood. The dialogue between the sufferer and the friend is not a spontaneous discussion like those we encounter in Plato’s works. In Mesopotamia, hearing and reading (seeing) are integrally bound in the pursuit of wisdom.

In the “Theodicy” we note that there are only two speakers, each representing a different viewpoint. The sufferer rejects established religious tradition and the notion that God rewards the good man and punishes the man who has transgressed. His own life illustrates this, he claims. He has loved God and man, performed the rituals correctly and with joy, and served his fellow man. What

has he to show in return? He is outcast from society, he has lost his wealth and honor. Something has gone awry, he insists, in the age-old views toward God's goodness. The friend tenaciously holds onto those traditions rejected by the righteous sufferer; there is justice in the end, he is sure. This discussion highlights two speakers only. We find that also in the contest literature two contestants are featured.⁴⁷

It is unfortunate that the group of contest texts, which is representative of dialogic disputes, is in such a poor state of preservation. Still, a basic pattern in the texts is discernible. First, a mythological scene is given as a prologue to the encounter of the disputants. This mythological introduction, having its roots in the cosmogonic myth, provides an essential orientation. Next, the debate proper begins. Finally, a judgment scene occurs before a deity who renders a decision.

The limitation to only two disputants is almost without exception in Mesopotamian dialogues. This is a notable contrast with Platonic dialogues which may include a variety of people in the discussion (for example, the *Symposium* and the *Protagoras*). For Plato, the essential point was that something was *verbally* discussed and deliberated. Wisdom is a matter of dialogue between many discussants. In Mesopotamia, on the other hand, discussion and instruction was more of a one-on-one affair, not a matter of many people discussing and debating. This instruction is to be supplemented by reading and seeing the text. One learns through verbal instruction and reflective reading of the text. This emphasis on both reading and listening clearly indicates the script-bound nature of Mesopotamian culture with its stress on the scribal, literate tradition. This emphasis on reading is also apparent in the great legal tradition of Mesopotamia. In his epilogue to his famous 'law-code,' Hammurapi invites his people to use his stele as a standard of justice:

Let any oppressed man who has a case come into the presence of the statue of me, the king of justice, and then read carefully my inscribed stele, and give heed to my precious words, and may my stele make the case clear to him; may he understand his cause; may he set his mind at ease.⁴⁸

Conclusions

Wisdom is not a solitary affair. It is not a treasure chest that an individual fills up for himself and his own enlightenment. Wisdom's real value lies in its power to instruct and illuminate. It needs to be communicated. Dialogue is its vehicle. Through his words, the master constructs a dialogic kinship with another in order to instruct him in the perplexities of life. In Mesopotamia, the master may be a special priest, initiated into the intricacies of ritual, responsible for the education of the novice. Or he may be an Utnapishtim who needs to instruct a brash young hero in the realities of normal life. Wisdom is also a dangerous matter. The dialogue texts in Mesopotamian discuss affairs of the gravest significance and their characters often utter revolutionary statements that threaten the established order. If not dangerous, wisdom can still be an ambiguous affair, something that exists on the periphery of that established order, an elusive something as difficult to define as it is to acquire. Wisdom can be the ability to see the *pro* and the *contra* at the same time.

We have noted several differences in the approaches to dialogue in the Greek and Mesopotamian traditions. For Plato, verbal discussion and debate were important and the written word served as an aid to the spoken. In Mesopotamia, we witness an emphasis on the written tradition and a closer integration of the written and spoken word in the business of instructing. A common denominator underlies both traditions, however. Plato stresses the need for play with the written word; his dialogues, whether written or spoken, are dramatic pieces of play. In Mesopotamia, we find a similar element of drama that lends a real quality of play to the dialogue. The contest literature offers an excellent illustration of this. There is no accompanying narrative, no real development of characters, no "stage props." The only "setting" that most of them have is the mythological prologue. Each disputant must present his "case," develop it, provide convincing arguments, and subtly undermine his opponent within the context of a verbal sally. Since these disputationes were usually judged by a deity, we can easily imagine these disputes being "enacted" before him. What we have, in effect, is a dialogic drama between the contestants. All

arguments and images must be portrayed by the speaker solely through his words; in the debate, that is all that he has at his disposal. The dramatic element of the contest literature is due precisely to the use of dialogue.

This element of play and drama is also marvelously illustrated in the “Dialogue of Pessimism.” Indeed, E.S. Speiser and F. M. Th. de Liagre Böhl suggested that this text was a dramatic one, enacted publicly.⁴⁹ This seems most likely, and then the sense of drama and satire stand out sharply. Wisdom cannot be approached in somber, solemn, grave manners alone. It cannot be grasped without a sense of life’s humor and play. It is through dialogue and the play provided by dialogue that one begins the arduous journey toward wisdom. The Mesopotamian tradition stressed the written word alongside the verbal discussion. But the sense of play is there. It is also there in the wisdom materials of other ancient Near Eastern cultures. We see this humor underlying the words of the “Eloquent Peasant” in Egyptian literature⁵⁰ as surely as we see it in the seriousness of Job’s interlocutors and in God’s response. We hear wisdom crying aloud in public places, at the top of the busy streets and at the open gates, in the biblical book of *Proverbs*, beckoning men to listen to her and be instructed, to turn away from their foolishness. In the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean world, wisdom dons a number of variously colored garments but wisdom never separates herself from the ordinary, most accessible, public places and things. In the most splendid and universal tradition of humor, the most unreachable sublime, and the most common, intermingle. In spite of the differences in cultural traditions and the stretch of millennia we discover that we can understand. Wisdom cries out to human creatures and human creatures in human words react to each other for her sake. Within the deadly serious demeanor of wisdom we see always a subtle smile that commands us not to lose sight of the play.

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¹ Marvin H. Pope, Job, *A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1979).

² All biblical quotations are taken from the *New English Bible*.

³ *Meno* 100b. Translation of W. K. C. Guthrie (Penguin Books, 1956).

⁴ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁶ *La sagesse suméro-accadienne* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1953).

⁷ "A New Look at the Wisdom of Sumer and Akkad," *BiOr* 17 (1960), 122-152.

⁸ *JAOS* 101 (1981), 35-47.

⁹ *nam-tar pēšx dur5-ra-ām lú-da giri-ni im-ma-da-an-zé-er*. B. Alster, *The Instructions of Shuruppak, Mesopotamia*, vol. 2 (Copenhagen, 1974), p. 44, lines 174-176.

¹⁰ See G. Buccellati, "Wisdom and Not: The Case of Mesopotamia."

¹¹ See J. Gonda, *Die Religionen Indiens I* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960); L. Renou and J. Filliozat, *L'Inde classique* (Paris, 1947); Kees W. Bolle, *The Persistence of Religion* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2nd ed., 1973).

¹² W. G. Lambert, "Ancestors, Authors, and Canonicity," *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 11 (1957) 1-14.

¹³ Stanley M. Burstein, *The Babylonica of Berossus* (Malibu: Udena, 1978), 14.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20. Mention should also be made of the "discovery" of the Book of the Torah during the reign of Josiah (621 B.C.). This written material that was unearthed from the Temple at Jerusalem became the basis of Josiah's Deuteronomic reform.

¹⁵ See Buccellati, "Wisdom and Not."

¹⁶ See E. I. Gordon, *Sumerian Proverbs: Glimpses of Everyday Life in Ancient Mesopotamia* (Philadelphia: University Museum, 1959), section 1.1, p. 41.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, line 18, p. 50.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, line 5, p. 43.

¹⁹ Georg Fohrer, "Sophia," in *Studies in Ancient Israelite Wisdom*, J. Crenshaw, ed. (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1976), 63.

²⁰ W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 27.

²¹ References are from H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), s.v. *σοφια*, p. 1621.

²² *Ibid.*, s.v. *σοφια*, *σοφος*.

²³ The Akkadian word *tašimtu* is a good illustration of this. W. von Soden derives this word from *šummu* IV, "sich (aus)denken, sich überlegen," and translates *tašimtu* as "Einsicht, Verständnis" (see *Akkadisches Handwörterbuch*, s.v. *tašimtu(m)*, p. 1338). Lambert suggests, for several passages, that *tašimtu* is "that practical wisdom which enables a man to make the best of his circumstances." See Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature*, p. 282, n. 24.

²⁴ Translation of A. Heidel, *The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949), 70.

²⁵ NEB

²⁶ M. Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature*, vol. I (University of California Press, 1973), 196-197.

²⁷ English translations of these texts may be found in Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature*, volumes I (1973) and II (1976).

²⁸ C. Wilcke, “Philologische Bemerkungen zum ‘Rat des Šuruppag’ und Versuch einer neuen Übersetzung,” *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* 68 (1978), 196-232.

²⁹ These last three texts may be found in Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature*.

³⁰ [Ša] ana Esagila egū ina qātiya līmur. K. 3291 (G) Reverse, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature*, p. 56, line p.

³¹ See E. Reiner, *Surpu: A Collection of Sumerian and Akkadian Incantations. Archiv für Orientforschung. Beihefte* 11 (1958).

³² In Mesopotamia, the ear was considered to be the seat of the intelligence. To be “wide of ear” meant “to be wise.”

³³ Loeb Classical Library. Translated by Rev. R.G. Bury (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 341b-e.

³⁴ “The gardens of letters he will, it seems, plant for amusement, and will write, when he writes, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path” (*Phaedrus* 276d).

³⁵ Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 59.

³⁶ Loeb Classical Library. Translated by H. N. Fowler.

³⁷ Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. IV, p. 58.

³⁸ *Republic* 532a-e.

³⁹ *Republic* 510-511e.

⁴⁰ Note, too, his efforts to ‘educate’ Dionysius II of Syracuse as a philosopher-king, in *Epistles* VII and VIII. They show the oneness of theory and practice in Plato, no matter how much these efforts failed.

⁴¹ See, for instance, the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus*. Note also, R. Ferwerda, “Democritus and Plato,” *Mnemosyne* 25(1972), 337-378.

⁴² Uštammā ana libbiša amāta [izakkar]

iti ramāniša-ma ši [simtalik]:

“Minde-ma annū muna’ [ru]:

Ajjānumma iššera ina....?” (Tablet X, i, 11-14, Assyrian version).

⁴³ J. Nougayrol, “Une version ancienne du ‘juste souffrant,’ ” *Revue biblique* 59 (1952), 239-250.

⁴⁴ Loeb Classical Library. Translated by H.N. Fowler. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

⁴⁵ See the discussion in Kees W. Bolle, *The Freedom of Man in Myth* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), Chapter 6.

⁴⁶ a-na-ku sa-ag-gi-il-ki-/ i-na-am-u b-bi-bb ma-dš-ma-šu ka-ri-bu ša i-li ú šar-ri.

⁴⁷ The “Fable of the Fox” is one of the only exceptions. For the contest literature, see Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature*, chapter 7; and J.J.A. van Dijk, *La sagesse suméro-accadienne*, 31-42.

⁴⁸ reverse xxv, 3-19. Translation of Theophile J. Meek in James B. Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 178.

⁴⁹ See Speiser, “The Case of the Obliging Servant,” *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 8 (1954), 98-105; and de Liagre Böhl, *Das Menschenbild in Babylonischer Schau*, *Numen, Supplements* 2 = C.J. Bleeker, *Anthropologie religieuse* (1955), 47-48.

⁵⁰ Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature*, vol. I, 169-184.

MEDIEVAL JAINA GODDESS TRADITIONS

JOHN CORT

The place of goddesses and their worship is one of the many areas within the Jaina tradition that has been little studied. Most secondary sources on the Jainas hardly mention the Jaina goddesses. Padmanabh S. Jaini in his excellent *The Jaina Path of Purification* relegates the subject to just one footnote, in which he refers the reader only to James Burgess' 1903 article on Digambara iconography, ignoring the many more recent and more thorough articles.¹ Margaret Stevenson's *The Heart of Jainism*, although based in large part on her observations of the Jainas in Gujarat where she lived for many years, doesn't mention the subject at all.² More doctrinally oriented works such as Walther Schubring's *The Doctrine of the Jainas* also ignore the subject.³ Even scholars such as K. K. Handiqui⁴ and V.A. Sangave⁵ who do not ignore the subject discuss goddess worship as a "Hindu practice followed by Jainas," an approach hardly conducive to accurately understanding the place of goddess worship within Jainism.

With a few exceptions, the secondary material on Jaina goddesses has been written by art historians, and has been concerned with iconographical issues from an historical perspective. The iconographical approach, as best exemplified in the many thorough studies by U. P. Shah, considers all the extant images of a particular deity and the relevant passages in medieval texts, maps the iconographic development of the deity, and goes no further. Questions of vital interest to an historian of religions—What were the distinctive features of the cult of a particular goddess? Who worshipped the goddesses? What were the worshippers' motivations and expectations?—are not addressed in such an approach. This article draws on historical data to begin to answer such questions; a fuller answer will have to await field research in India.

Goddess worship rose to a position of importance among the Jainas in the medieval period, in large part as the Jaina component of the devotional bhakti movements which dominated medieval

Indian religion, although there is evidence of some goddess worship from earlier levels of Jainism. P. B. Desai, and following him, Burton Stein, have argued that the Jaina goddess cults played a significant role in the popularity of Jainism in medieval South India.⁶ These Jaina goddess cults were not just Jaina incorporations of Hindu deities into lay Jaina devotional practices. The Jaina goddess cults were an integral part of both lay and monastic religious belief and practice, and the Jaina goddess traditions constitute a distinct strand within the complex history of goddess worship in India.

Jaina cosmology distinguishes the various goddesses as residing in three realms, the upper (*urdhvvaloka*), middle (*tiryagloka*), and lower (*adholoka*).⁷ This three-realm scheme pervades Jaina cosmology. In the upper realm are two goddesses common to Hindus and Jainas, with clear Vedic heritages, Sarasvatī and Lakṣmī. They are both clean, vegetarian goddesses, who are little different from their Hindu manifestations. In the middle realm are the Tantric *vidyādevīs*, a group of 16 goddesses who did not develop differentiated personalities or individual cults. In the lower realm are the *yakṣī* attendants of the 24 *tīrthaṅkaras*. Most of these goddesses remain little more than a name and an iconographic form, but three—Ambikā, Padmāvatī, and Jvālāmālinī—are the most important Jaina goddesses.

Sarasvatī, the goddess of learning, is mentioned in several early Jaina texts, including some of the Śvetāmbara canonical *Āngas*.⁸ The antiquity of Sarasvatī within the Jaina tradition is seen from an image from the Kaṇkālī Tilā at Mathurā.⁹ The inscription on the pedestal of the image gives its date as the year 54 of the Kuṣāṇa era, or 132 C.E., making it the oldest extant Sarasvatī image of any tradition. This headless image is squatting in an unusual pose known as *godohikāsana*, or the “cow-milking pose.” This is the same pose in which Mahāvīra attained his enlightenment.¹⁰ The similarity of poses is significant in that Sarasvatī presides over the *śruta*, or teachings, of the *tīrthaṅkaras*, and thus is also known as Śrutadevatā. The early Jaina connection between Sarasvatī and the Jaina teachings is further seen in that the Mathurā image holds a text in her right hand. As Śrutadevatā she was worshipped as the embodiment of the sacred, eternal word of the *tīrthaṅkaras*, and her

worship had a significant enough place in the Jaina cultus that one medieval aniconic movement, the Āgamikas of the 12th century, went so far as to specifically repudiate her worship.¹¹ Sarasvatī is still worshipped annually, by the Śvetāmbaras on Jñāna Pañcamī (5th day of the bright fortnight of the lunar month Kārttika (Oct.-Nov.)),¹² and by the Digāmbaras on Śruta Pañcamī (5th bright Jyeṣṭha (April-May)).¹³ Tantric worship of Sarasvatī as Vāgiśvarī was popular in medieval Jainism. Texts such as the late-11th century *Bhāratī Kalpa* of Malliṣeṇa and the 13th century *Sarasvatī Kalpa* of Arhaddāsa are devoted to her *sādhanā*, or Tantric worship. The 10th century *Jvālāmālinī Kalpa* of Indranandī, while primarily devoted to the worship of the Tantric goddess Jvālāmālinī, also describes a rite in which Vāgiśvarī is worshipped in the form of a clay head with sharp, white, upward-curved fangs, a protruding tongue, three eyes, and a horrible appearance, in order to destroy all of one's afflictions.¹⁴

Lakṣmī, or Śrī, in her role as the goddess of wealth and prosperity, has an important place in the life of lay Jainas, most of whom are merchants. Her worship in this context is a pan-Indian phenomenon, not differing in any significant way from the Hindu worship of Lakṣmī. Lakṣmī can well be described as an “occupational deity” of all merchant castes in India. She is worshipped annually by the Jainas at Dīpāvalī, the autumn “festival of lights,” when all merchants close their account books for the previous year and purchase new ledgers.¹⁵ Gajalakṣmī, Lakṣmī anointed by two elephants, is also the fourth of the auspicious dreams seen by the mother of a *tīrthankara* or *cakravartin* upon his conception, an event frequently depicted in Jaina miniature paintings.¹⁶

In the middle realm, *tiryagloka*, are the *vidyādevīs*, a group of 16 Tantric goddesses. Jaina Tantra, in common with other Indian Tantric systems, distinguishes between *mantras*, single word “spells” that are presided over by male deities and are learnt by repetition, and *vidyās*, multi-word invocations that are presided over by female deities and are learnt by initiation and practicing the prescribed *sādhanā*.¹⁷ This distinction, however, is not followed very closely in practice, and in Jainism as well as in Hinduism the two terms are generally synonymous in their meanings as spells.

References to *vidyās* (Prakrit *vijjā*) are found at the earliest levels

of Jainism. The *vidyās* are discussed in many of the early Jaina texts as magical powers which can be obtained through meditation and ascetic practice. Since they can be used only for worldly ends, and therefore are not conducive to advancing one towards liberation, the cultivation and use of *vidyās* were strongly criticized. This warning against the occult powers which are among the byproducts of ascetic practice is common to the orthodox strands of Buddhism and Hinduism as well as Jainism. The need to constantly reprove and warn monks about acquiring *vidyās*, however, indicates that from the earliest periods of Jainism (and, indeed, from the earliest periods of the Indian renunciant traditions) the use of magic powers was common among renunciants. The *Uttarajihāyā Sutta*, in a discussion of what a true monk should not do, describes some of the occult practices which many of the monks *were* practicing:

“He who does not profess and live on divination from cuts and shreds, from sounds on the earth or in the air, from diagrams, sticks, and properties of buildings, from changes in the body, from the meaning of the cries (of animals)—he is a true monk.

“Spells, roots, every kind of medical treatment, emetics, purgatives, fumigation, anointing of the eye, and bathing, the patient’s lamentation, and his consolation—he who abstains from all these things is a true monk.”¹⁸

Another long list of the occult sciences practiced by some monks is found in the *Sūyagadāṅga*.¹⁹ U. P. Shah gives similar references to *vidyās* and other “sinful sciences” (*pāpaśruta*) from eight early Jaina texts.²⁰

While the *vidyās* were treated as things to be avoided in the early canonical texts, by the time of texts such as the 4th century C.E. *Āngavijjā*²¹ and the beginnings of the Jaina Purāṇa tradition (1st-5th centuries C.E.), the tone of approbation had disappeared. With the influence of Tantric traditions upon Jainism from the early centuries C.E., the attaining of *vidyās* for worldly ends became a part of Jaina practice. As Mircea Eliade has noted, Jaina Tantrics were primarily interested in ascetic techniques and powers “that were part of the most archaic Indian tradition, which Jainism took over.”²² Significantly, Jaina Tantra is known as Mantravāda, “the Way of Spells.” But the cult practices associated with *vidyās* never became as strong a part of the orthodox tradition as did Tantra in Buddhism. Whereas schools within both Hinduism and Buddhism

incorporated Tantric practices into their soteriologies (especially among what Karl Potter calls the “leap” schools²³), Tantra always remained a secondary tradition in Jainism without overt soteriological implications, nor did Jainism ever develop within it any “leap” school. For the Jainas, liberation has always been a process, a path, and not a single saving event.

The discussions of the *vidyās* in the early texts describe them as occult powers, but by the time of the *Vasudevahinḍī* (c. 500-700 C.E.) they are described as goddesses. From words of feminine gender they gradually became goddesses, although the relationship between *vidyā* as spell and *vidyā* as goddess was always maintained. The story concerning the organization of the *vidyās* within Jainism is first given in a brief account in the *Paūmacariya* (= Sanskrit *Padmacaritra*, i.e. Jaina Rāmāyaṇa) of Vimalasūri (1st-5th c. C.E.). The story is found in longer versions in the *Vasudevahinḍī* of Saṅghadāsagaṇī, the Jaina *Harivamśa Purāṇa* of Punnāṭa Jinasena (783 C.E.), and the *Trisaṣṭiśalakāpuruṣacaritra* of Hemacandra (12th c.). According to the fully-developed story as given by Hemacandra,²⁴ Nami and Vinami worshipped Ṛṣabhanātha, the first *tīrthankara* of the present age, to obtain worldly prosperity, but Ṛṣabha in his meditation paid them no heed. Dharaṇendra, king of the *nāgas*, was concerned that people might say that worship of Ṛṣabha was fruitless, and so granted Nami and Vinami lordship over the *vidyādhara*s. Nami founded 50 cities on the southern slope of Mt. Vaitāḍhya, and Vinami 60 cities on the northern slope. Each of them took control over eight of the sixteen classes of *vidyās*, and established deities to preside over the *vidyās*. The list of sixteen *vidyās* given by Hemacandra agrees with an earlier list given by Jinadāsa in his 7th c. C. E. *Āvaśyakacūrṇī*.²⁵

One of the earliest list of *vidyās* comes from the *Paūmacariya*,²⁶ where 61 *vidyās* are mentioned. There is also a list of 24 *mahādevīs* given in the *Rṣimandala*.²⁷ This text is attributed to Gautama Svāmī, the first disciple of Mahāvīra, but is obviously of a much later date; however, since both Śvetāmbara and Digambara texts of the *Rṣimandala* describe the exact same *maṇḍala*, the original text must be from the fairly early centuries C.E. Hindu Tantra shows lists of 10, 12, and 27 *mahāvidyās*.²⁸ Hinduism also absorbed a tradition of the *mātrikās*, “Mothers,” usually seven or eight in number,

but sometimes 16.²⁹ All of this indicates a fluid situation of the worship of clusters of goddesses which finally crystallized within the Digambara tradition in the 16 *vidyādevīs*, first enumerated as such in the late-8th century *Harivaniśa Purāṇa* of Punnāta Jinasena.³⁰ Jinasena significantly divides the *mahāvidyās* into eight *ārya* and eight *daiya*, probably reflecting the two groups of eight classes of *vidyās* in the Nami-Vinami story. The *ārya-vidyās* belonged to the *gandharvas*, the celestial musicians, while the *daiya-vidyās* belonged to the *pannagas*, serpent deities, so in addition to the north-south distinction between *vidyās*, there were also *urdhvvaloka-adholoka*, or heaven-underworld (*gandharva-pannaga*), and noble-demonic (*ārya-daiya*) distinctions. Yet another distinction was given by Jinasena (the disciple of Vīrasena) in his 9th century *Ādipurāṇa*, where he says that *vidyās* are acquired either through one's lineage (*kula*), or by personal effort, a distinction similar to that in Hinduism (and Jinasena was a converted *brāhmaṇa*) between a person's inherited lineage deity (*kuladevatā*) and chosen personal deity (*iṣṭadevatā*).³¹ The Śvetāmbaras continued to enumerate only four *mahāvidyās*³² until the 8th-9th centuries, but eventually also adopted 16 as the standard number.³³ Some goddesses are found in textual lists of both *vidyādevīs* and *yakṣīs*, although the lists of *vidyādevīs* predate the lists of *yakṣīs*.³⁴ Images and paintings of the group of 16 are rare; in fact, there are no Digambara and few Śvetāmbara images extant, the most famous being the ones from the ceilings of the *rāngamanḍapas* of the Vimala Vasahī and Lūna Vasahī temples at Mt. Ābū.

The medieval Jaina Purāṇas are replete with stories of individuals who performed extended *sādhanās* in order to bring about the submission of a *vidyā*. In the Jaina Rāmāyaṇas, for example, the various demons, monkeys, bears, etc., of the Hindu versions are described as humans who had conquered *vidyās* and thereby become *vidyādhara*s, or “possessors of *vidyā*” (translated by van Buitenen as “wizard”). Thus Hanuman was a human (whose banner showed a monkey) who through ascetic practices had gained a *vidyā* which enabled him to fly. Other *vidyās* gave their possessors special powers such as martial invincibility, bodily invisibility or transformation, and amorous prowess.

In the lower realm, the *adholoka*, are the most important goddesses of the Jaina tradition, the *yakṣīs* (also known as *yakṣiṇīs*

and *sāsanadevatās*) of the 24 *tīrthaṅkaras*. Their development within Jainism is relatively late, and most of them remained merely attendant deities; but several of them are the most important Jaina goddesses. One of their main functions is to preside over the *tīrthas*, or pilgrimage sites associated with different *tīrthaṅkaras* and other liberated Jainas—Āmbikā at Girnār, Cakreśvarī at Śatruñjaya, Padmāvatī at Śravaṇa Belgola, etc. Nāthūrām Premī describes two instances in which *sāsanadevatās* presiding over the *tīrtha* of a *tīrthaṅkara* were called upon to resolve whether the *tīrtha* belonged to the Digambaras or the Śvetāmbaras.³⁵ The *tīrtha* of Śatruñjaya was re-established by Jāvaḍa Śēṭh in the 11th century C.E. (2nd century C.E. according to Jaina tradition) after he worshipped Cakreśvarī to disclose to him the location of the image of R̥ṣabha initially established there by Bāhubali and subsequently lost.³⁶ The spread of individual *yakṣī* cults may well have been associated with the rise of pilgrimage in Jainism, as pilgrims brought home with them the cult of the respective *yakṣī* from a pilgrimage.

The role of *yakṣīs* and *yakṣas* in ancient Indian religion has been extensively discussed by A.K. Coomaraswamy,³⁷ V.S. Agrawala,³⁸ and Moti Chandra.³⁹ *Yakṣa* as used to denote the cult figures in ancient India was almost synonymous with the later usages of the terms *deva* and *devatā*. *Yakṣas* were popular cult figures, the focus of the religious life of the bulk of the people not involved with the Vedic sacrificial cult. *Yakṣa* worship was considered a normal part of everyday religious practice by both the Buddha and Mahāvīra, who often stayed in *yakṣa* shrines or *caityas* in their wanderings. While most of the names of *yakṣas* that have come to us from the early texts indicate male deities, some were female deities, and the earliest levels of iconographic data from Bhārhut, Sāncī, and Mathurā show as many *yakṣīs* as *yakṣas*. The *yakṣa* cults contributed greatly to the rise of theistic Hinduism, and influenced the growth of devotional practices in Buddhism and Jainism.

The earliest evidence for the rise of *yakṣīs* specific to Jainism doesn't come until the 6th century C.E., with the development of the *sāsanadevatās*, the *yakṣas* and *yakṣīs* who attend upon the *tīrthaṅkaras* and preside over their teachings (*sāsana*). The earliest iconographic evidence of *sāsanadevatās* in Jainism is a standing image of R̥ṣabha flanked by a *yakṣa* and *yakṣī*, from the Akoṭā

hoard, and dated by U.P. Shah at around 550 C.E.⁴⁰ The earliest literary evidence is from about the same time, in an unpublished 6th century C.E. autocommentary by Jinabhadragaṇī Kṣamāśramaṇa on the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*.⁴¹

U.P. Shah, in several articles,⁴² has put forth the following sequence in the development of the *yakṣīs* within Jainism. Around 500 C.E., the *yakṣī* Ambikā became associated with all 24 of the *tīrthaṅkaras* as an attendant deity. Similarly associated was a short, pot-bellied Kubera-like *yakṣa*, whom Shah calls Yakṣeśvara or Sarvānabhūti. Around 900 C.E. the *yakṣīs* attendant upon the *tīrthaṅkaras* began to be differentiated. Some of these were popular goddesses (such as Padmāvatī) worshipped by lay Jainas and gradually incorporated into the official iconographic and textual traditions, while others were Jaina Tantric *vidyādevīs* (such as Jvālāmālinī) given new roles.

This process can be clearly seen in the representations of the *yakṣīs* on the temples at Deogarh in Jhansi District, U.P.⁴³ In the earliest temples, Ambikā is the *yakṣī* attendant for all 24 *tīrthaṅkaras*. Then Ambikā is replaced for all of the *tīrthaṅkaras* except Neminātha, for whom she remains the *yakṣī*, by identical but differently-named two-armed *yakṣīs* each holding a pot or citron, and showing the *abhaya mudrā* (“fear-not” hand gesture). Finally, with temple no. 12, dated about 950 C.E., each *yakṣī* has a different name and iconography. Deogarh temple no. 12 is the first physical evidence of the set of 24 different *yakṣīs*; the first literary evidence is much later, in the 12th century *Abhidhānaçintāmaṇi* and *Trīṣaṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra* of Hemacandra.

The Navamuni Gumpha (cave) at Khanḍagiri in Orissa shows what may have been an important influence in the differentiation of the *yakṣīs*, or else an Orissan regional phenomenon. Carved on a wall of the cave are seen seven *tīrthaṅkaras*: Ṛṣabha, Ajita, Saṁbhava, Abhinandana, Vāsupūjya, Pārśva, and Nemi. Below them are carved seven *yakṣīs*: Cakreśvarī, Rohinī, Prajñapti, Vajraśrīnkhala, Gāndhāri, Padmāvatī, and Ambikā. While several of the *tīrthaṅkaras* are ones rarely singled out for cultic adoration in Jainism, and conspicuously absent are two of the five most important *tīrthaṅkaras*, Śāntinātha and Mahāvīra, the *yakṣīs* include some of the most important ones. The number seven probably shows a

direct borrowing of the *saptamātrikās*, or seven mother-goddesses, into the Jaina tradition. This cave has been dated as no later than the 11th century C.E. In another cave at the same site, the Barabhuji Gumpha, dated 11th-12th centuries C.E., there are similar carvings, but of all 24 *tīrthankaras* with their *yakṣīs* carved below them.⁴⁴

While the Orissa carvings of the *tīrthankaras* and *yakṣīs* are of the same size, the placing of the *tīrthankaras* directly above the *yakṣīs* evidences a development also found at Deogarh, and common in most independent *yakṣī* images, in which the *tīrthankara*, much smaller in size than the *yakṣī*, is seated above her, often as though in the branches of a tree. This calls to mind a similar development in Mahāyāna Buddhism, where seated *buddhas* is located in the crowns of the *bodhisattva* images. The *bodhisattvas*, divine saviors still in the phenomenal realm and therefore able to respond to the petitions of the worshipper, eclipsed the *buddhas* as cult figures in the early medieval period. A similar process appears to have begun in Jainism, but the *yakṣīs* never became as central in Jainism as the *bodhisattvas* did in Buddhism. *Bhakti* did not significantly affect Jaina soteriology, due perhaps in large part to the physical and somewhat mechanistic Jaina views on *karma* and liberation.

Some of the *yakṣīs* were originally *kuladevīs*, lineage goddesses, of powerful local families who were allied with Jainism. Such seems to have been the case with Padmāvatī, the most popular Jaina goddess in medieval Karnataka. She was the *kuladevī* of several local ruling families such as the Śīlāhāras, Raṭṭas, and Śāntaras.⁴⁵ Many Karnataka officials described themselves as devotees of Padmāvatī in the *prāśastis* (dedications) to inscriptions.

The dynamics of the process by which a non-Jaina *kuladevī* was converted into a Jaina goddess when a caste or lineage became Jaina is clearly seen in the case of Saccikā (or Saciyā), the *kuladevī* of the Osvāl Jainas of Rajasthan and Saurashtra. Saccikā is a Rajasthani version of Mahiṣamardini Durgā, the famous and ancient goddess slaying the buffalo-demon. Her iconography in no way differs from that of the Hindu goddess.

R.C. Agrawala⁴⁶ discusses a clearly-labeled image of Saccikā from near Jodhpur, dated 1180 C.E., and a Saccikā temple at Osian (the original home of the Osvāls), 40 miles from Jodhpur. In the niches on the outer wall of the *garbhagṛha* (innermost shrine) of

the Osian Temple are images of Cāmuṇḍā, Mahiṣamardini, Śītalā, and a naked Bhairava, while the main image is of Saccikā. Agrawala elsewhere⁴⁷ summarizes a Jaina monastic lineage text, the *Upakeśagaccha Paṭṭāvalī* (Upakeśa = Osian = Osvāl), which tells how the Jaina ācārya (the head of the monastic lineage) Ratnaprabhasūri tried to convince the Jaina laity at Osian to stop worshipping Cāmuṇḍā/Saccikā, but in vain, and so instead converted the bloodthirsty Hindu Cāmuṇḍā into the vegetarian Jaina Saccikā. An inscription dated 1598 C.E. confirms that Ratnaprabha converted Cāmuṇḍā into Saccikā.⁴⁸ Osvāl Jainas today still bring their children to the temple at Osian for their first tonsure.

Hemacandra in the 12th century reported a similar occurrence. The Jaina layman Bandhudatta converted the Bhilla tribal goddess Caṇḍasenā from accepting only living creatures as offerings to accepting flowers, fruits, and other vegetarian offerings. By converting the goddess, he also incited right belief (*samyagdarśana*) in the minds of many of the Bhillas.⁴⁹

Padmāvatī is the attendant of the 23rd *tīrthakara*, Pārvīvanātha, and the consort of Pārvīva's *yakṣa*, the *nāga* king Dharaṇendra. She is immediately recognizable by the serpent hoods over her head. But her association with Pārvīvanātha (and perhaps with Jainism) is fairly late. Not until about 900 C.E. is the *nāga* queen protecting Pārvīvanātha in sculptures labelled as Padmāvatī. Since Padmāvatī is not listed in literature as one of the queens of Dharaṇendra, U.P. Shah has hypothesized that the earlier *yakṣī* was Vairotyā, a snake-goddess and the 13th *vidyādevī*, who was replaced by Padmāvatī in the 10th century due to the latter's increasing popularity.⁵⁰

Padmāvatī seems to be associated with a cult of a snake goddess and eight *nāgas*. In the Hindu tradition the goddess Padmā is associated with eight *nāgas* in both the Sanskrit *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* and the Bengali *Padma Purāṇa* of Vijaya Gupta. The Buddhist goddess Śuklā Kurukullā (and the Jaina *Bhairava Padmāvatī Kalpa* X.41 mentions Kurukullā) is also associated with eight *nāgas*.⁵¹

The importance of Padmāvatī for the Jaina tradition can be seen both in the large number of images of her and the many references in Jaina history and literature. For example, inscription no. 77 from Śravaṇa Belgoḷa, dated 1129 C.E., says that Padmāvatī

helped the Jaina *guru* Pātrakesari defeat his opponents,⁵² and in Merutunga's *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, Padmāvatī is worshipped to protect King Jayacandra's capital.⁵³ The story of Padmāvatī's aiding in the foundation of the Śāntara dynasty in Karnataka is illustrative of the nature of Jaina goddesses. First, she helped Jinadatta, founder of the dynasty, to escape from his father, who due to the influence of a low-caste wife had planned to eat Jinadatta. The father sent an army after the fleeing Jinadatta, but Padmāvatī created the illusion of an even greater army, at which point the father's army turned back. Later the goddess told the penniless Jinadatta to touch an iron bar to the vulva of her image, whereupon the bar turned into the gold he needed to found a city. (There is a definite connection between the medieval Jaina interest in alchemy and hidden treasure troves and the Jaina goddesses. Arībikā, for example, gives a touchstone (*sparsopala*) to the poor layman Aśokacandra of Campā in response to his penances.⁵⁴) The goddess later disappeared when Jinadatta found two pearls, one real and one fake, and gave the real one to his wife but the fake one to the goddess.⁵⁵

In addition to being a *kuladevī*, Padmāvatī was also popular in Jaina Tantra. The most important text of her cult, the *Bhairava Padmāvatī Kalpa* ("Manual of Rituals to the Fierce Padmāvatī"),⁵⁶ was composed by the Digambara monk Malliṣeṇa in 1057 C.E. in what is now Dharwar District in Karnataka. The rituals described in the *Bhairava Padmāvatī Kalpa* can be used for the accomplishment of any the *satkarmā*, or "six actions." Throughout the rituals, different offerings are prescribed depending on which of the *satkarmā* the practitioner is pursuing. The *satkarmā* are the six ritual aims which make up the *kāmya* Tantric ritual, or those rituals performed either to fulfill a special desire or to avert a misfortune. The *satkarmā* in Jaina Tantra are:

- (1) *sānti* ("pacification"), the curing of a disease, or countering of the bad influence resulting from the ritual practices of others;
- (2) *vasya* or *vasī* ("subjugation"), gaining control over another so as to have one's own desires fulfilled;
- (3) *stambhana* ("immobilization"), preventing or stopping the actions of another;
- (4) *vidveṣaṇa* or *dveṣa* ("generation of enmity"), causing victims to come into conflict with each other;

- (5) *uccātana* (“displacement”), causing victims to flee;
- (6) *strī-ākṛsti* (“attraction of women”), a specialized case of *vaśya*.

These are the same as in Hindu Tantra with the exception of *strī-ākṛsti*, which is replaced by *maraṇa* (“killing”), which would violate the central Jaina ethical precept of *ahimsā* (“non-injury”) and so was unacceptable for even a Tantric Jaina.⁵⁷

Another popular goddess among the Digambara Jainas in medieval Karnataka was Jvālāmālinī, the “flame-garlanded” goddess who is the Digambara (but not Svetāmbara) *yakṣī* of the eighth *tīrthankara*, Candraprabhu. She is evidently of Tantric origin, and is the subject of another important Jaina Tantric text, the 10th century C.E. *Jvālāmālinī Kalpa* of Indranandī.⁵⁸ The oldest image of Jvālāmālinī is an eighth century one from Aihole in Karnataka,⁵⁹ while epigraphical records attest to the existence of separate Jvālāmālinī temples in Karnataka from the 12th and 13th centuries.⁶⁰

The traditional origin of her cult, as given in the *Jvālāmālinī Kalpa* (I.5-21), concerns the monk Helācārya, a leader of the Drāviḍa Saṅgha (a Digambara monastic lineage). Helācārya lived several generations before the author Indranandī, i.e. in the mid-to-late ninth century. Helācārya had a female disciple named Kamalaśrī, who was possessed by a fierce *brahmaṛāksasa* (a type of demon). Helācārya took her to the top of Nīlagiri Hill (located probably either in North Arcot District of Tamil Nadu or in the Western Ghats in the Rāṣṭrakūṭa domain⁶¹) to Vahnidevī, “Fire-Goddess,” for help. This goddess gave him a *mantra*, instructed him in its use, and with it he drove out the demon. Helācārya then began to instruct others in the worship of the goddess as Jvālāmālinī.

Two things stand out in this account. First, while nuns are common in Jainism, their behavior and contact with monks are strictly circumscribed. Helācārya having one female disciple (no others are mentioned in the story) even though monastic discipline forbids a nun and a monk to be alone leads one to suspect that even before the revelation atop Nīlagiri, Helācārya was engaged in Tantric practices. (Jaina scholars always insist that Jaina Tantra was strictly right-handed, with no *vāmācāra*, or left-handed practices.⁶² Given the lack of research into Jaina Tantra, and the suggestive nature of the Helācārya-Kamalaśrī story, one is lead to

at least question whether or not Helācārya might have been a *vāmācārin* Jaina Tantric.) Secondly, calling the goddess Vahnidevī in this episode (elsewhere in the text she is always called Jvālāmālinī) indicates the probable inclusion of a non-Jaina goddess named Vahnidevī into Jaina Tantra as Jvālāmālinī.

The third popular *yakṣī*, Armbikā, also known as Kūṣmāṇḍinī, appears to have been primarily a goddess of the Śvetāmbara Jainas of Gujarat. While her iconography shows much variation, her most distinguishing marks are the presence of two children, her two sons, one on her left leg and the other standing touching her right knee. Armbikā literally means “Mother,” and she appears to have been a goddess of children (and possibly childhood diseases and/or childbirth) who was “elevated” to the position of *yakṣī* attendant on the *tīrthāṅkaras*. Her role as goddess of childbirth was preserved by medieval Śvetāmbaras, who worshipped Armbikā following the birth of a child.⁶³ The story of Armbikā as found in the 14th century *Vividha Tīrtha Kalpa* of Jinaprabhasūri (chapter 61, “Armbikā Devī Kalpa”), explains both her iconography and her vehicle, the lion:⁶⁴

An orthodox *brāhmaṇa* named Soma lived in Koṇināra (in Saurashtra) with his wife Armbikā and two sons Siddha and Buddha (“Liberated” and “Enlightened”). On the *śrāddha* ceremony on the anniversary of his father’s death, Soma invited several *brāhmaṇas* for a feast. Soma’s mother cooked the meal, and then went for her bath, leaving only Armbikā and the two boys in the house. A Jaina monk who had been fasting for a month came to the house, and Armbikā gave him some of the food from the prepared feast (giving the food with which a Jaina renunciant breaks a fast is an especially meritorious act for a layperson). When Soma heard what had happened—from a brāhmaṇical perspective she had polluted the food, rendering it unfit for the feast—he became angry and kicked her out of the house. She and her two sons wandered homeless. The sons were hungry, and Armbikā had no food for them, when a dried mango tree by the road suddenly gave forth ripe fruit. The sons were thirsty, and there was no water to be found, when a dried lake suddenly filled with water. In the meantime, Soma had realized his error, and came running after Armbikā to bring her back. She saw him coming, feared further violence, and so to save herself she and her sons jumped into a well and died. Soma died soon afterwards from remorse. Armbikā was reborn as the *śāsanadevatā* of Neminātha (the pre-eminent *tīrthāṅkara* of Gujarat, with his principle *tīrtha* at Girnār in Saurashtra, and cousin of Kṛṣṇa). Soma was reborn as a lion, her vehicle. The two sons are shown in the iconography of Armbikā, and the cluster of mangoes she is usually shown holding are the mangoes she fed to her sons.

As well as explaining the iconography of Armbikā (although the story obviously comes later than the iconography), the story shows

well Ambikā's earlier position as a goddess of plenty, an earth deity. Through her virtue, purity, and loyalty to the Jaina teachings, dried trees suddenly became fruitful, and a dried lake filled with water. The connection of the lion vehicle with Ambikā indicates a connection between the Jaina Ambikā and one of the most popular Hindu goddesses of Gujarat, the similarly-named Ambājī, or Ambā Bhavānī, of the Arasur hills, whose vehicle is also a lion. The Jaina story of Ambikā also corresponds to a particularly Gujarati oicotype of the goddess. The stories of many popular Gujarati goddesses—of whom Bahucarājī in North Gujarat is the most important—show a similar pattern of a violated woman who kills herself and is then transformed into an avenging goddess.⁶⁵

While the threefold division of the goddesses according to the three realms of Jaina cosmology shows us how the Jaina tradition itself analyses the differences among the goddesses, we can get a clearer picture of the nature of the Jaina goddesses by looking at the roles they played in medieval Jaina mythology, story-literature, and biography.

The first and most important thing to note is that the Jaina goddesses are not approached or worshipped to directly aid an individual in attaining liberation. Rather, they are approached to assist the devotee in worldly affairs, be they the affairs of a professional renunciant or a layperson.

Thus we find goddesses coming to the aid of Jaina kings in Gujarat and the Deccan. Ambikā aided the 12th century Kumārapāla in his accession to the throne in Gujarat,⁶⁶ Padmāvatī protected the capital of Jayacandra in Gujarat,⁶⁷ and the bards in the court of Yaśodhara in Karnataka invoked the blessings of Aparajitā (the “undefeated goddess,” here identified with Ambikā) for the king’s success in battle.⁶⁸

Power over one’s enemies, as well as over gods/*devas*, *sākinīs*, and *dākinīs* (malevolent female spirits), is one of the powers (*devīśakti*) specifically promised to the practitioner in the *Jvālāmālinī Kalpa*.⁶⁹ There is extensive evidence in texts and inscriptions that the goddesses assisted many monks in debates and religious contests, both with monks of other Jaina sects, and with Buddhists and Hindus.⁷⁰


The goddesses interceded in human affairs in other ways.

Guérinot tells how the 12th century Digambara monk Śrīdhara wanted to establish an image of a *tīrthaṅkara*, but was opposed by his disciple. Śrīdhara persisted, and ten years later Padmāvatī appeared to him and approved his plan to establish the image.⁷¹ Armbikā played a central role in deciding a dispute between the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras as to who had authority over the *tīrtha* of Girnār,⁷² as did Sarasvatī in another account of the same dispute.⁷³

A.K. Ramanujan has detailed some broad taxonomical distinctions within Hindu goddess traditions between the Sanskritic consort goddesses and the local “mother” goddesses—or, to use Ramanujan’s terminology, between the Breast Mothers and the Tooth Mothers—which highlight some of the distinctive features of the Jaina goddesses.⁷⁴ The Breast Mothers are married and subordinate to their husbands, while the Tooth Mothers are generally unmarried and independent. The Breast Mothers are related to auspicious life-cycle rites, whereas the Tooth Mothers are invoked in times of crisis. Breast Mothers have their temples within the village or city confines, and have well-sculpted faces and images, while the Tooth Mothers’ temples are outside the village boundaries, and their images are rough-hewn and often faceless. The Breast Mothers are vegetarian, and are generally benevolent, whereas the Tooth Mothers demand blood sacrifices, are quite ambivalent in nature, are dreaded by devotees, and have possession as part of their ritual.

If we compare the Jaina goddesses with the models of the Breast Mothers and the Tooth Mothers, we see that while Sarasvatī and Lakṣmī remain Breast Mothers as in Hinduism (although in the Jaina tradition they are unmarried), most Jaina goddesses fall somewhere in between the two models. The Jaina goddesses are like the Breast Mothers in that they are benevolent and vegetarian (this latter aspect being a *sine qua non* for Jainism). They tend to be installed in satellite shrines in temples to *tīrthaṅkaras*, and so are usually located within the village or city boundaries. At the same time, they exhibit some characteristics of Tooth Mothers: they are unmarried, and tend to be related more to life-crises than to life-cycle rites. The Jaina goddesses are not just Hindu goddesses worshipped by Jainas. They have much in common with the local

Tooth Mothers, but have been transformed by the highly ethical Jaina tradition. They have developed personalities similar to goddesses within the Hindu tradition, but are still distinct. Jaina goddesses are active in the world, assisting their devotees both in their worldly concerns and in the furtherance of the Jaina teachings (which, for the lay Jaina, are often synonymous, for the accumulation of wealth and worldly success is necessary for lay Jainas to be able to support the renunciants, build and maintain temples and *upāśrayas* (renunciant rest-houses), etc.). These are not transcendent, universal goddesses; they are *yakṣīs*, the prototypical earth goddesses, involved with wealth, fertility, and specific locales. Their myths and stories take place not in the timeless *illo tempore* of the great Hindu consort goddesses, but in specific times and places, involving specific human devotees and specific events. Jaina goddesses operate within the same three realms of conditioned existence that all unliberated *jīvas* or “souls” live in. The goddesses are in the same continuity of being as their human devotees. This is graphically illustrated by the Jaina *svastika*, in which the four arms represent the four modes of existence in the three realms—as a god (*devatā*), a human (*manuṣya*), an animal or plant (*tiryāñc*), or a hell-being (*narakī*)—the three dots the three jewels (*ratnatraya*) of correct faith (*samyagdarśana*), correct knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), and correct conduct (*samyakcaritra*), and the crescent and dot at the top represent the transcendent, totally-other fifth “state” of *mokṣa*, liberation, or *kaivalya*, “isolation”:



The gods and goddesses are in and of the triple world, while the *tīrthankaras* and the *siddhas*, the liberated beings, are not. Therefore it is the goddesses who can meet the non-salvational religious needs of their Jaina devotees, needs which cannot be met by the aloof, unresponsive, and totally-transcendent *tīrthankaras*. In this way the relationship is similar to that between many Hindu gods and their

consorts; in Kāśī, for example, Viśvanātha is worshipped as the supreme, universal lord who through his *tāraka mantra* grants liberation to all who die in Kāśī, while his consort Annapūrṇā (“Full of Food”) is worshipped for sustenance in this life, and ensures that no one shall starve in Kāśī.

The Jaina goddesses cannot grant the devotee salvation, for that is a condition greater than themselves. But it is important to remember that liberation for the Jaina is a long process, lasting over many lives, and not the event of a single, saving instant. If one views final liberation as unattainable in this life (and, according to Jaina cosmology, it is presently impossible for anyone in this part of the universe to attain liberation), then activity within the world which allows one to further the Jaina teachings becomes profoundly religious. Occasionally in the *stotras* (praise-poems) addressed to the Jaina goddesses, one sees indications of the beginnings of a movement towards worshipping the goddesses as saviors, such as when Lakṣmī and Sarasvatī are addressed as *samsārāñavatāriṇī*, “the goddess who leads across the ocean of the world of birth and rebirth.”⁷⁵ But this movement was always curtailed within the Jaina tradition, and the goddesses were more often worshipped as *jagadānandadāyinī*, “the goddess who grants the pleasures of the world.”⁷⁶

The worship of the goddess in medieval Jainism falls within the broad spectrum of practices known as *kāmya*, “motivated by one’s wants and needs.” *Kāmya* ritual can be broadly distinguished from *dharma* ritual, that which is performed to fulfill an individual’s personal and social religious duties and obligations. *Kāmya* ritual is performed because one *wants* something, whereas *dharma* ritual is performed because one *ought* to do it. *Kāmya* ritual, however, should not be seen in a negative light when compared to *dharma* ritual. From the absolutist perspective of concern for liberation, *mokṣa*, both are concerned with the maintenance of the world. While *kāma* as one of the four legitimate concerns of humanity (*puruṣārtha*) is ranked hierarchically lower than *dharma*, both are of an altogether different order from *mokṣa*, the transcendent fourth concern of humanity; both are part of the *trivarga*, or three concerns, which stand in opposition to *mokṣa*. Desire is seen as a basic and necessary motive force for the maintenance of the universe, and is especially

the proper motivation for the *vaiśya varṇa*, or merchant stratum of Indian society, to which most Jainas belong. *Kāma* as desire in a positive, world-maintaining sense needs to be distinguished from *rāga*, desire in a negative sense as thirst, one of the passions (*kaṣaya*) which bind a *jīva* to conditioned existence. *Kāma* when properly fulfilled is part of the life of a righteous person; *rāga* is blind desire which deludes and ensnares the individual.⁷⁷

Thus the aims of the Jaina worship of the goddess should be seen as falling within the broader purview of what it means to be religious (and not “magical” as opposed to “religious”). Yet these aims are of a different order from the ultimate religious aim of liberation. In this sense Jaina iconography is clearly indicative of the hierarchization of values within Jainism, for the goddess, the fulfiller of the aims of *kāmya* rituals, is merely a subordinate attendant of the *tīrthankara*, the one who has indeed obtained the ultimate goal of liberation.

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² Margaret (Mrs. Sinclair) Stevenson, *The Heart of Jainism* (London: Oxford, 1915; reprint New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1970).

³ Walther Schubring (Wolfgang Beurlen, tr.), *The Doctrine of the Jainas* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1962).

⁴ K. K. Handiqui, *Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture* (Sholapur: Jaina Saṃskṛti Saṃrakṣaka Saṅgha, 1949).

⁵ V.A. Sangave, *Jaina Community* (2nd rev. ed. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1980).

⁶ P. B. Desai, *Jainism in South India and Some Jaina Inscriptions* (Sholapur: Jaina Saṃskṛti Saṃrakṣaka Saṅgha, 1957), pp. 72-74; Burton Stein, *Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India* (Delhi: Oxford, 1980), pp. 79 and 83. See also Gananath Obeyesekere, *The Cult of the Goddess Pāttini* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 511-523.

⁷ Eberhard Fischer and Jyotindra Jain, *Jaina Iconography* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), Vol. II, p. 20. See also *Tiloya Pannatti* of Yativr̥ṣabha, ed. A.N. Upadhye and Hiralal Jain (Sholapur: Jaina Saṃskṛti Saṃrakṣaka Saṅgha, 1943-51).

⁸ See U.P. Shah, “Iconography of the Jain Goddess Sarasvatī,” in *Journal of the University of Bombay* 10 (1941): 195-218, p. 197n for references to *Viyāhappannatti* (*Bhagavatī Sūtra*), etc.

⁹ Vincent A. Smith, *The Jain Stūpa and other Antiquities of Mathurā* (Allahabad: Government Press, 1901), pp. 56-57 and pl. XCI/X; U.P. Shah, *ibid.*

¹⁰ *Kalpa Sūtra* 5.120, tr. Hermann Jacobi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884; SBE 22), p. 263.

¹¹ Walther Schubring (Amulyachandra Sen and T.C. Burke, trs.), *The Religion of the Jainas* (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1966), p. 14.

¹² See the 11th c. *Nānapañcamikahāo* of Maheśvarasūri, ed. A.S. Gopani (Bombay: Sīnghī Jaina Sāstra Sīkṣapīṭha and Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana, 1949).

¹³ See the 10th c. *Śrūtāvatāra Kathā* of Indranandī, in *Śrūtāvatāra āṇī Śrūtapañcamikriyā* (Sholapur: Jaina Saṃskṛti Saṃrakṣaka Saṅgha, 1978), pp. 37-43.

¹⁴ *Jvālāmālinīkalpa* 9.16-17, ed. Candraśekharji Śāstrī (Surat: Digambara Jaina Pustakālaya, 1966).

¹⁵ For a text used in the Śvetāmbara worship of Lakṣmī at Dīpāvalī, see Padmanabh S. Jaini, “*Vasudhārā-dhāraṇī*: A Buddhist Work in Use among the Jainas of Gujarat,” in *Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya Golden Jubilee Volume* (Bombay: Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, 1968), pp. 30-45; and paraphrasing but not citing Jaini, Niranjan Ghosh, *Concept and Iconography of the Goddess of Abundance and Fortune in Three Religions of India* (Burdwan: University of Burdwan, 1979), pp. 165-167.

¹⁶ *Kalpa Sūtra* 3.36, Jacobi tr. pp. 232-33.

¹⁷ U.P. Shah, “A Peep into the Early History of Tantra in Jain Literature,” in *Bhārata Kaumudi* (Allahabad: The Indian Press, 1947), Pt. II, pp. 850-51, quoting *Pindaniryukti*, *Pañcāśaka* of Haribhadra, and *Darśanaśuddhi*.

¹⁸ *Uttarādh্যāyana Sūtra* 15.6-7, tr. Hermann Jacobi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895; SBE 45), pp. 70-71.

¹⁹ *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.2.25-27, tr. Hermann Jacobi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895; SBE 45), pp. 365-67.

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²¹ *Āngavijjā*, ed. Muni Punyavijaya (Banaras: Prakrit Text Series, 1957).

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²³ Karl H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972), pp. 236-56.

²⁴ Hemacandra, *Trīsañśalākāpuruṣacaritra* I.3.124-226, tr. Helen M. Johnson (Baroda: Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, 1931-62), Vol. I, pp. 170-76.

²⁵ U. P. Shah 1947 (n. 20 above), p. 116.

²⁶ M. B. Jhavery, *Comparative and Critical Study of Mantraśāstra* (Ahmedabad: Sarabhai Nawab, 1944), p. 265.

²⁷ *Rśimandalastotra* 68-70, in S. B. Nawab (ed.), *Mahāprābhāvika Navasmaraṇa* (Ahmedabad: Sarabhai Nawab, 1938), p. 516; U. P. Shah, “Supernatural Beings in the Jain Tantras,” in *Acharya Dhruva Smaraka Grantha* (Ahmedabad: Gujarat Vidya Sabha, 1946), p. 71.

²⁸ Chintaharan Chakravarti, *Tantras-Studies on their Religion and Literature* (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1963), pp. 85-86.

²⁹ Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), p. 807.

³⁰ U. P. Shah 1947 (n. 20 above), p. 119. The sixteen Digambara *vidyādevīs* are Rohinī, Prajñapti, Vajrasñikhalā, Vajrāñkuśā, Jāmbunadā, Puruṣadattā, Kālī, Mahākālī, Gaurī, Gāndhārī, Jvālāmālinī, Mānavī, Vairoṇī, Acyutā, Mānasī, and Mahāmānasī.

³¹ Jinasena, *Ādiapurāṇa* 18.13ff., cited in U. P. Shah 1947, p. 169.

³² Gaurī, Gāndhārī, Rohinī, and Prajñapti.

³³ U. P. Shah 1947, p. 120. The sixteen Śvetāmbara *vidyādevīs* are Rohinī, Prajñapti, Vajraśrīkhalā, Kuliśānkuśā, Cakrēvarī, Naradattā, Kālī, Mahākālī, Gaurī, Gāndhārī, Sarvāstramahājvālā, Mānavī, Vairotyā, Acchuptā, Mānasī, and Mahāmānasi (Hemacandra, *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* 2.152-154, ed. Nemicandra Śāstrī (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1964)).

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³⁵ Nāthūrām Premī, *Jain Sāhitya aur Itihās* (2nd ed. Bombay: Hindī Granth Ratnākar, 1956), pp. 469 and 473-74.

³⁶ Dhaneśvara, *Śatruñjaya Māhātmya* XIV, 168-182, as summarized in Albert Weber (James Burgess, ed. and tr.), "The Śatruñjaya Māhātmyam," in *Indian Antiquary* 30 (1901), p. 305; and Jinaprabhasūri, *Vividhatīrthakalpa* I.71-83, ed. Jinavijaya (Santiniketan: Singhī Jaina Jñānapīṭha, 1934).

³⁷ A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Yakṣas* (Washington: Smithsonian, 1927-31).

³⁸ V. S. Agrawala, *Ancient Indian Folk Cults* (Varanasi: Prithivi Prakashan, 1970).

³⁹ Moti Chandra, "Some Aspects of Yaksha Cult in Ancient India," in *Bulletin of the Prince of Wales Museum* 3 (1952-53); 43-62.

⁴⁰ U. P. Shah, "Introduction of Sāsanadevatās in Jaina Worship," in *Proceedings and Transactions of the All-India Oriental Conference* XX:II:1 (1959), pp. 141-43.

⁴¹ Cited in U. P. Shah 1975 (n. 34 above), p. 80.

⁴² U. P. Shah 1959 (n. 40 above), 1975 (n. 34 above), and "Jaina Iconography—A Brief Survey," in *Bhāratīya Purātata (Purātavācārya Muni Jinavijaya Abhinandana Grantha)* (Jaipur, 1973), Pt. II, pp. 184-218.

⁴³ U. P. Shah 1959: 148-49.

⁴⁴ Debala Mitra, "Sāsanadevīs in the Khaṇḍagiri Caves," in *Journal of the Asiatic Society* (Bengal) (4th Series) I:2 (1959), 127-34; and Debala Mitra, *Udayagiri and Khandagiri* (New Delhi: Archaeological Survey of India, 1975), pp. 58-65.

⁴⁵ P. B. Desai 1957 (n. 6 above), p. 171.

⁴⁶ R. C. Agrawala, "A Unique Sculpture of the Jaina Goddess Saccikā," in *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (N.S.) 29:2 (1954), p. 63.

⁴⁷ R. C. Agrawala, "Iconography of the Jain Goddess Saccika," in *Jaina Antiquary* XXI:1 (1956), pp. 15-16. For a translation of the relevant passage, see A. F. R. Hoernle, "The Pattavalī or List of Pontiffs of the Upakesa-Gachchha," in *Indian Antiquary* 19 (1890), pp. 237-38.

⁴⁸ R. C. Agrawala 1954, p. 65.

⁴⁹ Hemacandra, *Trīṣaṭīśalākāpuruṣacaritra*, tr. Helen M. Johnson (Baroda: Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1931-62), Vol. V, p. 419.

⁵⁰ U. P. Shah 1975 (n. 34 above), p. 80.

⁵¹ A. K. Bhattacharya, "An Introduction to the Iconography of the Jain Goddess Padmāvatī," in *Bhāratīya Purātata* (see n. 42 above), Pt. II, pp. 224-25.

⁵² R. Narasimhacharya (ed.), *Epigraphica Carnatica, Vol. II: Sravana Belagola* (Mysore: University of Mysore, 1973), p. 385.

⁵³ Merutunga, *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*, tr. C. H. Tawney (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1899), p. 185.

⁵⁴ Dhaneśvara, *Śatruñjaya Māhātmya* X. 149-150 (see n. 36 above), p. 290.

⁵⁵ Walter Elliot, *Panchala Book* (unpublished manuscript, 1846-48; on microfilm at University of Wisconsin-Madison Memorial Library); also C. Hayavadana Rao (ed.), *Mysore Gazetteer, Vol. V, Gazetteer* (Bangalore: new ed., 1930), p. 1299; and P.B. Desai 1957 (n. 6 above), pp. 171-72.

⁵⁶ *Bhairava Padmāvatī Kalpa* of Malliṣeṇa, with *vivaraṇa* of Bandhusena, ed. K. V. Abhyankar, appended to Jhavery 1944 (n. 26 above).

⁵⁷ For the *satkarmaṇ* in Hindu Tantra, see Sanjukta Gupta, “Modes of Worship and Meditation,” in Sanjukta Gupta *et al.*, *Hindu Tantrism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979), p. 159; and Agehananda Bharati, *The Tantric Tradition* (New York: Anchor, 1970), p. 156.

⁵⁸ See n. 14 above.

⁵⁹ S. Settar, “The Cult of Jvālāmālinī and the Earliest Images of Jvālā and Śyāma,” in *Artibus Asiae* XXXI:4 (1969), 312-320.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁶² For example, see Jhavery 1944 (n. 26 above), p. 60.

⁶³ Ācāradinakara of Vardhamāna, cited in R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga* (London: Oxford, 1963), p. 279.

⁶⁴ *Vividhatīrthakalpa* of Jinaprabhasūri (see n. 36 above), pp. 107-108.

⁶⁵ See R. K. Trivedi (ed.), *Census of India 1961, Vol. V, Gujarat, Part VII-B, Fairs and Festivals* (Delhi, 1965), pp. 268-75; and Sigrid Westphal-Hellbusch, “Living Goddesses, Past and Present, in North-West India,” in *German Scholars on India, Vol. I* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1973), pp. 387-405.

⁶⁶ James M. Campbell (ed.), *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. I, Pt. I, History of Gujarat* (Bombay, 1896), p. 182.

⁶⁷ Merutūṅga, *Prabandhacintāmani* (n. 53 above), p. 185.

⁶⁸ K. K. Handiqui (n. 4 above), p. 398.

⁶⁹ *Jvālāmālinī Kalpa* X (p. 133).

⁷⁰ See Jhavery 1944 (n. 26 above), pp. 204, 214, 217, and 229; and Narasimhacharya (n. 52 above), p. 385.

⁷¹ A. Guérinot, *La Religion Djaïna* (Paris: Paul Guenther, 1926), pp. 54-55.

⁷² Premī (n. 35 above), pp. 470-71, citing *Upadeśa Taraigini* of Ratnamandiragāṇi.

⁷³ Premī, pp. 473-74, citing the *Gurvāvalī* of the Nandi Saṅgha.

⁷⁴ A. K. Ramanujan, “The Relevance of South Asian Folklore” (unpublished paper, 1980), pp. 47-48. For another application of Ramanujan’s taxonomy, see Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, *Women, Androgynes, and Other Mythical Beasts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 90-91. A similar but more refined distinction is that of Veena Das between goddesses as *satī* and *śakti*. See Veena Das, “The Mythological Film and its Framework of Meaning: An Analysis of *Jai Santoshi Ma*,” in *India International Quarterly* 8:1 (1980), 43-56.

⁷⁵ Sādhvī Śivāryā, *Pathitasiddhasārasvalastava*, v. 3 (appx. 13 to Jhavery 1944 (n. 26 above)); Niranjan Ghosh (n. 15 above), p. 148.

⁷⁶ *Padmāvatistotra*, v. 1 (appx. 9 to Jhavery 1944).

⁷⁷ While the schema of the *puruṣārthas* is usually considered to be distinctively Hindu, it can also be used when discussing the Jainas. Hemacandra, for example, constantly refers to the *puruṣārthas* in his *Trisaṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra* within the context of lay Jainism, as does Dhaneśvara in the *Śatruñjaya Mahātmya* (XIV. 154-159).

My discussion of *kāma* as a positive value within the context of the *puruṣārthas* has been strongly informed by the spirit behind Veena Das’ “Kāma in the Scheme of Puruṣārthas: the Story of Rāma,” in T.N. Madan, ed., *Way of Life* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982), pp. 183-203, although the direction of my investigation diverges sharply from hers.

BUDDHISM: A Religion of Revelation After All?*

(*Review article*)

PAUL HARRISON

One of the most potent stimuli to further development in the field of Buddhist studies has been provided by recent anthropological observations of Theravāda Buddhist societies. In attempting to understand these societies, anthropologists (one thinks in particular of M. Spiro and S. Tambiah) have of necessity been greatly affected by our existing pictures of Buddhism, which are derived primarily from historical sources, i.e. from texts. Their work, then, constitutes the beginning of a dialogue between those who study Buddhist texts and those who study Buddhist societies, in which each party, it is to be hoped, will continually stimulate fresh discoveries and correct stale misapprehensions in the other. This development comes at a time when many Buddhist scholars are actively re-evaluating long-cherished preconceptions and suppositions about Buddhism. Such critical reflection is a healthy thing in any discipline, although it can be taken too far, and degenerate into debunking for its own sake (the indiscriminate slaughter of sacred cows), or into the complete loss of scholarly nerve which seems to underly much so-called 'methodological' discussion. Such excesses would be particularly reprehensible in the field of Buddhist studies, since there is a lot of territory still relatively unexplored, and Buddhist scholars should be out there exploring it, not sitting around in camp all day, mooning over their equipment.

One significant phenomenon observed by the anthropologists has been that of the recitation of the sacred word, in which 'hearing' the word is generally deemed more important than 'understanding'

* *À propos* Peter Masefield's *Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism*, The Sri Lanka Institute of Traditional Studies, Colombo, and George Allen & Unwin, London: 1986, xx + 187, £ 18.00 ISBN 0-04-294132-6

it. They have advanced differing interpretations of this kind of activity (which would seem, at first sight, more appropriate to Tantric Buddhism than to Theravāda), according to the differing degrees of discomfort they have felt in reconciling it with ‘canonical Buddhism’, but usually the *parittas* are cited as a convenient anchoring-point. The implication is that this practice does have some scriptural basis, but was not central to ‘original Buddhism’. This is one area, however, in which the dialogue referred to above can and should be pursued, with text-historians taking a fresh look at the canonical sources. To this end a recent book by Dr. Peter Masefield, *Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism*, makes an important contribution, one which merits detailed examination.

Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism?—the very title of the book comes as a shock. What on earth, one asks, has happened, that the banner of theism should be fluttering from the ramparts of Theravāda Buddhist rationalism? Has there been a mutiny in the ranks of the Pali scholars, and if so, how long will it take before it is put down and the offending standard lowered? Closer inspection confirms these suspicions, for the contents of the book turn out to be just as revolutionary as its title. It is Dr. Peter Masefield’s contention that Buddhism, or at least Pali Buddhism, far from degenerating *from* a noble and humanistic path of self-improvement into a religion distinguished by faith in a higher power, grace and revelation — a common charge, as we all know, and even one levelled by some Buddhists against others —, has in fact suffered the reverse fate: it has degenerated *into* a humanistic path of self-improvement. Further, this novel and surprising thesis, this avowed attempt to ‘remythologise’ the Pali Canon, is based not on the author’s imagination nor on some largely unsupported general theory of religion, but on the most careful study of the Nikāyas, the earliest stratum of that Canon. This firm evidential basis, however, is both a strength and a weakness of the present work, in that many of its findings and hypotheses need to be checked against the testimony of the (admittedly fragmentary) canons of other so-called ‘Hīnayāna’ schools, as well as that of the Mahāyāna scriptures.

Masefield’s work begins with the claim that originally the main ‘spiritual division’ of the Buddhist world was not the monastic-lay division, as is often supposed, but that between the *ariyasāvaka* and

the *puthujjana*. The *ariyasāvaka* is the person (and not just the man, as Masefield's persistent use of non-inclusive language might suggest) who has come into possession of 'right view', otherwise known as the *Dhammacakkhu* and defined as insight into the Four Truths, and who for that reason is on the path to *nibbāna*, release from rebirth. The *puthujjana*, on the other hand, is chiefly defined by his/her not having heard the Dhamma (*assutavant*); lacking therefore an understanding of things as they are, he or she remains attached to *samsāra*, pursuing at best the path of meritorious action in the hope of a more favourable rebirth. What is important is that this division of the world into two types of persons transcends the purely social distinction between monastic personnel and the laity: the Nikāyas leave no doubt as to the fact that some laypeople and *devas* were *ariyasāvakas*, while many monks and nuns were *puthujjanas*.

So far we seem to be in the realm of the nibbanic-kammatic distinction employed by Melford Spiro and others in the studies of modern Theravāda Buddhism referred to above, a problematical distinction, to be sure, but useful as long as one remembers not to identify it too rigidly with the lay-monastic division. However, Masefield's objective is not to give us a peg on which to hang our perceptions of the different goals and levels of commitment to which modern Theravādins subscribe, but is more drastically exegetical. For, as his analysis of the Nikāyas reveals, it is only the *ariyasāvaka* who is capable of pursuing the well-known ariyan eightfold path, a fact which Masefield claims has been almost entirely overlooked by Western scholarship. That is to say, this path is not, after all, something which 'one could, if one so chose, begin to follow at, say, 2.30 pm tomorrow.' Related to this is the finding that common notions of the actual sequence of the eight factors of the path (generally arranged in the order of the three rubrics of *sīla*, *saṃādhi* and *paññā*) have no basis at all in the Nikāyas. The path does not begin with moral training and move through meditation to its culmination in perfect wisdom, or 'right view'. It commences rather with right view itself, traditionally always the first element. Furthermore, this right view is not to be understood as some kind of preliminary intellectual grasp of the facts of suffering, nor is it the result of any training or effort on the part of the person attaining it. Acquisition of right view, or of the *Dhammacakkhu*,

which brings one to a new level of insight and makes one an *ariyasāvaka*, always occurs in the Nikayas as a result of a ‘specially tailored oral initiation’ by the Buddha or (rarely) by one of his disciples. According to Masefield, it is that initiation and the transformation it effects which put one on the eightfold path. Translation to *ariyasāvaka* status thus depends solely upon hearing the Dhamma: it is the fruit of grace, of revelation in fact, rather than the outcome of any previous training or cognitive operation.

Given the fact that this revelation produces a critical transformation in its recipients, in that those so transformed are assured of release, one may wonder as to its content. Here Masefield takes his cue from some work by Andrew Rawlinson on the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīkasūtra* (see pp. 45 ff for details). Rawlinson claims that ‘in the earliest layers of the Lotus Sūtra terms such as the Dharma and the ‘sound’, ‘voice’ and ‘word’ and so on of the Buddha had an inner, transcendental meaning and that the Lotus originally conceived and experienced the Dharma as an inner sound.’ That is to say, the original message of the sūtra was not simply some intellectually comprehensible set of teachings, but rather some ‘inner, transcendental entity manifesting itself, through the medium of the Buddha, as sound’ (both quotations on p. 45). A critique of this thesis, unusual as it is, would of course be out of place here. While the symbolism of Mahāyāna sūtras, indeed of all Buddhist literature, clearly deserves far closer study, it does seem to the present writer that Rawlinson’s theory subjects metaphorical language to undue metaphysical strain—although it raises the question whether all religious traditions do indeed construct ontologies out of metaphor — and the same is true of Masefield’s attempt to apply it to the Pali Canon. His own statement on p. 46, that ‘it is possible to detect this same trend in the Nikāyas although the subsequent Pali and Theravāda traditions would seem to have been more thorough in their editing, so that only a few of the earlier, quite unambiguously transcendental passages now survive’, rings warning bells that a slim body of evidence is about to be called on to support a hypothesis of considerable weight. At any event, the passages Masefield examines are anything but ‘unambiguous’, and it has to be said that his attempts to demonstrate that ‘the Dhamma consisted of sound’ or that *parato ghosa* might mean ‘the sound from the

Beyond' are suggestive but not convincing. Here especially, it is absolutely essential that the relevant parallels in the non-Pali sources be run to ground before a final conclusion can be drawn. At the same time, this does not invalidate the rest of Masefield's findings, since in the absence of more convincing evidence, one can always take up the position that the critically transformative nature of the hearing of the Dhamma is to be seen as an indication of the Buddha's skill as a teacher or of the intrinsic power of his message. Whatever the case may be, the Dhamma is certainly strong stuff, if hearing it destroys most of one's previously generated *kamma* and prevents the production of fresh *kamma*, so that one has, at most, seven rebirths left to undergo.

What is more surprising is that the realisation of the goal of the path turns out, in the case of *most* recorded occurrences, also to be the result of hearing the teaching of the Buddha, in addition to which, this second and final teaching takes place very soon, sometimes even a matter of minutes, after the initial hearing of the Dhamma, with which the path begins. In such cases it hardly seems appropriate to talk about a 'path' at all. However, 'most' is not 'all': there are enough cases (listed in Table 5) of monks attaining arahantship through the practice of meditation ('dwelling aloof') to invalidate the generalisation that 'the acquisition of the goal of the path was as much the outcome of an oral teaching as had been that path's entrance' (p. xviii; here, as elsewhere, I have omitted the asterisks which dot the text). Yet although this generalisation is to be rejected as applying to all cases, it certainly does apply to the majority of them, so that one has once again to reconsider conventional notions of the eightfold path, and the role played by revelation at its completion as well as its inception.

Masefield next moves on to a study of the different forms which the goal of the eightfold path took. *Ariyasāvakas* are often divided into four groups, the *sotāpannas*, the *sakadāgāmins*, the *anāgāmins* and the *arahants*, each group itself being subdivided into those pursuing the path and those who have attained the fruit, thus yielding the eight varieties of *ariya-puggalas*, or 'holy persons'. The crucial point is that these terms do not refer to different stages on the path to liberation, as is often supposed, but to different goals of that path. (This is confirmed, as Masefield himself observes, following Bud-

dhaghosa, by the addition to the list, common in Mahāyāna sūtras, of *pratyekabuddhas* and Buddhas, the latter two terms referring clearly to two different types of attainment, rather than to two stages on the one path of development.) Furthermore, these four goals are not differentiated on the basis of the diligence with which one follows the path: the attainment of one or the other of them depends solely on the amount of kammic residue which one has still to expiate before final release. For example, if one's *kamma* can be expiated within the same lifetime, one becomes an *arahant*, otherwise one has to continue on after death as one of the other three main types of *ariyasāvaka*.

There are various other subdivisions of these three types. Working from the top down, Masefield provides a valuable analysis of the different classes of *anāgāmins* ('non-returners'), especially that of the *antarā-parinibbāyin*, a term which raises the 'intermediate state' problem. After a lengthy discussion he arrives at the conclusion that the three categories of *antarā-parinibbāyin* do indeed attain release in an intermediate state shortly after death, whereas the *upahacca-parinibbāyin* attains it at the moment of being reborn, and the other three classes of *anāgāmins* attain it at varying intervals after being reborn — the rebirth in all these cases being into the upper levels of the Buddhist cosmology, hence the name 'non-returner' (i.e. to the Realm of Desire). Once again, such distinctions are not based on different levels of spiritual accomplishment, but solely on the amount of *kamma* remaining to be expiated by the liberated person — *kamma*, incidentally, of an exceedingly meritorious kind, since it requires a sojourn in the *Brahmaloka* before it is played out. Others, whose kammic substrate is less meritorious, are liable to be reborn as human beings or *devas* of the *Kāmadhātu*. These are the *sakadāgāmins* ('once-returners'), the *ekabijins*, the *kolaikolas* and the *sattakkhattuparamas*, the last category being those required to undergo divine or human rebirth seven times at most before experiencing final release.

As Masefield points out, all these different categories are nothing more than a further elaboration of the basic fourfold division, which, although it originally referred to four alternative goals of the religious life, came during the Abhidhamma period to be re-interpreted as successive stages on the path to arahantship. In fact,

this re-interpretation, still current today, has created a number of logical problems, and thus compounded the difficulties which already existed. Consequently, anyone who has struggled to understand the meaning of these terms will be grateful to Masefield for his magisterial elucidation of them.

Similarly helpful is his explanation of the term *sotāpanna*, which he derives from Sanskrit *śrotas* ('hearing'), as have various other Buddhist scholars. Thus the *sotāpanna* is not a 'stream-enterer' — the inappropriateness of this rendering is demonstrated — but 'one who has come into contact with (or undergone) the hearing', i.e. the hearing associated with the path, the hearing of the Dhamma. As such, *sotāpanna* functions as a general term for those converted to Buddhism, and is tantamount to (*ariya-*) *sāvaka*, thus including those on the path to (or in possession of the fruits of) all classes of attainment, including arahantship.

Whatever the grade of attainment, Masefield's central contention is that its eventual realisation, as well as the initial entrance upon the path to it, is achieved not by one's own efforts, but by the act of hearing the Buddha. Thus Buddhism was not originally a path of strenuous self-development at all, but a religion of grace, and one that found itself in a difficult position after the demise of its founder, since Masefield asserts that there is little evidence that the Buddha's disciples shared his ability to bestow the *Dhammacakkhu* on others or to bring them to the final goal. He therefore concludes, rather guardedly, that there were no new *sāvakas* after Gautama's death. In fact, as we have already seen, the Nikāyas do record cases of individuals achieving the goal by their own efforts, while Masefield himself lists some ten recorded instances of the Buddha's disciples converting people to *sotāpanna* status (but only two instances, rather doubtful, of them bringing people to final realisation). This countervailing evidence aside, one should be wary here of the dangers of any argument from silence, since the Nikāyas are, after all, primarily dedicated to the glorification of the Buddha and the perpetuation of his teachings. In addition, it would be one thing to deduce that the logical consequence of the relevant material in the Nikāyas is 'No Buddha, no *sāvakas*', quite another to take into account the later development of Buddhism in all its forms. Indeed, there are Buddhists who (as, e.g., Gombrich has observed) believe that there have been no *arahants* for a very long

time, or even since Gautama's own day, and who therefore look forward to the possibility of release being once more available under the future Buddha Metteya/Maitreya. But there are also others who believe just as firmly that even in this corrupt age there are *arahants* in the world (as, for example, Tambiah has reported in the case of Thai Buddhism), or that to this day certain people still attain the highest goals that the Buddhist path has to offer (as in Tibetan Vajrayāna or Japanese Zen). In short, a religious tradition is never bound by its scriptures, but rather submits to them, re-interprets them, and ignores them in a unique and complex pattern.

Masefield's concluding chapter deals with the historical background of Buddhism and its relationship with the Brahminic tradition. He argues that the Buddhists were essentially conservative in promoting the *ariyasāvakas* as the true brahmins, i.e. as those truly capable of fulfilling that traditional religious responsibility which the brahmins themselves were no longer able to carry out, namely, to function as a channel of communication with the supermundane plane through the medium of the sacrifice. Henceforth, the Buddhists claimed, the *ariyasāvakas* were to be seen as superior 'fields of merit', worthy (*arahant*) recipients of the sacrifices of the people and mediators of all that was sacred. In Masefield's view, however, the Buddhists themselves gradually became incapable of performing this function, as the Sangha turned into an assembly of *puthujjana* monks, growing rich on the generosity of the laity and, deprived of any real contact with the true Dhamma, engaging instead in the tireless scholasticism of the Abhidhamma. Once again, this is to approach the question from a purely exegetical standpoint, and even then, it is a standpoint based on a rather oversimplified reading of the Nikāyas, according to which only *sāvakas* who had received the appropriate oral initiation from the Buddha himself were capable of treading the eightfold path to liberation, so that after Gautama's death this path was closed to all others — yet the evidence for this, as we have seen, is far from unequivocal. In short, the case has been overstated, although there is still a case.

In the light of all this, *Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism* is hardly likely to find favour with present-day members of the Sangha, whom it relegates to irrevocable *puthujjana* status (at least until

Metteya arrives). Nor will it recommend itself to their lay supporters, whose merit-making activities it seriously undermines, since gifts to *puthujjanas* bear meagre fruit. Nor will it appeal to those whose enthusiasm for Buddhism is founded on their perception of it as a uniquely rational and empirically based path of self-improvement, open to all, and leading step by step to the ultimate resolution of human suffering. Indeed, it suggests that Buddhism has more in common with other forms of religion (especially forms of Indian religion) than has hitherto been admitted, and to this extent, Masefield's avowed aim of remythologisation has been successfully accomplished. Early Buddhism now emerges as a religion in which revelation played a crucial role, even if the content of that revelation is not altogether certain. At the same time, the contemporary Theravāda practice of the recitation of the sacred word can no longer be regarded as an aberration or an epiphenomenon, even if its precise relationship to the Pali Canon has yet to be explored in detail. As has been pointed out, Masefield is not always entirely convincing, and often raises more questions than he answers, yet *Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism* is nevertheless a book which ought to be read and thought about by all those seriously interested in the history of Buddhism, since it says something fresh and stimulating about the Pali Canon on the basis of careful, original research. Indeed, its message has wider implications. It has become commonplace to observe that the cultural preconceptions of scholars of religion condition their understanding of the traditions they study, and that, in the case of Buddhism, the Western reaction against revealed religion and the development of the humanistic perspective contributed to a distorted picture of Theravāda Buddhism, a picture which highlighted its supposedly humanistic, rational, practical and philosophical elements. *Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism* acts as a valuable corrective to that picture, and while, even in its own notion of the Dhamma as a transcendental entity apprehended as sound, one may discern unmistakable cultural echoes, nevertheless there can be no doubt that the ramparts of 'Pali rationalism' are well and truly breached.

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BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK SURVEY

Visible Religion

Religion is always “visible”—at least for the student of religion who has to perceive the object of his research, even if it be with historical, textual-philological, psychological, sociological or whatever other X-ray eyes. Since the appearance of Thomas Luckmann's *Invisible Religion* (Engl. ed. 1967)—though surely the sociologist Luckmann somehow managed to see the “invisible” in our modern, secular society—the term has gained popularity, and it was therefore a real *trouvaille* of the Institute of Religious Iconography of the University of Groningen to call its series of studies *Visible Religion*. This series is a companion to the “Iconography of Religions” series which has been appearing in small fascicles for over fifteen years. Both series are published for the Groningen Institute by Messrs. Brill of Leiden. The Iconography fascicles, probably quite unintentionally, bring home to us once again the distinction between “iconic” and “aniconic” religion. Thus Judaism is represented at best by religious (synagogue) architecture and ritual objects (cups for the blessing over the wine, prayerbooks, Torah-scrolls, circumcision implements, pictures of wedding ceremonies, of burials or of other liturgical customs).¹ For the purposes of the series, *The Samaritans*² are placed in the Jewish section, and the iconographic material is not much different: Torah-scrolls, amulets, photos of ceremonies (Passover sacrifice, burials). Another solution for an aniconic religion would be to find alternative art forms, and here the first example to spring to mind is Arabic calligraphy. In fact, the first fascicle of Section xxii (Islam), published in 1970, is entitled *Islamic Calligraphy*³ and authored by the uncontested authority in the field, Prof. Annemarie Schimmel. The 31 pp. of text plus 33 figures and 48 plates give the reader as good and complete a survey as is possible, within the limited space available, of the history of the various styles (for writing as well as for decorative purposes), as well as the uses and sacred character of the Arabic script which was used throughout many parts of the Islamic world also for non-Arabic languages (e.g., Persian or Turkish). Since the publication of that fascicle prof. Schimmel has published a larger volume on the subject⁴ in the Hagop Kevorkian Series on Near Eastern Art and Civilization. The book places calligraphy within

the spectrum of Islamic culture, from fine arts to poetry, religion and mysticism, and is embellished by plenty of colour plates as well as black-and-white plates. Its value and usefulness are enhanced by excellent indexes of proper names, technical terms, book titles, Koran- and Hadith-references. The volume is a boon to students of Islam and to art-lovers alike.

Four more fascicles of the "Iconography of Religion" series have happened to reach the reviewer's desk. But before mentioning them a few reflections of a more general nature may be in order. For some decades an increasing number of scholars have been complaining that religious studies were addicted too much to philologico-historical methods (i.e., the study of texts), to the dire neglect of iconography. There was much justification, but even more exaggeration, in that complaint. After all, historians of e.g. ancient Near-Eastern and classical religions could never have done their work without the indispensable *apport* of archeology which was always gratefully acknowledged. Did Cumont write on Mithraism on the basis of texts or of iconography? Is there a student of Indian religion who does not know his Coomaraswamy or Stella Kramrisch by heart? The same holds true of all Indian and Far Eastern religions where history of art has become an indispensable part of the history of religions. But the problem is more complicated. What would "pure iconography" teach us without accompanying or background texts? Who would be able to distinguish one Catholic saint from another, or identify a Greek, or Egyptian or Indian deity, or interpret a mandala or a Buddhist mudra without a knowledge of the relevant texts, myths or sutras? As Wilfred C. Smith once put it, you can stare at crosses until you are blue in the face (and, I would add, mobilise all your Jungian archetypes and Eliadean cosmic trees) and yet never know what the cross means to the Christian unless you have read the N.T. and know something of the *theologia crucis* of St. Paul and the Early Fathers. On the other hand a better understanding of iconography can also contribute to a better understanding of the so-called aniconic religions.

Fasc. 14 of Section xiii of the aforementioned series⁵ is devoted to Buddhism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Central Asia was a *carrefour de civilisations* if ever there was one, which has not yet yielded all its treasures, both those already discovered and scattered in various libraries and collections and still awaiting adequate scholarly exploitation, and those still awaiting discovery or at least accessibility. Students of Christianity, Manichaeism, Buddhism and other religions still find Central Asia a full-time occupation. The two fascicles mentioned here provide as good an introduction to the Buddhist side of the matter as can be expected in the limited scope available. The various Buddha representations

(standing, seated, depictions of the life story [Jatakas and Avadanas], the Thousand Buddhas, the Two-headed Buddhas) are followed by illustrations of major Bodhisattvas, the minor and assimilated divinities, monks and ascetics, and—last but not least—mandalas. Between the main text and the plates there are a few pages of short and succinct descriptions and explanations of the illustrations.

Fascicles 12 and 13 in the same section are devoted to Jaina iconography,⁶ and illustrate and describe the Tirthankara notion and the variations of its image, as well as the manifold objects of meditation, and last but not least the immense Jaina pantheon. Fascicle 15 in the same Section⁷ still keeps us in the “Central Asian” area. Whilst Jainism plays no role in Nepal, Hinduism and Buddhism, as well as the heritage of folk-religion (especially of the Newar tradition) do. The minor goddesses and astral divinities are not forgotten.

The Groningen Institute of Religious Iconography has had the happy idea of enlarging the scope of its work by publishing an annual entitled *Visible Religion*.⁸ (See above p. 265 and NUMEN XXXIV, 1987, Chronicle Section, p. 143). The first volume has the character of a *Festschrift* presented to Prof. Th. P. van Baaren. Prof. van Baaren's special interest in the religions and religious iconography of “primitive” societies are reflected in the volume which ranges from the Baiga (a central Indian tribe) to Yama on the Black Buffalo, to West Africa (Akan and Yoruba), to the Near East (ancient Egypt and hellenistic Syria), to the American Indian Inouit. Vol. ii ranges from India to the Pergamon Altar to Rumanian folklore. Of special interest—because related to the problem of iconic/aniconic viz. visible/invisible—is Moshe Barash's thoughtful contribution on “Das Bild des Unsichtbaren”: Zu den frühen Christusbildern”. Vol.iii deals with Popular Religions (thus the title), which very definitely does *not* mean “primitive religions”. The varied subjects treated in the volume include Italian votive figures of seated mothers with children in their lap or in their arms, Assyrian and Babylonian spirits and demons, Greek tree-cults and the Buddhism of the Yün-kang caves (near Tat'ung viz. Da-tong in Shansi province). Unlike e.g., the sculpture at the Hau-Yen Monastery in Da-tong (10th cent.), the Yüh-kang caves take us back to the earliest phases of the “sinisation” of Buddhism (5th cent.). To what extent this cave sculpture represents “popular” Buddhism is a moot question since a good case can be made out for its connection with “imperial” Buddhism. The double volume iv-v⁹ ranges over Egyptian, classical, Persian, Japanese, Jewish and so-called “primitive” (Australia and Yoruba) religions. It would seem ungracious and arbitrary to single out some titles and leave others unmentioned. There are 18 contributions in the volume, and to whet the reader's

appetite let us make mention of Kippenberg's extremely stimulating Introduction, Muensterberger's "De Gustibus Notes on the genetics of taste", von Stietencron's "Political Aspects of Indian Religious Art", Versnel's "Apollo and Mars one hundred years after Roscher" and D. Metzler's deliberately paradoxical title "Anikonische Darstellungen". It is a matter of very great regret (to put it mildly) that neither the *Visible Religion* annuals nor the *Iconography of Religions* series are as well-known as they deserve to be.

It would be an insult to the scholarly world to "review" Heinrich Zimmer's classic *Kunstform und Yoga* (1926), now available in English translation.¹⁰ According to the rules of modern academic ignorance in English-speaking countries (*Germanica, sive Gallica, sunt: non leguntur*), also a classic is practically non-existent until translated. Zimmer's name was known because of the English version of *Philosophies of India*, but his most original and important work (a 2nd German ed. of which was published by Suhrkamp in 1976) was as good as unknown, though psychologically oriented minds, influenced by C. G. Jung, knew of Zimmer's work. (The Jung-Zimmer relationship, in matters indological, was somewhat similar to that between Jung and Wilhelm in matters sinological—hence also the remarkable boom of the I Ching among Jungians). The translation is excellent, the 54 plates are very good, and the production is in keeping with the standards of the Princeton University Press. This masterwork overwhelms the reader with its combination of religious, philosophical, aesthetic and artistic insight, and with the innovative contributions it makes to our understanding of the nature of the "sacred image", of Lamaist mandalas, and especially of the linear *yantra*. The subtlety of Zimmer's analysis is rarely as evident as in his discussion of the inversion between male and female significations taking place in the transition from Hindu to Buddhist symbolism. The two short appendices (autobiographical remarks by Zimmer, and a selected bibliography) are an added boon. One fervently wishes that Princeton University press will convert the selected bibliography into a volume of "Selected Essays by H. Zimmer".

The multitude of female Buddhist deities in the Vajrayana tradition is confusing beyond words, especially as positive and negative syncretisms with Brahmanical figures (both for missionary/adaptive and for polemical/hostile reasons) play an important role. Mrs. Mallar Gosh's erudite study,¹¹ confusing as it is, is nevertheless much less confusing than its subject-matter to which, in fact, it brings much original though sometimes debatable clarifications. The author's main subject is Tara in her many forms and seven main manifestations. The emphasis on East India is due to the undisputed fact that this area is the stronghold of Shakti

worship, and hence it is possible to place Devi at the origins of Tara. Mrs. Ghosh acknowledges the pioneer work of Benoytosh Bhattachariya and Marie-Thérèse de Mallmann, and seeks to build upon it. In fact, she also adopts de Mallman's method of dealing with selected specific deities, thus avoiding the twofold dangers of superficial generalisations on the one hand and drowning in an ocean of goddesses on the other. Using known and less well-known iconographical evidence as well as texts (many hitherto untranslated into western languages), she succeeds in dealing fully with at least some of the main manifestations of Tara, with the little-known Buddha-shaktis (Prajnas) of the five Thathagatas viz. Dhyani-Buddhas, and—in the last chapter—with Bhirukti. The latter (in which Mrs. Ghosh distinguishes at least thirty variants) should be seen as utterly distinct from Tara and as evolved from the Parvati of Brahminical tradition. Originally a Ph.D. thesis, this study will provoke both assent and dissent, but there can be no two opinions about its qualities.

It is one of the almost obvious and hence not surprising oddities in the field of religious iconography that many, if not most, relevant contributions are the catalogues of exhibitions held in different musea all over the world. For reasons not difficult to guess, the western mind, always prone to succumb to the lure of the exotic, is fascinated in particular by Indian and Buddhist art, and even more so by Tibetan and tantric iconography. The huge volume *The Image of the Buddha* (Gen. Ed. D. Snellgrove) published under the auspices of UNESCO was followed in short succession by ever so many monographs, studies and catalogues.

One such catalogue is that published by the University of Pennsylvania.¹² It is meant for non-experts visiting an exhibition, but within the narrow terms of its purpose it does a splendid job. Covering India (and the historical foundations of Buddhism), Central Asia, Japan, Tibet, Sri Lanka and South East Asia, the text and the illustrations (many of them excellent colour photographs) give an informative overview of the subject. A map of the main sites of the "Buddhist world", a time-map and a glossary make the catalogue even more useful. Whether figures of Nats (p. 43) belong to Buddhist iconography may be a debatable point, but Nats are certainly part of the world inhabited by Burmese Buddhists.

The Kunstmuseum Berlin-Tempelhof exhibited *Das Bild des Buddha* mainly on the basis of purely artistic criteria, and the catalogue was subsequently transformed into a book.¹³ The editor was assisted by an international team of experts whose contributions render the volume valuable also to historians of religion. Prof. H. Härtel's introduction deals with the Buddha's life, teaching and legend. The illustrations cover two millenia and a wide geographical area, from India to Nepal, Tibet, Cambodia and Java. Each reproduction (of reliefs, statues, paintings, mandalas, tankas)

is accompanied by a full explanatory text which does not neglect also the exact technical details (size, workmanship, type of material used, composition of the metals, the consecration of cult objects etc.). The introductory chapters also provide a short history of Buddhism and Buddhist art, and the essentials of Mahayana and Vajrayana.

The success of the 1979 exhibition encouraged the Berlin museum to hold an exhibition of tantric art in 1981. The resulting catalogue-volume¹⁴ has a wide-ranging and helpful introduction by the Editor which not only gives a succinct account of what tantra, tantric art, the tantric pantheon and the esoterica of tantric iconography are, but also attempts to do away with some popular misconceptions. Unfortunately pp. 185-200 (text and reproductions) are bound upside down—at least in the reviewer's copy. Both volumes have a good bibliography and index at their end. That tantric iconography can be very confusing is unwittingly illustrated by Prof. Uhlig's description (p. 164) of reproduction no. 57 as the "Mandala des Vajradhara". Exactly the same mandala appears in the catalogue of another exhibition (1976) with a very different identification and description!

The album-type publication (format 22 x 28,5 cm.) of the Austrian Akademische Verlagsanstalt¹⁵ on the iconography of Tibetan Buddhism follows on earlier but related publications (e.g. Pradapaditya Pal, *Bronzes of Kashmir* and a reprint of Nebesky-Wojkowitz's *Oracles and Demons of Tibet*). 92 pp. of text, 8 colour and 81 black-and-white plates provide an introduction to the basic iconographic principles of Tibetan art and describe in detail the illustrations chosen. Whilst the choice is never quite arbitrary—it is a function of the editor's intentions and emphasis when planning his volume—the accompanying descriptions are valuable for their cross-references to both Tibetan texts and scholarly literature. Although the title speaks of Tibetan Buddhism only, the volume does, in fact, provide more than it promises by taking into account also pre-Buddhist Bon religion.

The passing reference above to Nebesky-Wojkowitz provides an opportunity to draw attention to a small booklet on Tibetan Amulets.¹⁶ Amulets and Magic are a major if not essential part of Tibetan (and not only of Tibetan) religion. The paucity of literature on the subject (Schlagintweit and Waddell are the old classics, Nebesky-Wojkowitz and N. Douglas are more recent contributions) contrasts strangely with the importance of the subject-matter (for Tibetans). Per Kvaerne in his Preface reminds us of several, and partly well-known, examples. T. Skorupski not only argues but also illustrates his thesis that amulets and spells are an integral part of Buddhism (not only in Tibet!) and not merely a residue of non- or pre-Buddhist superstition thinly veiled by Buddhist symbols. He presents us

with 109 amulets and 102 protective chakras taken from an "apocryphal" collection of revelations, compiled by a learned Tibetan author who in his own education and career combined Bonpo and Buddhist tradition. The author's short introduction (pp. 1-7) helps to place the illustrations against their proper background.

The most impressive and monumental of all iconographic creations—iconography beyond iconography—is, without doubt, the Borobodur (henceforth abbreviated B.). Apart from being also a stupa, it is an incomparable iconographic monument not only because of the wealth of iconography covering the walls of its galleries and terraces and even its top platform, but because the monument as such is a microcosmic representation of a mystical macrocosmos. The literature on the B. is enormous, from Sir Stamford Raffles' pioneer paper of 1815 via the publications of Kern, Krom, Foucher, Bosch, Sylvain Lévi and ever so many others, including Heinrich Zimmer, to Paul Mus' monumental *magnum opus*, worthy of the monumental character of its subject, which appeared 1932-4 in the BEFEO and was reprinted in 2 volumes in 1935. Mus was followed by many others, including Japanese scholars, all fascinated by this "Buddhist Mystery in Stone" (the title of Bernet Kempers's contribution to the volume under review). What were the dates and the circumstances of the construction of this monument? What was its function and "message"? To say that it is a stupa is to say practically nothing, nor is the correlation of much of its iconography with details from the jatakas and avadanas particularly enlightening. Many scholars have tried to identify the sutras i.e., the doctrinal system which the B. is supposed to reflect. UNESCO has devoted a multi-million fortune to saving (i.e., completely dismantling and then re-assembling and reconstructing) the crumbling and endangered monument. Since then the B. has—alas—become of interest to students not only of iconography but also of iconoclastic religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, because this masterwork of reconstruction was heavily damaged again when nine bombs (planted by whom?) ripped through it in 1985. Although with the passage of time the B. has lost nothing of its impressive grandeur and power of fascination, it continues to pose riddles to scholarship. The volume edited by Gomez and Woodward¹⁷ is a milestone in B. research, since this collection of papers by seven internationally recognised authorities, whilst not providing any definitive solutions, clearly and succinctly reviews and discusses and puts into perspective the present *status quaestionis*, the current theories, as well as the most up-to-date information. All future studies of the B. will have to continue from where the present volume leaves off.

Iconography can also serve polemical purposes, and the most obscene

example of this genre is undoubtedly the *Judensau*. From the point of view of Jewish religious law, the pig is no more and no less "impure" than any other forbidden animal (i.e., among quadrupeds, any animal that does not chew the cud and has no cloven hoof; both characteristics are necessary, and the pig is "unclean" because it does not chew the cud although it has cloven hoofs). When, how and why the pig achieved the special status, in the eyes of Jews and Gentiles alike, of the supreme Jewish symbol of the utmost abomination deserves a special investigation. But once we take the fact for granted, the stereotypical representation of Jews sucking at the teats of a sow, occurring mainly in German architectural sculpture from the 13th to the 16th century (but also as late as the 17th and 18th centuries, and even in the 19th, in woodblocks and prints) requires special monographic treatment. The late I. Schachar, whose premature death bereft the history of Jewish religious art and iconography of one of its best and most promising scholars, has provided this monograph¹⁸—unfortunately his last major work. No doubt there were other anti-Jewish images current in the Middle Ages, but the better known among them (e.g., the blindfolded Synagogue paired with the triumphant Church) usually had a very definite—in this case theological—context. Some broadsheets and woodcuts depict other Jewish horrors (ritual murder, desecration of the Host). But the *Judensau* is a special case. Its popularity was due precisely to the fact that its *Aussagekraft* required no specific context but resided simply in its aggressive obscenity. The author examines this motif as a case-study in the development and metamorphoses of an abusive stereotype. The study is a model of careful scholarship, especially as the author avoids both hasty generalisations about antisemitism as such, and the even more dangerous pitfall of expanding a single case-study into a general theory of iconographic stereotypes. But he is surely not overstating his case when he argues that this particular stereotype served to "stereotypise" an attitude towards the Jews as alien and almost non-human, at any rate as being absolutely not "of us". A final chapter deals with the decline and disappearance of this motif. A map (facing the titlepage) indicates the places where the sculptured *Judensau* can be found: the northernmost instance seems to be the Cathedral of Uppsala; the Minster of Basle the most southern.

Nipponica

NUMEN has, on more than one occasion, sung the praises of the selfless compilers of bibliographies. Of course any serious student of Shinto will have recourse to Japanese material and hence also to the Japanese bibliographies. A. Saeki (1937) and Genji Kato (1937) list

10,000 and 15,000 items respectively. But the former lists all literature (beginning with the *Kojiki*), and Kato too does not restrict himself to modern research only. Moreover his bibliography takes us up to Meiji only, though an additional volume (1953), covering the years 1868-1953 lists over 15,000 further titles in over 700 pages. Further supplementary bibliographies have been published by Kokugakuin University and others. Compared to this immense output, the material available in western languages is meagre (and of very unequal quality). Here too Genji Kato was a pioneer. His western languages bibliography (1953) numbers—together with Schiffer's addenda—over 1200 titles. A French publication by Jean Herbert (1968) lists 1182 (incl. some Japanese) items.

The most recent bibliography¹⁹ with its 2006 items is, by definition, more up-to-date. As its subtitle indicates, it tries to include more than Shinto "religion" and cult proper. The listing is by alphabetical order of authors' names, but the topical index at the end mitigates this inconvenience. The value of this otherwise useful compilation is diminished by what seems to be a somewhat puzzling lack of consistency, or of criteria, in the inclusion viz. omission of titles. For in addition to articles in journals also books are listed in what appears to be a somewhat arbitrary fashion. A serious lacuna is the absence of the many, at times very good and extremely useful, accounts of Shinto appearing as chapters in larger "History of Religions" works (e.g. in the French Pleiade *Histoire des Religions* or in the *Historia Religionum* ed. by Bleeker and Widengren). What is needed most urgently is a *bibliographie critique*, somewhat along the lines of Earhart's "New Religions" bibliography. What is needed even more urgently is a more precise working definition of Shinto. Many of the titles dealing with Ancestor Worship might equally well figure in a Buddhist bibliography. And by listing Shinto-derived "new religions", the phenomenon of the *shin shukyo* runs the danger of being dangerously, because onesidedly, represented. A revised and much improved edition is highly desirable.

The Higashi Honganji (which means the Otani Sect and hence also the dominant Jodo Shinshu group) has been much in the news in recent years in Japan. The mass media thrive on scandals, and religious organisations are very lavish providers of this commodity. But scandals apart, historians of religions are used to schisms, secessions and the like even if these are not, or not always, connected with "reformist" movements. Because of its long history, social significance, dominant position in Japanese Buddhism, the aristocratic standing and even imperial connections of its top clergy, the Otani case aroused more than usual interest.²⁰ Religion in Japan being generally a somewhat "right wing" affair, the accusation of "Communist plotting" plays a considerable role in many internecine

sectarian struggles. (The Oomoto-kyo provides another recent example). As for Buddhism in contemporary Japan, one regrets that the author—alas—does not seem to be aware how frightfully right he is when mentioning the terms “funeral cult” and even “funeral business”. Our author contributes his share to these aspects of Japanese religious polemics. The dustcover exhorts readers to judge for themselves the issue discussed. This is certainly sound and (in Buddhist language) “wholesome” advice. But in order to judge, those interested in the recent Otani crisis should read more than this one, well-written, fascinating and militant book alone.

*Japanese Religion in the Modern Century*²¹ is an important book, written by a leading Japanese specialist and translated by one of the leading western specialists. There are few works in English (or in any western language for that matter) telling in a straightforward manner the story of Japanese religion in the modern era i.e., from Meiji on. The author deals in historical-chronological order with the main developments: the persecution of Buddhism, the re-introduction of Christianity, the widening gulf between State Shinto and Sectarian Shinto, the Buddhist movement, the re-organisation of Shrines, the role of Christianity as a forerunner of social movements, the new religions looking forward to a world renewal, the religious oppression under the militarist régime, and the role of Shinto in the Imperial War. A final chapter deals with the post-war freedom of religion, the separation of Religion and State, and the post-war “new religions” (with special attention to the Sokka Gakkai, which also provides an opportunity for discussing the relations politics-and-religion), and the present religious situation.

The book is so handy and useful that it would be ungrateful to cavil at details. Of course a Japanese book originally published in 1968 is sadly out of date in the eighties. An important lacuna is the absence of a fuller discussion of the present-day political dimensions of Shinto: its alliance with right-wing nationalist trends (even leaving aside Yasukuni-jinja), its susceptibility to political exploitation, and the struggles inside the Shinto world for a deeper religious understanding notwithstanding the political Tennoism that seems to be inseparable from Shinto. But students of Japanese religion can supply these addenda themselves. The main thing is to have in one's hands a competent basic account to which one can then add ad lib.

The question “What's in a name” haunts historians of religion no matter what they do: names of gods, of spirits and demons, of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and—in this case—of Buddhist Temples in Japan,²² compared to which the names given to synagogues and mosques are much less interesting. (Shinto shrines are another question altogether). The names of Christian churches are a relatively simple affair. They are

generally taken from the names of (patron or other) saints, archangels, theological concepts (Holy Trinity, Sacred Heart) or divine viz. near-divine persons (St. Saviour, Our Lady of....). Some evangelical congregations prefer Old Testament words: Ebenezer, Immanuel etc. Compared to all this, East Asian names can be confusing. The same person changes his name throughout his career as he changes his function or rank. He may have his normal name next to his ecclesiastical or artist's (e.g. calligrapher, Kabuki-player, Sumo-wrestler) name. Practically everybody receives a Buddhist posthumous name (*kaimyo*), and some use this name already in their lifetime. The reign-names (*nengo*) of emperors play an important role. Many temples have more than one name: the official name (*jigo*)—often unknown to most people—and the popular name (*sango*). Every tourist knows the Koke-dera (Moss Temple); few would know its “real” name *Seihōji*. The Amidist head-temple *Zenrinji* is much better known as *Eikando*. And apart from Shingon priests hardly any citizen of Kyoto, no matter how familiar he may be with the *Toji*, would know its real name *Kyō-o-Gokoku-ji* (which is already an abbreviation of the “real” real name). There is thus every reason to welcome a publication systematically dealing with the subject, and every reason to be grateful to Prof. D. Seckel for having done it.

Prof. Seckel needs no introduction to students of East Asian religious art, and some of the considerations advanced in the preceding paragraph are not the reviewer's original contribution. In fact, they have been made and briefly discussed by the author himself by way of introduction to the main part of the work which presents the material in typological arrangement: names connected with numina (e.g. Nyorai, Bosatsu etc.), sutras and scriptures, doctrinal concepts, good wishes and omina, Chinese motifs, *nengo* and political elements, historical and topographical names etc. He also distinguishes between official and private temples as well as official and popular names. The introduction also discusses future tasks and methods of research. No doubt some readers would have preferred different ways of arranging the material. But considering the fact that Japan has tens of thousands of temples, a complete survey will probably be impossible (and most probably also unnecessary). Prof. Seckel's study has filled an important lacuna and has, moreover, blazed the trail for any future research on this particular subject.

Shinzo by Dr. Christine Guth²³ is a rare gem of a book. An art-historian's work written primarily for art-historians, it is nevertheless indispensable to students of Japanese religion for any number of equally valid reasons. One of them is the strange paradox with which Shinto confronts every student brought up in the western tradition and with the biblical *idée fixe* that polytheism = idolatry (i.e., worship of images). A

purely “spiritual” religion like (allegedly) Buddhism simply smothers the beholder with images and statues (and you don’t have to visit the Sanjusangendo in Kyoto or Buddhist cave sculptures in China for that purpose)—no matter what *upaya/hoben* justifications you mobilise—whereas the shrines of an unashamedly polytheistic *yao-yorozu-no-kami* religion *par excellence* i.e., Shinto, are as movingly “empty” as a mosque or a puritan church. Of course every Shinto has its *shintai* (“god-body”), but the latter is usually invisible (even to the Shrine’s headpriests), and in most cases is not a human figure but a symbolic object (e.g., a mirror). *Shinzo* (as distinct from *butsuzo*) are sculpted images in human form of a Shinto *kami*. Of these the Hachiman-*shinzo* are by far the most prominent, and this gives the book an added dimension of interest. The name and the history of this god are still largely unsolved—at least they still leave ample room for further research. A pukkah Shinto deity (though not mentioned in the Kojiki), Hachiman was soon swept into the maelstrom of Shinto-Buddhist syncretism and in due course came to play the role of a *bosatsu* not less than that of a *kami*. Here, of course, the *honji-suijaku* theory developed by esoteric Buddhism came in handy. (The exactly parallel, though inverse, Shinto theory is *yuichi shinto*). Hachiman’s main role (in later periods) as a war god—a function still unknown in the Nara and Heian periods—seems to be due to the Minamotos who, in fact, turned him into a kind of *ujigami*. But no matter how and what, he is one of Shinto’s most popular deities.

Further interest attaches to the fact that the examples analysed in great detail and precision and with impressive erudition by Dr. Guth are of the single woodblock type. Attempts have been made to relate this kind of statuary with dominant Korean influence. Dr. Guth has already made short shrift of this nonsense in a review in NUMEN (XXXIII, 1986, p.179). There is something extraordinarily fascinating about this wooden statuary, especially the single woodblock type, because here the Japanese artist really comes into his own. Unlike bronze which was not indigenous and therefore not available, then very rare, and always very expensive, the Japanese artist (and this applies *mutatis mutandis* also to pottery) was at his best when his artistic *kokoro* responded to the *kokoro* and the qualities of the material with which nature provided him: in this case the various types of wood, its grain etc.

One other aspect should be mentioned: there are *shinzo* of the syncretic (i.e. Buddhist-influenced) and of the aristocratic-courtly type. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of the distinction in China between Buddhist statuary (never denying its ultimately Indian pedigree), and Taoist and Confucian sculptures which look like court-officials and mandarins.

Hachiman viz. Hachiman-Bosatsu statues (incl. those where the god is accompanied by consorts and attendants, or appears in triads) being not too plentiful, Dr. Guth's study, though deliberately restricted to selected examples, is in fact a comprehensive study which deserves to rank as a classic. It is also a threefold study: of Hachiman, of *shinzo*, and of the art of woodblock carving. It is a book so rich and suggestive that this reviewer gladly admits that even a review three times this size would not have done justice to it.

Death is a (if not "the") central element in many religions. On the empty screen of the "beyond" or the "hereafter", human imagination uninhibitedly projects its perceptions, fears and hopes. Often, in non-literate civilisations, the funeral arrangements are all we can know about their religious life, and even there the meanings generally elude us, no matter how many the dry "bones" (with apologies for the bad pun) of archeological facts. What notions of the soul and its fate did people entertain? What cosmologies did they construct (divine spheres, hells, Pure Lands, underworlds, courts of post-mortem judgment etc.) to describe the fate of the soul and to elicit the appropriate behaviour from the survivors? In literate cultures this pre-occupation can reach fantastic levels of elaboration. Egypt and China have given us the most impressive as well as the best documented examples.

Japanese "history" begins with the "invasion" of Chinese culture (including Chinese Buddhism). Before that, the centuries that are daylight history in China are obscure pre- (or proto-) history in Japan, and the Shinto classics, being written documents, are by definition sinicised (and actually written partly in Chinese and partly in Chinese characters) and hence of dubious value for the reconstruction of the proto-historic "Shinto". (I am using this term with humble apologies to all those super-purists who reject it—probably with good reason—as illegitimate for these earlier—Jomon, Yayoi, Kofun—periods). The title of M. Macé's excellent study²⁴ is rather a misnomer, and probably due to the wishes of the publisher who must keep an eye on prospective buyers/readers. For what this piece of impeccable and solid scholarship deals with is not *le Japon ancien* but *le Japon archaïque*. The author squeezes to the last drop—like a lemon—all the available types of evidence, from archeology to Chinese and Japanese sources to the most recent instances of the use of imperial funeral practices. The main part of this bulky study is devoted to a careful analysis of the *mogari*, and there is not a single relevant detail that has not been fully explored and discussed. This book is a monument of careful, almost perfectionist scholarship, and hence the author himself is painfully aware of the frustrating fact that in view of the nature of his material there cannot be any answers to some of the most important ques-

tions: with so much of the evidence relating to imperial deaths and burials, what about the ordinary man? And with so many factual (ritual and archeological) details concerning the "outside" of funerary practices, how much shall we ever know about the "inside" i.e., what people thought and believed?

Pilgrimage is central to many religions, and the comparatist can amuse himself with making subtle distinctions between religions where pilgrimage is absolutely "central" (e.g., Second Temple Judaism with its pilgrimages to the Temple in Jerusalem); or the Muslim *hajj* to Mecca, one of the "pillars" of Islam, alongside the less canonical or even dubious—from the orthodox point of view—pilgrimages), and such where it is important, popular, meritorious, even characteristic of an age (e.g., Jerusalem or Santiago in Christianity) but not theologically central. In Japan pilgrimage is a central feature of popular religion, unlike China where, in spite of the importance of Holy Mountains and the visits there, pilgrimage has a very different *Stellenwert*. Mr Statler²⁵, known from many popular books about Japan, here follows the model so successfully applied by him in *Japanese Inn*. In that "historical novel" he looked at Japanese history from the vantage point of successive generations of a family owning a roadside inn on the Tokaido Road. Here the same method is applied to the Shingon-type pilgrimage. Inevitably the first chapters are devoted to Kobo Daishi and to the forms of piety which his name and saintly memory evoked. The fact that the author's account also very explicitly describes the seamier sides of itinerant monkhood (e.g. one "holy man" enjoying during one night both the female and male (younger) members of the pious family that hospitably put him up) should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with e.g., such Christian literature as Boccaccio, Chaucer, *Le Roman de la Rose* etc. An eminently readable and worthwhile book.

Talking about pilgrimage in Japan it is a pleasant duty to draw attention to the modest but very well-produced catalogue of an unpretentious but valuable exhibition on the subject of *O-meguri* arranged by Prof. Michael Pye of the History of Religions Department at the University of Marburg.²⁶ A lot of useful and insightful information as well as many good maps and delightful pictures have been compressed in this small catalogue which deals with the types of pilgrimage roads (the Shikoku as well as Kannon pilgrimages), pilgrim's garb and travel rules, votive tablets, seals etc., forms of singing, recitation and worship. The historian will be glad to note that Reader's article on "The changing nature of Japanese pilgrimage" is mentioned in the bibliography; the phenomenologist will regret that J. M. Kitagawa's paper "Three Types of Pilgrimage in Japan" has been overlooked.

Like most of Prof. Hardacre's publications, also the slim size of the present volume²⁷ stands in inverse relation to its quality and importance. The history of Japan's treatment of Korea during the last hundred years, and of its treatment of its sizeable Korean minority today (though de facto indistinguishable from the rest of the Japanese population)—as also of other groups considered to be “outsiders” by the “homogeneous” Nipponese society—does not make for edifying reading. There is not very much more to be said on this unsavoury subject since the publication of the G. de Vos & Chung Daekyun (eds.) volume (1982), considered also by Helen Hardacre as a “watershed” in the study of this subject. But the religion of the Korean minority and its function in the preservation of ethnic identity (the other side of the coin of the struggle for adaptation and integration), has so far not been adequately researched. Prof. Hardacre's intensive fieldwork—mainly in the Osaka area, one of the main concentrations of Korean population—marks a significant advance. A short account of the Korean minority is followed by accounts of Korean temples, rituals, religious practices, the typically Korean combination of Buddhist and shamanistic elements, the forms and types of ritual associations etc. 9 tables and 3 figures complete this excellent survey and analysis. The reviewer can do no better than to quote the author's conclusion: “The existence of these Korean temples in Japan provides its minority with an alternative to Japan's religious institutions that reverses the usual hierarchy in which Koreans must defer to the Japanese. In the temples as in few other areas or the minority's social life, Koreans exclude Japanese; there Koreans need not encounter Japanese discrimination. In temple worship Koreans can act entirely independently of the Japanese, and in that setting, if nowhere else, Korean heritage becomes an unqualified good”.

RJZW

¹ E. g. in fasc. 4 of Section xxiii (Judaism), *The Jewish Life Cycle* by Joseph Gutmann, 1987, pp. 36 of text plus 48 pp. of plates, ISBN 90-04-07892-4. “Iconography of Religions” Series, Brill, Leiden.

² Fasc. 5 of Section xxiii, *The Samaritans* by Reinhard Pummer, 1987, pp. 46 of text (incl. catalogue of illustrations) plus 48 plates, ISBN 90-04-07891-6.

³ A. Schimmel, *Islamic Calligraphy*, Fasc. 1 of Section xxii (Islam) of the series mentioned in n. 1 (Leiden, Brill), 1970.

⁴ A. Schimmel, *Calligraphy and Islamic Culture* (New York and London, New York Univ. Press), 1984, pp. 264, ISBN 0-8147-7830-5.

⁵ Simone Gautier, R. Jera-Bezard & Monique Maillard (eds.), *Buddhism in Afghanistan and Central Asia*, 1976, Pt. 1 pp. xiii + 30, followed by 76 plates; Pt. 2 pp. 53 followed by 47 more plates, ISBN 90-04-04744-1/8 and 90-04-04744-1/6.

- ⁶ J. Jain & E. Fischer (eds.), *Jaina Iconography*, 1978, pp. 1-34 + 46 plates, and pp. 43 + 47 plates, ISBN 90-04-05259-3.
- ⁷ K. R. van Kooij (ed.), *Religion in Nepal*, 1978, pp. 33 + 48 plates, ISBN 90-04-05827-3.
- ⁸ H. Kippenberg (Chief Editor), *Visible Religion* (Brill, Leiden). Vol. i *Commemorative Figures*, 1982, pp. 174 incl. numerous illustrations, ISBN 90-04-06779-5; vol. ii *Representations of God*, 1983, pp. 173 incl. numerous plates and illustrations, D.fl. 75.-, ISBN 90-04-07114-8; vol. iii *Popular Religion*, 1984, pp. 171 incl. numerous plates and illustrations, D.fl. 72.-, ISBN 90-04-07496-1.
- ⁹ Vol. iv-v. *Approaches to Iconology*, 1985-6, pp. 325, ISBN 90-04-07772-3.
- ¹⁰ H. Zimmer, *Artistic Form and Yoga in the Sacred Images of India*, transl. by G. Chapple and J. B. Lawson (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press), 1984, pp. 289 + 54 plates, \$ 33.-, ISBN 0-691-07289-2.
- ¹¹ Mallar Ghosh, *Development of Buddhist Iconography of Eastern India. A Study of Tara, Prajnas of the Five Tathagatas and Bhurkti*. (New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal), 1980, pp. 210, 22 x 28 cm., with 32 pp. on half-tone plates giving 54 illustrations. Rs. 225.
- ¹² E. Lyons & H. Peters (eds.), *Buddhism: History and Diversity of a Great Tradition*, The University Museum, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1985, pp. 64, \$ 12.95, ISBN 0-934718-76-8.
- ¹³ H. Uhlig (ed.), *Das Bild des Buddha* (Berlin, Safari Verlag [= Ullstein]), 1979, pp. 252 consisting of 68 pp. of text + plates (black-and-white as well as colour) with explanations.
- ¹⁴ H. Uhlig (ed.), *Tantrische Kunst des Buddhismus*. Eine Ausstellung vom Kunstartm Tempelhof Berlin (Berlin, Ullstein), 1981, pp. 316 consisting of 104 pp. of text + plates, many in colour, with explanations.
- ¹⁵ D. I. Lauf, *Eine Ikonographie des tibetischen Buddhismus* (Graz, Austria, Akad. Druck- und Verlagsanstalt), 1979, pp. 204.
- ¹⁶ Tadeusz Skorupski, *Tibetan Amulets* (Bangkok, White Orchid Books), 1983, pp. 122. With a Preface by Per Kværne.
- ¹⁷ L. Gomez & H. W. Woodward Jr. (eds.), *Barabadur: History and Significance of a Buddhist Monument* (Berkeley, Asian Humanities Press, Univ. of California) 1981, pp. 253, \$ 20.-, ISBN 0-89581-151-0.
- ¹⁸ Isaiah Schachar, *The Judensau: a medieval anti-Jewish motif and its history* (Warburg Institute Surveys vol. v), London, The Warburg Institute, University of London, 1974, pp. 101 + 62 pp. of plates, ISBN 0-85481-049-8.
- ¹⁹ Arcadio Schwade, *Shinto-Bibliography in Western Languages: Bibliography on Shinto and Religious Sects, Intellectual Schools and Movements influenced by Shintoism*. (Leiden, Brill), 1986, pp. 124, D.fl. 58.; U.S. \$ 26,25 papercover, ISBN 90-04-08173-9.
- ²⁰ David A. Suzuki, *Crisis in Japanese Buddhism: Case of the Otani Sect. A Communist Conspiracy to Destroy Religion?* (Los Angeles—Tokyo, Buddhist Books International), 1985, pp. 284, cloth \$ 19.50, Y 5400.-, ISBN 0-914910-51-5.
- ²¹ Shigeyoshi Murakami, *Japanese Religion in the Modern Century* (transl. by Byron Earhart, Tokyo, Tokyo Univ. Press, distrib. by Prentice-Hall International), 1980, pp. 186, hardcover, \$ 12.50, ISBN 0-86008-260-1.
- ²² Dietrich Seckel, *Buddhistische Tempelnamen in Japan* (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden), Münchener Ostasiatische Studien Bd. 37, 1985, pp.xii + 318, kt. DM. 92.-, ISBN 3-515-04152-4.
- ²³ Christine Guth-Kanda, *Shinzo: Hachiman Imagery and its Development* (Harvard

East Asian Monographs 119, distrib. by Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge Mass. & London), 1985, pp. 135, 20 x 28 cm. with 76 plates, ISBN 0-674-80650-6.

²⁴ François Macé, *La mort et les funérailles dans le Japon ancien* (Paris, Publications Orientalistes de France), 1986, pp. 660, ISBN 2-7169-0214-3.

²⁵ Oliver Statler, *Japanese Pilgrimage*, William Morrow & Co., New York, 1983, pp. 349, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-688-01890-4.

²⁶ O-Meguri: *Pilgerfahrt in Japan*, von M. Pye (Marburg, Schriften der Universitätsbibliothek Marburg 31), 1987, pp. 101, ISBN 3-8185-0000-2.

²⁷ Helen Hardacre, *The Religion of Japan's Korean Minority: The Preservation of Ethnic Identity* (Berkeley, Univ. of California, The Inst. of East Asian Studies, Korean Research Monograph no. 9), 1984, pp. 74, ISBN 0-912966-67-X.

HORSLEY, G. H. R., *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity: A Review of the Greek Inscriptions and Papyri published in 1976*—Macquarie University. The Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, 1981.

idem, *New Documents... 2*, 1977 (Macquarie University, 1982).

idem, *New Documents... 3*, 1978 (Macquarie University, 1983).

Il faut saluer l'initiative audacieuse d'un groupe de chercheurs de l'Université australienne Macquarie, qui ont lancé le projet de renouveler l'ouvrage de Moulton et Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the New Testament*. Sous l'impulsion de E. A. Judge, ces chercheurs s'efforcent de maîtriser toutes les données, non littéraires aussi bien que littéraires, qui peuvent nous donner des détails sur le monde du Nouveau Testament et des chrétiens des premiers siècles. Dans ce domaine, Judge lui-même est l'un des pionniers à refuser les frontières "disciplinaires" traditionnelles entre philologie et histoire. Pour lui, on ne fait pas de bonne histoire avec de la mauvaise philologie, ni non plus sans utiliser sérieusement les concepts développés par les sociologues.

Les trois volumes édités par Horsley, qui représentent le premier résultat tangible de cet effort collectif, sont en fait conçus comme les premiers numéros d'un Annuaire dont il faut espérer qu'il jouira d'une grande diffusion.

Le public visé est avant tout celui de néo-testamentaires et des chercheurs dans le domaine du christianisme ancien. Le groupe de Macquarie est sous l'impression, très probablement juste, que ce public souffre d'une hypertrophie de textes théologiques et d'atrophie pour tout ce qui est de la documentation non littéraire.

Les très riches résultats enregistrés chaque année par les papyrologistes et les épigraphistes ne semblent atteindre la grande majorité des néo-testamentaires que très partiellement. C'est pour leur révéler, textes à

East Asian Monographs 119, distrib. by Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge Mass. & London), 1985, pp. 135, 20 x 28 cm. with 76 plates, ISBN 0-674-80650-6.

²⁴ François Macé, *La mort et les funérailles dans le Japon ancien* (Paris, Publications Orientalistes de France), 1986, pp. 660, ISBN 2-7169-0214-3.

²⁵ Oliver Statler, *Japanese Pilgrimage*, William Morrow & Co., New York, 1983, pp. 349, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-688-01890-4.

²⁶ O-Meguri: *Pilgerfahrt in Japan*, von M. Pye (Marburg, Schriften der Universitätsbibliothek Marburg 31), 1987, pp. 101, ISBN 3-8185-0000-2.

²⁷ Helen Hardacre, *The Religion of Japan's Korean Minority: The Preservation of Ethnic Identity* (Berkeley, Univ. of California, The Inst. of East Asian Studies, Korean Research Monograph no. 9), 1984, pp. 74, ISBN 0-912966-67-X.

HORSLEY, G. H. R., *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity: A Review of the Greek Inscriptions and Papyri published in 1976*—Macquarie University. The Ancient History Documentary Research Centre, 1981.

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Il faut saluer l'initiative audacieuse d'un groupe de chercheurs de l'Université australienne Macquarie, qui ont lancé le projet de renouveler l'ouvrage de Moulton et Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the New Testament*. Sous l'impulsion de E. A. Judge, ces chercheurs s'efforcent de maîtriser toutes les données, non littéraires aussi bien que littéraires, qui peuvent nous donner des détails sur le monde du Nouveau Testament et des chrétiens des premiers siècles. Dans ce domaine, Judge lui-même est l'un des pionniers à refuser les frontières "disciplinaires" traditionnelles entre philologie et histoire. Pour lui, on ne fait pas de bonne histoire avec de la mauvaise philologie, ni non plus sans utiliser sérieusement les concepts développés par les sociologues.

Les trois volumes édités par Horsley, qui représentent le premier résultat tangible de cet effort collectif, sont en fait conçus comme les premiers numéros d'un Annuaire dont il faut espérer qu'il jouira d'une grande diffusion.

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l'appui (ces textes sont reproduits, traduits, et commentés) les progrès faits dans notre connaissance de l'histoire des idées et des milieux religieux dans lesquels se développèrent les premiers groupes chrétiens que *New Documents* est publié. (Le projet a aussi un aspect didactique, souligné par l'éditeur: la formation d'une chrestomathie grandissante d'année en année.)

Quiconque s'est frotté, si peu que ce soit, aux travaux d'un Louis Robert sait à quel point les documents épigraphiques permettent une compréhension intime, pourrait-on presque dire, du monde de l'antiquité tardive à laquelle aucune étude prolongée des œuvres littéraires ne peut mener. Il en est de même pour les papyrus. Et il est grand temps que cesse la division entre histoire du christianisme et histoire du monde païen, division trop souvent reflétée par la nature différente des sources dont se servent les uns et les autres. (Pour un tout récent exemple de cette dichotomie dans la méthode, voir par exemple Robin Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, New York 1987.) Chrétiens et païens habitaient le même monde: dans les papyrus choisis par Horsley, on rencontre Serapion, Isis, un culte de Zeus à Sardis, la réponse d'un oracle, un charme d'amour. On y trouve aussi l'épitaphe d'un soldat, un épigramme pour Apollonius de Tyane, la grande déesse de Samarie, le contrat d'un diacre, la première attestation du terme *monachos*, et la première référence à une synagogue. La date d'Ezana, le "Constantin" de l'Ethiopie, y est traitée, ainsi que le développement du christianisme dans le Sinaï ou dans le Sahara égyptien.

On y trouve aussi des documents sur les transports publics, la circulaire d'un préfet interdisant la magie, ou les recensements, les devoirs sociaux et la courtoisie.

Les documents sont suivis de notes philologiques sur divers mots, de textes et de citations bibliques, de rubriques *Judaica* et *Ecclesiastica*, et d'*Indices*. Certaines des discussions sont remarquables, toutes sont caractérisées par l'honnêteté et la rigueur.

En bref, les ouvrages recensés semblent ouvrir la porte à une "histoire totale" du monde des premiers chrétiens, une approche d'où paraîtraient les différences entre histoire religieuse et histoire sociale, où l'histoire elle-même se transformerait, selon les voeux de Paul Veyne (*Comment on écrit l'histoire*, Paris 1979²) en sociologie. L'historien des religions ne peut qu'encourager une telle approche, qui devrait permettre, dans un domaine particulièrement délicat, la dissociation de plus en plus nette, pour le bénéfice des uns et des autres, entre historiens et théologiens.

DIETRICH, Bernard C., *Tradition in Greek Religion*—Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986.

Des deux formes sous lesquelles la religion grecque se présente à l'historien des religions, le rituel et le mythe, seule la seconde fait partie de l'héritage du monde grec. Contrairement à ce qu'affirme Dietrich à la première page de son livre, la religion grecque en tant que telle n'a pas laissé de marques profondes dans la pensée européenne. A lui seul, ce fait explique pourquoi cette religion est si difficile à comprendre, sous des apparences trompeuses qui nous la font parfois croire proche.

Placée depuis Albrecht Dieterich au cœur même de l'étude comparée des religions, et reconnue depuis Jane Harrison comme essentiellement archaïque, la religion grecque continue de susciter les polémiques méthodologiques. Ces polémiques semblent souvent refléter les différences des cultures, mais elles révèlent aussi le problème fondamental auquel est confrontée l'étude de la religion grecque: celui de son histoire — et de sa préhistoire. Les services que peut rendre l'analyse structurale des mythes, par exemple, ne valent que pour la période archaïque et classique. Ce n'est qu'à partir des neuvième et huitième siècles que la religion grecque dévoile ses contours avec quelque peu de précision, bien que l'archéologie nous livre ses traces depuis la période néolithique.

Dans *The Origins of Greek Religion* (Berlin, 1974), Dietrich s'était efforcé de remonter aussi haut que possible. Toute tentative de ce genre se fonde sur une base documentaire extrêmement limitée, et ses résultats restent, de nécessité, spéculatifs.

Dans ce nouvel ouvrage, Dietrich confronte les données fragmentaires de l'archéologie à celles, tout aussi incomplètes, et plus tardives, de la littérature. Cette méthode est tout à fait légitime; c'est celle même qu'avait employée M. P. Nilsson dans *The Mycenaean Origin of Greek Mythology* (Berkeley, 1932). Une autre approche possible est celle de Walter Burkert, qui fait appel, dans *Homo Necans: Interpretationen altgriechischen Opferriten* (Berlin, 1972), aux parallèles ethnologiques pour soutenir son analyse des plus anciens rites grecs. Comme Burkert, Dietrich pense que l'erreur de Nilsson avait été de s'arrêter à mi-chemin dans sa quête des origines. Les centres des grands cycles mythologiques ne coïncident pas seulement avec les centres mycéniens, mais aussi avec des régions habitées depuis le néolithique et le premier âge du bronze.

Ainsi, Dietrich insiste avant tout sur la longue durée, et tient à montrer la continuité du culte à travers l'évolution des croyances. Des *dromena* et des *legomena*, la priorité chronologique est de toute évidence accordée aux premiers: le culte a certainement précédé le mythe tel que nous le connaissons.

Tradition in Greek Religion se présente comme une étude préparatoire à une histoire de la religion grecque. Le premier chapitre s'efforce de démontrer l'unité religieuse des Minoens et des Mycéniens. Les cultures du bronze tardif partageaient les mêmes conceptions du divin et du culte. C'est au sommet de montagnes et dans des grottes que les Minoens célébraient leur culte. Les récents progrès de l'archéologie (plus de cinquante sanctuaires ont été identifiés en Crète dans la dernière décennie) permettent de supposer que roches et grottes sont similaires à l'*adyton* des sanctuaires de type *megaron*, et que les rites célébrés dans de tels "temples" à la fin de l'époque mycénienne perpétuaient un culte minoen. L'étymologie de *megaron* (le mot est apparenté à l'hébreu *me^cara*, grotte) fait allusion aux profondes influences sémitiques, qui sont notées à plusieurs reprises dans l'ouvrage.

Un deuxième chapitre est consacré à l'idée de tradition dans l'histoire de la religion grecque. Le nouvel alphabet, produit de rapports intensifs avec le Proche Orient, permet la dissémination de l'épopée homérique et le processus de sélection dont est issu le panthéon Olympien. Là où l'archéologie est incapable de prouver la continuité (figures du culte tout autant que le culte lui-même), l'auteur fait appel au vocabulaire religieux. Dans ce domaine, la continuité apparaît dès le linéaire B.

La discussion des formes et concepts divins forme l'objet d'un troisième chapitre. C'est à leur personnalité anthropomorphe que les dieux grecs de l'époque classique tiennent leur caractère si exceptionnel dans le monde de la Méditerranée antique. Homère avait défini les fonctions individuelles des dieux olympiens. Après lui, les images des dieux représentent le type humain idéal. On peut noter, dans l'iconographie religieuse, un passage conscient du concept à la représentation. De même, la mythologie subit une transformation radicale à partir du moment où les dieux sont conçus comme des personnes bien plus que comme des entités abstraites ou des forces naturelles.

C'est la profondeur de tels changements qui fait ressortir la permanence remarquable du culte. Le dernier chapitre traite d'un cas particulièrement intéressant, le sanctuaire d'Appolon à Kourion, Chypre, à travers les transformations du dieu de l'âge du bronze à l'époque romaine. En conclusion, Dietrich note que cet impressionnant conservatisme religieux s'allie dans la Grèce archaïque et classique à la tolérance d'attitudes religieuses nouvelles, permettant leur intégration dans une longue évolution sans ruptures majeures.

Les thèses de Dietrich seront sans doute attaquées ici ou là. Le fait reste que dans ce livre dense, il propose un modèle plausible, documenté de façon précise, sur la permanence de certains traits essentiels dans la religion grecque. Un nouveau pas dans la recherche sera franchi

lorsqu'on réussira à concevoir les méthodes comme se complétant plutôt que s'opposant les unes aux autres. La piste ouverte par Dietrich mènera à des intuitions nouvelles lorsque l'on saura utiliser en même temps que les données de l'archéologie et de la littérature, celles de l'anthropologie et la méthode structurale d'analyse des mythes.

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SEGAL, Robert A., *The Poimandres as Myth: Scholarly Theory and Gnostic Meaning*, Religion and Reason 33—Berlin, New York, Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 1986.

Qu'est ce qu'un mythe? Quelles sont la nature du récit mythique, son but, sa fonction? L'auteur constate au départ de sa recherche qu'une question aussi capitale semble ne pas préoccuper les historiens des religions, que seul le particulier intéresse. Face à eux, Segal mentionne les "théoriciens", un groupe hétérogène où l'on trouve Tylor, Frazer, Lévy-Bruhl, Malinowski, Bultmann, Jung, Eliade, Lévi-Strauss. C'est une question légitime que de se demander pourquoi et comment l'anthropologie semble porter aux conclusions générales plus que l'histoire. Après tout, l'anthropologue, tout autant que l'historien, sinon plus que lui, travaille sur un domaine précis et limité. En quoi les attitudes religieuses dans les îles de Mélanésie sont-elles plus aisément universalisables que celles de la Grèce à l'époque classique ou hellénistique? Segal, toutefois, ne se pose pas cette question. Il propose, de façon plus directe, de voir en quoi les théories du mythe peuvent nous apporter une compréhension approfondie de certains mythes. Pour être plus précis, il choisit un mythe, celui du *Poimandres* (*Corpus Hermeticum* I), et s'efforce de tester, à son sujet, les conceptions de Mircea Eliade et celles de Carl Gustav Jung. Pourquoi, précisément, ce mythe, pourquoi ces deux auteurs? Segal ne répond pas à ces questions. Eliade comme Jung manifestent un certain intérêt pour la gnose — quoique moins que pour d'autres mouvement religieux ou spirituels; ni l'un ni l'autre, toutefois, n'offrent d'analyse du *Poimandres*, fait qui donne au livre un ton spéculatif, ou, pour être plus précis, lui impose le mode conditionnel: "Si Eliade (ou Jung) s'était intéressé au *Poimandres*, il aurait pu écrire..." On voit tout ce que cet exercice a d'artificiel, et somme toute de futile et de gratuit. Le livre semble se dérouler en une série de comparaisons entre incommensurables. Les historiens de la Gnose et de l'Hermétisme (ou de tout autre courant religieux), ne peuvent répondre qu'aux questions que leur posent les

textes. Eliade et Jung ne s'intéressent pas aux textes; l'un s'intéresse aux expressions du sacré, l'autre au sacré dans l'expérience psychologique.

Segal note à plusieurs reprises le statut ambivalent du *Poimandres* (on pourrait élargir cette remarque à la littérature gnostique en général), entre le mythe et la philosophie. N'aurait-on pas pu faire appel à Cassirer, plutôt qu'à Eliade ou Jung, pour comprendre ce phénomène? On ne voit pas très bien à quelles conclusions l'enquête aboutit. Cela n'étonne pas, puisque le problème posé est fondé sur une taxonomie simpliste. Comme le mot de Boileau nous le rappelle, "ce qui se conçoit bien s'énonce clairement".

En fait, un point auquel l'auteur ne fait pas la moindre allusion, semble rapprocher Eliade de Jung. Tous deux ont été séduits, plus que d'autres, par le grand mythe monstrueux du vingtième siècle, le fascisme totalitariste prometteur d'harmonie et d'interprétation dans un monde et une expérience brisés. Ce n'est peut-être pas un hasard si la gnose et l'alchimie attirent tant certains esprits. La séduction de la gnose chez un certain type d'intellectuels du vingtième siècle est un sujet digne d'intérêt. On pourrait, par exemple, écrire l'histoire du groupe *Eranos*, d'inspiration toute Jungienne, et auquel Eliade a participé. Il s'agirait là d'une étude *démystifiante* du mythe, qui devrait intéresser les directeurs d'une collection s'intitulant "Religion and Reason".

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